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SUMMARY		
This	 thesis	 analyses	 communication	 on	 the	 micro-blogging	 service	 Twitter	during	 the	 2011	 UK	 riots.	 It	 examines	 the	 complex	 constructive	 relationship	between	software	and	collective	meaning-making	during	a	period	of	acute	social	crisis	 and	 asks	 whether	 Twitter’s	 software-structures	 facilitated	 productive,	democratic	 discourse.	 It	 seeks	 to	 advance	 the	 social	 study	 of	 software,	 to	reconcile	cultural	and	digital	 theory	and	to	develop	an	 innovative	methodology	for	the	empirical	observation	of	discursive	semiotic	practices.		
The	UK	riots	began	in	London	in	August	2011.	The	shooting	of	Mark	Duggan	by	the	Metropolitan	Police	Service	 (MPS)	 sparked	material	 and	social	destruction.	Within	 a	 few	 days	 the	 riots	 were	 finished,	 but	 there	 followed	 a	 period	 of	vociferous	 public	 debate	 and	 extraordinary	 state	 recalcitrance.	 Thousands	 of	rioters	were	arrested,	tried	in	specially	convened	courts	and	incarcerated	at	an	unprecedented	rate.		
While	 politicians	 rushed	 to	 impose	 ‘Victorian’	 condemnation	 on	 the	 moral	failings	 of	 rioters	 and	 their	 families	 (Bridges	 2012),	 the	 broadcast	 and	 print	media	 delivered	 commentary	 that	 was	 reductive,	 politicised	 and	 polemical	(Kelsey	2012).	 	These	concerns,	 combined	with	an	absence	of	 rigorous,	 critical	oversight,	suggest	a	failing	of	the	public	sphere.		
Several	theorists	have	argued	that	Internet	media	–	websites,	blogs,	social	media	sites	 –	 should	be	 capable	 of	 fulfilling	 the	normative-democratic	 role	 seemingly	vacated	by	 ‘established’	 corporate	media	 (Dutton	and	Dubois	2015).	The	2011	
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riots	 were	 one	 of	 the	 first	 public-political	 events	 in	 the	 UK	 to	 be	 extensively	mediated	by	Internet	technology.		
A	thorough	review	of	existing	literature	suggests	that	analyses	of	 ‘acute	events’	have	 been	 undermined	 by	 insufficient	 empirical	 rigour,	 invalid	 theoretical	assumptions	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 comprehension	 or	 specificity	 about	 digital	technological.	 Consequently,	 an	 analysis	 of	 Twitter	 discourse	 during	 the	 riots	requires	precise	technological	definitions,	a	thorough	understanding	of	relevant	software	 (form	 and	 function)	 and	 a	 rigorous	 theoretical	 framework	 for	interpreting	the	relationship	between	software	and	social-political	action.		
The	 framework	 defines	 technology	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 software-constructed	affordances,	 which	 shape	 communicative	 conditions:	 fields	 of	 exchange,	symbolic	and	representational	practices	and	interfaces	for	information	retrieval	and	processing.	This	 framing	emphasises	 the	 temporal	and	spatial	dynamics	of	these	conditions.		
There	 is	 a	 growing	 consensus	 that	 the	 temporality	 of	 Internet-enabled	communication	may	undermine	democratic	expectations,	because	the	rapidity	of	information	 flow	 stresses	 the	 deliberative	 period	 (Barber	 2006,	 Hassan	 2012,	Buchstein	2002).	The	conceptual	 framework	 identifies	several	 ‘logics’	by	which	the	software-constructed	temporality	of	communication	should	interact	with	the	normative	 requirements	 of	 deliberative	 exchange.	 These	 logics	 frame	 the	development	 of	 an	 empirical	 methodology.	 Software	 is	 observed	 via	 its	communicative	 structures;	 democracy	 is	 evaluated	 using	 an	 interpretation	 of	communicative	action	(Jacobson	and	Pan	2008).		
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The	 methodology	 is	 applied	 to	 a	 sample	 of	 several	 thousand	 tweets	 collected	during	 the	 riot	 period.	 Within	 that	 sample,	 several	 riot-specific	 hashtags	(collectively,	the	riot	public)	are	identified.	Tweets	containing	these	hashtags	are	extracted	 and	 submitted	 to	 thematic	 and	 deliberative	 content	 analysis.	Temporality	 is	 assessed	 at	 each	 of	 Twitter’s	 structural	 communication	 layers	(Bruns	 and	 Moe	 2014)	 using	 proprietary	 analytics.	 The	 interaction	 between	time-space	and	discourse	is	then	considered	comparatively.		
Analysis	 of	 thematic	 content,	 deliberative	 potential	 and	 the	 constructive	influence	 of	 Twitter	 time-space	 in	 the	 riot	 public	 produces	 the	 following	 key	findings.		
1.	The	most	dominant	 thematic	 concerns	 reflect	 closely	discourse	 in	 the	wider	mediasphere.	 Twitter	 users	 strive	 to	 explain	 the	 riots,	 seeking	 and	 analysing	socio-structural	 causes.	 They	 attempt	 to	 define	 the	 rioters;	 often	 this	 involves	locating	 rioters	 as	outside	 the	 social,	 cultural	 and	moral	 collective.	 Some	users	seek	to	implicate	society	more	widely	in	the	riot	culture,	particularly	the	political	and	professional	classes	who	are	charged	with	looting	during	the	parliamentary	expenses	scandal	and	the	financial	crisis.		
2.	 There	 is	 clear	 evidence	 of	 a	 relationship	 between	 software-structures	 and	discourse.	 Twitter’s	 hashtag	 syntax	 supports	 thematically	 and	 deliberatively	discreet	discourse	streams.	Social	complexity	arguments	tend	to	concentrate	 in	the	#UKRiots	hashtag	stream,	which	contains	a	higher	percentage	of	adjunctive	discussion	tweets	and	is	judged	more	productive.	‘Rioter	as	other’	tweets	tend	to	concentrate	in	streams	where	adjunctive	discussion	is	more	emotional.	
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3.	Deliberative	tweets	also	concentrate	 in	the	#UKRiots	stream,	suggesting	that	there	 may	 be	 discreet	 hashtag	 cultures	 on	 Twitter	 –	 communities	 that	 are	shaped	by	 (or	 themselves	 shape)	 structural	 identifiers	 and	are	 committed	 to	 a	certain	type	of	discourse.	While	such	hashtag	cultures	suggest	coordination,	the	effect	 may	 be	 illusory.	 By	 enabling	 different	 discourses	 to	 circulate	independently,	 Twitter	 permits	 different	 langues	 that	 discourage	 deliberation.	Analysis	 across	 the	 structural	 layers	 finds	 little	 evidence	 of	 ideal	 speech	conditions,	 suggesting	 that	 Twitter’s	 algorithmic	 engines	 are	 doing	 little	 to	coordinate	discourse	streams	for	deliberation.			
4.	Twitter	 is	clearly	deeply	embedded	 in	wider	media	systems.	The	majority	of	tweets	 contain	 links	 to	 external	 media,	 and	 this	 has	 implications	 both	 for	 the	deliberative	potential	of	tweets	but	also	for	the	temporality	of	Twitter.	In	terms	of	 deliberation,	 the	 logic	 of	 hyperlinking	 defers	 meaning	 in	 complex	 ways:	analysis	 includes	 the	primary	destination	of	any	hyperlink	 in	any	evaluation	of	thematic	content	or	deliberative	potential,	but	webs	of	hyperlinks	extend	digital	texts	 through	 the	network.	 Locating	 and	 restricting	meaning	 is	 thus	 extremely	difficult.		
5.	 There	 is	 some	 evidence	 that	 the	 temporality	 of	 hashtag	 streams	may	 reveal	something	 about	 the	 dynamics	 of	 discourse	 coordination.	 As	 stream	 density	increases,	 communicative	reasoning	may	become	more	difficult:	 the	situational	efficacy	of	 a	hashtag	 is	 inversely	proportional	 to	 the	density	of	discourse	 flow.	However,	hyperlinking	challenges	the	temporal	unity	of	the	tweet	object	and	the	notion	 of	 linear	 Twitter	 time	 may	 be	 unhelpful.	 Twitter	 time	 is	 a	 complex	assemblage	of	relative	flows	in	different	structural	and	textual	layers.		
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These	 findings	 suggest	 some	 important	 conclusions	 about	 the	 democratic	potential	of	Twitter	discourse	and	some	priorities	for	future	research.	Principal	among	these	is	a	call	for	greater	dialogue	between	the	computing,	statistical	and	social	sciences.		
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CHAPTER	ONE	
 
INTRODUCTION	
THE	UK	RIOTS	
Early	in	the	evening	on	Thursday	4	August	2011,	Mark	Duggan	was	a	passenger	in	a	minicab	driving	down	Ferry	Lane	in	Tottenham,	north	London	(IPCC	2015).	Following	 the	 minicab	 were	 four	 unmarked	 police	 cars	 carrying	 officers	 from	London’s	Metropolitan	Police	Service	(MPS).	Some	of	 the	officers	belonged	to	a	unit	called	Trident,	which	was	meant	to	investigate	gang-related	violence	in	the	capital;	with	them	were	armed	officers	from	another	unit	called	CO19.	One	of	the	cars	 “overtook	 the	 minicab,	 moved	 in	 front	 of	 it	 and	 braked	 sharply”	 (Cutler	2014,	5).	The	police	were	performing	a	“hard	stop”	–	more	formally,	an	enforced	vehicle	stop.	Later,	during	evidence	to	an	official	 inquiry	and	 in	submissions	to	the	 coroner,	 the	 police	 explained	 that	 they	 had	 “intelligence”	 that	 Duggan	 had	tried	to	acquire	an	illegal	handgun.	According	to	police,	he	had	recently	collected	the	weapon	from	a	contact	in	Leyton	and	was	returning	to	the	Broadwater	Farm	Estate	in	Tottenhami.		
Duggan	and	several	police	officers	left	their	cars	and	stood	on	the	pavement.	An	aerial	 photograph	 of	 the	 scene	 shows	 the	 first	 police	 car	 pulled	 onto	 the	pavement,	 blocking	 it	 partly.	 “Around	 four	 seconds	 after	 the	minicab	 stopped”	one	of	the	officers	from	the	third	car	fired	two	shots,	one	of	which	hit	Duggan	in	
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the	 chest,	 wounding	 him	 fatally	 (IPCC	 2015,	 462).	 The	 Independent	 Police	Complaints	Commission	(IPCC)	later	failed	to	find:			
“material	evidence	to	undermine	v53’s	[the	police	officer’s]	assertion	that	he	had	an	honestly	held	belief:	(1)	that	he	saw	a	firearm	in	Mr	Duggan’s	right	hand	and	Mr	Duggan’s	right	arm	beginning	to	move;	and	(2)	that	his	life	or	that	of	his	colleagues	was	in	imminent	danger.”	(ibid	6).		
Despite	the	officers	performing	first	aid,	Duggan	died	within	“a	few	seconds”	of	being	shot.	He	was	29	years	old.		
The	gun	that	Duggan	was	suspected	of	carrying	was	located	4.35m	from	his	body	according	 to	 the	 IPCC	 and	 between	 “10	 and	 20	 feet	 away”	 according	 to	 the	coroner,	 and	 over	 a	 fence.	 Subsequent	 investigations	 into	 the	 shooting	 have	failed	to	resolve	exactly	what	happened	in	the	four	seconds	between	the	minicab	stopping	 and	 the	police	 shooting.	The	 IPCC	 concluded	 that	 the	 “most	plausible	explanation	for	the	location	of	the	firearm,	JMA/1,	is	that	Mr	Duggan	was	in	the	process	of	throwing	the	firearm,	JMA/1,	to	his	right	as	he	was	shot.”	(IPCC	2015,	6).	A	jury,	working	with	the	coroner:	“found	that	Mark	Duggan	had	collected	the	gun…	but	did	not	have	it	in	his	hand	when	shot…	having	thrown	it	away	as	soon	as	he	opened	the	minicab	door	and	before	he	exited	the	minicab.”	(Cutler	2014,	15).		
Only	 the	 officer	 who	 had	 fired	 the	 shots	 gave	 a	 statement	 at	 the	 scene.	 After	returning	 to	 a	 police	 station	 in	 Leman	 Street,	 the	 other	 officers	 made	 “brief	entries	 in	 the	 evidence	 and	 action	 books	 after	 taking	 legal	 advice”.	 Full	statements	 were	 only	 gathered	 on	 7	 August.	 The	 coroner	 lamented	 that	 the	
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initial	 statements	were	 “bland”,	 “uninformative”	 and	 “did	 not	 include	 relevant	detail”	 (ibid	 20).	 He	 noted,	 also,	 “that	 there	 was	 considerable	 scope	 for	conferring	before	any	account	was	given”	(ibid,	21).	
Two	days	 after	 the	 shooting,	 at	 approximately	 5pm,	 a	 group	 of	 people	walked	from	 the	 Broadwater	 Farm	 housing	 estate	 towards	 Tottenham	 police	 station.	Several	reports	estimated	the	size	of	the	group	differently.	According	to	the	BBC,	“around	300”	gathered	outside	the	police	station	saying	“they	want	 ‘justice’	 for	Mr	Duggan	and	his	family”	(BBC	2014).	The	Guardian	newspaper		reported	that	there	were	“around	200	protesters	demanding	answers	over	the	death	of	Mark	Duggan”	 (P	 Lewis	 2011).	 A	 government	 paper	 long	 afterwards	 described	 the	group	 as	 being	 the	 “family	 and	 supporters	 of	Mr	Duggan”	 and	 estimated	 their	number	to	be	120	(DCLG	2013,	6).	All	accounts	agree,	however,	that	the	protest	was	peaceful.		
At	 some	 point	 during	 the	 evening,	 however,	 the	 gathering	 turned	 chaotic	 and	violent.	The	BBC	cited	unconfirmed	reports	that	“the	incident	was	sparked	off	by	a	confrontation	between	a	teenage	protester	and	a	police	officer”	 (BBC	2011a).	“What	 happened…	 is	 subject	 to	 debate,	 but	 what	 is	 clear	 is	 that	 tensions	gradually	 escalated,	 as	 police	 made	 only	 limited	 attempts	 to	 talk	 to	 the	demonstrators.”	(P	Lewis	2011).	As	far	as	the	police	were	concerned,	however:	“There	was	 no	 indication	 that	 the	 protest	would	 deteriorate	 into	 the	 levels	 of	criminal	and	violent	disorder	that	we	saw.”	(MPS	2011b).		
At	around	8.20pm	two	police	cars	were	set	on	fire,	then	more	fires	were	started.	“By	 11pm,	 a	 double-decker	 bus	 had	 been	 set	 alight,	 and	 shops	 –	 mostly	 local	businesses	 –	 along	 the	 high	 road	 broken	 into.”	 (P	 Lewis	 2011).	 Widespread	
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looting	was	reported	by	major	news	outlets,	much	of	which	was	perpetrated	by		“certain	 elements”	 not	 associated	 with	 the	 protest,	 the	 police	 alleged	 (MPS	2011b).	The	London	Fire	Brigade	was	called	 to	49	separate	 fires	 (BBC	2011a);	the	 police	 reported	 that	 42	 arrests	 were	 made	 and	 26	 police	 officers	 were	injured	(MPS	2011b).		
Calm	appeared	 to	have	been	 restored	on	Sunday	morning,	 but	 television	news	stations	 were	 broadcasting	 footage	 of	 burned-out	 buildings	 and	 of	 looting	teenagers	(Blight	et	al.	2011).	The	police	announced	that	a	“major	investigation	team”	had	been	 launched	 to	respond	to	 the	disorder,	while	community	 leaders	toured	 the	 damaged	 streets	 and	 condemned	 the	 “mindless”	 violence	 (BBC	2011a).	 Later	 in	 the	 day,	 reports	 emerged	 that	 looting	 was	 taking	 place	 in	Enfield,	 a	borough	 to	 the	north	of	Tottenham,	 and	 in	Brixton	 in	 south	London,	missiles	were	 apparently	 thrown	 at	 police	 (Reuters	 2011).	 Overnight	 and	 into	the	early	hours	of	Monday	morning,	further	incidents	of	rioting	were	reported	in	Islington,	 Ponders	 End	 and	 Walthamstow.	 The	 police	 confirmed	 “significant	disorder	breaking	out	in	a	number	of	our	communities	across	London”	and	215	arrests	to	date	(MPS	2011a).		
Through	 Monday	 evening	 and	 into	 Tuesday,	 rioting	 and	 looting	 spread	 to	Croydon,	 Ealing,	Woolwich,	 Hackney	 and	 other	 areas	 in	 the	 capital	 city.	 There	were	also	reports	of	incidents	in	the	West	Midlands,	Nottingham	and	Liverpool.	In	Birmingham,	there	was	a	fire	in	a	police	station	(BBC	2011a).	David	Cameron,	the	Prime	Minister,	returning	from	a	summer	holiday,	made	a	statement	in	front	of	Downing	Street	on	Tuesday	morning,	in	which	he	said:		
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“These	 are	 sickening	 scenes	 -	 scenes	 of	 people	 looting,	 vandalising,	thieving,	 robbing,	 scenes	 of	 people	 attacking	 police	 officers	 and	 even	attacking	fire	crews	as	they’re	trying	to	put	out	 fires.		This	 is	criminality	pure	 and	 simple	 and	 it	 has	 to	 be	 confronted	 and	 defeated.”	 (Cameron	2011b).	
He	 outlined	measures	 to	 restore	 order,	 including	 “more	 police	 on	 the	 streets”	and	“even	more	robust	police	action”,	aligning	his	government	with	“the	side	of	the	 law	 abiding”.	He	 also	 announced	 plans	 to	 speed	 up	 court	 “procedures	 and	processes”	and	to	leverage	the	“full	 force	of	the	law”	against	those	“responsible	for	this	wrongdoing	and	criminality”.	(Cameron	2011b).		
Disorder	 continued	 on	 Tuesday	 night,	 however,	 in	 cities	 across	 the	 country:	Manchester,	 Liverpool,	 Nottingham,	 Birmingham,	 Bristol,	 West	 Bromwich	 and	Wolverhampton	police	all	 reported	 incidents.	 In	 the	early	hours	of	Wednesday	morning,	 three	 men	 in	 Birmingham	 were	 killed	 while	 trying	 to	 protect	community	property	from	rioters;	reports	 indicated	that	they	were	hit	by	a	car	that	may	 have	 been	 driven	 at	 them	 deliberately	 (BBC	 2011b).	 On	Wednesday	morning,	 David	 Cameron	 made	 another	 statement,	 in	 which	 he	 discussed	deploying	 water	 cannons	 to	 British	 streets	 –	 something	 never	 previously	permitted.	Both	the	MPS	and	Greater	Manchester	Police	(GMP)	started	releasing	close	 circuit	 television	 (CCTV)	 stills	 of	 suspected	 rioters,	 using	 Facebook	 and	Twitter	to	disseminate	the	images.	Magistrates	courts	stayed	open	overnight	to	“fast	track”	the	convictions	of	those	already	arrested	(BBC	2011a).		
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Most	of	those	convicted	were	young	and	male.	The	majority	were	charged	with	burglary	and	violent	disorder	offences	and	newspapers	started	to	report	on	the	exceptionally	 high	 percentage	 of	 custodial	 sentences	 being	 handed	 down	 –	 “a	rate	of	50-60%”	when	 the	rate	 for	 those	offences	was	3.5-10%	 in	 the	previous	year	(Rogers	and	Evans	2011).	The	extraordinary	sentencing	reflected	the	will	of	the	 government,	 which	 both	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 and	 Theresa	 May,	 the	 Home	Secretary,	 outlined	 in	 parliament	 on	 Thursday.	 The	 Prime	Minister,	 especially,	commended	the	“efficiency”	of	courts	in	dispensing	“swift	justice”:	
“no	phoney	human	rights	concerns	about	publishing	the	photographs	will	get	in	the	way	of	bringing	these	criminals	to	justice.	Anyone	charged	with	violent	disorder	and	other	serious	offences	should	expect	to	be	remanded	in	 custody,	 not	 let	 back	 on	 the	 streets;	 and	 anyone	 convicted	 should	expect	to	go	to	jail.”	(Cameron	2011a).	
Rioting,	 he	 said,	 “was	 not	 about	 politics	 or	 protest,	 it	 was	 about	 theft.”	 Mark	Duggan’s	 death	 was	 used	 “as	 an	 excuse	 by	 opportunist	 thugs	 in	 gangs”	 to	perpetrate	 “looting,	 violence,	 vandalising	 and	 thieving.”	 (Cameron	 2011a).	Echoing	 the	Prime	Minister,	 the	Home	Secretary	declared	 that	 “we	must	never	forget	that	the	only	cause	of	a	crime	is	a	criminal”,	and	lay	further	blame	on	the	“violent	 gang	 culture”	 in	 British	 cities	 (May	 2011).	 The	 parliamentary	 debate	continued	 into	 the	evening	and	police	 reported	 that	 they	had	made	more	 than	1000	arrests	and	charged	over	400	people	(BBC	2011a).				
Over	 subsequent	 weeks,	 details	 of	 some	 of	 those	 charges	 and	 the	 state-sanctioned	 punishments	 began	 to	 be	 reported	 in	 the	 press.	 The	 length	 of	sentences	themselves	attracted	attention.	The	Telegraph	noted	that	the	“average	
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length	of	sentence	was	14.2	months,	almost	four	times	as	long	as	the	3.7	months	given	 for	 similar	 offences	 the	 previous	 year.”	 (Beckford	 2012).	 Additionally,	some	of	the	crimes	being	sentenced	in	this	way	began	to	make	headlines.		
The	cases	of	two	young	men,	Perry	Sutcliffe-Keenan	and	Jordan	Blackshaw,	from	Warrington	 and	 Marston,	 two	 regional	 towns	 in	 northern	 England,	 are	instructive	 in	 this	 respect.	 As	 the	 riots	 continued	 in	 London	 and	 other	 major	cities,	 Sutcliffe-Keenan	 and	 Blackshaw	 independently	 did	 something	 very	similar.	 Sutcliffe-Keenan	 created	 a	 Facebook	 page	 –	 a	 feature	 of	 the	 popular	social	 network	 site	 (SNS)	 that	 allows	 users	 to	 aggregate	 content	 and	relationships	around	a	particular	 topic	or	 interest	–	while	Blackshaw	created	a	Facebook	 event	 advertisement.	 According	 to	 press	 reports,	 Blackshaw’s	 event	called	 on	 the	 “Mob	 Hill	 Massive	 Northwich	 Lootin”	 to	 take	 part	 in	 a	 “Smash	d[o]wn	in	Northwich	Town”	on	8	August.	He	suggested	a	meeting	place	but	in	the	event	 only	 the	 police	 attended.	 Sutcliffe-Keenan’s	 page	 was	 called	 “The	Warrington	Riots”	and	was	created	in	the	early	hours	of	9	August,	after	he	had	been	 drinking.	 When	 he	 awoke	 the	 next	 morning,	 he	 removed	 the	 page	 and	apologised	for	a	poor	joke	(Bowcott	2011).		
Both	men	were	arrested	and	convicted	of	crimes	under	two	different	sections	of	the	 UK	 Serious	 Crimes	 Act,	 44	 and	 46,	 both	 of	 which	 deal	 with	 the	encouragement	 and	 assistance	 of	 serious	 offences	 (Serious	 Crimes	 Act,	 2007).	The	same	judge,	sitting	at	Chester	Crown	Court,	proceeded	to	sentence	both	men	to	four	years	in	jail.	Claiming	both	sentences	would	act	as	deterrents,	the	judge	made	 reference	 to	 a	 “collective	 insanity”	 gripping	 the	nation,	 in	 light	 of	which,	the	 Facebook	 acts	were	 “evil”,	 “disgraceful”	 and	 “revolted	many	 right	 thinking	
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members	of	 society”.	The	 fact	 that	neither	Facebook	page	prompted	rioting,	or	indeed,	 any	 social-physical	 manifestation	 other	 than	 a	 police	 response,	 was	testament	 to	 the	 “prompt	 and	 efficient	 actions	 of	 police	 in	 using	 modern	policing”	(Bowcott	2011).	The	sentences	were	passed	on	Tuesday	16	August,	less	than	two	weeks	after	the	MPS	had	shot	Mark	Duggan.			
	
READING	THE	RIOTS:	CAUSES	AND	EXPLANATIONS	
This	brief	history	as	personification	of	the	“collective	insanity”	that	swept	the	UK	in	 the	 summer	 of	 2011	 is	 hardly	 sufficient	 to	 do	 justice	 either	 to	 the	 events	themselves	or	to	their	complex	social	causes.		
Since	2011,	there	have	been	several	substantive	investigations	into	the	causes	of	the	riots.	After	the	Brixton	riots	in	1981,	the	UK	government	had	established	an	independent,	 judiciary-led	 inquiry,	 but	 the	 Conservation-Liberal	 Democrat	coalition	 government	 opted	 against	 this	 approach	 in	 2011.	 Instead,	 a	 Riots	Communities	 and	 Victims	 Panel	 (RCVP)	 panel	 was	 appointed	 to	 investigate	causes	and	make	resilience-building	recommendations	(Singh	et	al.	2012).	That	panel’s	report,	made	seven	months	after	the	riots,	identified	several	contributory	factors,	 including	 poor	 parenting,	 a	 lack	 of	 personal	 resilience,	 too	 few	 work	opportunities	 and	 high	 unemployment,	 a	 problem	 with	 “brands”	 and	materialism,	low	community	cohesion	and	a	lack	of	“trust”	between	communities	and	 police	 forces	 (ibid	 6-12).	 The	 report	 found	 no	 particular	 issue	 with	government	policy	or	with	 institutions	of	 the	state,	beyond	a	perception	of	 the	
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police	 that,	while	not	 “in	 any	way	 accurate…	must	be	damaging	 to	 the	police’s	relationships	with	the	communities	they	serve.”	(ibid	11).	
The	report	made	a	series	of	recommendations	aimed	at	building	resilience	and	personal	 character,	 that	 is	 “self-discipline,	 application,	 the	 ability	 to	 defer	gratification	 and	 resilience	 in	 recovering	 from	 setbacks”	 (ibid	 7).	 Those	recommendations	 included	 the	 suggestion	 that	 public	 services	 “take	 steps	 to	ensure	 that	 all	 children	 have	 a	 positive	 role	 model”,	 new	 requirements	 for	schools	 to	develop	policies	on	 “building	character”	and	 then	 to	assess	students	on	 “strength	 of	 character”,	 financial	 penalties	 for	 schools	 that	 fail	 to	 improve	student	literacy	and	increased	efforts	to	get	students	“work	ready”.		
Recognising	that	there	may	be	economic	constraints	on	some	communities,	 the	report	recommended	that	the	government	provide	job	guarantees	for	“all	young	people	who	have	been	out	of	work	for	two	years	or	more”	and	encouraged	more	businesses	 to	 adopt	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	 activities	 (ibid	 9).	 The	authors	were	particularly	 concerned	about	 the	nebulous	effects	of	 “brands”	on	the	 wants	 and	 desires	 of	 young	 people,	 and	 advised	 educational	 programs	 to	alert	 young	 people	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 advertising	 and	 branding	 techniques.	Concerning	 the	 police,	 the	 report	 suggested	 various	 improvements	 in	 terms	of	community	 communication	 and	 identified	 that	 there	 were	 perceptual	 issues	concerning	the	independence	of	the	IPCC.	
There	 is	 persistent	 paternalism	 in	 the	 analysis,	 evident	 in	 many	 of	 its	recommendations,	 and	 redolent	 of	 “Victorian	 values	 and	underlying	notions	 of	the	‘deserving’	and	‘undeserving’	poor”	(Bridges	2012,	8).	It	places	responsibility	mostly	on	the	shoulders	of	the	rioters	(who	it	wants	“appropriately	punished”),	
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but	 also	 on	 their	 families	 and	 schools.	 Its	 recommendations	 for	 local	 council	schemes	to	encourage	volunteerism	were	criticised	for	coming	“at	a	time	when	local	councils’	own	youth	services	and	other	social	support	services	have	 faced	devastating	cuts	under	the	coalition	government’s	austerity	measures”	(ibid	9).		
There	 is	 little	 hint	 of	 any	 austerity-related	 impact	 in	 the	 report:	 in	 the	 section	dedicated	to	youth	unemployment,	for	instance,	there	is	a	recommendation	that	local	public	services	fund	a	“Youth	Job	Promise”	but	no	suggestion	of	where	the	necessary	 jobs	 will	 come	 from,	 nor	 how	 they	 will	 provide	 long-term,	 stable,	rewarding	 and	 remunerative	 employment.	 The	 issue,	 it	 seems,	 is	 not	 one	 of	structural	 inequality,	 or	 a	material	 system	 in	which	profit	 is	 dependent	on	 the	ever-increasing	 sales	 of	 symbols	 and	 simulacra,	 but	 rather	 that	 certain	 young	people	lack	the	fortitude	to	resist	(a	lust	for)	those	symbols	to	which	they	have	no	legitimate	access.		
If	the	RCVP	was	the	official	account	of	the	riots,	then	the	unofficial	version	was	provided	by	the	Guardian	newspaper	and	the	London	School	of	Economics	(LSE),	who	 combined	 resources	 shortly	 after	 rioting	 had	 finished	 to	 produce	 an	extensive	“Reading	the	Riots”	document,	based	on	interviews	with	270	rioters	(P	Lewis	et	al.	2011).	Published	in	December	2011,	it	placed	far	more	emphasis	on	socio-structural	factors	and	political	explanations	for	rioting.	Its	lead	finding,	for	instance,	was	that	“anger	and	frustration	at	people’s	everyday	treatment	at	 the	hands	 of	 police	was	 a	 significant	 factor	 in	 the	 summer	 riots”	 (ibid	 4).	 Another	significant	theme	in	the	testimony	of	rioters	was	the	impact	of	increased	tuition	fees,	 the	 closing	 of	 youth	 services	 and	 “the	 scrapping	 of	 the	 education	maintenance	 allowance”.	 The	 authors	 note,	 however,	 that	 for	 many	 rioters	
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looting	was	opportunistic	–	 “a	perceived	suspension	of	normal	 rules	presented	them	 with	 an	 opportunity	 to	 acquire	 goods	 and	 luxury	 items	 they	 could	 not	ordinarily	afford”	(ibid	5).		
Police	behaviour	in	certain	communities	is	an	issue	identified	by	other	analysts	too.	Bridges	 (2012,	2)	 is	 critical	 of	 the	 specific	behaviour	of	 the	MPS	and	 IPCC	following	the	death	of	Mark	Duggan:	“there	was	a	catalogue	of	errors	by	both	the	police	and	 the	 IPCC,	without	which	any	 subsequent	disorder	might	never	have	erupted	in	Tottenham	or	across	London	and	the	rest	of	the	country.”	He	argues	that,	 rather	 than	 an	 “orgy	 of	 consumerist-led	 looting”,	 the	 riots	 in	 Tottenham	began	specifically	as	an	anti-police	protest.	This	analysis	draws	attention	to	on-going	police	activities	 in	certain	communities,	 especially	 the	so-called	stop	and	search	 protocol,	 which	 allows	 police	 to	 detain	 and	 search	 citizens	 without	warrants,	and	which	is	a	tactic	disproportionally	targeted	at	young	men,	typically	from	ethnic	minorities	(ibid	4).		
The	 fact	 that	 Bridges	 can	 locate	 so	 much	 responsibility	 for	 the	 riots	 with	 the	police	is	significantii,	not	least	for	what	it	says	about	policing	in	modern	Britain,	but	 also	 because	 it	 demonstrates	 the	 interpretative	 nature	 of	 the	 post-riots	analysis.	It	is	notable	that	so	much	analysis	tends	to	regress	to	long-established	British	archetypes	–	 the	 ideology	and	politics	of	 class,	morality,	 inequality,	 law	and	order.		
This	thesis	is	not	intended	to	be	a	complete	sociological	analysis	of	riots.	Rather,	it	 is	 an	 analysis	 of	 how	 British	 citizens	 and	 the	 British	 state	 made	 meaning	during	 those	events	–	and	how	 those	meanings	 justified	 such	an	extraordinary	judicial	 response.	 It	 reflects	 on	 the	 way	 that	 the	 riots	 and	 the	 rioters	 were	
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politicised,	 questions	 how	 the	 extraordinary	 judicial	 processes	 were	 justified,	and	 explores	 how	 the	 mediasphere	 (Hartley	 1996,	 Lewis	 2008)	 formed,	communicated	 and	 reformed	 meaning	 following	 what	 were,	 undoubtedly,	tumultuous	civic	events.	
Kelsey	(2012,	244)	has	described	how	politicians	and	the	national	press	sought	first	to	depoliticise	rioters	and	then	to	re-politicise	them	in	a	way	that	“mobilised	a	 battlefield	 of	 ideological	 constructions.”	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 right	 wing	newspapers	 emphasised	 the	 “discourse	 of	 materialism	 and	 greed”	 as	symptomatic	 of	 a	 “sick”	 	 underclass	 (ibid	 257),	 a	 position	 that	 denies	 rioters	political	 justification	 while,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 leverages	 them	 for	 political	purposes	 –	 specifically	 to	 denigrate	 welfare	 entitlements	 and	 unemployment	benefits:	 “the	 depoliticised	 actions	 of	 rioters	 were	 eventually	 redefined	 as	 a	
politicised	 problem;	 a	 problem	 responsible	 for	 a	 sick	 society,	 to	 be	 cured	 by	Conservative	policy.”	(ibid	257).		
That	 post-riot	 discourse	 should	 proceed	 in	 this	 way	 was	 perhaps	 inevitable.	Following	 the	 2008	 Global	 Financial	 Crisis,	 a	 Conservative-Liberal	 Democrat	coalition	government	had	come	 to	power	 in	2010	after	a	 campaign	 focused	on	budget	 deficits	 and	 promises	 to	 reign	 in	 spending	 through	 austerity	measures	(Emmott	2015).	For	the	newly	elected	chancellor	George	Osborne,	spending	on	social	 welfare	 was	 a	 key	 target	 for	 making	 cuts	 and	 so	 “benefits”	 became	 a	central	 focus	 for	socio-political	argument.	With	austerity	politics	also	prevalent	across	Europe	(Blyth	2013),	the	riots	–	and	particularly	the	looting	that	occurred	during	 the	 riots	 –	 were	 quickly	 interpreted	 according	 to	 the	 terms	 of	 this	prevailing	political	discourse.		
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Given	the	persistent	disparity	in	these	positions	and	the	long-standing	polemics	of	 UK	 socio-political	 discourse,	 it	 is	 extremely	 difficult	 to	 identify	 any	 sort	 of	consensus	around	what	factors	may	or	may	not	have	contributed	to	rioting	in	the	UK	 in	 August	 2011.	 For	 one	 group	 of	 analysts,	 rioting	 is	 symptomatic	 of	 a	morally-deficient	 “feral	 underclass”	 (Hastings	 2011);	 for	 another,	 rioting	 is	 a	manifestation	 of	 far	more	 complex	 socio-structural	 and	 political	 grievances	 (P	Lewis	and	Ball	2011).		
In	general	terms,	the	role	of	the	media	in	reporting,	interpreting	and	shaping	the	riots	 is	a	subject	worthy	of	 investigation	 in	 itself,	but	 the	 focus	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	narrower	than	a	general	account	of	media	culpability.	The	focus	in	this	thesis	is	on	 one	 type	 of	 media	 only	 –	 which	 is	 to	 say,	 one	 type	 of	 technology	 through	which	those	events	were	mediated.	This	is	an	investigation	of	digital	mediation,	a	study	 of	 the	 Internet,	 and	 the	 role	 that	 Internet	 technologies	 played,	 not	 in	causing	the	riots,	but	in	shaping	the	discourse	around	them.		
A	full	explanation	and	justification	for	that	aim	will	follow	in	the	next	section,	but	first	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 establish	why	 the	UK	 riots	 require	 analysis	 of	 this	 type.	Beyond	the	apparent	social	and	political	importance	–	and	the	historical	interest	–	what	 is	 it	about	 the	riots	 that	particularly	demands	a	study	of	 the	media	and	mediated	meaning-making?		
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CONCEPTUALISING	THE	RIOTS	FOR	STUDY	
Perhaps	 the	 single	most	 compelling	 reason	 for	 this	 focus	 is	 that	 the	 riots	were	clearly	 a	 complex	 phenomenon	 and	 yet	 the	 government	 strove	 to	 frame	 the	rioters	as	criminals,	“pure	and	simple”.	This	account	–	this	public	narrative	–	was	fraught	with	contradictions.	The	rioters	had	to	be	hedonistic,	wanton	criminals,	both	driven	by	material	greed	and	yet,	 somehow,	operating	wholly	outside	 the	social	norms	and	structures	 that	 inculcated	 them.	 It	was	a	position	 that	had	 to	be,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 reductive	 and	 exceptional	 –	 these	 were	 ordinary	 acts	(“criminality	pure	and	simple”)	but	these	were	extraordinary	circumstances.	The	judiciary,	sitting	through	the	night	in	specially	convened	court	sessions,	handed	down	 extraordinary	 custodial	 sentences,	 as	 if	 to	 emphasise	 that	 there	 was	nothing	pure,	simple	or	reductive	about	the	behaviour	(“collective	 insanity”).	 It	was,	in	short,	an	ideological	position	to	externalise	the	rioters,	and	to	absolve	the	“societal	structures	that	frame	and	condition	social	action”	(Fuchs	2012,	388).		
There	 is	 an	 important	 distinction	 to	 make	 here.	 The	 ideological	 struggle	surrounding	the	riots	is	not	the	central	concern	of	this	thesis:	it	does	not	seek	to	elucidate	causes,	apportion	blame	or	 impose	a	cultural	or	critical	reading	on	to	the	 riots	 or	 the	 rioters.	 Rather,	 the	 central	 concern	 is	 the	 way	 that	 digital	technology	 (Twitter)	enabled	 the	production	and	exchange	of	 these	 ideological	struggles	 –	it	 does	 not	 examine	 Twitter	 itself	 as	 a	 central	 player	 within	 these	language	wars.	In	order	to	explain	this	position,	and	to	outline	why	the	UK	riots	are	particularly	important	in	terms	of	digitally-enabled	meaning-making,	first	it	is	 necessary	 to	 outline	 the	 key	 ideological	 arguments	 that	 the	 riots	 prompted.	
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Any	 discussion	 of	 riot-related	meaning-making	will	 have	 to	 engage	with	 these	ideological	arguments,	because	they	were	so	central	to	the	mediated	discourse.		
According	to	Fuchs	(2012,	386),	during	and	after	the	riots,	technology	played	a	central	role	in	this	course:	“Focusing	on	technology	(as	a	cause	or	a	solution	for	riots)	 is	 the	 ideological	 search	 for	 control,	 simplicity	 and	 predictability	 in	 a	situation	of	high	 complexity,	unpredictability	 and	uncertainty”.	Certainly,	 there	was	 a	 close	 association	 between	 ideology	 and	 technology	 during	 the	 riots,	though	 to	 suggest	 a	 mono-directional	 logic	 is	 possibly	 a	 misrepresentation:	within	David	 Cameron’s	 statements	 alone	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 distinguish	 between	technologies	 of	 control	 (water	 cannons,	 CCTV	 cameras)	 and	 technologies	 of	disorder	(social	media).				
This	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 address	 questions	 about	 technology	 and	 public	 discourse	during	 the	riots.	 It	 is	 concerned	with	 the	 functioning	of	Twitter	–	 the	potential	for	that	technology	to	support	constructive,	productive	meaning-making	–	but	it	is	also	concerned	with	socio-political	processes	and	with	democratic	legitimacy.	This	 second	 focus	 is	 important,	partly	because	draconian	punishments	 seemed	to	be	levied	with	something	approaching	retributive	glee,	but	mainly	because	the	punishments	 raise	 vital	 questions	 about	 collective	 meaning-making	 during	periods	 of	 acute	 social	 upheaval.	 It	 must	 be	 recalled	 that	 2011	 was	 a	 year	 of	global	mediated	protest.	A	 year	 that	 began	with	 the	politicians,	 academics	 and	journalists	 commending	 protesters	 for	 using	 social	 media	 to	 challenge	authoritarianism	 in	 the	 Arab	 Spring,	 ended	 with	 the	 Occupy	 movement,	 and	included	 the	 UK	 Prime	 Minister	 proposing	 mass	 media	 shutdowns	 and	surveillance	in	his	own	country.		
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That	proposition,	first	raised	in	parliament	on	11	August,	was	founded	on	a	false	premise	–	that	rioters	were	using	social	media	tools	to	coordinate	their	 looting	and	to	evade	police	(P	Lewis	et	al.	2011)	–	but	the	role	of	social	media	in	the	riots	is	 still	worthy	of	 study.	As	demonstrated	already,	 in	 large	part,	 the	established	media	 (the	newspapers	 and	news	broadcasters)	performed	 to	 their	 traditional	ideological	 roles	 (Kelsey	 2012).	 These	 newspaper	 tropes	 only	 provide	 half	 the	picture,	 however,	 because	 for	 almost	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 UK,	 the	 riots	represented	a	national,	social	upheaval	that	was	extensively	mediated	via	digital	communication	tools.		
The	 temporality	 of	 the	 riots	 is	 particularly	 significant	 in	 this	 respect.	As	noted	earlier,	Mark	Duggan	was	shot	on	4	August.	On	16	August	two	young	men	were	sentenced	 to	 lengthy	 jail	 terms	 for	 online	 riot	 organisation	 that	 conspicuously	failed	to	organise	any	riots.	It	took	less	than	a	week	for	the	first	penal	sentences	to	 be	 handed	 down,	 often	 to	 young	 perpetrators	 and	 often	 for	 offences	 that	would	normally	not	attract	any	such	punishment	(Bridges	2012).	How	could	it	be	that	society	at	large	–	the	citizenry,	the	media	and	the	political	class	–	was	quite	so	prepared,	quite	so	quickly,	to	condemn	so	many	young	people	to	jail	 in	such	extraordinary	circumstances?		
	
MEDIATED	MAYHEM:	THE	RIOTS	AS	AN	ACUTE	EVENT	
Katz	(1980)	defined	a	set	of	circumstances	under	which,	he	believed,	audiences	engaged	in	an	intense,	communal	consumption	of	media.	He	called	it	 the	media	
event	–	an	event	that	sustains	the	mass	attention	of	the	audience,	thus	replicating	
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the	 sort	 of	 collected	 experience	 that	 models	 of	 media	 fragmentation	 and	segregation	 would	 seem	 to	 argue	 against	 (Dayan	 and	 Katz	 1992,	 Katz	 1980).	There	were	 crucial	 elements	or	 conditions	necessary	 to	 sustain	a	media	event.	These	were:	1.	live	transmission;	2.	preplanning;	3.	framing	in	time	and	space;	4.	the	 appearance	 of	 a	 heroic	 personality	 or	 group	 (i.e.	 there	 must	 be	 a	 central	personality	 or	 group	 of	 personalities,	 around	 which	 a	 narrative	 can	 be	constructed);	5.	drama	or	ritual	significance;	6.	"the	force	of	a	social	norm	which	makes	 viewing	 mandatory"	 (Katz	 1980,	 4).	 For	 Dayan	 and	 Katz	 (1992)	 these	events	 were	 integrative,	 a	 co-production	 of	 broadcasters	 and	 establishments,	bringing	the	audience	together	in	shared	meaning-making	practices.	
The	 media	 event	 was	 very	 much	 a	 genre-construction	 of	 a	 particular	 age	 of	broadcasting	 –	 one	 in	 which	 technology,	 production	 values	 and	 social	 mores	combined	 to	 generate	 normative	 viewing	 practices.	 By	 the	 early	 twenty-first	century	 that	 age	 had	 passed	 and	 Katz	 and	 Liebes	 (2007)	 updated	 the	 genre-typology	to	recognise	the	ever	greater	role	that	disruption	played	in	collectivised	meaning-making:	 “media	events	of	 the	ceremonial	kind	seem	to	be	 receding	 in	importance,	maybe	even	in	 frequency,	while	the	 live	broadcasting	of	disruptive	events	such	as	Disaster,	Terror	and	War	are	taking	center	stage.”	(ibid	158).			
The	 significant	 difference	 between	 the	 ceremonial	 (media)	 event	 and	 the	emergent	 disruptive	 event	 is	 the	 absence	 of	 pre-planning	 –	 or,	 at	 least,	collaborative	 pre-planning	 between	 broadcasters	 and	 actors.	 This	 is	 not	 to	suggest	that	media	and	disruptive	actors	do	not	collaborate	in	the	production	of	disruptive	 events,	 but	 emphasises	 the	 ‘real	 time’	 evolution	 of	 such	 events	 –	something	 that	makes	 problematic	 questions	 of	 control.	 “Disaster	marathons…	
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are	obvious	threats	to	establishments,	in	which	the	organizers	–	the	perpetrators	–	are	an	invasive	force,	far	out	of	the	reach	of	establishment	control.”	(ibid,	164).		
Such	a	 framing	emphasises	 the	acutely	political	nature	of	disruptive	events.	 	 In	an	 analysis	 that	 covers	 the	 September	 11	 terrorist	 attacks	 and	 US	 military	campaigns	 in	 both	 Iraq	 and	 Afghanistan,	 Kellner	 (2004,	 41)	 argues	 that	 “both	Islamic	 Jihadists	 and	 two	 Bush	 administrations	 have	 deployed	 spectacles	 of	terror	 to	 promote	 their	 political	 agendas”.	 If	 the	 live	 broadcasting	 of	 the	September	 11	 attacks	 can	 be	 read	 as	 a	 new	 type	 of	media	 event,	 then	Kellner	argues	 that	 the	 “media	 spectacle”	 served	 to	 “to	 whip	 up	 war	 hysteria,	 while	failing	 to	provide	 a	 coherent	 account	of	what	happened,	why	 it	 happened,	 and	what	would	count	as	responsible	responses.”	(ibid	44).		
According	to	this	account,	the	hyper-politicisation	of	media	coverage	of	the	War	on	 Terror	 was	 very	 much	 a	 collaboration	 between	 the	 media	 networks	 and	different	 political	 actors	 promoting	 Manichean	 discourse.	 Under	 such	circumstances,	 Kellner	 argued	 that	 it	 was	 better	 to	 turn	 to	 the	 Internet	 for	“alternative	information”:	“It	offers	a	wealth	of	opinion	and	debate,	and	a	variety	of	 sites…	 it	 also	 provides	 users	 with	 the	 potential	 to	 become	 literate	 and	informed	on	a	variety	of	important	topics.”	(ibid	59).		
Kellner’s	 claim	 that	 the	 Internet	 can	 support	 discourse	 in	 addition	 (if	 not	necessarily	 independent)	 from	 broadcast	 media	 during	 disruptive	 events,	 is	surely	 significant.	 If	 Katz	 and	 Liebes	 (2007)	 could	 argue	 that	 more	 mobile	television	 cameras	 were	 a	 significant	 influence	 in	 reshaping	 the	 archetypal	media	event,	what	might	be	the	implications	of	a	hyper-mobile	media	system,	in	which	the	audience	is	as	much	a	source	of	content	as	the	broadcaster?		
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This	 is	 a	 dramatic	 reconfiguring	 of	 the	 mediasphere	 (Hartley	 1996).	 The	mediasphere	is	a	“smaller	sphere”	within	the	semiosphereiii	–	it	is	all	the	“output	of	 the	 published	media,	 both	 fictional	 and	 factual,	 on	 all	platforms”	 and	 thus	“encloses”	the	public	sphere.	“The	idea	is	that	the	public	sphere	is	not	separate	from	 but	 enclosed	 within	 a	 wider	 sphere	 of	 cultural	 meaning”	 (Hartley	 2011,	169).	 Not	 only	 does	 the	 emergence	 of	 digital	 media	 add	 to	 the	 number	 and	variety	 of	 platforms	 for	 publishing,	 it	 transforms	 access	 to	 those	 platforms	 as	well	(Coleman	and	Freelon	2015).		
In	a	 further	update	 to	 the	original	media	event	concept,	Burgess	and	Crawford	(2011)	 defined	 the	 acute	 event,	 emphasising	 the	 increasingly	 participatory	audience	 and	 the	 co-production	 of	 significant	 real-world	 events.	 These	 events,	they	 argued,	 are	 highly	 mediated	 and	 frequently	 controversial	 –	 which	 drives	“adjunctive	conversations”,	typified	by	“sharp	peaks”	in	Internet	discourse.		
The	UK	 riots	 clearly	 fit	 this	 genre:	 they	were	disruptive,	 highly	 politicised	 and	extensively	 mediated.	 There	 was	 an	 obvious	 threat	 to	 the	 establishment,	 in	response	 to	 which	 there	 was	 a	 “media	 spectacle”	 that	 favoured	 ideological	interpretation	 above	 “coherent”	 and	 “responsible”	 interpretations.	 They	 also	fuelled	 intensive	 Internet	 activity,	 both	 during	 the	 rioting	 itself	 and	 in	 the	intermediate	 aftermath.	 What	 was	 the	 effect,	 though,	 of	 this	 emergent	 media	type?	Was	the	Internet	any	better	than	the	national	broadcast	and	print	media	at	making	 citizens	 “literate	 and	 informed”?	 Ultimately,	 this	 is	 a	 question	 about	discourse	 and	 democracy.	 Implicit	 in	 Kellner’s	 reading	 of	 disruptive	 media	events	 is	 that	 certain	 types	 of	 mediation	 produce	 outcomes	 that	 are	 less	democratic	 than	 others	 –	 they	 are	more	 prone	 to	manipulation,	 to	 ideological	
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regression,	 to	 simplification	 and	 stereotyping.	 It	 has	been	 shown,	 already,	 that	even	 lengthy	 investigations	 failed	 to	 produce	 political	 consensus.	 Newspaper	reporting	 was	 ideological	 and	 political.	 Is	 there	 any	 evidence	 that	 Internet	discourse	was	any	more	productive?	
RESEARCH	THEMES	
It	 should	 be	 recalled	 that	 2011	 was	 a	 year	 in	 which	 the	 liberating	 and	democratising	potential	 of	 Internet	media	was	 supposedly	 realised	on	 a	 global	scale.	 There	 was	 a	 great	 deal	 written,	 spoken,	 imagined	 and	 asserted	 about	society	as	 it	existed	 then,	and	as	 it	could	exist	given	 the	maturation	of	 Internet	technology	 (Jurgenson	 2012,	 Comninos	 2011,	 Shirky	 2011,	 Tufecki	 2011,	Howard	et	al.	2011,	Diamond	2010).		
The	 power	 of	 the	 Internet	 to	 disrupt	 and	 to	 reconfigure	 established	 media	discourses	 remains	 a	popular	 and	potent	 argument	 for	progressive	democrats,	and	this	brief	introduction	to	the	UK	riots	illustrates	some	of	the	ways	in	which	this	 argument	 is	 made.	 As	 such,	 it	 establishes	 some	 central	 themes	 that	 will	become	recurrent	concerns	in	this	thesis.		
First	 is	 the	 inherently	 political	 nature	 of	 the	 riots.	 These	 politics	 play	 out	 in	 a	hyper-mediated	 public	 sphere	 (mediasphere),	 as	 seems	 to	 be	 typical	 of	 these	types	 of	 acute	 event	 and,	 in	 this	 summary	 reading	 at	 least,	 polarise	 around	traditional	conservative	and	 liberal	attitudes	 towards	poverty	and	punishment.	Second	 is	 that,	 in	 addition	 to	 enabling	 this	 public	 negotiation	 of	 meaning,	 the	media	plays	a	role	in	shaping	that	negotiation.	That	may	happen	overtly,	through	the	right	wing	press	pushing	a	particular	 interpretation	of	events,	 for	 instance.	
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There	may	also	be	a	more	 insidious	 interaction	between	politicians	and	media	producers,	in	which	the	dynamics	of	reporting	favour	one	particular	agenda	over	another	(Lewis	2005,	Kellner	2004).		
Third,	 there	 is	 the	 suggestion	 that	 the	 nature	 or	 type	 (technology)	 of	 media	involved	may	 play	 a	 role	 in	 shaping	 the	 discourse.	 This	 is	 an	 idea	 that	will	 be	discussed	extensively	during	 the	 literature	 review	chapters	and	 the	conceptual	framework.	 Fourth,	 and	 finally,	 the	 temporality	 of	 the	 riots	 is	 important:	 the	spread	 of	 rioting,	 the	 frenetic	 political	 response	 and	 the	 speed	with	which	 the	state	enacted	retribution	was	extraordinarily	quick.	The	state’s	reaction	was	not	an	ordinary	procedural	response;	it	was	extraordinary.	Rioters	were	imprisoned	in	special	court	sessions	before	parliament	had	reconvened	to	debate	the	crisis.	In	 such	 extraordinary	 circumstances,	 how	 does	 such	 a	 response	 acquire	legitimacy?	 The	 temporality	 of	 the	 media	 becomes	 very	 important	 –	 can	 it	respond	to	events	quickly	enough	to	support	the	sort	of	discussion	(debate	and	negotiation)	that	might	legitimiseiv	extraordinary	political	measures?			
This	thesis	aims	to	examine	the	role	of	digital	media	in	the	cultural	politics	of	the	UK	 riots.	 In	 very	 general	 terms,	 it	 will	 investigate	 the	 role	 that	 digital	 media	platforms,	especially	Twitter,	played	in	enabling	and	shaping	political	meaning-making	during	the	UK	riots	–	particularly	during	the	period	following	the	initial	unrest	 when	 the	 country	 was	 formulating	 some	 kind	 of	 procedural	 and	emotional	response.		
It	 is	 aligned	 closely	 with	 the	 fields	 of	 cultural	 studies	 and	 Internet	 studies:	 it	seeks	 to	 understand	 what	 were	 the	 political	 and	 social	 implications	 of	 media	discourse	 and	 the	 role	 that	 communication	 technology	 played	 in	 constructing	
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that	mediation.	More	specifically,	it	is	an	interpretative	study	of	communicative	democracy	and	a	specialist	analysis	of	Internet	technology	–	a	contribution	to	the	emergent	 fields	 of	 software	 studies	 and	 social	 computing	 research,	which	 –	 as	the	 names	 suggest	 –	 seeks	 to	 describe	 what	 software	 is	 and	 to	 explore	 what	software	does	in	the	material	world	(Freelon	2015,	Fuller	2008).		
As	such,	this	thesis	must	achieve	the	following:		
• First,	 it	 must	 develop	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 to	 define,	 describe	 and	locate	Internet	technology.		
• Second,	 it	must	apply	 that	 framework	 to	 the	study	of	political	discourse	during	 the	UK	riots.	This	will	 require	a	suitable	methodology,	but	 it	will	also	require	a	clear	definition	of	political	discourse.		
This	 summary	 of	 thematic	 concerns	 makes	 it	 very	 clear	 that	 these	 are	communication	 questions	 about	 a	 communicative	 process.	 Furthermore,	 the	outcome	 –	 a	 reasonable,	 responsible	 political	 discussion	 –	 is	 explicitly	 a	communicative	interpretation	of	democracy.		
There	are	many	different	interpretations	of	that	word,	of	course,	both	historical	and	current	(Coleman	and	Freelon	2015,	Held	2006,	Williams	1976),	and	those	interpretations	 involve	 differences	 in	 emphasis	 that,	 in	 turn,	 affect	 any	 theory	about	how	 technology	might	 influence	democracy.	The	 full	 implications	of	 that	communicative	 interpretation	will	 require	 a	 thorough	 discussion	 and	 analysis.	For	now,	it	will	suffice	to	recognise	that	the	democratic	norm	typically	invoked	in	discussions	of	the	Internet	and	democracy	is	a	communicative	norm:	the	public	debate	of	opposing	political	ideals.		
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CHAPTER	SUMMARIES		
With	that	overarching	template	in	place,	it	is	possible	to	look	more	closely	at	the	individual	objects	of	study.	First,	there	is	a	media	channel	that	may	(or	may	not)	allow	democratic	discussion	to	flourish.	Chapter	two	aims	to	establish	what	the	Internet	 is,	what	 the	 Internet	does,	and	how	those	 two	 things	 translate	 into	an	object	 to	 be	 studied.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 simple	 task,	 necessarily,	 but	 it	 is	 absolutely	essential.	 Confusion	 on	 this	 issue	 is	 a	 considerable	 limitation	 for	 scholarly	endeavour	 (Wellman	 2004).	 The	 confusion	 is	 understandable,	 to	 an	 extent,	because	 the	 Internet	 is	 a	 multi-layered	 technology,	 involving	 many	 types	 of	engineering	 specialty:	 it	 is	 a	 considerable	 task	 to	master	 any	 sort	 of	 overview.	There	 are	 also	 complex	 social	 dynamics	 that	 are	 central	 to	 any	 coherent	understanding	of	the	Internet	in	the	world.	Relatively	few	scholars	are	equipped	to	investigate	the	technological,	the	social	and	the	phenomenological	complexity	of	 the	 technology,	 and	 full	 inter-disciplinary	 collaboration	 remains	 relatively	rare	(Freelon	2015).	
In	large	part,	then,	chapter	two	is	an	attempt	to	define	these	different	aspects	of	Internet	 technology,	 and	 to	 narrow	 these	 definitions	 sufficiently	 to	 enable	productive	 investigation.	 The	 preferred	 approach	 is	 to	 define	 the	 technology	first,	 starting	with	 the	network	architecture	and	computing	protocols,	 then	 the	software	powering	the	World	Wide	Web,	and	finally	the	individual	applications	that	interact	within	that	software.	A	central	argument	is	that	the	Internet	(both	the	noun	 itself	and	 the	suite	of	 technologies	 it	 represents)	cannot	be	 theorised	and	analysed	as	though	it	has	a	mono-directional,	mono-causal	logic.	Specificity	lies	 in	 identifying	 and	 describing	 relevant	 applications	within	 the	Web,	 and	 in	
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understanding	 how	 the	 features	 of	 those	 applications	 shape	 communicative	practices	and	behaviour.		
Chapter	 three	 reviews	existing	 literature	on	 the	 subject	of	 ‘digital	democracy’	and	 develops	 that	 review	 into	 a	 specific	 concept	 for	 closer	 study.	 It	 asks	 two	questions:	how	has	 the	relationship	between	digital	 technology	and	democracy	been	studied	historically	and	how	should	 it	be	studied	 in	the	context	of	 the	UK	riots?	The	literature	review	reveals	that	different	theorists	have	relied	on	quite	different	interpretations	of	democracy:	the	result	being	that	different	logics	are	developed	 to	 connect	 cause	 and	 effect.	 This	 is	 not	 necessarily	 problematic,	 as	long	 as	 these	differences	 are	 recognised,	 but	 the	 literature	 review	also	 reveals	that,	too	often,	this	hasn’t	happened.		
For	instance,	advocates	of	action-orientated	democracy	have	tended	to	focus	on	the	 connective	 structures	 of	 digital	 technology	 (Bennett	 and	 Segerberg	 2012),	while	proponents	of	representational	democracy	see	the	Internet	as	a	petitioning	tool	 or	 a	 platform	 for	 e-voting	 (Wright	 2015).	 In	 other	 words,	 democratic	preferences	have	 tended	 to	shape	 technological	definitions,	and	chapter	 three	argues	 that	 this	 is	 problematic.	 On	 occasion,	 the	 result	 has	 been	 a	 reverse-engineered	 determinism,	 when	 a	 better	 approach	 is	 to	 “conceptualise	 the	relationship	of	technology	and	society	as	dialectal”	(Fuchs	2012,	387).		
Chapter	 four	 is	 the	 conceptual	 framework.	 It	 identifies	 the	 relevant	(communicational)	 logics	 and	 develops	 these	 for	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 public	discourse	during	the	UK	riots	–	it	also	justifies	the	need	for	empirics	in	this	area.	That	development	process	specifies	the	interactive	mechanisms	by	which	digital	technology	could,	theoretically,	shape	democratic	discourse.		
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Explanations	 of	 the	 technology-democracy	 dialectic	 have	 tended	 to	 emphasise	either	 organisational	 or	 communicational	 dynamics.	 The	 relative	merits	 of	 the	groups	 are	 considered:	 theoretical	 and	practical	 issues	with	 the	 organisational	group	 support	 the	 preference	 for	 an	 approach	 grounded	 in	 communication	studies.	 
A	specific	description	of	 the	digital	 technology	 is	established,	as	well	as	a	clear	definition	of	the	democratic	outcomes	of	interest.	In	order	to	establish	empirical	specificity,	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 returns	 to	 a	 recurring	 theme	 in	 the	communicational	 logics	 (and	 in	 Internet	 studies	 more	 widely):	 the	 uncertain	epistemological	 and	 ontological	 framing	 of	 digital	 time-space.	 To	 a	 greater	 or	lesser	extent,	the	different	communicational	logics	invoke	the	idea	that	the	social	and	cognitive	experience	of	time-space	is	complicated	by	the	act	of	being	online.	Information	 liberation	 arguments	 emphasise	 that	 digital	 flows	 are	 free	 from	physical	restraints;	information	overload	arguments	suggest	that	the	temporality	of	 these	 flows	 overwhelms	 human	 brains.	 Digital	 dualism	 perceives	 that	 the	relationship	between	digital	and	physical	 time-space	 is	probably	 important	but	poorly	understood.				
This	focus	on	time-space	is	potentially	productive.	On	the	one	hand,	it	should	be	possible	both	to	theorise	and	to	observe	the	temporality	and	spatiality	of	Twitter	communication.	On	the	other,	there	are	clearly	defined	models	to	help	evaluate	the	 effect	 of	 time-space	 on	 discourse.	 The	 remainder	 of	 the	 conceptual	framework	 establishes	 a	 theoretical	 justification	 for	 such	 an	 approach,	 and	specifies	exactly	which	models	are	best	suited	to	the	evaluative	task.		
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In	 summary,	 first	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 seeks	 to	 establish	 a	 theory	 of	technology	that	recognises	the	importance	of	defining	an	emergent	technology	in	a	 way	 that	 limits	 confusing	 assumptions	 and	 supports	 contextual	 empirical	analysis.	 This	 process	must	 include	 a	 definition	 of	 what	 software	 is	 and	what	software	does:	how	it	interacts	with	networked	protocols	and	with	human	users.	Second,	it	seeks	a	theory	of	democracy,	specifically	one	that	identifies	the	type	of	democratic	 practice	 to	 which	 the	 technology	 supposedly	 contributes.	 Third,	 it	describes	 a	 theory	 of	 interactive	 logic:	 an	 explanation	 of	 how	 technology	 and	democracy	 shape	 each	 other	 that	 is	 both	 contextually	 relevant	 and	 available	empirically.		
Chapter	five	translates	the	conceptual	framework	into	four	research	questions.	Each	 research	question	 is	 intended	 to	 interrogate	 a	 theme	or	 logical	 argument	from	the	framework.	So,	the	first	research	question	deals	with	the	complexity	of	describing	 meaning-making	 through	 discourse	 on	 Twitter;	 the	 second	 with	evaluating	 the	deliberative	potential	 of	 that	 discourse;	 the	 third	with	Twitter’s	software-enabled	 communicative	 structures	 –	 and	 the	 description	 of	 those	structures	 in	 time-space;	 and	 the	 fourth	 the	 distribution	 of	 deliberative	discourse	 across	 those	 temporal-spatial	 structures	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 assumed	intersect	between	software	construction	and	deliberative	outcome.		
The	four	research	questions	are:		
Question	1:		
What	are	the	features	of	discourse	in	the	riot	public,	and	how	are	these	features	distributed	across	Twitter’s	software-structural	layers?		
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Question	2:		
Is	there	evidence	of	deliberation,	or	at	least	of	discourse	that	does	not	preclude	a	normative	deliberative	model?	
Question	3:		
What	 are	 the	 temporal	 and	 spatial	 dynamics	 of	 Twitter’s	 software-structural	layers?	
Question	4:		
Can	the	attempts	to	record	Twitter	time	and	to	characterise	discourse	within	the	riot	 public	 be	 combined/synthesised	 to	 interrogate	 the	 central	 claim	 in	 the	conceptual	 framework:	 that	 digital	 technologies	 shape	 communication	environments	that	are	too	fast	for	deliberative	democracy?	
The	chapter	includes	an	extended	methodological	discussion,	which	explains	the	rationale	behind	the	research	design.	The	discussion	explores	some	of	the	critical	issues	 involved	 in	 developing	 a	 methodology	 for	 the	 specific	 research	 project	(that	 is,	a	methodology	 to	 interrogate	 the	research	questions),	but	 these	 issues	also	apply	to	Twitter	research	more	generally.	The	focus	on	Twitter	time-space	is	innovative	–	theories	of	network	time	continue	to	be	developed	–	and	there	have	been	few	attempts	to	subject	these	theories	to	empirical	analysis.	Consequently,	it	 is	 necessary	 to	 spend	 some	 time	 translating	 the	 research	 questions	 into	 a	coherent	 methodology,	 delineating	 methodological	 issues	 and	 justifying	methodological	 decisions.	 This	 methodological	 discussion	 precedes	 a	 detailed	
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description	 of	 the	 research	 design	 –	 including	 data	 collection,	 processing,	analysis	and	presentation	methods.		
Chapter	six	reports	on	the	findings	of	the	empirical	research	planned	in	chapter	
five.	 Observations	 are	 organised	 into	 sections	 corresponding	 to	 the	 first	 three	research	 questions:	 first,	 discourse	 is	 described	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 material	 and	thematic	content;	second,	the	deliberative	potential	of	that	discourse	is	assessed;	third,	 the	 temporal	 and	 spatial	 affordances	 of	 Twitter’s	 communicative	structures	are	recorded	and	displayed	via	a	range	of	interpretative	metrics.		
Chapter	 seven	 discusses	 those	 findings,	 addressing	 each	 research	 question	 in	turn,	 and	 asking	 how	 the	 empirical	 observations	 inform	 the	 research	 question	and	the	conceptual	framing	behind	it.	Once	the	thematic	and	deliberative	coding	have	been	evaluated,	and	the	distribution	of	discourse	across	Twitter’s	software-structures	 described,	 the	 chapter	 considers	 in	 detail	 the	 relationship	 between	time-space	and	deliberative	potential.		
Chapter	eight	is	the	concluding	chapter.	It	returns	to	the	central	concern	of	the	thesis:	and	critically	analyses	the	deliberative	potential	of	Twitter	during	the	UK	riots.	That	analysis	involves	several	steps.	It	aims	to	move	beyond	the	normative	analysis	 required	 by	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 and	 to	 consider	 Twitter’s	deliberative	role	within	the	wider	mediasphere.	In	other	words,	it	contextualises	the	specific	findings	about	the	riot	public,	and	compares	discourse	on	Twitter	to	discourse	 in	 other	 spheres	 of	 public	 debate.	 Did	 digital	 communication	technologies	enable	productive	(responsible)	political	discourse	during	the	2011	UK	riots	in	a	way	that	national	print	and	broadcast	media	did	not?			
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In	 addition,	 it	 reflects	 on	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 and	 the	 methodology	derived	 from	 it,	 identifies	 limitations	 and	 discusses	 ways	 in	 which	 these	limitations	 could	 be	 addressed.	 Finally,	 it	 addresses	 the	 wider	 question	 of	research	 into	 digital	 democracy	 and	 suggests	 several	 priorities	 for	 future	research	efforts.		
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CHAPTER	TWO	
REVIEW:	THE	STRUCTURE	OF	SOFTWARE	
INTRODUCTION		
The	primary	 focus	 for	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	define	 the	 Internet	 as	 an	object	 to	be	studied.	 The	 introduction	 established	 the	 centrality	 of	 different	 media	 in	 the	intense	meaning-making	processes	that	happened	during	and	after	the	UK	riots.	Additionally,	 it	 identified	 an	 important	 theoretical	 complaint	 about	 so-called	traditional	 media:	 namely	 that	 they	 are	 prone	 to	 hysteria,	 polemics	 and	manipulation,	 and	 that	 this	 undermines	 their	 contribution	 to	 democratic	discourse	(Kellner	2004).		
Since	 the	 Internet	 emerged	 as	 a	 potentially	 transformative	 technology	 in	 the	nineties	(Castells	1996),	several	theorists	have	argued	that	 it	has	the	potential	to	reinvigorate	the	democratic	potency	of	public	discourse	(Tufekci	and	Freelon	2013,	 Benkler	 2006,	 Rheingold	 2000).	 	 A	 full	 discussion	 of	 that	 democratic	potential	–	how	it	has	been	conceived,	formulated	and	studied	–	follows	in	the	next	 chapter,	which	 argues	 that	 a	weakness	 in	much	 of	 this	work	 is	 a	 lack	 of	specificity	about	what	constitutes	Internet	technology.		
A	 key	 aim	 for	 this	 dissertation	 is	 to	 deliver	 an	 empirical	 account	 of	 Internet	communication	during	the	UK	riots	that	can	support	a	critical	analysis,	without	resort	 to	 assumption	 and	 generalisation.	 This	 requires	 specificity,	 and	 this	chapter	 will	 argue	 that	 critical	 and	 conceptual	 specificity	 is	 dependent	 upon	
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technological	 specificity.	 Ultimately,	 that	 involves	 a	 narrow	 focus	 on	 a	 single	media	 type	 (an	 application)	 and	 a	 discussion	 that	 is	 limited	 to	 the	 particular	properties,	 affordances	 and	 logics	 of	 that	media	 (Joinson	 and	Piwek	2013,	 van	Dijck	and	Poell	2013,	Jurgenson	2012,	Hutchby	2001).	This	does	not	imply	that	the	 media	 operates	 in	 isolation.	 There	 are	 institutional,	 personal,	 strategic,	informal	and	accidental	connections	between	all	media	types,	and	so	to	describe	one	media	or	one	connection	is	to	ignore	countless	others.	Bruns	et	al.	(2012,	5)	use	the	term	“media	ecology”	to	refer	to	the	“increasingly	complex	relationships	among	professional	media	outlets,	online	social	networks,	and	mobile	media.”	It	is	simply	not	possible,	however,	to	conduct	a	taxonomy	of	all	these	media	and	all	these	 connections,	 so	 vast	 is	 the	 media	 system	 and	 so	 complex	 are	 the	relationships	and	connections	between	media	types.		
	
THE	ROLE	OF	THE	INTERNET	IN	THE	MODERN	MEDIASPHERE	
The	 term	mediasphere	emphasises	 the	dense	and	 interactive	 flows	of	meaning	and	 mediation	 that	 circulate	 the	 globe	 via	 countless	 communication	 channels	(Lewis	 2008,	 Hartley	 1996).	 It	 mirrors	 Appadurai’s	 canonical	 conception	 of	mediated	 globalisation	 whereby	 the	 media	 provides	 “large	 and	 complex	repertoires	 of	 images,	 narratives	 and	 ‘ethnoscapes’	 to	 viewers	 throughout	 the	world,	 in	which	 the	world	of	 commodities	and	 the	world	of	 ‘news’	and	politics	are	profoundly	mixed.”	 (Appadurai	1991,	299).	 It	 is	 important	 to	recognise	 the	complexity	 and	 the	 evolving	 dynamics	 of	 this	 space.	 Clearly,	 emergent	communication	 technologies	 have	 changed	 the	 mediasphere	 considerably	 and	
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rapidly.	As	Castells	argues:	“the	boundaries	between	mass	media	communication	and	 all	 other	 forms	 of	 communication	 are	 blurring”	 (Castells	 2009,	 64).	 A	principal	 feature	 of	 the	 modern	 media	 ecology	 is	 convergence:	 not	 only	 are	different	media	 forms	 (texts,	 audios,	 videos,	 software)	 deeply	 interactive,	 they	are	 increasingly	 delivered	 via	 the	 same	 communication	 channels,	 so	 that	 the	Internet,	 for	 instance,	 is	 a	medium	 through	which	 printed	 news,	 radio	 shows,	movies	and	interactive	games	all	stream.	
The	mass	media	 industry	 is	 global,	powerful	 and	 increasingly	 concentrated.	As	McChesney	and	Schiller	(2003,	iii)	point	out,	however,	the	contemporary	media	ecology	 was	 not	 produced	 by	 technological	 development	 alone	 but	 by:	 “a	political	 force	–	the	shift	to	neoliberal	orthodoxy	–	which	relaxed	or	eliminated	barriers	 to	 commercial	 exploitation	 of	 media,	 foreign	 investment	 in	 the	communication	system	and	concentrated	media	ownership.”	 .	Corporate	media	and	mainstream	politics	 continue	 to	 be	heavily	 represented	 (Turner	2010).	 So	while	 Castells	 can	 argue	 that	 technology	 “does	 not	 determine	 society:	 it	 is	society”	 (Castells	 2005,	 3),	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 the	 social,	 political	 and	commercial	dynamics	that	influence	the	application	of	that	technology.	
As	 Castells	 notes,	 developments	 in	 media	 practices	 often	 appear	 to	 follow	developments	in	technology.	As	such,	an	analysis	of	the	modern	mediasphere	is,	in	part,	an	analysis	of	modern	media	technology	(though	it	should	not	be	limited	to	 just	that).	This	means	that	a	study	of	modern	media	 is	also	partly	a	study	of	the	 shifting	 dynamics	 between	 media	 and	 the	 fluctuating	 influence	 (both	commercial	 and	 social)	 of	 different	 technologies.	 For	 instance,	 print	 media	includes	newspapers,	magazines,	periodicals	and	books,	among	other	forms,	but	
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the	 circulations	 of	 the	 once	dominant	newspapers	have	been	 in	decline	 across	most	 national	 and	 international	 markets	 for	 several	 years,	 with	 only	 a	 few	exceptionsv.	
In	2015,	Pew	Research	Centre	reported	that	“newspaper	circulation	fell	again	in	2014”,	continuing	a	trend	that	has	been	ongoing	for	at	least	a	decade	(although	there	was	a	slight	upturn	in	circulation	in	2013)	(Barthel	2015).	In	2008,	“for	the	first	 time	 in	 roughly	 15	 years	 of	 asking	 the	 question,	 fewer	 than	 half	 of	 all	Americans	report	reading	a	daily	newspaper	on	a	regular	basis…	Only	34%	say	they	 read	 a	 newspaper	 yesterday,	 down	 from	 40%	 in	 2006.”	 (PEW	2008,	 17).	Young	people	(under	25)	are	especially	unlikely	to	read	a	newspaper.	Efforts	to	move	print	publications	online	remain	nascent	and	involve	notable	difficulties	as	far	 as	 protecting	 content	 and	 generating	 revenue	 are	 concerned.	 While	 some	newspapers,	 like	 The	 Guardian,	 for	 instance,	 have	 discovered	 large	 global	readerships,	this	has	proved	no	guarantee	of	profitabilityvi.		
Losses	from	print	advertising	continued	to	be	greater	than	any	gains	made	from	digital	 advertising	 (ibid).	 Revenue	 generating	 schemes	 such	 as	 ‘pay	walls’	 and	subscription	services	have	proved	profitable	only	in	certain	circumstances;	some	news	outlets	have	also	experimented	with	philanthropic	models	and	grant-based	funding	 (Birbrair	 2015).	 These	 alternative	 models	 remain	 in	 their	 infancy,	however,	 and	 the	 future	 remains	uncertain:	 “newspaper	 executives	 at	 the	New	
York	Times…	have	asked	whether	there	will	be	a	print	version	of	their	paper	in	ten	years”	(Ahlers	2006,	29).			
Broadcast	 media	 is	 usually	 taken	 to	 mean	 both	 television	 and	 radio,	 and	 of	course	 within	 those	 two	 are	 several	 more	 sub-categories,	 including	 public,	
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commercial,	 cable	 and	 satellite	 television.	 Television	 has	 been	 the	 “archetypal	medium	 of	 mass	 communication”	 since	 the	 1960s	 and	 radio	 the	 “medium	 of	mass	 communication	 most	 adaptable	 to	 individual	 schedules	 and	 audience	locations”	(Castells	2009,	59-61,	Williams	1975).	While	the	audience	for	printed	news	has	declined	 in	 the	US,	PEW	reports	 that	 television	news	audiences	have	held	steady	and,	in	the	case	of	cable	networks,	increased	in	recent	years	(Matsa	2015,	 PEW	 2008).	 Television	 broadcasting	 has	 developed	 from	 a	 highly	centralised	system	at	its	inception,	to	a	“diverse	and	decentralised	broadcasting	system	based	on	enhanced	transmission	capacity”	(Castells	2009,	59).	According	to	 surveys	 and	 census	 data,	 television	 access	 approaches	 ubiquity	 in	 the	West	and,	across	the	world	multiple	television	channels	are	available	in	most	homes.	So	television	remains	a	highly	influential	media	–	arguably	the	most	influential	–	but	Castells	 identifies	two	changes	that	he	considers	significant.	The	first	 is	 the	proliferation	 of	 multiple	 TV	 channels	 catering	 to	 specific	 audiences,	 and	 the	second	 is	 the	 practice	 of	 recording	 and	 re-watching	 programs	 according	 to	individual	 preferences.	 As	 such:	 “television	 remains	 a	 mass	 communication	medium	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 sender…	 it	 is	 often	 a	 personal	communication	medium	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	receiver.”	(Castells	2009,	60).	
Despite	 this	 apparent	 fragmentation,	 ownership	 of	 television	 media	 is	increasingly	concentrated	–	a	trend	that	applies	equally	to	radio.	Indeed,	across	all	 types	 of	media,	 vertical	 integration,	 mergers	 and	 takeovers	 have	 created	 a	situation	 in	 which	 a	 few	 global	 corporations	 control	 vast	 swathes	 of	 media	content.	According	to	Steger	(2009),	in	2006,	eight	media	companies	accounted	
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for	 approximately	 two-thirds	 of	 all	 the	 worldwide	 revenues	 generated	 by	 the	communication	industry	(somewhere	between	$250	and	$275	billion).		
McChesney	 and	 Schiller	 (2003)	 have	 documented	 how,	 in	 the	United	 States	 at	least,	 a	 few	 corporations	 came	 to	 dominate	 communication	 systems;	 they	describe	 how	 monopolistic	 contracts	 in	 the	 early	 privatisation	 of	 state-built	communication	 infrastructure	 created	 a	 few	 incredibly	 wealthy	 companies.	These	 companies	 resisted	 regulation	 in	 the	name	of	 a	 free	press	–	where	once	free	was	taken	to	mean	free	to	 investigate	and	to	print	without	 interference	or	hindrance,	it	has	increasingly	become	aligned	with	neo-liberalism	and	a	notion	of	a	free	market.	This	freedom	resulted	in	an	increasingly	homogenised	industry,	in	which	 the	 early	 competitive	 diversity	 of	 the	 newspaper	 market	 became	 “a	concentrated	 site	 of	massive	 profit	 generation”	 (McChesney	 and	 Schiller	 2003,	3).	In	their	account,	the	US	model	was	exported	to	the	world	via	the	neo-liberal	politics	of	Regan	and	Thatcher:	
“The	 conventional	 explanation	 of	 globalized	 communication	 centres	 on	technology:	 that	 radical	 improvements	 in	 communication	 technology	make	global	media	flows	and	global	business	operations	feasible	and	that,	in	general,	 this	 is	all	 to	 the	good.	However,	 this	 is	a	misleading	account.	Underlying	 new	 communication	 technology	 has	 been	 a	 political	 force	 –	the	shift	to	neoliberal	orthodoxy,	which	relaxed	or	eliminated	barriers	to	commercial	 exploitation	of	media,	 foreign	 investment	 in	 communication	systems,	and	concentrated	media	ownership.”	(ibid,	6).	
An	 intense	 period	 of	 global	 expansion	 and	 market	 consolidation	 created	 an	industry	dominated	by	“nine	transnational	corporations	(TNCs):	General	Electric	
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(owner	 of	 NBC),	 Liberty	 Media,	 Disney,	 AOL	 Time	 Warner,	 Sony,	 News	Corporation,	 Viacom,	 Vivendi	 Universal	 and	 Bertelsmann.”	 (McChesney	 and	Schiller	2003,	9).	These	companies,	together	with	some	“second	tier”	media	firms	now	 “control	 much	 of	 the	 world’s	 media:	 book,	 magazine	 and	 newspaper	publishing;	music	recording;	television	production;	television	stations	and	cable	channels;	 satellite	 television	 systems;	 film	 production;	 and	 motion	 picture	theatres”	 (ibid,	 12).	 That	 situation	 has	 not	 changed	 much	 in	 the	 intervening	decade.	The	2011	Finkelstein	Review	of	Media	and	Media	Regulation	in	Australia	found	 that	 three	 organisations	 (Fairfax,	 News	 Ltd	 and	 APN)	 owned	 92%	 of	newspaper	titles	in	the	country		(Finkelstein	and	Ricketson	2012).		
This	concentration	of	ownership	and	the	commercialisation	of	news	may	explain,	in	 part,	 why	 print	 and	 broadcast	 media	 fail	 to	 deliver	 socially	 responsible	commentary	 on	 acute	 events	 like	 the	 UK	 riots	 (Kellner	 2004).	 Some	 authors	perceive	 a	 threat	 of	 Western	 cultural	 imperialism,	 typified	 by	 this	 relentless	“Hollywood	 juggernaut”	 (McChesney	 and	 Schiller	 2003,	 Ritzer	 1983).	 The	inevitability	 of	 cultural	 imperialism	may	 be	 exaggerated,	 however,	 as	 cultural	flows	appear	a	good	deal	more	complex	and	interactive	than	this	homogenising	model	would	predict.	Nevertheless,	such	extreme	concentration	of	media	power	challenges	 perceived	 wisdom	 about	 the	 essential	 role	 that	 the	 media	 plays	 in	relation	 to	 democracy	 and	 political	 institutions.	 The	 presumption	 (itself	relatively	 recent)	 that	 media	 content	 –	particularly	 news	 coverage	 –	 will	 be	impartial	 and	 objective	 is	 undermined	 by	 several	 examples	 of	 media	corporations	pursuing	policies	(and	producing	content)	aligned	specifically	with	their	own	commercial	and	political	interests	(Dover	2008).	
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A	 media	 industry,	 in	 which	 a	 handful	 of	 powerful	 conglomerates	 dominate,	creates	a	 situation	 in	which	 relatively	 few	people	have	extraordinary	 influence	over	the	information	flowing	into	those	communication	systems.	The	production	of	 media	 content	 is	 restricted	 to	 a	 few,	 highly	 concentrated	 organisations;	moreover,	 within	 those	 organisations,	 a	 managerial	 hierarchy	 means	 that	decisions	over	the	production	of	content	are	further	restricted.	Such	a	business	model	 not	 only	 creates	 a	 class	 of	 professional	 information	 producers,	 it	 also	places	creative,	political	and	moral	authority	over	media	content	in	the	hands	of	a	small	cabal	of	media	gatekeepers	(Shirky	2008,	Kahn	and	Kellner	2007).	
The	Internet	 is	said	to	challenge	this	business-model.	Most	media	products	can	be	digitised,	copied	and	shared	–	text,	video	and	audio	files	for	instance	–	and	the	sheer	availability	and	accessibility	of	information	challenges	the	supply-limiting	media	 concentration	 model.	 Additionally,	 the	 number	 of	 media	 channels	 has	increased	 dramatically,	 liberating	 the	 technologies	 of	 transmission	 and	distribution.	 This	 is	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 network	 understanding	 of	 these	technologies.	 Instead	 of	 being	 broadcast	 en	 masse	 from	 a	 single	 producer,	information	 (media)	 flows	 between	 connected	 individual	 nodes,	 “circulating	through	the	channels	of	connection	between	nodes.”	(Castells	2009,	20).	
Whether	 it’s	 print	 (blogs),	 photographs	 (Flickr),	 audio	 (SoundCloud)	 or	 video	(YouTube),	 the	 internet	 enables	 individuals	 to	 create	 and	 distribute	 media	product.	Different	 terms	exist	 to	describe	the	change:	 internet	 technologies	are	called	participatory,	 interactive	or	 social,	 for	 instance.	 In	essence,	 the	 terms	all	describe	the	same	feature	of	the	technology:	namely,	that	audience	members	can	produce	content	almost	as	easily	as	they	can	consume	it.	As	Castells	describes	it,	
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internet	media	are	“not	media	in	the	traditional	sense.	Rather	they	are	means	of	interactive	communication”	(Castells	2009,	64).	This	creates	a	new	trend	in	the	global	 mediasphere	 –	the	 decline	 of	 mass	 media	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 “mass	 self	communication”.		
It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 apparent	 democratisation	 of	 media	 access	 and	production	 is	 not	 solely	 a	 phenomenon	 associated	 with	 digital	 technology.	Graeme	 Turner	 has	 described	 in	 detail	 the	 mass	 production	 of	 media	 status,	especially	through	the	construction	of	celebrity	–	a	trend	that	is	just	as	common	in	television	as	it	is	on	YouTube.	This	demotic	turn	is	a	fundamental	shift	in	the	function	 of	 media,	 which	 has	 “increasingly	 directly	 participated	 in	 the	construction	of	cultural	identity”	(Turner	2006,	154).		
It	 should	 also	 be	 noted	 that,	 for	 Turner,	 this	 demotic	 turn	 is	 not	 so	 much	 a	democratisation	of	media	production	–	as	it	is	for	Hartley	(1999),	for	instance	–	as	 it	 is	 an	 “accidental”	 by-product	 of	 cultural	 practices	 that	 are,	 essentially,	exploitative	 (Turner	 2010).	 Symbolic	 hierarchies	 continue	 to	 dominate	 a	mediasphere	 that	 increasingly	produces	and	consumes	celetoid	celebrities	as	a	type	of	content	production.		
“No	 amount	 of	 public	 participation	 in	 game	 shows,	 reality	 TV	 or	 DIY	celebrity	websites	will	alter	the	fact	that,	overall,	the	media	industries	still	remain	in	control	of	the	symbolic	economy,	and	that	they	still	attempt	to	operate	this	economy	in	the	service	of	their	own	interests.”	(ibid,	157).	
Clearly,	the	two	themes	–	the	supposed	flattening	of	hierarchical	media	channels	into	 communication	 networks	 and	 the	 audience’s	 ability	 to	 mass	 self-
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communicate	–	are	closely	related.	The	modern	media	ecology	is	one	in	which	all	different	 types	of	media,	 and	different	 communication	 technologies,	 are	deeply	embedded	in	each	other,	so	that	information	flows	in	complex,	multi-layered	and	multi-directional	 systems	 (Appadurai	 1991).	 As	 such,	 the	 development	 and	widespread	dissemination	of	Internet	communication	technologies	 is	clearly	an	incredibly	 significant	 trend	 in	 terms	 of	 shaping	 late-age	 modernity,	 driving	globalisation	 processes	 and	 in	 configuring	 the	 contemporary	 mediasphere.	These	 technologies	 are,	 quite	 demonstrably,	 changing	 the	 way	 that	 media	 is	produced	and	consumed,	and	changing	how	information	flows	between	socially	connected	individuals	and	within	social	formations.	As	such,	understanding	their	influence	 has	 great	 commercial,	 political	 and	 social	 significance.	 As	 described,	these	 technologies	 make	 it	 easier	 to	 produce	 media	 and	 harder	 to	 control	 its	distribution.		
McChesney	 and	 Schiller	 (2003,	 15)	 suggested	 that	 “commercially	 viable	media	content	 Internet	 sites	 remain	 few	 and	 far	 between	 –	 and,	 today,	 it	 would	 be	difficult	 to	 find	an	 investor	willing	to	bankroll	any	additional	attempts.”	Within	the	decade,	in	2012,	the	company	Facebook	floated	on	the	Nasdaq	at	$38	a	share,	pricing	the	company	at	$16	billion	(Raice	et	al.	2012);	the	micro-blogging	service	Twitter	prepared	 its	own	 initial	public	offer	 (IPO)	 in	2013	and,	 for	a	 time,	was	trading	at	a	value	approaching	$20	billion	(Shefrin	2013).	So	investors	have	not	proved	 reluctant,	 though	 the	 type	 of	media	 company	 in	 question	 is	 somewhat	different	from	what	the	authors	might	have	anticipated.	In	some	respects,	their	structure	 and	 their	 function	 are	 different	 from	 the	 global	 corporations	dominating	 traditional	 media	 forms;	 in	 other	 respects	 the	 similarities	 are	
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remarkable.		
Between	1999	and	2013	the	number	of	Internet	users	on	the	planet	grew	from	under	 40	million	 to	 2.7	 billion	 (ITU,	 2013)vii.	 The	 rapid	 expansion	 of	 portable	communication	 devices,	 including	 smartphones,	 tablets	 and	 e-readers,	 means	that	 the	 Internet	 is	 an	 increasing	 mobile	 technology.	 Globally,	 there	 are	 6.8	billion	mobile	telephone	subscriptions	(more	than	two	billion	mobile	broadband	subscriptions),	and	in	several	regions	the	number	of	subscriptions	outstrips	the	population.	Some	forecasts	predict	that	more	people	will	have	mobile	broadband	access	in	2018	than	currently	have	standard	mobile	subscriptions	–	all	of	which	means	 that	 Internet-delivered	 media	 is	 an	 increasingly	 significant	 force	 in	systems	of	culture	and	communication	(Lewis,	2008).		
Audiences,	while	 always	 implicated	 in	 the	 interactive	 creation	 of	meaning,	 are	increasingly	available	for	study,	principally	because	of	mass	self-communication	(Castells	 2010).	 The	 role	 that	 the	 audience	 plays	 in	 interpreting	 texts	 and	attaching	 meaning	 to	 social	 action	 is	 visible	 in	 a	 way	 that	 it	 has	 never	 been	previously.	This	creates	a	curious	tension	for	social	research,	including	empirical	research.	 The	 negotiation	 and	 attachment	 of	 meaning	 to	 social	 action	 feels	unknowable	because	of	its	complexity	and	yet,	because	of	Internet	technologies	and	big	data	capture,	it	is	also	tantalisingly	accessible	for	study.		
	
DEFINING	THE	INTERNET	FOR	STUDY		
Perhaps	 because	 the	 Internet	 is	 so	 available	 for	 study	 (Internet	 technology	 is	
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increasingly	‘present’;	Internet	media	penetrates	all	aspects	of	the	human-social	experience;	data	capture	tools	are	increasingly	available	to	researchers)	analyses	of	 effects	 and	 outcomes	 have	 sometimes	 proceeded	 without	 much	 prior	consideration	of	what	is	being	studied.	The	word	Internet,	itself,	is	imprecise.	It	is	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 a	 range	 of	 technologies,	 often	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 not	 strictly	correct,	 at	 least	 not	 from	 an	 engineering	 or	 computer	 science	 perspective	(Morozov	2013b,	Latour	1990).	The	word	is	capitalised	throughout	this	thesis	to	emphasise	 this	 epistemic	 uncertainty;	 the	 Internet	 can	 be	 said	 to	 have	 an	objective	existence	 in	a	 few	cases,	certainly,	but	not	 in	all	 the	ways	 the	 term	 is	used.	This	is	still	a	proper	noun,	the	name	often	given	to	a	thing,	but	in	ways	that	often	 complicate	 the	 thing	 itself.	 This	 lack	 of	 specificity	 can	 hamper	 both	theoretical	and	empirical	analysis.		
It’s	 a	 contentious	 issue	 for	 Evgeny	 Morozov,	 who	 has	 enthusiastically	 and	repetitively	 denounced	 the	 “enduring	 emptiness”	 of	 Internet	 theory,	 reserving	particular	 scorn	 for	 popular	 Internet	 theorists	 such	 as	 Tim	 O’Reilly	 and	 Clay	Shirky.	O'Reilly	 (2007)	 is	 credited	with	 introducing	 the	 semantics	 of	 ‘Web	2.0’	into	 Internet	 theory,	 while	 Shirky	 (2008)	 has	 argued	 extensively	 for	 the	collaborative	properties	of	Internet	media.	In	an	article	for	The	Baffler	magazine,	Morozov	 deconstructed	 O’Reilly’s	 role	 in	 conceiving	 and	 promoting	 several	influential	 ‘memes’	 that	 carry	 significant	 knowledge-currency	 in	 the	 realm	 of	Internet	 study	 and	 entrepreneurship	 (Morozov	 2013a).	 Effectively,	 Morozov	emphasises	a	constructionist	perspective	on	 the	 Internet.	He	argues	 that	 terms	like	 Web	 2.0	 (or	 cognitive	 surplus)	 trade	 on	 an	 assumed	 objectivity	 and	specificity	when	really	they	are	laden	with	assumption	and	highly	reductive.	
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To	avoid	both	assumption	and	misapplication	it	is	important,	right	at	the	start	of	this	 dissertation	 review	 chapter,	 to	 define	 key	 terms	 and	 to	 make	 clear	 the	provenance	 of	 these	 definitions.	 Most	 often	 in	 this	 thesis,	 Internet	 is	 used	 as	collective	noun,	a	heading	in	a	conceptual	media	taxonomy	–	to	group	together	a	range	 of	 technologies	 that	 employ	 networking	 protocols	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	distributed	 connections	 and	 communications,	 as	 in	 Internet	 communication	
technologies.		
This	 raises	a	 classification	 issue:	what	 is	an	appropriate	 taxonomy	 for	 Internet	technologies?	When	 is	 it	 valid	 to	group	 individual	applications	under	 the	same	conceptual	 umbrella,	 and	 when	 is	 it	 nonsensical?	 In	 another	 sense,	 it	 is	 a	 far	more	 fundamental	problem:	a	question	of	how	best	 to	conceive,	 formulate	and	explain	both	what	technology	is	and	how	technology	functions	in	society.	This	is	because	 the	 relationship	 between	 a	 technology	 and	 the	 humans	who	 use	 that	technology	 can	 be	 complex	 and	 contested,	 and	 a	 shift	 in	 the	 emphasis	 of	 the	conceptualisation	will	alter	the	logic	behind	the	taxonomy.		
The	debate	surrounding	this	relationship	has	a	long	and	contentious	history	and	much	of	that	history	is	well	beyond	the	scope	of	this	discussion.	On	the	one	hand,	students	of	Marshall	McLuhan	emphasise	that	“the	medium	is	the	message”	–	an	analysis	 that	 locates	 technological	 form	 right	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 human	experience	(Coupland	2010).		
For	McLuhan:		
“the	‘message’	of	any	medium	or	technology	is	the	change	of	scale	or	pace	or	 pattern	 that	 it	 introduces	 into	 human	 affairs.	 The	 railway	 did	 not	
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introduce	 movement	 or	 transportation	 or	 wheel	 or	 road	 into	 human	society,	 but	 it	 accelerated	 and	 enlarged	 the	 scale	 of	 previous	 human	functions,	 creating	 totally	new	kinds	of	 cities	 and	new	kinds	of	work	and	leisure.”	(McLuhan	1964,	8).		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 social	 constructionists,	 including	 Raymond	 Williams,	 are	careful	 to	 emphasise	 the	 social	 practices	 and	 cultural	 forces	 embodied	 in	technology	and	its	application	(Williams	1975).	Williams	was	highly	critically	of	McLuhan’s	medium-centric	 theorising,	which	 he	 characterised	 as	 technological	
determinism,	 or	 the	 assumption	 that	 social	 action	 is	 best	 explained	 by	 the	technologies	that	make	that	action	possible.	Determinism	exaggerates	the	role	of	technology	at	the	expense	of	the	individual	subject,	and	it	associates	function	too	closely	 with	 effect.	 For	 Williams,	 there	 are	 social	 (and	 subjective)	 elements	throughout	the	development	and	application	of	new	technologies.	Social	reality	is	a	co-construction:	situated	in	social	and	cultural	norms	and	structures,	partly	human	endeavour,	partly	subjective	and	partly	technological.	
Can	these	two	positions	be	resolved	to	produce	a	framework	for	understanding	technology	 (and	 a	 definition	 of	 the	 Internet)	 that	 is	 neither	 deterministic	 nor	relativist?	In	Manuel	Castells’	account	of	modernity,	technology	plays	a	starring	role,	 and	 yet	 he	 is	 at	 pains	 to	 make	 it	 quite	 clear	 that	 this	 role	 is	 not	deterministic.	Technology	 is	 socially	 constructed:	 “the	 Internet	provides	 ample	evidence	that	the	users,	particularly	the	first	thousands	of	users,	were,	to	a	large	extent,	 the	producers	of	 the	technology.”	(Castells	2005,	4).	As	Thomas	Hughes	wrote	 in	 his	 account	 of	 the	 electrification	 of	 western	 society,	 any	 “effort	 to	explain	 the	 change	 involves	 consideration	 of	 many	 fields	 of	 human	 activity,	
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including	 the	 technical,	 the	 scientific,	 the	 economic,	 the	 political,	 and	 the	organizational.	 This	 is	 because	 power	 systems	 are	 cultural	 artefacts.”	 (Hughes	1983,	 2).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 however:	 “technology	 is	 a	 necessary,	 albeit	 not	sufficient	condition	for	the	emergence	of	a	new	form	of	social	organization	based	on	networking,	that	is	on	the	diffusion	of	networking	in	all	realms	of	activity	on	the	basis	of	digital	communication	networks.”	(Castells	2005,	4).	Society	makes	technology,	and	technology	remakes	society,	and	so	the	two	are	bound	together:	technologies	“are	both	causes	and	effects	of	social	change”	(Hughes	1983,	2).			
However,	 to	 say	 that	 “technology	 is	 society”,	 as	 Castells	 does,	 seems	unsatisfactoryviii .	 It	 appears,	 for	 instance,	 to	 make	 the	 two	 factors	 wholly	encompassing	of	 each	other:	 if	 technology	 is	 society,	 then	how	 is	 it	possible	 to	perceive,	or	observe,	or	explain	any	sort	of	social	action	beyond	technology	and	vice	versa?	Perhaps	 it	 is	not	meant	 to	be:	humans	and	 technology	have	always	been	entangled	in	the	co-construction	of	society.	At	the	same	time,	however,	 to	‘base’	 a	 new	 form	 of	 social	 organisation	 on	 networking	 is	 to	 suggest	 that	technology	is	not	so	much	a	“sufficient	condition”	as	a	sufficient	pre-condition	of	social	change.	Otherwise,	what’s	to	say	that	humans	didn’t	design	social	network	technologies	 to	 suit	 a	 mode	 of	 social	 organisation	 –	 diffuse,	 distributed,	networked	–	that	was	already	in	existence?	The	risk	of	circularity	is	evident.		
Castells	is	able	to	conceive	of	the	technology	before	the	social	change	with	which	he	 associates	 it.	Whereas	 knowledge	 and	 information	 have	 been	 central	 in	 all	historically	 known	 societies:	 “What	 is	 new	 is	 the	 microelectronics-based,	networking	 technologies	 that	 provide	new	 capabilities	 to	 an	old	 form	of	 social	organization:	networks.”	(Castells	2005,	5,	my	emphasis).	It	makes	no	difference	
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whether	the	new	network	is	an	evolution	of	an	old	form,	or	a	new	form	in	and	of	itself,	 what	matters	 is	 that	 it	 is	 new,	 that	 it	 didn’t	 exist	 previously,	 and	 that	 it	exists	now	because	of	technological	change	that	came	first.			
In	a	universal	sense,	perhaps,	technology	and	society	are	inseparable,	but	in	the	narrower	 process	 of	 seeking	 explanations	 for	 social	 events,	 for	 empirically	observed	phenomena,	 theorists	 frequently	 resort	 to	 technological	 explanations	that	 aren’t	 quite	 deterministic.	 These	 explanations	 may	 simply	 be	 the	 most	recent	link	in	a	techno-social	causal	change	stretching	back	millennia,	but	in	the	short	 term	 –	 in	 the	 immediacy	 of	 interest	 –	 it	 makes	 some	 sense	 to	 place	technology	before	society,	or	society	before	technology,	as	the	situation	dictates	–	 provided,	 of	 course,	 that	 there	 is	 an	 empirically	 plausible,	 theoretically	reasonable	explanation	for	a	causal	relationship.	
The	 question	 becomes:	 how	 best	 to	 do	 this?	 How	 should	 the	 relationship	between	 a	 technology	 and	 its	 human	 users	 be	 formulated	 to	 allow	 for	construction	and	determination	on	both	sides?		
One	 possible	 solution	 –	 certainly	 one	 that	 has	 gained	 favour	 in	 the	anthropological	and	ethnographic	fields	–	is	to	adopt	and	to	adapt	the	concept	of	
affordances	 originally	proposed	by	 James	Gibson,	 	 a	 cognitive	psychologist.	For	Gibson,	writing	about	the	relationship	between	animals	and	the	environment,	an	affordance	 was	 something	 offered	 or	 suggested	 by	 the	 environment	 to	 the	animal:	 it	 “implies	 the	 complementarity	 of	 the	 animal	 and	 the	 environment”	(Gibson	 1979,	 56).	 Gibson’s	 argument	was	 that	 behaviours	 or	 actions	 become	possible	 only	 through	 interaction	 between	man	 and	 object	 	 (objects	 being	 the	“furniture	of	 the	earth”).	When	observing	an	object,	man	sees	not	some	 innate,	
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intrinsic	or	absolute	qualities	but	instead	affordances	–	what	seems	promising	in	terms	 of	 object-human	 interaction.	 For	 technology	 theorists	 trying	 to	 avoid	determinism,	this	is	a	useful	distinction.		
The	object	 (software)	affords	certain	actions:	 it	 shapes	but	does	not	determine	them.	As	 Joinson	and	Piwek	(2013,	8)	 suggest,	 the	utility	of	affordances	 is	 that	“they	 imply	a	direct,	 in	some	cases	designed,	 link	between	the	properties	of	an	object,	material	or	tool,	and	the	uses	to	which	it	is	put.”	For	Hutchby	(2001,	444),	affordances	 are:	 “functional	 and	 relational	 aspects	 which	 frame,	 while	 not	determining,	 the	 possibilities	 for	 agentic	 action	 in	 relation	 to	 an	 object.”	 The	question	 then,	 of	 course,	 is	what	 functional	 and	 relational	 aspects?	Where	 are	they	located,	how	can	they	be	identified,	and	by	what	mechanisms,	exactly,	does	that	framing	of	agentic	action	take	place?		
According	 to	 boyd	 (2011,	 39):	 “affordances…	 shape	 how	 people	 engage	 with	these	 environments.	 The	 properties	 of	 bits	 —	 as	 distinct	 from	 atoms	 —	introduce	 new	 possibilities	 for	 interaction.”	 In	 other	 words,	 Hutchby’s	“functional	 and	 relational	 aspects”	 are	 properties	 of	 bits	 themselves,	 of	 the	primary	 information	 units	 in	 computing.	 This	 seems	 too	 sweeping	 a	generalisation	–	 it	doesn’t	discriminate	sufficiently	between	the	vastly	different	software	 technologies	 that	 run	 on	 the	 Internet	 using	 bitwise	 computer	processing.	 Rather	 than	 reducing	 all	 Internet	 technologies	 to	 elemental	properties,	it	is	surely	more	productive	to	conceptualise	the	Internet	as	a	layered	technology,	with	each	layer	having	different	properties	that	interact	to	present	a	system	of	affordances	to	the	end	user,	users	or	social	institutions.	From	beneath	this	 user-facing	 surface	may	 emerge	 traces	 of	 deeper	 affordances	 (networking	
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potential,	processing	speed	and	so	on,	 the	properties	of	 ‘bits’).	 It	 thus	becomes	possible	 to	 conceive	 both	 local	 and	 pervasive	 affordances	 operating	simultaneously,	 the	 first	 being	 particular	 to	 specific	 applications	 or	 interfaces,	the	latter	lurking	in	the	deeper	layers	of	the	Internet	architecture,	shaping	these	local	interactions.	
Best	(2009)	seeks	to	develop	the	concept	of	affordances	critically,	starting	with	the	 premise	 that	 a	 central	 feature	 of	 digital	 technology	 is	 the	 issue	 of	 control.	Reframing	 the	 notion	 of	 enabling	 affordances,	 Best	 argues	 that	 “the	 more	competent	a	 technology’s	 functional	and	perceived	affordances,	 the	greater	 the	experience	 of	 user	 control”	 (ibid	 1015).	 A	 technology	 can	 grant	 its	 users	 an	experience	of	control	–	the	ability	to	manipulate	it	for	particular	purposes.		More	specifically:		
“When	a	 technology	 accomplishes	 its	 professed	 aim	and	does	what	 it	 is	supposed	 to	 do	 –	 when	 it	 fulfils	 its	 functional	 affordances	–	 a	 user	 will	most	 likely	 feel	 in	 control	of	 the	 task.	When	a	 technology	 is	 easy	 to	use	and	 understand	 –	when	 its	perceived	affordances	are	 sufficient	 –	 a	 user	will	most	likely	feel	in	control	of	the	technology.”	(ibid	1020).	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 users	 can	 also	 be	 confronted	 with	 the	 sense	 of	 being	controlled	 by	 technological	 architecture ix ,	 an	 experience	 which	 must	 be	negotiated	 by	 “modifying	 use,	 modifying	 the	 technology,	 decreasing	 use	 and	acceptance”	(Best	and	Tozer	2012,	401).	Rather	than	enabling	human	potential,	digital	 technology	 (code)	 is	 an	 obstacle,	 with	 “power	 to	 layer	 commands	constricting	 use”	 (ibid,	 402).	 The	 concept	 of	 affordance	 must	 be	 flexible,	
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therefore,	 to	 account	 for	 this	 power	 struggle	 between	 deterministic	 code	 and	adaptive,	sometime	recalcitrant	users.		
The	challenge,	 then,	 in	defining	 the	 Internet	 for	 study,	 is	 to	provide	both	a	 full	account	 of	 the	 objective	 technological	 properties,	 and	 a	 conceptual	 framework	that	can	integrate	those	properties	into	a	constructivist	account	of	social	action.	Software	studies	is	an	emergent	field	that	seeks	to	explore	how	“digital	objects,	languages,	 and	 logical	 structures…	makes	 possible	 much	 of	 the	 contemporary	world.”	(Fuller	2008,	1).	 It	 is	a	critical	enquiry	 into	the	affordances	of	software	for	social	action	and,	as	such,	is	a	guiding	rubric	for	this	thesis.	Instead	of	being	something	ephemeral	and	elemental,	digital	technology	is	bundled	software	–	an	object	 in	 the	world,	 itself	 constructed	 from	 digital	 objects,	 bits,	 languages	 and	logical	 operators.	 Twitter	 is	 bundled	 software	 running	 on	 the	 Internet	(constructed	 from	 pipes	 and	 protocols).	 Users	 interact	 with	 that	 software	through	 web	 browsers,	 smartphone	 applications,	 desktop	 clients	 and	 various	other	 user	 interfaces.	 Through	 this	 interaction	 Twitter	 affords	 certain	behaviours,	one	of	which	is	communicative	interaction	with	other	Twitter	users.	The	 purpose	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 explore	 this	 interaction	 between	 software	 and	discourse,	 to	unpack	 the	shaping	 logics	and	 to	ask	whether	Twitter	affords	 the	sort	of	communication	compatible	with	existing	democratic	practices.		
Distinct	 software	 applications	 may	 be	 layered	 similarly	 and	 may	 present	affordances	that	are	similar,	and	this	is	what	van	Dijck	and	Poell	(2013)	identify	as	 logics.	 Social	 media	 –	 Facebook,	 Twitter,	 Instagram	 and	 so	 on	 –	 may	 be	discussed	 as	 a	 group	 usefully	 because	 each	 is	 an	 assemblage	 of	 similar	 logics,	which	 is	 to	 say	 that	 they	 share	 affordances.	 Equally,	 deeper	 affordances	 –	
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networking	 potential,	 processing	 speeds	 and	 so	 on	 –	 may	 penetrate	 across	 a	wider	range	of	software	applications	–	ultimately,	all	software	applications	that	run	on	the	Internet	are	shaped,	at	least	in	part,	by	the	technological	architecture	of	networked	computing.	In	order	to	fully	comprehend	Internet	software,	then,	it	is	first	necessary	to	comprehend	the	computing	and	communications	technology	that	permits	the	software	to	run.	
	
NETWORKED	COMMUNICATION	PROTOCOL	
Alan	Turing	defined	a	computer	as	a	programmable	digital	machine,	one	capable	of	 carrying	 out	 operations	 or	 calculations	 on	 a	 data	 store	 according	 to	instructions	reducible	to	binary	numerals	(Turing	1950).	The	full	implications	of	that	 definition	 are	 too	 broad	 for	 exploration	 here,	 but	 suffice	 to	 say	 the	computing	 technology	 enables	 all	 types	 of	 complex	 processing	 and	communicative	 capabilities.	 In	 the	 simplest	 possible	 sense,	 the	 Internet	 is	 a	series	 of	 connections	 between	 computers	 made	 possible	 by	 packet	 switching	technology	 (Leiner	 et	 al.	 2009).	 The	 problem	 is	 that	 this	 rather	 simple	mechanical	 definition	 is	 easily	 expressed	 in	 far	 more	 expansive	 terms.	 	 For	instance:	 “The	 Internet	 is	 at	 once	 a	 world-wide	 broadcasting	 capability,	 a	mechanism	for	 information	dissemination,	and	a	medium	for	collaboration	and	interaction	 between	 individuals	 and	 their	 computers	 without	 regard	 for	geographic	 location.”	 (Leiner	 et	 al.	 2009,	 22).	 There	 is	 nothing	 hugely	controversial	 in	 that	 second	definition	except	 that	 it	begins	 to	 include	 features	that	are	enabled	by	 the	 Internet,	 rather	 than	 limiting	 itself	 to	 features	 that	are	
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strictly	 technological.	This	 subtle	difference	 is	 too	often	 the	 cause	of	 imprecise	and	inaccurate	claims	about	the	scope	and	the	science	of	the	Internet.		
Packet	 switching	 technology	 was	 originally	 a	 project	 of	 the	 US	 government,	through	 its	 Advanced	 Research	 Projects	 Agency	 (ARPA)	 (later	 called	 Defense	Advanced	 Research	 Projects	 Agency	 (DARPA))	 and	 Massachusetts	 Institute	 of	Technology	(MIT)	scientists	(Abbate	2000).	Packet	switching,	put	simply,	 is	the	ability	 to	 transmit	 information	 between	 digital	 computing	 machines	 in	 data	streams	 consisting	 of	 blocks	 or	 packets.	 The	 ability	 to	 connect	 computers	 this	way	was	conceived	and	described	by	different	scientists	in	several	papers	during	the	early	1960s	 (Leiner	et	al.	2009,	Kleinrock	1964).	A	series	of	 collaborations	between	 researchers,	 their	 laboratories	 and	 the	 US	 government	 led	 to	 the	engineering,	 in	 1968,	 of	 ARPANET	 –	 the	 first	 functioning	 packet-switching	network	 of	 computer-computer	 connections.	 The	 US	 government’s	 interest	 in	this	 nascent	 technology	was	 primarily	 born	 of	 defence	 and	 security	 concerns:	ARPANET	promised	a	distributed	and	interconnected	data	store,	which	would	be	resilient	 to	 any	 one	 of	 its	 individual	 connections	 failing	 –	 a	 potential	 valuable	attribute	 in	 the	 face	 of	 a	 nuclear	 strike	 or	 some	 other	 Cold	 War	 catastrophe	(Castells	1996).		
ARPANET	 grew	 in	 size	 and	 complexity	 over	 the	 next	 few	 years	 as	 engineers	added	 networking	 protocols	 and	 began	 to	 develop	 applications	 to	 run	 on	 the	new	technology.	An	application	 is	defined	here	as	a	collection	of	technologies	–	front	and	back	end	software,	databases	–	that	operate	synchronously	to	enable	a	particular	function	or	service.	Email	is	an	example	and	was	first	demonstrated	in	1972:	“a	harbinger	of	the	kind	of	activity	we	see	on	the	World	Wide	Web	today,	
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namely,	the	enormous	growth	of	all	kinds	of	“people-to-people”	traffic.”	(Leiner	et	 al.	 2009,	24).	The	 transformation	of	ARPANET	 into	 the	 Internet	 relied	upon	changes	 to	 the	 original	 communication	 protocols,	 which	 are	 essentially	 digital	rules	 –	 or	 programs	 –	 governing	 how	data	 should	 be	 exchanged	 in	 networked	systems.	 The	 original	 ARPANET	 protocols	 were,	 for	 various	 reasons,	 too	inflexible	 to	allow	open-architecture	networking,	of	 the	 type	envisioned	by	 the	Internet’s	 pioneers.	 An	 engineering	 solution	 to	 this	 inflexibility	was	 developed	and	 first	 described	 in	 1973	 (Leiner	 et	 al.	 2009).	 The	 Transmission	 Control	Protocol/Internet	 Protocol	 (TCP/IP)	 remains	 the	 principal	 communication	protocol	 governing	 Internet	 communication	 and	 is	 particularly	 notable	 for	 the	way	that	it	allows	so	many	different	applications	to	run	on	the	same	underlying	network	architecture	.		
This,	 of	 course,	 is	 the	 key	 distinction.	 So	many	 features	 of	 what	 is	 commonly	called	the	Internet	are,	more	accurately,	applications	that	run	on	the	Internet	and	its	 TCP/IP	 architecture.	 As	 ARPANET	 evolved	 into	 the	 Internet,	 via	 many	different,	 smaller	 scale	 networks	 (CSNET,	 USENET),	 the	 communication	applications	 that	 the	 network	 supported	 became	 increasingly	 integral	 to	 the	concept	 of	 the	 Internet	 itself,	 so	 that	 in	 1985,	 the	 Federal	Networking	 Council	(FNC)	 –	 a	 US	 federal	 body	 set	 up	 to	 manage	 the	 sharing	 and	 coordination	 of	infrastructure	costs	and	development	–	issued	the	following	definition:		
The	 Federal	 Networking	 Council	 (FNC)	 agrees	 that	 the	 following	 language	
reflects	 our	 definition	 of	 the	 term	 “Internet”.	 “Internet”	 refers	 to	 the	 global	
information	system	that	--	(i)	is	logically	linked	together	by	a	globally	unique	
address	 space	 based	 on	 the	 Internet	 Protocol	 (IP)	 or	 its	 subsequent	
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extensions/follow-ons;	 (ii)	 is	 able	 to	 support	 communications	 using	 the	
Transmission	 Control	 Protocol/Internet	 Protocol	 (TCP/IP)	 suite	 or	 its	
subsequent	 extensions/follow-ons,	 and/or	 other	 IP-	 compatible	 protocols;	
and	(iii)	provides,	uses	or	makes	accessible,	either	publicly	or	privately,	high	
level	 services	 layered	 on	 the	 communications	 and	 related	 infrastructure	
described	herein.	(Leiner	et	al.	2009,	30).	
The	 uncertainty	 between	 where	 the	 Internet	 ends	 and	 Internet	 applications	begin	is	problematic	 in	the	social	sciences.	The	situation	is	well	 illustrated	by	a	related	term:	network.	Strictly	speaking,	in	the	language	of	computing	and	digital	communications,	 a	 network	 is	 a	 distributed	 system	 of	 digital	 computers	 that	connect	 and	 coordinate	 according	 to	 a	 set	 of	 pre-defined	 communication	protocols	 (Leiner	 et	 al.	 2009,	 Castells	 1996).	 There	 is	 a	 strict	 determinism	inherent	 in	 the	 term:	 it	 implies	 that	 the	 things	 connected	 (the	 computers)	 and	the	connections	between	them	have	certain	properties	determined	by	the	rules	of	 digital	 computing	 and	 the	 protocols.	 The	 phrase	 social	 network,	 however,	though	assumed	to	exist	because	of	the	digital	network,	cannot	include	any	such	determinism.	So	how	is	the	social	network	like	the	digital	network	at	all?	A	social	network	 is	 a	 loose	 collection	 of	 relationships	 identified	 between	 different	humans	 beings	 –	 the	 network	 part	 of	 the	 phrase	 has	 very	 little	 to	 do	 with	networking	 as	 it	 is	 commonly	 understood	 in	 the	 Internet	 context	 (Marin	 and	Wellman	2010,	Scott	1988).	
Castells	theorised	that	globalisation	(social)	forces:	
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“could	 only	 be	 effectuated	 because	 they	 have	 at	 their	 disposal	 the	 global	networking	 capacity	provided	by	digital	 communication	 technologies	 and	information	 systems…	This	 is,	 in	 fact,	what	 separates,	 in	 size,	 speed,	 and	complexity,	 the	 current	 process	 of	 globalization	 from	 previous	 forms	 of	globalization	in	earlier	historical	periods.”	(Castells	2009,	24-25).		
It	 is	 little	 exaggeration	 to	 say	 that	 the	 network	 is	 the	 dominant	 concept	 in	contemporary	 research	 in	 digital	 media	 and	 communication.	 It	 has	 gained	prominence	 through	 the	 work	 of	 authors	 like	 Yochai	 Benkler	 (2006),	 and	 is	supported	by	 a	 variety	 of	 quantitative	network	 science	 techniques,	which	 take	advantage	 of	 modern	 processing	 power	 to	 analyse	 and	 summarise	 relatively	accessible	social	media	big	data	(Hansen	et	al.	2011).	Castells	has	documented	in	detail	 how	 networked	 computing	 power	 is	 transforming	 finance,	 industry,	politics,	 the	 media	 and	 several	 other	 critical	 components	 of	 human	 social	experience.	 According	 to	 this	 interpretation,	 contemporary	 globalisation	becomes	 a	 function	 of	 network	 reconfiguration	 and	 of	 microelectronic	technological	 development	 —	 especially	 communication	 technologies.	 “Digital	networks	 are	 global,	 as	 they	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 reconfigure	 	 themselves,	 as	directed	 by	 their	 programmers,	 transcending	 territorial	 and	 institutional	boundaries	through	telecommunicated	computer	networks.”	(Castells	2009,	24).	
The	many	arguments	 that	emphasise	 the	networking	 logic	of	digital	media	are,	on	 the	 whole,	 effectively	 comparative	 statements:	 digital	 communication	technologies	 are	 networked	 structures	 whereas	 broadcast	 and	 print	technologies	 are	not.	 According	 to	Castells	 (2009,	 64),	 internet	media	 are	 “not	media	 in	 the	 traditional	 sense.	 Rather	 they	 are	 means	 of	 interactive	
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communication”.	This	type	of	 interactive	mass	self-communication	challenges	a	media	industry	in	which	a	handful	of	powerful	conglomerates	dominate,	and	in	which	relatively	few	people	have	extraordinary	influence.	Moreover,	it	is	argued,	within	these	organisations,	a	managerial	hierarchy	means	that	decisions	over	the	production	 of	 content	 are	 further	 restricted.	 Such	 a	 business	 model	 not	 only	creates	 a	 class	 of	 professional	 information	 producers,	 it	 also	 places	 creative,	political	and	moral	authority	over	media	content	in	the	hands	of	a	small	cabal	of	media	gatekeepers	(Kahn	and	Kellner	2007).			
Mass	self-communication	via	networks	is	meant	to	disempower	these	privileged	roles	 and	 the	 institutional	 structures	 within	 which	 they	 reside.	 The	 modern	media	 ecology	 is	 one	 in	 which	 all	 different	 types	 of	 media,	 and	 different	communication	 technologies,	 are	 deeply	 embedded	 in	 each	 other,	 so	 that	information	flows	in	complex,	multi-layered	and	multi-directional	systems.			
The	network-affordance	approach	sees	Internet	communication	technologies	as	agents	of	 socio-structural	 reconfiguration.	 In	 turn,	 these	 ‘networked’	groupings	enable	 new	 patterns	 of	 information	 transmission,	 new	 forms	 of	 social	organisation	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 redistributing	 power	 between	 social	 actors.	This	 approach	 is	 a	 recurrent	 theme	 in	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 analysis.	 The	 use	 of	 the	term	 network	 in	 sociology	 “conjures	 up	 strange	 but	 surprisingly	 powerful	images	of	social	reality”	(Scott	1988,	109).		
"The	 word	 network	 indicates	 that	 resources	 are	 concentrated	 in	 a	 few	places	–	the	knots	and	the	nodes	–	which	are	connected	with	one	another	–	the	 links	 and	 the	 meshes:	 these	 connections	 transform	 the	 scattered	resources	 into	a	net	 that	may	seem	to	extend	everywhere."	(Latour	1987,	
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180).		
Network	 theory	 appeared	 in	 classical	 sociology	 long	 before	 it	was	 adopted	 by	Internet	 theorists	or,	more	widely,	proponents	of	mathematical	 social	network	analysis.		
“Sociology,	 from	 its	 earliest	 days,	 has	 been	 concerned	 with	 the	 ways	 in	which	 the	 social	 relations	between	people	 constitute	 a	distinct	 reality	 sui	
generis.	 This	 realm	of	 social	 structure	was	 seen	 as	 produced	 through	 the	intersection	of	chains	of	action	and	their	unintended	consequences.	While	classical	 sociologists	 may	 have	 disagreed	 among	 themselves	 on	 the	question	 of	 whether	 such	 structures	 were	 reducible,	 in	 principle,	 to	 the	constituent	 social	 actions	 of	 the	 people	who	produced	 them,	 there	was	 a	general	 agreement	 that	 social	 structures	 had	 distinct	 and	 important	properties	 which	 provided	 the	 basic	 subject	 matter	 of	 the	 discipline	 of	sociology.	It	was,	perhaps,	in	classical	German	sociology	that	this	viewpoint	was	 most	 explicitly	 allied	 with	 the	 metaphor	 of	 a	 ‘network’	 of	 social	relations,	 the	 social	 world	 being	 depicted	 as	 an	 intertwined	 mesh	 of	connections	through	which	individuals	were	bound	together.”	(Scott	1988,	109-110).	
There	 are	 two	 points	 to	 emphasise.	 First,	 a	 network	 approach	 to	 sociology	 is	inherently	 a	 structural	 approach,	 which	 inevitably	 reduces	 the	 role	 that	meaning-making	plays	 in	connecting	social	reality	and	social	action.	 It	assumes	that	the	network	is	an	overriding	influence	on	human	behaviour;	as	such,	it	tends	to	 ignore	 individual	 subjectivity.	 Second,	 the	 network	 begins	 as	 a	metaphor	 in	sociology	–	social	relations	are	described	as	network-like.	This	is	a	very	different	
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position	from	an	“American	and	British	concern…	for	the	structural	properties	of	networks	of	social	relations"	(Scott	1988,	111).	At	some	point	in	the	evolution	of	network	theory,	the	metaphorical	element	was	forgotten	and	the	social	relations	themselves	assumed	the	structural	properties	of	being	networks.		
Erickson	 (2012,	 912)	 cautioned	 that	 one	 risk	 behind	 adopting	 the	 network	metaphor	 as	 the	 default	 analytical	 tool	 (a	 prism	 through	 which	 to	 view	 all	Internet	 communication	 technologies)	 is	 that	 “the	 use	 and	 articulation	 of	metaphors,	particularly	spatial	metaphors,	can	have	remarkable	effects	upon	our	perceptions.”	 What	 he	 was	 referring	 to	 is	 the	 difficulty	 in	 abstracting	 social	complexity	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 better	 understand	 it,	 and	 then	 re-applying	 that	abstraction	 as	 though	 it	 were	 an	 objective	 actualisation	 of	 the	 social.	 This	becomes	a	particularly	acute	issue	if	the	abstraction	–	in	this	case,	the	network	–	reduces	complexity	in	order	to	make	a	situation	intelligible.	For	instance,	social	network	 science	 (SNS)	 approaches	 to	 studying	 internet	 communication	technologies	often	map	network	graphs,	in	which	the	connections	between	users	are	identified	and	plotted.	These	graphs	are	then	used	to	identify	the	influence	of	particular	users,	 for	 instance,	 or	 to	 compute	 the	 strength	or	 the	 inwardness	of	the	network.		
Apart	 from	 the	 self-fulfilling	 circularity	 of	 these	 approaches	 (the	 network	 is	defined	by	the	means	used	to	define	it),	there	is	a	worrying	necessity	to	assume	that	 all	 connections	 function	effectively	 the	 same.	Even	 the	more	 sophisticated	network	 analyses	 only	 take	 into	 account	 a	 handful	 of	 parameters	 when	considering	 different	 types	 of	 connection	 (one	 directional	 or	 reciprocal,	 for	instance).	 Furthermore,	 all	 nodes	 are	 assumed	 to	 function	 according	 to	 their	
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position	 in	 the	 wider	 network	 (Marin	 and	 Wellman	 2010).	 As	 such,	 network	sociology	is	more	concerned	with	the	relationships	between	individual	subjects		than	the	subjects	themselves.	The	complex	liminal	and	subliminal		processes	that	generate	 individual	 consciousness	 are	 subjugated	 to	 the	 network-governed	positioning	(and	information	processing	capacity)	of	individual	nodesx.		
Network	 analysis	 comes	with	 a	 range	 of	 associated	 terminology	 (nodes,	 links)	and	 derived	 theories	 that	 are	 better	 at	 describing	 the	 behaviour	 of	 computers	than	they	are	human	beings.	When	the	approach	is	welded	on	to	human	activity,	the	danger	is	that	the	abstraction	is	both	too	generic	and	too	removed	from	the	experience.	 In	 other	 words,	 we	 force	 our	 description	 of	 human	 behaviour	 to	seem	like	the	behaviour	of	computers	precisely	because	we	are	analysing	human	behaviour	 as	 though	 it	 were	 governed	 by	 networked	 communication	architecture.	 It	 is	 the	difference	between	saying	that	humans	send	messages	 to	each	other	 about	protests	 in	 Iran	using	networked	 communication	 technology,	and	saying	that	humans	protesting	in	Iran	are	part	of	networks	defined	by	that	communication	 technology.	 This	 risks	 demoting	 or,	 worse,	 ignoring	 all	 other	sorts	of	social	relationships.	As	Erickson	observes	presciently:	“networks,	if	they	exist,	must	at	least	be	a	part	of	society,	and	if	not,	if	they	are	all	of	society,	then	we	are	just	swapping	one	unknown	thing	for	another.”	(Erickson	2012,	912).		
Even	 disregarding	 this	 uncertainty,	 how	 useful	 is	 the	 network	 for	 unpicking	these	systems	and	for	understanding	how	they	work?	It	is	one	thing	to	describe	these	systems	in	the	new	mediasphere	and	to	say	that	they	are	network-based,	but	 how	much	 explanatory	 power	 is	 there	 in	 such	 a	 statement?	 In	 essence,	 a	network	 is	nothing	more	complex	than	the	connections	between	things;	calling	
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something	 a	 network	 doesn’t	 explain	 the	 nature	 or	 the	 effect	 of	 those	connections.	The	sociologist	Wilhelm	Baldamus	felt	that	the	use	of	the		network	metaphor	 in	 the	 social	 sciences	 was	 remarkable	 because	 it	 had	 “hardly	 any	explanatory	power	to	start	with”	(Baldamus	1982/2010,	107).		
The	power	of	the	network	metaphor	comes	from	its	description	of	the	“invisible	bonds”	that	connect	individuals	in	“criss-cross	mesh	of	connections”	(Scott	1988,	109).	 In	other	words,	within	society	 individuals	are	connected	 to	each	other	 in	variable,	complex	and	tangled	relationships.	This	is	hardly	a	revelation;	rather	it	is	 shorthand	 for	 a	 state	 that	 defies	 logical	 and	 intelligible	 disentanglement.	 As	Erickson	(2012,	913)	writes:	“network	sociology	is	conceptually	vacuous	as	it	is	merely	applying	a	different	range	of	labels	to	objects	identified	in	the	world,	and	will	often	apply	a	number	of	different	labels	to	the	same	phenomena.”		
The	 properties	 of	 the	 network	 metaphor	 that	 are	 relevant,	 then,	 are	 not	properties	 that	 do	 much	 to	 explain,	 simplify	 or	 otherwise	 explicate	 the	functioning	 of	 social	 reality.	 This	 is	 particularly	 a	 problem	 for	 social	 network	analysis	when	 it	 is	applied	 to	 Internet-enabled	social	construction.	Rather	 than	explore	 the	 complex	 entanglement	 of	 affordances	 suggested	 by	 the	 original	metaphor,	 these	 approaches	 tend	 to	 emphasise	 the	properties	 of	 the	 computer	
networks	and	to	apply	these	to	the	social	structures	under	consideration.	This	is	convenient	 and	 tempting,	 perhaps,	 especially	 given	 the	 preponderance	 of	 self-labelled	 social	networks	 in	 social	media.	However,	 these	 two	 types	of	network	
are	not	the	same:	they	are	subtly	but	significantly	different.	The	original	network	metaphor	emphasises	 the	complex	entanglement	of	 social	 relations	 (which	can	assume	 an	 infinite	 variety	 of	 forms,	 defying	 easy	 categorisation),	 whereas	 the	
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appropriation	 of	 computer	 networks	 implies	 a	 logical	 and	 mathematically	resolvable	 system	 that	 adheres	 to	 the	 distributed,	 packet-switching	 logic	 of	computing	systems.	In	short,	the	interpretation	of	affordances	in	social	network	analysis	is	confused	and	prone	to	technological	determinism.		
The	 preference	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 avoid	 social	 network	 analysis	 as	 a	 tool	 for	exploring	 human	 communicative	 behaviour	 and	 social	 structures,	 and	 only	 to	use	the	term	network	to	refer	to	applications	whose	function,	to	some	extent,	is	determined	 by	 the	 network	 architecture	 of	 the	 Internet.	 So,	 for	 instance,	Facebook	is	a	network	tool	because	it	runs	on	a	network	technology,	not	because	it	creates	social	networks	between	its	many	users.		
On	the	whole,	the	software	applications	of	interest	in	this	thesis	–	i.e.	those	that	people	were	using	to	discuss	the	UK	riots	–	are	children	of	the	World	Wide	Web,	itself	an	application	that	runs	on	the	Internet:	“The	Internet	is	like	a	network	of	electronic	 roads	 criss-crossing	 the	 planet	 –	 the	 much-hyped	 information	superhighway.	 The	 Web	 is	 just	 one	 of	 many	 services	 using	 that	 network”	(Cailliau	and	Gillies	2000,	1).	
The	Web	is	actually	a	suite	of	integrated	technologies,	famously	invented	by	Tim	Berners-Lee,	 a	 software	 engineer	 at	 CERN,	 in	 1989	 (Berners-Lee	 and	 Fischetti	2000,	Connolly	2000).	The	first	is	Hypertext	Markup	Language	(HTML),	in	which	web	 pages	 are	 written,	 and	 which	 is	 read	 and	 interpreted	 by	 browser	applications	in	order	to	display	content.	The	Uniform	Resource	Identifier	(URI)	is	an	address	system	necessary	for	locating	individual	resources	stored	somewhere	in	 the	 Web-running	 domain	 of	 the	 Internet.	 Finally,	 the	 Hypertext	 Transfer	Protocol	(HTTP)	is	employed	to	request	and	retrieve	Web-specific	resources.	 It	
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is	 simply	 another	 communication	 protocol,	 just	 specific	 to	 the	 Web,	 but	 it	 is	highly	 influential	 in	 that	 it	permits	 the	 linking	of	 resources	and	 the	creation	of	the	 ‘web’	 effect	 that	 is	 so	 crucial	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 digital	 information	flows	and	connectedness	(Berners-Lee	et	al.	1994/2003).	
The	development	of	HTML,	URI	and	HTTP	made	possible,	 for	the	first	time,	the	Internet	applications	that	served	content	in	a	way	that	was	accessible	to	general	computer	users	(Abbate	2000).	Crucial	to	this	development	was	CERN’s	decision	to	make	these	technologies	public	and	royalty-free	in	1993.	In	the	early	nineties,	web	 documents	 were	 very	 different	 from	 their	 modern	 equivalents:	 Berners-Lee’s	 invention	permitted	the	identification	and	retrieval	of	 information	via	the	Internet,	but	 it	did	 little	 to	make	 that	 information	as	engaging,	 appealing	or	as	influential	as	it	is	now.	That	transition	was	vital	for	transforming	the	Web	from	a	communication	and	 information	tool	 into	 the	social	and	culture	ecosystem	it	 is	today	(Hindeman	2010,	Cailliau	and	Gillies	2000).		
Facebook	and	Twitter	are	Web	technologies	that	run	on	the	Internetxi.	They	are	alike	 and	 they	 are	 different	 because	 although	 they	 make	 use	 of	 the	 same	underlying	 network,	 they	 are	 designed,	 engineered	 and	 used	 differently:	 they	enable	different	services	and	different	communicative	experiences.	Sticking	with	precise	 technical	 definitions	 permits	 a	 clear	 distinction	 between	 these	technologies,	 based	 on	 programing	 choices	 (code),	 data	 storage	 and	 User	Interface	 design.	 The	 benefit	 of	 a	 software	 studies	 approach	 is	 that	 it	 seeks	 to	combine	a	deep	understanding	of	software	with	 the	social	analysis	of	practices	through	which	software	is	realised.	The	following	extended	quote	from	Bernhard	
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Rieder	 is	 particularly	 instructive	 in	 terms	 of	 defining	 software	 technology	 in	terms	of	its	social	significance:		
“ultimately,	 if	 our	 business	 is	 not	 with	 the	 matter	 of	 how	 mechanical	computation	 is	possible	 in	 the	 first	place,	but	with	software	as	an	object	in-the-world…	The	elegant	concept	of	computation	then	quickly	begins	to	
bloat	 up	 with	 many	 different	 things:	 real	 computers,	 not	 just	 abstract	Turing	 machines;	 real	 software,	 lodged	 in	 tight	 networks	 of	 other	software,	 all	 written	 for	 a	 purpose;	 knowledge,	 ideas,	 skills,	 tools,	methodology,	 habits,	 and	 values	 that	 permeate	 practices	 embedded	 in	layers	of	social	organization,	cultural	configurations,	economic	rationales,	and	political	struggles.”	(Rieder	2012).	
The	 challenge	 for	 empirical	 researchers	 is	 to	 be	 cognisant	 of	 the	 factors	 that	make	 computation	 “bloat	 up”	 in	 this	 way.	 More	 often	 than	 not,	 this	 means	 a	formative	 micro	 approach	 to	 software	 studies,	 rather	 than	 sweeping	 or	comparative	macro	 approaches.	 It	 is	 a	 reminder	 to	be	 somewhat	 suspicious	of	any	 approach	 that	 claims	 to	 explain	 the	 role	 of	 social	media	 –	 or	 any	 suite	 of	technologies	 –	 in	 complex	 social	 processes.	 Software	may	 bloat,	 but	 as	 Rieder	implies,	it	can	do	so	in	many	different	ways.		
	
DEFINING	SOFTWARE	FOR	STUDY	
When	 politicians,	 commentators	 and	 academics	 discussed	 the	 role	 of	 the	Internet	 in	 the	 riots,	both	during	and	after,	 they	 tended	 to	be	discussing	social	
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media	software	(Hansard	2011,	P	Lewis	et	al.	2011).	Facebook	and	Twitter	are	both	examples	of	 social	media;	 so	are	media-sharing	applications	 like	YouTube	and	Instagram,	direct	messaging	services	like	WhatsApp	and	blogging	tools	like	Tumblr	and	Medium.	Some	of	the	tools	have	a	lot	in	common	while	others	seem	quite	 different.	 José	 van	 Dijck	 and	 Thomas	 Poell	 (2013)	 have	 developed	 the	notion	of	social	media	logic	to	frame	and	discuss	these	similarities.	They	contrast	their	 social	 media	 logic	 with	 an	 established	 framework	 developed	 for	 mass	media	 communication,	 and	 seek	 to	 identify	 grounding	 principles	 common	 to	these	 networked	 applications.	 They	 decide	 upon	 four:	 programmability,	popularity,	 connectivity,	 and	 datafication.	 “The	 logic	 of	 social	media,	 rooted	 in	these	 grounding	 principles	 and	 strategies,	 is	 gradually	 invading	 all	 areas	 of	public	life.”	(ibid	2).	
Social	 media	 logic	 continues	 to	 assume	 an	 over-arching	 homogeneity	 framing	different	 Web	 technologies,	 and	 this	 remains	 somewhat	 problematicxii.	 The	advantage	of	social	media	 logic	 is	 that	 the	grounding	principles	are	sufficiently	specific	to	permit	an	analysis	of	whether	these	different	technologies	enable	the	sort	of	effects	that	the	authors	claim.	As	they	write:		
“The	 quick	 rise	 of	 social	 media	 platforms	 in	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 this	century	was	part	of	a	more	general	networked	culture	where	information	and	 communication	 got	 increasingly	 defined	 by	 the	 affordances	 of	 web	technologies	such	as	browsers	and	search	engines…	Inferring	from	these	conditions,	 we	 contend	 that	 social	 media	 logic	 refers	 to	 the	 processes,	principles,	 and	 practices	 through	 which	 these	 platforms	 process	
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information,	 news,	 and	 communication,	 and	 more	 generally,	 how	 they	channel	social	traffic.”	(ibid	5)	
So,	 for	 instance,	 through	 the	 application	 of	 opaque	 algorithms	 to	 choreograph	user	interaction	with	their	communicative	capabilities,	social	media	technologies	shape	 the	 relational	 activities	 of	 their	 users,	 even	 though	 “content	 is	 not	 just	programmed	 by	 a	 central	 agency,	 even	 if	 this	 agency	 still	 has	 considerable	control;	users	also	participate	in	steering	content.”	(ibid	6).	Similarly,	popularity	“is	 conditioned	 by	 both	 algorithmic	 and	 socio-economic	 components”	 (ibid	 7)	depending	 upon	 the	 particular	 characteristics	 and	 user	 groups	 of	 individual	technologies.	The	authors	describe	 individual	mechanisms	for	conditioning	and	promoting	popularity	 for	Twitter,	Facebook	and	Google,	moving	 the	discussion	from	a	broad	social	media	logic	towards	more	technology-specific	investigation.		
This	sort	of	approach,	in	which	specific	principles	are	used	to	construct	an	over-arching	 logic,	 still	 recognises	a	network	 influence,	but	as	an	 individual	 force	or	dynamic	 within	 the	 techno-social	 construct,	 rather	 than	 as	 a	 determining	superstructure.	 The	 focus	 then	 moves	 to	 the	 ability	 of	 individual	 software	applications	 to	 connect	 users	 in	 ways	 that	 might	 previously	 not	 have	 been	possible,	 rather	 than	 on	 abstract	 super	 logics	 that	 supposedly	 transcend	 the	intricacies	and	affordances	of	individual	technologies.		
In	developing	a	definition	of	software	for	social	research,	it	is	important	to	note	the	difference	between	software	and	the	data	that	the	software	produces	–	which	is	then	captured	and	studied.	van	Dijck	and	Poell	call	datafication:	“the	ability	of	networked	 platforms	 to	 render	 into	 data	many	 aspects	 of	 the	world	 that	 have	never	been	quantified	before”	(ibid	9).	This	is	a	key	concept	in	Internet	studies,	
	64 
and	explains	both	the	interest	for	many	social	scientists	in	Internet	technologies	but	 also	 many	 of	 the	 approaches	 taken	 to	 studying	 these	 media.	 While	 the	principle	 of	 datafication	may	be	useful	 in	 terms	of	 constructing	 a	 social	media	logic,	it	should	be	distinguished	from	big	data.			
Big	data	has	a	narrow	technological	definition	from	computer	science	–	datasets	large	 enough	 to	 require	 super-computer	 processing	 (Manovich	 2011)	 –	 and	 a	much	broader,	 fuzzier	definition	from	the	social	sciences	and	Internet-affiliated	commentary.	Big	data	is	the	notion	that	datafication	enables	new	approaches	to	analysis	 and	 new	 forms	 of	 empirics	 based,	 essentially,	 on	 a	 principle	 of	 “total	knowledge”	 (Bowker	 2014).	 It	 “seems	 to	 combine	 the	 grand	 scale	 and	generalizability	of	methods	like	national	surveys	with	the	granularity	and	detail	of	close	textual	analysis,	ethnography,	or	participant	observation.”	(Driscoll	and	Walker	2014,	1746).	
The	concept	 is	deceptively	simple:	users	supply	applications	 like	Facebook	and	Google	 with	 all	 sorts	 of	 information	 about	 themselves,	 and	 this	 interaction	creates	yet	more	information	about	communication	patterns	and	preferences.	All	of	 this	 information	 is	 recorded	 inherently	 by	 the	 applications,	 processed	algorithmically	 and	 typically	 used	 to	modify	 or	 improve	 the	 function	 of	 those	applications	–	as	well	as	to	monetise	users	for	advertisers.	The	added	ability	to	store	 this	 information	 long-term	 in	 massive	 databases	 and	 to	 automate	 many	forms	 of	 investigation	 has	 led	 to	 some	 dramatic	 claims	 about	 the	 changing	nature	of	knowledge	and	enquiry.	One	commentator	declared	the	“end	of	theory”	as	 big	 data	 rendered	 statistical	 necessities	 like	 sampling	 and	 extrapolation	obsolete	 (Anderson	2008).	Bowker	 (2014,	1795)	explains	 that	 “we	are	moving	
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from	the	knowledge/power	nexus	portrayed	by	Foucault	to	a	data/action	nexus	that	 does	 not	 need	 to	move	 through	 theory:	 All	 it	 needs	 is	 data	 together	with	preferred	outcomes.”		
Big	data,	though,	is	another	term	that	can	obscure	more	than	it	reveals,	including	meanings	and	assumptions	that	are	both	value-loaded	and	debatable.	boyd	and	Crawford	 (2011,	 4)	 complain	 that	 such	 thinking	 betrays	 an	 “arrogant	undercurrent	in	many	Big	Data	debates	where	all	other	forms	of	analysis	can	be	sidelined	 by	 production	 lines	 of	 numbers,	 privileged	 as	 having	 a	 direct	 line	 to	raw	knowledge.”	Such	thinking	denies	subjectivity,	makes	unsupportable	claims	to	 objectivity,	 and	 siphons	 off	 knowledge	 creation	 to	 an	 array	 of	 unknown	algorithms	 that	 may	 be	 complex	 but	 cannot	 be	 value-neutral.	 Furthermore,	 it	engenders	a	 type	of	 technological	solutionsim	–	 the	 ideology	that	any	problem,	social	 or	 personal,	 can	 be	 solved	 by	 collecting	 sufficient	 data	 and	 promoting	algorithmically-derived	efficiencies:		
“Recasting	all	 complex	social	 situations	either	as	neatly	defined	problems	with	 definite,	 computable	 solutions	 or	 as	 transparent	 and	 self-evident	processes	that	can	be	easily	optimized—if	only	the	right	algorithms	are	in	place!—this	 quest	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 unexpected	 consequences	 that	 could	eventually	 cause	more	 damage	 than	 the	 problems	 they	 seek	 to	 address.”	(Morozov	2013b,	5)	
It	has	been	a	huge	boon	 to	 the	social	 sciences	 to	discover	 that	so	much	data	 is	both	rich	in	detail	and	relatively	accessiblexiii.	Indeed,	it	might	be	suggested	that,	in	 recent	 years,	many	 big	 data	 studies	were	 conducted	 precisely	 because	 they	
could	be	done,	and	not	necessarily	because	they	should	be	done,	either	from	an	
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ethical	or	a	critical	perspective.	There	is	also	a	risk	that	data	accessibility	directs	research	 towards	 certain	 technologies	 above	 others,	 and	 that	 this	 happens	irrespective	of	critical	interest	in	the	technology.	
In	this	thesis,	for	example,	there	are	good	reasons	for	concentrating	analysis	on	Twitter,	 because	 it	 enables	 a	 fluid	 and	 open	 form	 of	 communicative	 exchange	that	is	particularly	of	interest,	but	it	must	also	be	acknowledged	that	it	remains	comparatively	 easy	 to	 ask	 for	 and	 to	 retrieve	 data	 from	 Twitter’s	 application	programming	 interface	 (API).	A	 search	 for	 “Twitter”	on	Google	Scholar	 returns	nearly	five	million	results,	and	yet	the	actual	number	of	Twitter	users	represents	a	tiny	fraction	of	the	global	population,	and	is	concentrated	mainly	in	the	US	and	Europe.	 The	 nature	 of	 that	 data	 too	 –	 and	 it	 is	 not	 an	 objective	 form;	 data	 is	defined	 by	 programming	 choices	 and	 released	 discriminately	 –	 must	 also	 be	considered	carefully.	As	Driscoll	and	Walker	(2014,	1747)	explain:	“The	ontology	of	native	Twitter	objects	is	subject	to	change	without	warning,	and	different	data	sources	provide	tweets	in	entirely	different	formats.”			
Nevertheless,	many	researchers	are	taking	advantage	of	datafication	to	produce	analysis	that	is	informed,	nuanced	and	insightful.	A	full	summary	of	that	research	is	 not	 possible;	 the	 scope	 and	 volume	 of	 research	 is	 simply	 too	 great.	 Certain	applications	are	better	represented	than	others,	either	because	they	are	popular	with	users	or	because	they	are	accessible	and	subject	well	to	analysis.	A	search	of	the	 literature	 reveals	 that	 two	 software	 applications	 in	 particular	 have	dominated	research	efforts.		
Facebook	 has	 well	 over	 a	 billion	 users,	 according	 to	 the	 company’s	 own	information,	 and	 approximately	 a	 billion	 of	 them	 use	 the	 application	 –	 either	
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through	 its	desktop	website	or	smartphone	client	–	every	day	(Statista	2015a).	Twitter	 has	 284	 million	 users	 active	 each	 month	 –	 again,	 according	 to	 the	company	 itself	 –	 three-quarters	 of	 whom	 are	 based	 outside	 the	 US	 (Twitter	2015a).	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 global	 population,	 perhaps,	 these	 numbers	 are	 not	 so	impressive,	 but	 these	 two	 companiesxiv	(Facebook,	 especially)	 dominate	 the	social	 media	 landscapexv	and,	 it	 must	 be	 said,	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 academic	community.	 The	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	 big	 data	 research	 papers	 –	quantitative	efforts	to	explore	an	emergent,	global	communication	technology	–	focus	 on	 two	 companies	 who	 are	 based	 a	 short	 drive	 from	 each	 other	 in	 San	Francisco.		
On	the	whole,	papers	that	concentrate	solely	on	Facebook	are	not	reviewed	here	unless	 they	offer	propositions	or	 insights	 that	are	relevant	and	common	across	the	social	media	categorisation.	The	focus	in	this	thesis	is	on	Twitter	and	its	role	in	socio-political	meaning-making.	For	reasons	that	will	become	clear,	Twitter	is	regarded	 as	 an	 archetype:	 a	 software	 bundle	 that,	 in	 many	 ways,	 reflects	 the	utopian	logics	of	Internet	connectivity	(Lewis	1998).		
The	 Twitter	 code	 base	 is	 partly	 available	 for	 public	 inspection	 and	 partly	proprietary	(Vaughan-Nichols	2012)xvi.	It	is	clear,	however,	that	to	define	Twitter	as	“an	object	 in	the	world”	 involves	far	more	than	inspecting	the	code	base	–	 it	requires	a	close	study	of	how	that	code	base	shapes	affordances	into	logics	and	how	those	logics	shape	social	action.		
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TWITTER:	NETWORKED	COMMUNICATION	SOFTWARE	
Though	 the	 technology	 was	 only	 introduced	 in	 2006,	 Twitter	 has	 become	 a	“mass	phenomenon”	according	to	some	researchers	(Weller	et	al.	2014,	xxix).	It	is	certainly	the	case	that	while	the	size	of	its	user	base	is	less	than	one-fifth	of	the	size	of	Facebook’s,	it	is	often	used	by	high	profile	individuals,	already	prominent	on	other	media.	Wu	et	al.	(2011)	conducted	a	survey	of	user	profiles	on	Twitter	and	 discovered	 that	 “elite”	 users	 (that	 is	media,	 celebrities,	 organisations,	 and	bloggers)	 generate	 nearly	 half	 of	 the	 Uniform	 Resource	 Locator	 (URL)	 links	shared	on	the	service.	They	also	noted	that	celebrities	tend	to	use	the	service	to	communicate	with	other	celebrities,	bloggers	with	bloggers	and	so	on.		
Twitter	users	send	in	excess	of	400	million	tweets	each	day	(Weller	et	al.	2014).	A	 tweet	 is	 a	 short-form	 message	 structure	 that	 explains	 why	 Twitter	 is	commonly	referred	to	as	a	micro-blogging	service.	In	its	early	days,	the	company	prompted	users	 to	 tweet	by	 asking	 “What	 are	 you	doing?”,	 the	 idea	being	 that	users	would	blog	about	personal	activities	and	experiences.	It	now	asks	“What’s	happening?”,	 a	 change	 meant	 to	 reflect	 that	 “Twitter	 is	 used	 for	 a	 range	 of	communicative	 practices”	 (Bruns	 and	 Moe	 2014,	 15).	 “A	 birds-eye	 view	 of	Twitter	 reveals	 that…	 people	 are	 witnessing	 accidents,	 organizing	 events,	sharing	links,	breaking	news,	reporting	stuff	their	dad	says,	and	so	much	more.”	(Stone	2009).	Perhaps	 it	 is	better	described	as	a	short-form	messaging	service,	not	dissimilar	from	earlier	web-messaging	services	such	as	chat	rooms	and	from	Short	Message	Service	(SMS)	technologies.	It	is	different	from	these	technologies	in	 part	 because,	 by	 default,	messages	 are	 sent	 publicly.	Unless	 a	 user	 specifies	otherwise,	 any	 tweet	 that	 he	 or	 she	 posts	 can	 be	 accessed	 by	 anyone	with	 an	
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Internet	connection.		
This	feature	allows	for	some	interesting	dynamics	in	respect	to	how	users	source	information	from	the	application.	User	A	can	opt	to	 follow	user	B,	which	means	that	 any	 tweet	 that	 user	 B	 publishes	 will	 automatically	 be	 added	 to	 user	 A’s	
timeline	 –	 a	 live	 stream	 of	 content	 curated	 from	 different	 sources:	 user	 A’s	followed	 accounts	 plus,	 algorithmically-derived	 suggestions	 and,	 these	 days,	promoted	 content.	This	 enables	 complex	webs	of	 follow-followed	 relationships	to	develop	and	makes	Twitter	particularly	appealing	to	network	analysts.	These	relationships	can	be	reciprocal	–	A	follows	B	and	B	follows	A	–	but	they	do	not	have	to	be,	and	it	is	easy	for	researchers	to	distinguish	between	the	two	types.		
Bruns	 and	 Moe	 (2014)	 define	 three	 structural	 layers	 of	 communication	 on	Twitter.	They	call	this	follower-followed	exchange	a	meso	layer,	and	note	that	for	individual	 Twitter	 users,	 followers	 constitute	 something	 akin	 to	 a	 personal	public	 (Schmidt	 2014).	 The	 ability	 to	 establish	 these	 publics	 is	 one	 of	 the	“fundamental	affordances	which	determine	the	 flow	of	 information	on	Twitter”	(Bruns	and	Moe	2014,	16).	 In	addition	 to	 this	middle	 level	of	 exchanges,	 there	are	 micro	 and	 macro	 levels,	 defined	 by	 two	 syntactic	 conventions	 in	 tweet	composition.		
At	 its	 simplest,	 a	 tweet	 is	 a	 140	 character	 text	 string,	 including	 spaces	 and	symbols,	 that	 allows	 a	 user	 to	 answer	 the	 “What’s	 happening?”	 prompt.	However,	 users	 have	 developed	 conventions	 and	 practices	 to	 extend	 this	functionality,	 and	 Twitter	 has	 co-opted	 some	 of	 these	 conventions	 into	 the	design	 of	 the	 application.	 Tweets	 are	 frequently	 used	 to	 share	 URLs,	 making	Twitter	an	important	linking	application	for	other	information	on	the	Web	(Moe	
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and	Larsson	2013).	The	proliferation	of	URL-shortening	services	such	as	ow.ly,	bitly.com	 and	 goo.gl	 has	 enabled	 Twitter	 users	 to	 fit	 resource	 locations	comfortably	 within	 their	 tweets,	 leaving	 space	 for	 additional	 information	 and	comment.	
Twitter	users	employ	 the	#	symbol	 to	align	 their	 tweets	with	particular	 topics.	The	use	of	the	hashtag	is	a	product	of	co-development	between	Twitter	and	its	users,	 and	 often	 cited	 as	 an	 example	 of	 benevolent	 and	 accommodating	adaptability	on	behalf	of	the	company.	However,	Halavais	(2014,	30)	argues	that	Twitter	 “did	 more	 than	 merely	 make	 formal	 the	 informal	 workarounds	 of	 its	users.	 These	 appropriations	 often	 displaced	 social	 practices	 that	 better	represented	 the	diversity	 of	 users	 and	 their	needs,	 replacing	 them	with	model	uses	(and	users)	imagined	by	Twitter’s	developers.”	
The	hashtag	 is	Twitter’s	macro	communication	 layer.	A	keyword	 is	attached	 to	the	#	symbol	(e.g.	#LondonRiots)	so	as	“to	mark	a	tweet	as	being	relevant	to	a	specific	 topic	 and	make	 it	more	easily	discoverable	 to	other	users”	 (Bruns	and	Moe	2014,	17).	 In	 theory,	 this	means	that	a	 tweet	containing	a	hashtag	has	 the	potential	to	reach	many	more	people	than	the	direct	followers	of	the	publishing	user.	However,	 it	should	be	noted	that	there	 is	great	variability	 in	the	way	that	users	 interact	with	the	Twitter	application:	“the	majority	of	users	contribute	to	the	Twittersphere	via	third-party	applications”	(Halavais	2014,	31).	It	cannot	be	assumed	that	users	follow	a	hashtag	in	the	same	way	that	they	follow	individual	users,	 nor	 that	 users	 interact	 with	 one	 hashtag	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 another.	However,	 in	 certain	 circumstances,	 and	 for	 certain	 topics,	 the	 inclusion	 of	 a	hashtag	within	a	 tweet	may	reflect	 the	user’s	 intent	 to	contribute	 to	an	ad	hoc	
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issue	public	(Bruns	and	Burgess	2011).	It	should	also	be	noted	that	it	is	very	easy	to	query	the	Twitter	API	for	hashtags.	This	may	have	contributed	to	the	attention	the	hashtag	receives	from	Twitter	researchers.		
Twitter’s	 micro	 communication	 layer	 consists	 of	 @reply	 conversations.	Independent	of	follower-followed	relationships,	it	is	possible	for	user	A	to	insert	a	 tweet	 into	user	B’s	 timelines	by	appending	 the	@	symbol	 to	user	B’s	Twitter	username	and	including	this	within	the	tweet	(e.g.	“@userB	thanks	for	the	tweet.	How	are	you?”).	This	behaviour	is	now	an	integral	part	of	Twitter’s	design.	It	is	possible	 to	 start	@reply	 conversations	 automatically:	 a	 button	 is	 embedded	 in	every	 tweet	 to	enable	 this	 function,	 and	 the	web	application	uses	 JavaScript	 to	deliver	 an	 @reply	 dialogue	 box	 whenever	 there	 is	 a	 ‘hover-over’	 prompt.	Furthermore,	 Twitter	 and	 most	 Twitter	 clients	 will	 notify	 user	 B	 whenever	@userB	appears	in	the	body	of	a	published	tweet.	This	feature,	sometimes	called	the	@mention,	 is	 often	 distinguished	 from	 the	 @reply	 because	 any	 user	 can	mention	any	other	user	at	any	time:	there	is	no	requirement	for	an	initial	tweet	to	prompt	the	response.		
Finally,	 there	 is	 an	 important	 syntactic	 convention	 that	 may	 be	 viewed	 as	operating	 across	 the	 different	 structural	 layers.	 The	 syntax	 for	 a	 retweet	 is	straightforward.	 User	 B	 can	 retweet	 user	 A’s	 message	 either	 manually	 by	appending	RT	to	a	reply	to	the	original	tweet,	so	that	it	reads	“RT	@userA…”	or	via	an	automated	button	that	works	in	a	similar	way	to	the	@reply	button.	The	practice	of	retweeting:	
“is	 inherently	 designed	 to	move	 tweets	 across	 layer	 boundaries:	 Twitter	users	habitually	use	them	to	bring	messages	from	the	hashtag	level	to	the	
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attention	 of	 their	 own	 followers	 (in	 the	 form	 of	 manual	 or	 ‘button’	retweets),	or	even	to	that	of	specific	recipients”	(Bruns	and	Moe	2014,	22).	
These	 four	 conventions	 support	 a	 complex	variety	of	 communicative	practices.	@replies	 and	 retweets	 can	 be	 chained	 together,	 so	 that	 user	 interactions	 and	comments	are	 layered	upon	 the	original	message,	 creating	a	 far	more	 complex	matrix	 of	meanings	 than	might	 originally	 have	been	 intended.	 There	 are	 other	conventions	too,	including	the	MT	(mass	tweet)	and	.@reply	(used	to	broadcast	engagement	 in	 an	 @reply	 exchange	 to	 followers),	 and	 there	 is	 also	 direct	messaging	 functionality,	 so	 that	 users	 can	 conduct	 conversations	 privately	 but	remain	 within	 Twitter’s	 infrastructure.	 These	 additional	 conventions	 will	 be	discussed	and	explained	where	necessary.	To	start	with,	however,	it	is	sufficient	to	 introduce	 the	 hashtag,	 the	 @reply	 and	 the	 retweet,	 because	 knowledge	 of	these	conventions	is	essential	for	even	a	cursory	exploration	of	Twitter	research.				
Within	 a	 year	 of	 its	 release,	 researchers	 were	 attempting	 to	 determine	 why	anyone	 would	 use	 Twitter,	 focusing	 very	 much	 on	 its	 micro-blogging	functionality.	 Java	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 attempted	 to	 describe	 “the	 topological	 and	geographical	structure	of	Twitter’s	social	network”,	capturing	data	from	a	period	when	 Twitter	 was	 just	 beginning	 to	 become	 popular	 beyond	 its	 founding	community	 (ibid	 2).	 They	 found	 that	 Twitter	was	most	 popular	 in	 the	 US	 and	Europe,	and	that	those	users	who	followed	many	other	users,	also	tended	to	have	many	followers	of	their	own.	Neither	discovery	seems	particularly	surprising	in	hindsight,	 but	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 that	 only	 “one	 eighth	 of	 all	 posts	 in	 the	collection	contain	a	conversation	and	that	this	form	of	communication	was	used	by	almost	21%	of	users	in	the	collection”.	At	that	stage	in	Twitter’s	development,	
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users	were	 primarily	 posting	 updates	 “about	 daily	 routine	 or	what	 people	 are	currently	doing”	rather	 than	using	 the	application	 for	communicative	exchange	(ibid	 7).	 Twitter	 did	 not	 support	 user-user	 conversation	 initially.	 The	 @reply	convention	was	a	user-driven	innovation	that	was	still	being	adopted	n	2007.		
In	2009,	when	the	application	had	41	million	users	and	it	was	a	good	deal	easier	to	 access	 the	 API,	 Kwak	 et	 al.	 (2010,	 1)	 questioned	 whether	 Twitter	 was	primarily	 a	 social	 network	 or	 a	 news	 media,	 via	 a	 “quantitative	 study	 on	 the	entire	Twittersphere	and	 information	diffusion	on	 it”.	Their	analysis	 suggested	that	micro-blogging	was	no	longer	the	primary	activity	of	Twitter	users.	Taking	advantage	 on	 an	 emergent	 feature	 of	 the	 application	 –	 trending	 topics	 (an	algorithmically-derived	list	of	popular	or	oft-mentioned	key	words)	they	showed	that	“the	majority	(over	85%)	of	topics	are	headline	news	or	persistent	news	in	nature”.		
They	 also	 identified	 an	 apparent	 relationship	 between	 the	 numbers	 of	 tweets	posted	per	user	and	 the	number	of	 followers,	 though	 their	graphs	also	 imply	a	saturation	or	flattening	effect	above	a	certain	number	of	followers.	While	there	is	a	certain	sense	to	this	relationship,	the	observed	correlation	between	tweets	and	followers	reveals	little	about	why	or	how	tweets	should	translate	into	followers.	Using	 Twitter’s	 time	 zone	 data	 field,	 they	 calculated	 “the	 time	 differences	between	 a	 user	 and	 r-friends”,	 computed	 an	 average	 and	 assumed	 that	 users	within	the	same	time	zone	were	more	likely	to	be	similar.	They	found	that	up	to	a	threshold	 (2000	 followers)	 the	 “median	 time	 differences	 of	 the	 user	 and	 r-friends	 stays	 below	 3	 hours”.	 Once	 a	 user	 has	 5000	 followers,	 however,	 the	medium	 time	 difference	 is	 six	 hours	 (ibid	 4).	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 appeared	 as	
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though	smaller	follower	lists	tend	to	be	more	local.	Global	reach	tended	to	be	a	product	 of	 many	 followers,	 and	 popular	 Twitter	 users	 tended	 to	 have	 media	profiles	beyond	the	confines	of	the	application.		
Huberman	 et	 al.	 (2008)	 took	 a	 rather	 more	 nuanced	 approach	 to	 the	 Twitter	network,	 reasoning	 that	 attention	 scarcity	 limits	 the	 number	 of	 interactions	between	users	to	far	smaller	networks	than	those	implied	by	follower-following	lists.	 They	 noted	 that	 although	 the	 “standard	 definition	 of	 a	 social	 network	embodies	 the	 notion	 of	 all	 the	 people	 with	 whom	 one	 shares	 a	 social	relationship,	 in	 reality	people	 interact	with	very	 few	of	 those	 ‘listed’	 as	part	of	their	 network.”	 As	 such,	 they	 distinguished	 between	 a	 social	 network	represented	by	the	Twitter	API	and	the	social	network	that	matters	to	the	user	in	question.	This	approach,	at	least,	takes	into	account	some	of	the	criticisms	raised	earlier,	 particularly	 the	 complaint	 that	 automated	 social	 network	 analysis	reveals	little	about	the	type	of	relationships	identified	between	users.		
They	 differentiated	 between	 a	 user’s	 followers	 and	 friends,	 a	 friend	 being	someone	 to	 whom	 the	 user	 has	 directed	 two	 or	 more	@replies.	 Whereas	 the	correlation	 between	 posts	 (their	 assumed	 measure	 of	 productivity)	 and	followers	 appeared	 to	 saturate	 (i.e.	 once	 a	 certain	 number	 of	 followers	 is	reached,	the	number	of	posts	levels	off),	the	post-friends	relationship	continued	to	 grow.	 This,	 the	 authors	 suggest,	 implies	 that	 reciprocated	 attention	 is	 an	important	 driver	 of	 activity	 on	 Twitter.	 They	 also	 conclude	 that	 Twitter	 users	have	 a	 small	 number	 of	 friends	 compared	 to	 their	 follower-following	connections.	“This	implies	the	existence	of	two	different	networks:	a	very	dense	one	made	up	of	 followers	and	followees,	and	a	sparser	and	simpler	network	of	
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actual	friends.”	(Huberman	et	al.	2008).		
Such	a	finding,	clearly,	would	have	important	implications	for	any	theory	of	how	Twitter	 users	 were	 employing	 the	 application	 to	 communicate.	 It	 should	 be	acknowledged	 that	 this	 supposed	 relationship	 between	 friends/followers	 and	Twitter	productivity,	assumes	that	the	attention	drives	activity.	Of	course,	this	is	less	 likely	 to	 be	 the	 case	when	 follower	 numbers	 grow	 very	 large	 –	 unless	 an	account	 is	 automated	 (a	 bot	 of	 some	 sort)	 there	 is	 simply	 not	 time	 in	 day	 to	compose	 sufficient	 tweets.	 Additionally,	 it	 must	 not	 be	 forgotten	 that	 large	Twitter	 followings	 are	 often	 driven	 by	 celebrity	 status,	 or	 by	 a	 media	 profile	beyond	Twitter.	In	these	circumstance,	very	different	dynamics	are	likely	to	be	in	play,	affecting	both	how	a	user	attracts	followers,	but	also	how	the	user	chooses	to	communicate	on	Twitter.	
In	 an	 attempt	 to	 address	 precisely	 this	 question,	 Wu	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 sought	 to	discover:	“who	says	what	to	whom	on	Twitter”?	Their	approach	was	very	much	located	 in	 the	effects	 tradition	of	 communication	 theory,	 and	 is	not	one	 that	 is	endorsed	 here	 necessarily.	 They	 found	 “that	 although	 audience	 attention	 is	highly	 concentrated	on	 a	minority	 of	 elite	users,	much	of	 the	 information	 they	produce	reaches	the	masses	indirectly	via	a	large	population	of	intermediaries”	(Wu	 et	 al.	 2011,	 2).	 They	 concentrated	 on	 URL	 inclusions	 in	 tweets	 “because	URLs	 point	 to	 online	 content	 outside	 of	 Twitter;	 they	 provide	 a	 much	 richer	source	of	variation	than	is	possible	 in	the	typical	140	character	tweet”	(ibid	3).	By	tracking	the	tweeting	and	retweeting	of	selected	URLs,	their	analysis	revealed	that	hyperlinks	tend	to	originate	from	a	small	group	of	“elite”	users	before	they	are	 retweeted	 through	 chains	 of	 intermediaries	 to	 reach	 the	 “ordinary”	 users.	
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The	destination	of	those	hyperlinks	was	difficult	to	determine,	but	by	restricting	analysis	 to	 URLs	 specific	 to	New	York	Times,	 	 the	 authors	 categorised	 content	into	subject	areas,	including	business,	sport,	health	and	technology.			
Taking	 an	 even	 more	 mechanistic	 approach,	 Cha	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 attempted	 to	quantify	 influence	 among	 Twitter	 users	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 designing	 better	marketing	 campaigns.	 They	 identified	 three	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Twitter	application	 that	 they	 took	 as	 proxies	 for	 calculating	 the	 influence	 of	 any	 given	Twitter	 user:	 in-degree	 (more	 simply,	 the	 number	 of	 followers),	 retweet	 rates	and	 @mentions.	 While	 this	 work	 exposed	 some	 interesting	 dynamics	 of	 the	Twitter	user-base	(celebrities	are	widely	followed,	content	aggregators	are	often	retweeted)	 it	offers	 little	 insight	 into	how	the	audience	engages	with	content	–	the	nexus	of	influences	–	or,	indeed,	how	the	audience	is	configured	around	these	influential	usersxvii.			
This	classification	of	users	into	elite	and	ordinary	categories	may	seem	familiar.	In	the	effect	models	tradition,	content	was	perceived	to	pass	through	influential	actors	 in	 channels	 connecting	 the	 mass	 media	 to	 public	 opinion	 (Katz	 and	Lazarsfeld	 1955).	 Though	 communication	 theory	 has	 largely	 moved	 beyond	effects	models,	the	elite	category	is	reminiscent	of	Jürgen	Habermas’	description	of	 “elite”	 agents	 of	 mediated	 political	 communication	 in	 the	 public	 sphere	(Habermas	2006).	Wu	et	al.	(2011)	subdivided	their	elite	Twitter	users	into	four	categories	 –	 media,	 celebrities,	 organisations,	 and	 bloggers	 –	 user	 types	 that	would	 fit	 well	 into	 Habermas’	model,	 though	 Habermas,	 of	 course,	 appears	 to	have	little	time	for	bloggers	(Bruns	2007).	
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boyd	 et	 al.	 (2010,	 1)	 described	 the	 conversational	 dynamics	 of	 retweet	 chains	and	noted	that	individual	motivations	for	Twitter	activity	are	complex:	“issues	of	authorship,	 attribution,	 and	 communicative	 fidelity	 are	 negotiated	 in	 diverse	ways”.	
The	 ability	 to	 categorise	 Twitter	 users	 and	 to	 track	 the	 flow	 of	 information	between	 them	has	 framed	a	good	deal	of	 research	 into	 the	 technology	without	ever	really	revealing	a	method	that	enables	meaningful	cross-context	exploration	of	 the	 application.	 	 Bruns	 and	 Stieglitz	 (2012,	 162)	 noted	 that	 “comparative	research	 on	 a	 large	 number	 of	 discussions,	 their	 dynamics	 and	 patterns	 is	missing”.	In	response,	they	proposed	a	series	of	metrics	for	comparing	hashtag-centric	 communication	 data.	 The	 same	 authors	 have	 also	 argued	 for	 a	 more	systematic	 approach	 to	 the	 application	 of	metrics,	 and	 proposed	 standardised	methods	 for	 the	 collection	 and	 processing	 of	 data	 (Bruns	 and	 Stieglitz	 2013,	Bruns	and	Burgess	2012).	While	it	is	most	likely	desirable	to	have	a	standardised	framework	within	which	to	work	with	these	technologies,	the	authors’	proposals	were	 guided	 by	 their	 preferences	 for	 particular	 tools	 and	 data	 processing	techniques.	In	the	main,	this	involved	third-party	applications	rather	than	direct	engagement	 with	 the	 API	 and	 the	 data.	 At	 the	 very	 least,	 such	 an	 approach	inserts	 another	 layer	 of	 code	 –	 unknowable	 to	 most	 researchers	 –	 into	 the	processxviii.	If	the	aim	is	to	increase	transparency	and	to	limit	uncertainty,	then	it	is	 probably	 better	 to	 urge	 researchers	 to	 engage	 directly	 with	 their	 data	gathering	and	processing	methods,	rather	than	be	guided	by	the	preferences	and	limitations	of	third-party	tools.	
As	 it	 is,	 calls	 for	 standardised	 approaches	 betray	 a	 desire	 for	 quantitative	
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objectivity,	 and	 it	may	well	 be	 that	 such	 objectivity	 is	 simply	 not	 attainable	 in	this	contextxix.	For	many	researchers	the	API	itself	remains	a	black	box	(Driscoll	and	Walker	2014,	Morstatter	et	al.	2013):	it	is	an	assumption	that	the	streaming	samples	most	researchers	collect	are	random	and	representative.	Furthermore,	the	 complexity	 of	 the	 inter-connected	 modern	 media	 ecology	 ensures	 that	complex	 confounding	 relationships	 –	 often	 context-specific	 –	 will	 undermine	most	attempts	at	objective	cross-context	comparisons	(Ruths	and	Pfeffer	2014).	A	 headline-grabbing	 attempt	 to	 model	 social	 network	 site	 usage	epidemiologically	 was	 widely	 critiqued	 for	 the	 multiple	 assumptions	 and	methodological	mistakes	it	made	(Cannarella	and	Spechler	2014).		
Researchers	must	be	aware	that	their	choices	and	assumptions	in	the	collection	and	 processing	 of	 data	 are	 as	 relevant	 as	 their	 interpretative	 findings.	 Just	 as	good	programming	involves	meticulous	documentation	and	explanation	of	code,	good	research	 involving	code	must	maintain	a	similar	documentary	rigour.	For	that	reason,	 it	 is	particularly	useful	when	social	research	and	computer	science	teams	 work	 together	 and	 publish	 their	 efforts	 independently.	 For	 instance,	Anderson	and	Schram	(2011)	reported	on	their	work	to	develop	a	“data	analytics	infrastructure”	 to	 support	 different	 social	 science	 research	 teams.	 Beyond	 the	inherent	value	of	describing	the	computing	choices	and	strategies	involved,	what	is	 particularly	 notable	 is	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 decision-making	 processes	 and	programing	 logic	 required	 to	 address	 the	 type	 of	 questions	 the	 researchers	wanted	to	ask.	
For	 individual	 researchers,	 operating	 without	 rare	 research	 agreements	 with	Twitter,	 or	 expensive	 commercial	 datasets	 from	 Twitter’s	 corporate	 data	
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providers,	it	is	almost	impossible	to	capture	tweets	across	the	full	duration	of	an	event.	 There	 are	 a	 couple	 of	 reasons	 for	 this.	 It	 is	 very	 difficult	 to	 determine	exactly	 when	 an	 event	 begins	 and	 ends.	 Mark	 Duggan	 was	 shot	 by	 the	Metropolitan	 Police	 on	 4	 August.	 The	 protests	 in	 Tottenham	 took	 place	 on	 6	August	in	the	afternoon.	Rioting	began	in	the	evening	but	only	spread	elsewhere	on	 7	 and	 8	 August.	 A	 Twitter	 researcher	 would	 have	 to	 have	 been	 collecting	tweets	already	to	capture	all	of	 these	events.	Over	three	years	 later,	 tweets	are	still	being	sent	under	the	various	hashtags.		
Without	 considerable	 computational	 resources,	 it	 is	 almost	 impossible	 to	maintain	a	continuous	connection	to	the	Twitter	API.	Even	if	a	connection	can	be	maintained,	Twitter’s	 terms	of	use	make	 it	 almost	 impossible	 to	query	 the	API	continuously	in	a	way	that	might	be	useful.	The	outcome	is	that	researchers	must	either	anticipate	events	 like	the	London	riots	(and,	of	course,	 the	hashtags	that	will	 be	 used	 to	 discuss	 these	 events),	 or	 respond	 as	 quickly	 as	 possible	 once	these	 events	 have	 begun.	 Twitter	 permits	 limited	 historical	 access	 to	 tweets	through	its	API,	and	this	access	is	opaque	and	becoming	ever-more	restricted.	As	such,	datasets	collected	in	response	to	major	social,	political	and	environmental	crises	often	start	poorly,	end	disappointingly	and	are	incomplete	in	the	middle.		
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CHAPTER	THREE	
REVIEW:	PROGRAMMING	DEMOCRACY	
INTRODUCTION	
This	 second	 review	chapter	 looks	 to	 advance	 the	discussion	of	 communication	software	and	to	consider	more	closely	its	potential	for	providing	outcomes	that	could	reasonably	be	said	to	be	democratic.	 It	 is	an	 initial	response	to	the	claim	that	Internet	communication	tools	can	contribute	to	more	productive	discourse,	increasing	plurality	and	liberating	information	for	the	education	of	the	citizenry	(Kellner	 2004).	 	 It	 aims	 to	 answer	 two	 questions:	 how	 has	 the	 relationship	between	technology	and	democracy	been	studied,	and	how	should	it	be	studied	in	the	context	of	the	UK	riots?		
In	the	first	instance,	however,	it	is	necessary	to	define	democracy	in	this	context.	The	 word	 democracy	 has	 many	 meanings;	 there	 are	 different	 versions	 of	democratic	 theory	 and	different	 interpretations	 of	 that	 theory	 in	 action.	 These	differences	 affect	 any	 analysis	 of	 communication	 and	 political	 action.	 As	Hindeman	(2010,	5)	notes,	those	“who	discuss	the	Internet’s	impact	on	political	life	are	enormously	fond	of	the	word	democratization,	yet	public	discussion	has	used	 the	word	democratize	 in	 at	 least	 two	distinct	 senses.”	 The	 first	 sense,	 he	argues,	 is	 normative	 or	 aspirational,	 and	 frustratingly	 imprecise,	 in	 a	 way	perhaps	best	articulated	by	George	Orwell:	
“It	 is	 almost	universally	 felt	 that	when	we	call	 a	 country	democratic	we	
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are	praising	it:	consequently	the	defenders	of	every	kind	of	regime	claim	that	 it	 is	 a	 democracy,	 and	 fear	 that	 they	might	 have	 to	 stop	using	 that	word	if	it	were	tied	down	to	any	one	meaning.”	(Orwell	1946/2003,	346).	
The	second	use	of	democracy	is	normative-descriptive,	in	that	any	mechanism	by	which	 Internet	 technologies	 “amplify	 the	political	 voice	of	 ordinary	 citizens”	 is	automatically	called	democratic	 (Hindeman	2010,	6).	The	 fact	 that	 the	 Internet	does	amplify	citizen	voice,	cannot	be	taken	for	granted	of	course.	
The	 political	 theorist	 Henry	 Farrell	 has	 proposed	 three	mechanisms	 by	which	social	media	can	effect	socio-political	action	–	and	according	to	which	they	might	be	 called	 democratic.	 First,	 Internet	 technologies	 may	 affect	 collective	 action,	lowering	communication	costs	and	making	it	easier	for	political	groups	to	recruit	or	to	organise	themselves	(campaigns,	issue-advocacy,	protests,	voting).	Second,	these	technologies	may	make	it	easier	for	like-minded	individuals	to	locate	each	other	 and	 cluster	 –	 a	 process	 he	 calls	 homophily	 (a	 coinage	 that	 is	 context-specific,	 though	 it	draws	on	 ideas	 from	network	science,	 and	 the	propensity	of	certain	 groups	 to	 resemble	 each	 other).	 Third,	 they	 may	 affect	 individual	propensity	 to	 disguise	 or	 falsify	 true	 political	 preferences,	 which	 may	 be	significant	in	authoritarian	regimes	especially	(Farrell	2012,	p	8-9).	
These	 mechanisms	 assume	 an	 action-orientated	 model	 of	 democratic	 politics.	Social	media	 is	 conceptualised	as	 an	enabler	of	 group	 formation	and	 collective	action	–	an	approach	that	seems	to	suit	the	political	study	of	protest	movements.	An	 application	 like	 Facebook,	 for	 instance,	 may	 make	 recommendations	 for	 a	page	to	like	or	a	group	to	join	based	on	past	expressions	of	political	preference	or	through	association	with	political	activity	of	one’s	Facebook	friends	(Vitak	et	
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al.	 2010,	 Elmer	 et	 al.	 2009).	 Twitter,	 meanwhile	 may	 suggest	 users	 to	 follow	based	on	already	existing	follower-followed	relationships.	Suggestions	may	also	arise	 more	 organically	 through	 retweeting	 or	 favouriting	 practices.	 Some	 of	these	 linkages	 and	 suggestions	 depend	 upon	 algorithmic	 processing	 and	filtering,	 and	 introduce	 an	 entirely	 new	 layer	 of	 complexity	 into	 definitions	 of	software-enhanced	politics.		
Discussing	 the	 competing	 claims	 on	 democracy	 pursued	 by	 various	 ideologies	during	and	after	the	2003	invasion	of	Iraq,	Lewis	and	Best	(2003,	2)	argue	for	a	more	radical	interpretation	of	the	concept	–	one	that	recognises	that	“democracy	is	a	complex	and	multi-dimensional	concept,	that	is	subject	to	ongoing	semiotic	disputes	and	“language	wars”.	In	this	interpretation,	democracy	and	democratic	action	are	the	result	of	discursive	cultural	and	communicative	processes	–	claims	to	democracy	are	grounded	in	the	semiotic	struggle	and	legitimacy	is	a	product	of	 linguistic	 hegemony.	 Rather	 than	 an	 ideal	 or	 normative	 achievement,	 then,	democracy	is	either	“all	that	is	good	or	virtuous	in	the	modern	state”	or	it	is	the	“expression	of	public	approval	for	the	government	and	its	actions”	(ibid,	2).		
If	 democracy	 is	 imagined	 as	 a	 communicative	 process,	 either	 a	 discursive	 and	sometimes	violent	struggle	following	Lewis	and	Best	(2003)	or	a	deliberative	act	following	 Habermas	 (1991),	 (Habermas	 1984),	 then	 Farrell’s	 mechanisms	 are	less	well-suited	 to	 explaining	 social	 effects.	 The	preference,	 in	 this	 thesis,	 is	 to	treat	democracy	as	a	communicative	process,	and	to	concentrate	on	technology’s	influence	on	 the	mediation	of	 this	communicative	process.	 It	will	not	assume	a	
priori	 that	democracy	 is	 idealised	deliberation	or	 language	wars;	 rather,	 it	will	seek	 to	 study	 democratic	 communication,	 which	 for	 simplicity	 it	 will	 call	
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discourse,	and	to	explore	which	interpretative	description	of	democracy	appears	most	appropriate.	
	
THE	DEMOCRATIC	CONTEXT	FOR	THE	UK	RIOTS	
When	 the	 proposal	 for	 this	 thesis	was	 being	 drafted	 in	 the	 autumn	 of	 2011,	 a	“democratic	 impulse”	 (Hassan	 2012)	was	 supposedly	 transforming	 the	Middle	East:	 Tunisia	was	 heading	 for	 elections,	 Egypt	was	 attempting	 a	 post-Mubarak	transition,	Gaddafi	had	been	overthrown	and	killed	and	protesters	in	Syria	were	demanding	 the	 resignation	 of	 Bashar	 al-Assad.	 The	 democratic	 stock	 of	 social	media	 had	 never	 seemed	 higher	 (Jurgenson	 2012).	 In	mid-2015,	 as	 the	 thesis	approaches	 completion,	 the	 apparently	 inevitable	march	of	 democracy	 (Kaldor	2011)	 is	 looking	 somewhat	 disorientated.	 It	 has	 been	 waylaid	 by	authoritarianism	 in	 Egypt,	 chaos	 in	 Libya	 and	 four	 years	 of	 horrible	 state-sponsored	and	sectarian	violence	in	Syria	(Dyer	and	Hille	2015)	that	threatens	to	destabilise,	once	again,	vast	swathes	of	the	region.		
If	the	more	excitable	analysis	had	been	correct,	then	the	Arab	Spring	was	notable	mainly	because	protesters	were	tweeting	during	their	protests.	Indeed,	at	times	it	 became	 difficult	 to	 see	 the	 political	 protest	 as	 anything	 other	 than	 a	communicative	act,	such	was	the	attention	given	to	Facebook	and	Twitter	in	the	academic	 analysis	 (Harlow	 and	 Johnson	 2011,	 Hounshell	 2011).	 It	 was	 not	uncommon	 to	 read	 that	 protests	 in	 Egypt	 were	 a	 “Facebook	 Revolution”,	 for	instance xx .	 Adopting	 Larry	 Diamond’s	 (2010)	 description	 of	 “the	 modern,	interrelated	forms	of	digital	ICT	–	the	computer,	the	Internet,	the	mobile	phone,	
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and	countless	innovative	applications	for	them”	as	“Liberation	technology”	(ibid	70),	Snider	and	Faris	(2011,	49)	claimed	that	Facebook	and	Twitter	were	a	“main	cause”	 of	 political	 transformation	 in	 Egypt.	 In	 effect,	 two	 social	 media	applications	(one	of	which	was	barely	five	years	old	and	hardly	used	outside	the	West)	 had	 become	 so	 influential	 that	 they	 were	 centrally	 implicated	 in	 mass	protest	movements	of	incredible	organisational	and	ideological	complexity.	How	did	this	happen?		
In	part	it	happened	because	there	was	a	strong	intellectual	(and	political)	desire	in	the	West	for	it	to	happen	(Morozov	2011b).	In	2009,	following	a	presidential	election,	 a	 popular	 uprising	 led,	 in	 part,	 by	 the	 opposition	 Green	 Movement,	disputed	the	victory	by	incumbent	Mahmoud	Ahmadinejad.	Videos	of	protesting	students	 were	 uploaded	 to	 YouTube,	 people	 wrote	 blogs,	 and	 the	 social-messaging	 service	Twitter	 “drove	people	 around	 the	world	 to	pictures,	 videos,	sound	bites,	and	blogs	in	a	true	reality	show	of	life,	dreams,	and	death.”	(Pfeifle	2009).	Indeed,	so	strong	was	the	perceived	influence	of	Twitter	in	coordinating	the	 post-election	 protests,	 the	 US	 State	 Department	 asked	 the	 (US	 based)	company	 to	 delay	 scheduled	 maintenance	 work	 to	 avoid	 disrupting	communications	among	the	protesters	(Musgrove	2009).	“Through	it	all,	no	one	seemed	 to	wonder	why	 people	 trying	 to	 coordinate	 protests	 in	 Iran	would	 be	writing	in	any	language	other	than	Farsi.”	(Esfandiari	2009).		
As	 Morozov	 has	 argued,	 far	 too	 much	 of	 our	 theory	 connecting	 Internet	technologies	and	social-political	processes	over-simplifies	the	social	dynamics	of	technology	 use,	 and	 over-plays	 the	 emancipatory	 power	 of	 network	communication.	It	is	a	type	of	“cyber-utopianism:	a	naïve	belief	in	emancipatory	
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nature	of	online	communication	that	rests	on	a	stubborn	refusal	to	acknowledge	its	 downside.”	 	 (Morozov	 2011b,	 xiii,	 Lewis	 1998).	 Morozov	 is	 ever-keen	 to	emphasise	 the	 ideological	 aspects	 of	 cyber-utopianism:	 the	 neoliberal	 and	neoconservative	tendencies	of	a	technology	culture	born	and	nurtured	in	Silicon	Valley.		
Was	 2011	 simply	 a	 repeat	 of	 2009,	when	 claims	made	 about	 Twitter’s	 role	 in	Iran	were	 contradicted	 by	 cursory	 explorations	 of	 what	 actually	 happened	 on	Twitter?	 Certainly	 aspects	 of	 social	 media	 logic	 were	 co-opted	 into	democratisation	arguments	and	used	to	imply	that	Internet	technologies	would	challenge	 authoritarian	 and	 anti-democratic	 regimes	 through	 the	 irresistible	logic	 of	 their	 functioning	 (Jurgenson	 2012).	 So,	 for	 instance,	 social	 media	connectivity	 made	 it	 impossible	 to	 isolate	 the	 population	 in	 Egypt	 from	information	about	events	 in	Tunisia	 (Howard	et	al.	2011).	Similarly,	across	 the	region,	 the	 speed	 of	 social	 media	 made	 it	 impossible	 for	 repressive	 state	apparatus	 to	 respond	 sufficiently	 quickly	 to	 stamp	 out	 individual	 protests,	allowing	a	protest	momentum	to	build,	to	the	point	that	it	became	irrepressible	(Tufecki	2011).		
Clay	Shirky	has	argued	that	the	more	“promising	way	to	think	about	social	media	is	 as	 long-term	 tools	 that	 can	 strengthen	 civil	 society	 and	 the	 public	 sphere”	(Shirky	 2011,	 5),	 something	 he	 calls	 an	 “environmental	 view”	 of	 Internet	Freedom.	Which	tools	though,	and	by	what	mechanisms	in	which	contexts?	Why	should	all	social	media	tools	work	the	same?	Certainly	Shirky	is	able	to	provide	examples	 of	 communicative	 practices	 that	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 involved	 in	political	 movements	 (he	 references	 cell	 phones	 and	 the	 impeachment	 trial	 of	
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Philippine	 President	 Joseph	 Estrada,	 for	 instance)	 but	 there	 is	 no	 systematic	social	 theory	 to	 explain	 why	 specific	 technologies	 will	 make	 specific	 types	 of	political	 behaviour	 more	 likely.	 Rather,	 to	 accept	 Shirky’s	 analysis,	 is	 to	 be	content	with	a	“basic	truth	—	that	communicative	freedom	is	good	for	political	freedom”	(Shirky	2011,	4).		
There	 is	a	considerable	body	of	 literature	that	takes	this	“basic	truth”,	which	 is	really	a	context-free	assumption,	and	uses	it	to	argue	that	Internet	technologies	engender	 social	 and	 political	 freedom.	 Several	 broad	 themes	 run	 through	 this	work:	that	the	spread	of	the	Internet		is	a	little	like	the	rise	of	the	printing	press	(Jarvis	 2012);	 that	 like	 the	 printing	 press,	 the	 Internet	 will	 transform	 social	institutions	 and	 endeavours	 (Shirky	 2008,	 Benkler	 2006);	 that	 information	shared	 via	 a	 network	 is	 harder	 to	 hide	 and	 harder	 to	 censor	 (Tufecki	 2011,	Brooke	2011);	that	emancipated	information	creates	an	informed	and	politically	dynamic	 citizenry	 (Shirky	 2011);	 indeed,	 that	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 Internet	communication,	its	speed	or	its	virality	makes	social	change	if	not	inevitably	then	exceedingly	more	likely	(Hoang	and	Lim	2012,	Tufecki	2011,	O'Reilly	2007).		
There	is	nothing	inherently	problematic	about	the	apparent	political	motivation	behind	some	of	these	arguments	(Hammersley	1995);	rather	the	issue	is	with	a	perceived	lack	of	conceptual	and	methodological	rigour.		
Bennett	 and	 Segerberg	 (2012,	 743)	 argue	 that	 social	 media	 logic	 extends	 to	“digitally	 networked	 action	 (DNA)”	 (that	 is	 action	 enabled	 by	 digital	communication),	which	 they	credit	 for	 initiating	and	sustaining	several	protest	movements	 including	 the	 Put	 People	 First	 (PPF)	 campaign,	 Occupy	 and	 los	
indignados	 in	Spain.	 In	effect,	 they	suggest	 that	 the	bloating	effect	described	by	
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Rieder	 is	 uniform	across	 a	 range	of	 software,	 the	 implication	being	 either	 that	these	 different	 applications	 are	 remarkably	 similar	 or	 that	 effects	 are	predominantly	 socially	 constructed.	This	 sort	 of	 reasoning	 relies	 on	 a	Castells-inspired	 network	 structuralism.	 They	 describe	 how	 late	 age	 modernity	 has	produced	 an	 “engagement	 with	 politics	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 personal	 hopes,	lifestyles,	 and	 grievances,”	 especially	 among	 younger	 generations	 (ibid	 743).	This	 emergence	 of	 political	 positioning	 resonates	 in	 a	 society	 increasingly	structured	according	to	weak	tie	social	networks:		
“networks	 are	 established	 and	 scaled	 through	 various	 sorts	 of	 digital	technologies	that	are	by	no	means	value	neutral	in	enabling	quite	different	kinds	 of	 communities	 to	 form	 and	 diverse	 actions	 to	 be	 organized,	 from	auctions	 on	 eBay	 to	 protests	 in	 different	 cultural	 and	 social	 settings.”	(Bennett	and	Segerberg	2012,	744).	
This	produces	a	logic	of	connective	action	as	opposed	to	collective	action,	which	is	 the	established	political-science	and	social	movement	 formula	 for	explaining	how	individual	action	frames	can	be	mobilised	into	collective	political	action.	At	the	 “core”	 of	 the	 collective	 action	 logic	 is	 “the	 recognition	 of	 digital	 media	 as	organizing	agents.”	 (Bennett	and	Segerberg	2012,	752).	Bennett	and	Segerberg	offer	a	quasi-specific	explanation	of	the	mechanisms	through	which	this	network	logic	effects	itself:		
“Such	digital	mechanisms	may	include:	organizational	connectors	(e.g.	web	links),	event	coordination	(e.g.	protest	calendars),	information	sharing	(e.g.	YouTube	and	Facebook),	and	multifunction	networking	platforms	in	which	other	 networks	 become	 embedded	 (e.g.	 links	 in	 Twitter	 and	 Facebook	
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posts),	 along	with	 various	 capacities	 of	 the	 devices	 that	 run	 them.	 These	technologies	not	only	 create	online	meeting	places	and	 coordinate	offline	activities,	but	they	also	help	calibrate	relationships	by	establishing	levels	of	transparency,	 privacy,	 security,	 and	 interpersonal	 trust.”	 (Bennett	 and	Segerberg	2012,	753)	
A	 potential	 criticism	 of	 this	 approach	 is	 that	 different	 Internet	 applications	(software)	are	conceptually	reduced	to	the	digital	networks	upon	which	they	run	–	they	are	presumed	to	reconfigure	human	social	organisation	without	any	real	regard	 for	 how	 users	 and	 individual	 applications	 might	 interact.	 YouTube,	Twitter	and	Facebook	simply	become	homogenous	platforms	contributing	to	an	over-arching	logic	of	multifunction	networking.	The	specificity,	when	it	comes,	is	entirely	concerned	with	describing	the	types	of	network	and	the	types	of	action	that	 these	 networks	 produce.	 The	 communication	 mechanisms,	 the	 “real	software,	 lodged	 in	 tight	 networks	 of	other	 software,	 all	written	 for	 a	purpose;	knowledge,	 ideas,	 skills,	 tools,	 methodology,	 habits,	 and	 values	 that	 permeate	
practices”	(Rieder	2012)	are	largely	ignored.	In	other	words,	like	much	network-focused	 analysis,	 there	 is	 a	 problematic	 determinism	 inherent	 to	 this	 type	 of	utopianism:	human	culture	is	determined	by	the	systems	and	apparatuses	that	it	mobilises	for	specific	communication	purposes.		
It	is	overly	simplistic	to	assume	a	liberating	logic	for	any	technology,	which	may:	“work	 in	 favor	 of	 freedom	 of	 expression	 by	making	 it	 easier	 for	 us	 to	 express	ourselves,	but	at	the	same	time	they	also	tend	to	work	in	favor	of	surveillance	by	making	more	of	our	private	information	public.”	(Morozov	2011a,	62).	In	a	2011	report	for	the	activist	group	Association	for	Progressive	Communications	(APC),	
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Alex	Comninos	considers	the	value	of	the	“Facebook	revolution”	rhetoric	in	light	of	complicating	socio-political	dynamics	and	concludes:	
“While	the	terms	 ‘Twitter	revolution’	or	 ‘Facebook	revolution’	may	not	be	accurate,	the	assertions	that	‘the	revolution	will	be	tweeted,’	‘the	revolution	will	 be	 live-blogged’,	 and	 ‘the	 revolution	 will	 be	 streamed’	 do	 have	credence	 in	 the	 cases	 of	 Egypt,	 Tunisia,	 Syria,	 Bahrain	 and	 Libya.	 These	events	 involved	 masses	 of	 people	 protesting	 on	 the	 streets,	 many	 using	mobile	 phones	 to	 organise	 the	 demonstrations	 and	 to	 spread	 their	messages.”	(Comninos	2011,	7).	
Beyond	 the	 Egyptian	 government’s	 decision	 to	 switch	 off	 Internet	 access	between	 26	 January	 –	 2	 February,	 where	 is	 the	 evidence	 that	 Twitter	 and	Facebook	 were	 being	 used	 in	 this	 way	 –	 to	 organise	 demonstrations	 and	 to	spread	messages	(effectively	mechanisms	one	and	two	in	Farrell’s	schema)?	On	one	level,	 it	 is	possible	to	point	to	Facebook	pages	–	We	are	all	Khaled	Said	and	the	6	of	April	Youth	Movement	 both	 “called	 for	 demonstrations	 on	 25	 January”	(Comninos	2011,	8)	–	and	Twitter	hashtags	that	refer	directly	to	protest	events.	However,	 as	 Iran	 showed	 in	 2009,	 the	 presence	 of	 people	 on	 Facebook	 and	Twitter	discussing	and	promoting	protest	movements	 is	not	sufficient	 to	prove	on	the	ground	action.	Internet	technologies	enable	distanciation	(Giddens	1990).	Beyond,	 television	 footage	 of	 young	 Egyptians	 in	 Tahir	 Square	 with	 mobile	phones,	what	is	the	empirical	evidence	for	these	claims?	
It	 should	 be	 easier	 than	 ever	 before	 to	 gather	 empirical	 evidence	 about	 these	sorts	of	communication	practices.	The	datafication	of	communication	means	that	considerable	 information	 is	 available	 about	 individual	 cases	 of	 mass	 self-
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communication.	 Howard	 et	 al.	 (2011,	 2)	 gathered	 “a	 unique	 database	 of	information	collected	from	Facebook,	Twitter,	and	YouTube”	to	explore	the	role	that	these	applications	played	during	the	Arab	Spring.	They	concluded	that	social	media	 “played	 a	 central	 role	 in	 shaping	 political	 debates”,	 was	 “integral”	 to	physical	 protesting	 and	 “helped	 spread	 democratic	 ideas	 across	 international	borders”	(ibid	2-3).	There	remains	an	issue,	however.	How	easy	is	 it	to	convert	social	 media	 data	 points	 into	 ‘objective’	 conclusions	 about	 communication	practice?	A	closer	reading	of	the	authors’	methods	suggests	that	a	more	cautious	approach	would	be	advised:	the	knowledge	extractable	from	the	data	is	neither	that	persuasive	nor	that	conclusive.		
For	 instance,	 the	 authors	 state	 that	 “about	 25	 percent	 of	 the	 population	 in	Tunisia	and	10	percent	of	the	population	in	Egypt	has	used	the	Internet	at	least	once”	 (Howard	 et	 al.	 2011,	 6).	 These	 are	 small	minorities.	 Given	 this	 baseline,	what	does	it	matter	if	“30	percent	of	the	people	actively	contributing	to	Twitter	conversations	inside	of	Tunisia	were	women”	(ibid	6)	or	that	“18	percent	of	the	Tweets	 about	 the	 Tunisian	 uprising	 came	 from	 inside	 Tunisia,	 8	 percent	 from	neighboring	 countries,	 and	 32	 percent	 from	 outside	 the	 region”	 (ibid	 10).	Relative	to	the	populations	of	these	countries,	these	are	tiny	percentages	and	yet	they	 are	 being	 handed	 enormous	 socio-political	 agency.	 Given	 such	 a	 low	baseline,	 it	 is	 surely	 inappropriate	 to	 align	 use	 of	 social	 media	 with	 “average	citizens”	because	the	limited	sample	excludes	three-quarters	of	the	population	of	these	countries.		
The	authors	 conclude	 that	 “a	 spike	 in	online	 revolutionary	conversations	often	preceded	 major	 events	 on	 the	 ground.”	 (ibid	 23).	 This	 conclusion	 prompts	 a	
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couple	 of	 questions.	 First,	 a	 coincidental	 spike	 in	 social	 media	 interest	 with	 a	physical	protest	or	demonstration	 is	not	evidence	of	causation.	 Indeed,	given	a	
priori	 knowledge	 of	 a	 physical	 demonstration,	 it	 would	 be	 peculiar	 in	 the	extreme	 if	 there	were	no	corresponding	 increase	 in	 interest	 communicated	via	social	 media.	 Second,	 how	 is	 it	 possible	 to	 identify	 a	 “revolutionary	conversation”?	 So	 much	 data	 is	 available	 that	 such	 a	 task	 is	 almost	 always	automated,	 but	 defining	 and	 identifying	 “revolutionary	 conversation”	algorithmically	 is	 inherently	 reductive	 –	 to	 the	 point	 that	 apparently	 objective	observations	 quickly	 turn	 “to	 polemics	 rather	 than	 substance…	 to	 provide	rhetorical	support	for	grand,	sweeping	arguments”	(Farrell	2012,	1).	
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 critique	 is	 not	 to	 deny	 the	 democratic	 potential	 of	 social	media,	nor	 to	pre-empt	 the	analysis	of	 communication	practices	during	 the	UK	riots.	It	may	well	be	that	social	media	played	a	significant	role	in	the	Arab	Spring;	the	issue	is	that	such	a	claim	needs	to	be	conceptually	justifiable	and	supported	by	rigorous	empirical	analysis.	The	critique	is	intended	to	support	an	argument	that,	 to	date	 in	 Internet	 studies,	 conceptual	 framing	 remains	 in	 its	 infancy	 and	empirical	 analysis	 has	 not	 been	 sufficiently	 rigorous.	 The	 required	 weight	 of	evidence	has	not	yet	been	provided.	
Critics	 of	 cyber-utopianism	 must	 also	 be	 aware	 of	 making	 macro	 arguments	based	on	limited	observations	(Gladwell	2010)	and	of	concentrating	too	much	on	examples	 that	 suit	 a	purpose	 (Morozov	2013b).	The	 situation	 is	 almost	always	too	 complex	 for	 polemics,	 and	 that	 is	 why	 Farrell’s	 call	 for	 robust	 conceptual	hypotheses	 and	 detailed	 empirical	 work	 is	 so	 important	 –	 even	 if	 it	 only	produces	cautious	and	context-specific	findings.		
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An	 approach	 that	 might	 reveal	 something	 about	 the	 mechanistic	 relationship	between	social	media	and	democracy	seeks	to	describe	“information	flows”;	that	is	 recurring	 patterns	 in	 the	 communicative	 exchanges	 supported	 by	 Internet	applications.	 At	 least	 two	 independent	 research	 teams	 have	 applied	 such	 an	approach	 to	Twitter	datasets	 collected	during	 the	Arab	Spring,	Twitter	being	a	technology	 that	 lends	 itself	 to	 analysis	 in	 this	 way.	 Lotan	 et	 al.	 (2011,	 1375)	define	information	flows	as	“sets	of	near-duplicate	tweets”,	the	implication	being	that	 ideas	 encoded	 into	 language	 (information)	persist,	 and	 are	 identifiable,	 as	long	as	that	language	doesn’t	change	–	or	doesn’t	change	muchxxi.	In	the	case	of	Twitter,	 such	 information	 flows	are	generally	 retweet	 chains	–	 in	 this	 example	“any	group	of	retweets	that	included	19	or	more	posts	in	the	Egypt	dataset,	and	16	or	more	in	the	Tunisia	dataset.”	(ibid	1382).	
The	 authors	 proceed	 to	 identify	 influential	 actors	within	 these	 retweet	 chains	and	 analyse	 how	 those	 actors	 were	 responsible	 for	 creating	 and	 distributing	content	 on	 Twitter.	 Their	 approach	 permits	 a	 specific	 and	 detailed	 analysis	 of	Twitter	 information	 flows,	 tracking	 individual	 tweets	 from	 source	 through	various	retweets,	edits	and	amplifications.	In	doing	so,	they	identify	considerable	overlaps	 between	 information	 flows	 in	 separate	 Tunisia	 and	 Egypt	 datasets,	which	 they	 conclude:	 “suggest	 that	 patterns	 of	 Twitter	 usage	 simply	 highlight	pre-existing	relationships	among	people	with	similar	interests.	That	is,	there	is	a	set	of	people	interested	in	events	like	the	Egyptian	and	Tunisian	revolutions	that	Twitter	makes	visible.”	(Lotan	et	al.	2011,	1397).		
Alternative	 explanations	 include	 the	 idea	 that	 Twitter	 becomes	 a	 convening	place	 for	 people	 with	 similar	 interests	 (an	 example	 of	 homophily	 in	 Farrell’s	
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terminology),	 or	 that	 Tunisia	 produced	 a	 learning	 effect	 that	 proceeded	 to	influence	Twitter	use	in	Egypt.	Interestingly,	when	reviewing	the	sources	of	their	information	flows,	the	researchers	discovered	that	“news	on	Twitter	is	being	co-constructed	 by	 bloggers	 and	 activists	 alongside	 journalists”	 (Lotan	 et	 al.	 2011,	1400).	 Such	 a	 finding	 presumably	 has	 implications	 for	 any	 Habermasian	interpretation	of	social	media:	the	public	sphere	is	opened	up	to	a	greater	variety	of	citizen	voices.	 In	general,	 this	careful,	close	reading	of	Twitter	use	combined	with	 cautious	 but	 theoretically	 grounded	 conclusions,	 seems	 a	 far	 more	productive	 approach	 to	 studying	 social	 media	 applications	 during	 complex	political	events.		
Starbird	 and	Palen	 (2012)	 adopted	 a	 similar	 approach,	 choosing	 to	 investigate	retweet	chains	 to	 identify	patterns	of	diffusion	and	 influence	on	Twitter	during	the	 Egyptian	 protests.	 Diffusion	 can	 be	 a	 problematic	 term	 when	 applied	 to	communication	 studies xxii 	but	 the	 approach	 reveals	 some	 interesting	observations	regardless.	The	authors	argued	that	 “consideration	of	 the	retweet	mechanism	 reveals	 a	 good	 deal	 about	 information	 contagion	 across	 a	 large	number	of	people	and	how	this	behavior	figures	into	social	movements”	(ibid	2).	They	noted	that	30%	of	the	most	retweeted	Twitter	users	were	in	Cairo	during	the	protests,	 a	 finding	 that	 challenges	 the	assumption	 that	 the	most	 influential	Twitter	users	are	Western	media	personalities	–	celebrities	and	journalistsxxiii.	At	least	 in	 this	 case,	 Twitter	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 responsive	 to	 physically-located	tweets	 that	 “contained	 information	 about	 meeting	 times,	 injuries,	 violence,	supplies	 needed,	 etc.”	 (ibid	 1),	 perhaps	 because	 Twitter	 at-large	 found	 these	tweets	particularly	notable:		
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“While	 witty	 and	 humorous	 tweets	 experienced	 “sticky”	 retweetability,	serious	 tweets	 remarking	 on	 violence,	 especially	 violence	 against	 the	media,	and	asking	for	support	were	also	among	the	most	popular…	Popular	tweets	 from	 locals	 also	 included	 first	 hand	 reports	 of	 violence	 or	 tactical	information”	(ibid	6).		
Another	potential	explanation	is	that	Egyptians	in	Egypt	were	over-represented	in	the	Egypt-specific	Twitter	audience	(i.e.	the	Egypt	‘public’	was	predominantly	a	 national	 concern).	 Neither	 conclusion	 would	 be	 particularly	 surprising,	perhaps,	but	both	would	shed	some	light	on	distanciation	dynamics	–	and	both	would	challenge,	to	an	extent,	the	criticism	that	undermined	much	of	the	Iranian-Twitter	commentary.	Significantly,	journalists	and	media	outlets	were	prominent	among	the	most	retweeted	users:	seven	of	the	ten	most	retweeted	accounts	were	established	media	figures.	
The	detail	 in	this	type	of	analysis	is	rewarding.	The	authors	identified	the	most	retweeted	 tweet	 in	 their	 dataset	 and	 were	 then	 able	 to	 trace	 the	 ‘life’	 of	 this	tweet,	observing	how	different	meanings	were	attached	to	it	by	different	users,	through	 minor	 edits	 to	 the	 text	 and	 changes	 in	 emphasis.	 The	 tweet	 itself,	 a	visual	 pun	 that	 used	 block	 Ascii	 characters	 to	 mimic	 a	 computer	 load	 bar,	 is	adapted	in	different	ways	to	illustrate	“freedom	loading”,	“dictator	uninstalling”	and	to	compare	the	relative	progress	of	protests	across	the	region.	The	authors	compared	 the	 frequency	 of	 this	 tweet	 across	 their	 different	 groups,	 and	discovered	that	very	few	variations	on	its	theme	originated	from	Egyptian	users.		
There	 is	 something	 particularly	 notable	 about	 these	 types	 of	 analysis	 and	 it	 is	important:	 they	 proceed	 without	 consideration	 of	 the	 physical-social,	
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temporal-spatial	 contexts	 of	 the	 Twitter	 users	 producing	 the	 tweets	 that	
are	 being	 analysed.	 Clearly	 there	 are	 ethnographic	 and	 anthropological	arguments	 for	 situating	 these	 users	 better,	 for	 exploring	who	 they	 are,	 where	they	are,	 and	how	 they	use	 social	media	 as	part	of	 the	 socio-cultural	 reality.	A	critique	of	the	analysis	of	Tunisia’s	uprisings	was	that	it	assumed	too	much	about	the	minority	of	Tunisians	who	actually	use	Twitter.	This	does	not	mean	that	such	analysis	demands	a	full	ethnographic	account	of	the	study	population	–	this	is	a	textual	 dissertation,	 happy	 to	 interpret	 democracy	 through	 signs	 and	communicative	 practices.	 As	 Grimmer	 and	 Stewart	 (2013,	 1)	 have	 argued	 in	favour	 of	 textual	 analysis:	 “Politics	 and	 political	 conflict	 often	 occur	 in	 the	written	and	spoken	word”.	However,	it	is	surely	the	case	that	textual	analysis	can	be	 strengthened	by	a	 closer	analysis	of	 context	 and	 the	 recognition	of	 situated	users.		
So,	for	instance,	it	could	be	highly	instructive	to	add	a	temporal	dimension	to	this	analysis	 of	 retweet	 flows.	Were	 early	 retweets	 located	 similarly,	 or	 was	 there	immediate	global	diffusion	of	popular	messages?	Did	the	relative	distribution	of	this	 tweet	 change	 over	 the	 study	 period?	 This	 is	 information	 that	 could,	potentially,	reveal	a	great	deal	about	the	democratic	potential	of	these	flows	and	offer	 some	 insight	 into	 the	 relationship	 between	 dis-embodied	 Twitter	communication	and	the	physical-social	distribution	of	Twitter	users.	Developing	a	temporal-spatial	approach	for	specific	and	‘located’	analysis	is	a	primary	aim	in	this	thesis.	
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DEMOCRACY	AND	THE	LONDON	RIOTS	
The	discussion	of	 the	Arab	Spring	provides	 important	 context	 for	 the	UK	riots,	both	in	terms	of	recalling	the	media	focus	in	2011	and	providing	an	introduction	to	 the	 dominant	 themes	 and	 ideas	 in	 digital-political	 theory.	 These	 were	 the	popular	 and	 academic	 narratives	 when	 the	 riots	 occurred,	 they	 are	 useful	background,	but	 the	 riots	and	disorder	 that	occurred	across	London	and	other	English	 cities	 in	August	 2011	provide	 a	 specific,	 critical	 platform	 for	 analysing	the	 relationship	 between	 democracy	 and	 social	 media	 within	 an	 advanced	Western	content.		
As	 established,	 there	was	never	much	 suggestion	 that	Twitter	was	 responsible	for	riot	organisation	or	promotion	–	apart	from	a	remarkable	claim	(and	a	threat	to	“stop	people	communicating”	by	social	media)	made	by	the	Prime	Minister	in	parliamentxxiv.	If	there	were	any	blame	for	riot	organisation	support,	then	it	was	directed	 at	 Blackberry	 Messenger,	 an	 encrypted	 messaging	 service	 that	 was	never	 very	 common	 and	 hastened	 its	 own	 demise	 when	 the	 service	 failed	globally	 for	 several	 days	 in	 October	 2011.	 There	 is	 less	 temptation,	 then,	 to	consider	 Twitter	 as	 an	 organising	 force	 for	 the	 riots.	 In	 some	ways,	 then,	 this	makes	 it	 easier	 to	 consider	 the	 application	 simply	 as	 a	 media	 channel	 –	 to	normalise	 it	 in	 some	 respects	 –	 and	 to	 question	what	 contribution	 it	made	 to	meaning-making	practices	in	a	dense	but	discordant	mediasphere.		
There	 is	 also	 a	 gap	 in	 the	 literature	 that	needs	 addressing.	 In	 the	 introduction	chapter,	 several	 references	were	made	 to	 different	 reports,	 critiques,	 analyses	and	interpretations	of	the	UK	riots,	but	these	hardly	dealt	with	the	role	of	social	
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media	in	riot-related	meaning-making.	Fuchs	(2012)	established	that	there	was	widespread	 media	 condemnation	 of	 social	 media	 rioters,	 but	 critiqued	 this	condemnation	 as	 unjustified.	 There	 has	 not	 been	 a	 thorough	 empirical	investigation	 of	 how	 social	 media	 enabled	 (or	 inhibited)	 responsible	 political	discourse	 during	 the	 riots.	 Such	 an	 investigation	 would	 be	 a	 worthy	 addition	both	to	a	historical	understanding	of	the	riots	themselves,	but	also	to	the	wider	body	of	digital-political		theory.		
It	was	established	earlier	 in	 this	chapter	 that	 there	are	different	approaches	 to	imagining	and	to	studying	democracy	(Held	2006).	The	analyses	of	social	media	use	 during	 the	 Arab	 Spring	 tended	 to	 assume	 either	 an	 action-orientated	approach	 or	 a	 discursive	 communicative	 one,	 but	 not	 both	 together	 –	 either	social	media	helped	protesters	identify	each	other	and	organise,	or	it	contributed	to	 revolutionary	conversation	and	a	 rising	 tide	of	emancipatory	conviction.	 It’s	not	 that	 the	 two	 democratic	 models	 are	 mutually	 exclusive,	 or	 even	contradictory	 as	 such:	 as	 Farrell	 has	 suggested,	 there	 can	 be	 different	mechanisms	 by	 which	 social	 media	 affects	 democratic	 processes.	 However,	analytic	approaches	 tend	 to	be	driven	by	 theoretical	preferences,	 and	as	 far	as	this	 thesis	 is	concerned,	 the	communicative	approach	 is	superior	 to	 the	action-orientated	one.		
The	reasons	for	this	assumed	superiority	have	also	been	established	already,	but	a	quick	review	may	be	beneficial.	Action-orientated	models	assume	that	Internet	technologies	 confer	 on	 their	 users	 some	 of	 the	 properties	 of	 the	 underlying	network	 architecture.	 Such	 logic	 is	 uncomfortably	 close	 to	 determinism,	implicitly	 ignores	 the	 complexity	 and	 unpredictability	 of	 individual	 meaning-
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making	 practices	 and	 relies	 on	 a	 network	 structuralism	 that	 has	 very	 little	explanatory	 power	 (Morozov	2013b,	 Erickson	2012,	Rieder	 2012,	 Lewis	 2005,	Baldamus	 1982/2010).	 These	 are	 not	 criticisms	 of	 action-orientated	 political	theory,	but	of	the	techno-socio	interaction	model.	In	short,	this	thesis	is	happy	to	accept	the	idea	of	social	media	logic,	but	not	in	lieu	of	a	social	construction	model	that	 fully	 considers	 the	 interaction	 of	 communication	 technologies,	 meaning-making	processes	and	dominant	social	structures.		
For	 these	 reasons,	 a	 communicative	 approach	 to	 democracy	 is	 considered	preferable.	It	is	important	to	note	that	this	preference	is	not	meant	as	an	implicit	endorsement	 of	 communicative	models	 above	 participatory	 ones	 –	 or,	 indeed,	the	 republican,	 liberal	 or	 pluralist	 models	 (e.g.	 Held	 2006).	 Clearly	 there	 are	limitations	 to	 this	 approach,	 as	 there	 are	 to	 assuming	 any	 type	 of	 normative	democratic	model	 (Loader	 and	Mercea	 2011,	 Agamben	 1993).	 Rather,	 it	 is	 an	endorsement	 of	 a	 particular	 approach	 to	 framing	 the	 study	 of	 Internet	communication	technologies.	It	may	well	be	that	the	connective	action	approach	is	 a	 highly	 productive	 one	 (Bennett	 and	 Segerberg	 2012),	 but	 in	 its	 present	application	and	in	this	analysis,	it	does	not	pay	sufficient	attention	to	individuals	and	their	complex	meaning-meaning	practices.	At	the	heart	of	the	machine,	there	remains	an	unexplored	black	box,	and	this	thesis	aims	to	shed	some	light	on	its	workings.	
	
THE	PUBLIC	SPHERE	AND	DELIBERATIVE	DEMOCRACY	
With	 the	decision	made	 to	 focus	on	 communicative	democratic	models,	 Jürgen	
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Habermas	 looms	 large	 in	 the	 discussion.	 For	 better	 or	 for	 worse,	 as	 Roberts	(2009)	has	written,	debates	about	 the	 Internet	and	politics	have	 long	 revolved	“around	 a	 set	 of	 assumptions	 about	 the	nature	 of	 political	 communication	 and	the	functioning	of	what	is	often	referred	to	as	the	‘public	sphere’.”		
“Political	 philosophers	 have	 also	 worked	 in	 recent	 years	 to	 expand	 the	notion	of	political	voice,	with	a	torrent	of	scholarship	on	what	has	come	to	be	 called	deliberative	democracy…	 these	deliberative	democrats	 all	 agree	that	democracy	should	be	more	than	just	a	process	for	bargaining	and	the	aggregation	 of	 preferences.	 All	 suggest	 that	 true	 participation	 requires	citizens	 to	 engage	 in	 direct	 discussion	 with	 other	 citizens.”	 (Hindeman	2010,	7).	
In	 other	 words,	 there	 has	 long	 been	 an	 assumption	 that,	 through	 their	 social	media	logic,	applications	like	Facebook	and	Twitter	are	‘democratising’	because	they	extend	and	strengthen	civil	society	and	the	public	sphere	(e.g.	Shirky	2011).		
In	 the	 formative	days	of	 the	 Internet	–	both	as	a	popular	 technology	and	as	an	academic	concern	–	scholars	repeatedly	called	on	Habermas	and	his	theories	of	the	public	sphere,	deliberative	democracy	and	communicative	action	to	explain	how	 the	 Web	 could	 empower	 citizens	 and	 invigorate	 democratic	 processes	(Rheingold	 2000).	 These	 are	 normative	 theories	 –	 explanations	 of	 how	democracy	should	work	 in	an	 idealised	context,	where	deliberation	and	reason	are	 guiding	 principles.	 The	 validity	 of	 such	 a	 context,	 including	 its	 origin	 in	Enlightenment	thinking	has	been	debated	extensively,	and	it	is	not	a	debate	that	needs	 to	be	reignited	here	(e.g.	Love	1989).	Rather	 than	weighing	 the	absolute	validity	of	deliberation,	reason	and	communicative	action	as	concepts,	the	aim	is	
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to	 look	at	how	those	concepts	have	been	used	 in	 Internet	studies,	and	to	ask	 if	they	might	be	used	more	productively	in	future	empirical	investigations.		
Primarily,	Habermas	has	been	used	to	argue	that	the	Internet	enables	a	type	of	communication	 that	 is	 closer	 to	 the	normative	model	 than	 had	 previously	 been	the	case.	Two	main	logics	have	been	invoked	in	support	of	this	argument.	First,	Internet	technologies	supposedly	have	the	potential	to	liberate	publishing	from	media	gatekeepers	and	established	interest	groups.	By	lowering	communication	costs	 and	by	de-restricting	 access	 to	media	platforms,	 the	 Internet	 is	meant	 to	enable	 all	 citizens	 to	 participate	 in	 (and	 contribute	 to)	 deliberative	 discourse,	invoking	 reason	 and	 seeking	 consensus.	 As	 Dan	 Gillmore	 (2004,	 xviii)	 wrote:	“The	ability	of	anyone	to	make	the	news	will	give	new	voice	to	people	who’ve	felt	voiceless—and	whose	words	we	need	to	hear.”	Quoting	the	Deleware	Supreme	Court	(Reno	v.	ACLU,	U.S.	521	(1997)),	Michael	Hindeman	noted	that	it	was	“held	as	 a	 matter	 of	 fact	 that	 ‘the	 Internet	 is	 a	 unique	 democratizing	 medium’	 that	allows	 ‘more	and	diverse	people	 to	engage	 in	public	debate’”	 (Hindeman	2010,	3).	 Benkler	 (2006)	 coined	 the	 phrase	 “networked	 public	 sphere”	 to	 describe	 a	communicative	dynamic	more	open,	more	accessible,	and	more	informative	than	the	one	dominated	by	traditional	broadcast	and	print	media.		
The	 second	 logic	 to	 find	 popular	 support	 curiously	 mixed	 Habermas’	Enlightenment	 pursuit	 of	 reason	 through	 deliberative	 exchange	 with	 the	 very	postmodern	idea	that	the	Internet	could	liberate	users	to	navigate	and	construct	their	own	identities.	Sherry	Turkle,	writing	 in	Wired,	explained	that	“There	are	many	Sherry	Turkles”,	one	of	whom	is	“the	cyberspace	explorer,	the	woman	who	might	 log	on	as	a	man,	or	as	another	woman,	or	as,	simply,	ST.”	(Turkle	1996).	
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The	 assumption	 was	 that	 this	 ability	 to	 navigate	 the	 self,	 and	 to	 re-identify	oneself,	 enabled	all	 citizens	 to	 engage	 in	 the	public	 sphere	on	an	equal	footing.	Much	 like	 in	 Habermas’	 coffee	 houses	 –	 his	 Tischgesellschaften	 of	 eighteenth	century	France	(Habermas	1991)	–	on	the	Internet	there	“was	disregard	of	social	status,	a	fundamental	parity	among	all	participants	such	that	the	authority	of	the	better	 argument	 could	win	 out	 over	 social	 hierarchy.”	 (Dean	 2001,	 244).	On	 a	message	board	or	 in	a	chat	 room,	 it	didn’t	necessarily	matter	 if	a	user	was	 the	company	CEO	or	the	janitor	–	social	credentials	were	stripped	away,	and	in	the	pursuit	of	reason	ideas	could	triumph	on	merit	alone.			
It	wasn’t	especially	long	before	critics	began	to	point	out	that	the	Internet	didn’t	work	 very	 often	 in	 the	 ways	 that	 were	 being	 described.	 Dean	 (2001,	 246)	“highlights	 the	 inability	 of	 Habermas’s…	 concepts	 of	 the	 public	 sphere	 to	 deal	adequately	 with	 the	 complexities	 of	 the	 information	 age.”	 Not	 only	 does	 the	Internet	 fail	 to	 replicate	 the	 civilised	 and	 rational	 environment	 of	 Habermas’	coffee	 houses,	 “the	 regulatory	 fiction	 of	 the	 public	 sphere	 privileges	 a	theorization	of	political	norms”	(ibid	247).	In	short,	the	normative	restrictions	of	the	public	sphere	model	are	actually	very	unlike	the	techno-socio	reality	found	in	Internet	 chat	 rooms,	 on	message	 boards	 and,	 these	 days,	 on	 social	media.	 Far	better,	 she	 suggests,	 to	 adopt	 “a	 civil	 society	 model”	 that	 “presents	 a	 move	toward	 heterogeneity	 and	 contestability	 as	 well	 as	 an	 acknowledgment	 of	 the	contingency,	variety,	 and	potential	 for	violence	among	 the	diversity	of	political	styles	and	engagements”	(ibid	250).		
In	order	to	illustrate	this	point,	it	is	worth	quoting	the	passage	at	some	length:	
	“To	return	to	Salon’s	discussion	groups:	from	the	standpoint	of	the	public	
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sphere,	the	discussions	seem,	at	best,	a	kind	of	banal	content	enabled	by	a	software	program	installed	so	as	to	draw	in	consumers	and	advertisers	or,	at	worst,	a	set	of	irrational	and	often	demeaning	rants	of	the	privileged	few	against	 a	 disenfranchised	 many.	 From	 the	 standpoint	 of	 civil	 society,	however,	 the	 discussions	 appear	 much	 more	 as	 specific	 expressions	 of	curiosity,	 play,	 or	 engagement,	 expressions	 that	 may	 well	 be	 hateful	 or	maligning	but	are	not	therefore	outside	of	or	beyond	politics.	Instead,	they	are	 linked	 to	 other	 inter-	 actions	 and	possibilities	 as	 part	 of	 an	 extended	network	 of	 political	 meaning	 and	 opportunity,	 subjugation	 and	interpellation,	cooptation	and	resistance.”	(Dean	2001,	253)	
Buchstein	(2002)	identified	several	points	of	argument	where	normative	claims	ran	 up	 against	 the	 reality	 of	 Internet	 technologies.	 First,	 because	 Internet	technologies	involve	a	monetary	cost	–	either	the	purchase	of	the	computer,	or	of	connectivity,	or	of	the	education	and	the	knowledge	to	make	use	of	these	tools	–	they	 are	 distributed	 unevenly.	 Rather	 than	 stripping	 away	 social	 hierarchies,	then,	 the	 Internet	 replicates	 them,	 even	 at	 the	 point	 of	 access.	 As	 Benjamin	Barber	argued	a	little	later:	
“Because	 many	 people	 think	 the	 answer	 to	 the	 digital	 divide	 is	 the	hundred-dollar	 computer,	 we	 must	 remind	 them	 that	 literacy	 is	 also	 a	prerequisite	 to	 technological	 access…	 to	buy	 fifteen	years	of	 education	 in	order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 use	 a	 computer	 sensibly	 costs	 a	 lifetime	 of	 wealth.”	(Barber	2006,	4).	
Second,	 Buchstein	 noted	 that	 private	 companies	 were	 increasingly	 controlling	Internet	 architecture	 and	 applications	 –	 a	 process	 made	 inevitable	 by	 Bill	
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Clinton’s	 Federal	 Communication’s	 Act	 in	 1996,	 which	 privatised	 emergent	Internet	 technologies	 and	 left	 oversight	 and	 regulation	 to	 the	market	 (Barber	2006).	Buchstein	imagined	that	this	would	“change	the	character	of	the	Internet,	making	 it	 an	 instrument	 of	 further	 commercialization.”	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	migration	 of	 ever	 more	 communication	 practices	 online	 would	 create	 a	 new	panopticon	 –	 a	 state	 of	 constant	 surveillance	 –	 and	 “increase	 government	agencies’	and	capitalist	companies’	capacity	for	control”	(Buchstein	2002,	250).	
There	 were	 other	 issues	 too,	 less	 concrete	 perhaps,	 but	 in	 some	 ways	 more	worrisome.	Cyber	utopians	argued	that	the	Internet	enabled	citizens	to	access	all	the	 information	 they	 required	 on	 any	 subject	 –	 anyone	 could	 publish;	 anyone	could	access	that	published	content	–	but	the	flip-side	of	this	was	that	there	was	an	enormous	amount	of	information	to	process.	In	such	circumstances,	how	can	any	one	citizen	read	it	all,	verify	it	all,	process	it	and	make	use	of	it	in	the	pursuit	of	 reason?	 Furthermore,	 the	 speed	 at	 which	 the	 information	 circulated	 was	seemingly	unprecedented,	and	 the	concern	was	 that	 it	made	deliberation	–	 the	process	at	the	very	heart	of	communicative	democracy	–	impossible.		
“Above	all,	communication	on	the	Internet	is	fast…	democracy	is	a	process	based	 on	 deliberateness.	 It	 is	 about	 slow	 and	 prudent	 movement…	Democracy	is	not	just	about	collective	decision	making.	It	is	about	
deliberate	 collective	decision	making.	Deliberation	 is	 absolutely	 essential.	The	difference	between	the	tyranny	of	the	majority	and	real	democracy	is	deliberation.”	(Barber	2006,	7).	
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Human	beings	have	only	so	much	conscious	processing	power,	and	such	ubiquity	and	 speed	 could	 cause	 “information	 overload”	 (Buchstein	 2002,	 253).	Furthermore,	citizens	weren’t	actually	part	of	 this	 information	circulation,	 they	were	sitting	in	front	of	their	computer	screens,	detached	from	it	both	physically	and,	 it	was	assumed,	conceptually	 too.	 In	such	circumstances,	could	citizens	be	trusted	to	engage,	 listen,	deliberate	and	respond	in	a	normative	fashion?	These	are	questions	that	are	taken	up	elsewhere	in	this	thesis,	as	both	digital	dualism	and	the	logic	of	network	time	are	central	to	the	conceptual	framework.	
In	 terms	 of	 democracy,	 then,	 the	 technology	 is	 ambiguous	 (Barber	 2002).	Similarly,	the	effect	of	any	media	logic	is	also	ambiguous.	Rather	than	eliminating	media	 gatekeepers,	 Hindeman	 (2010,	 13)	 argues	 that	 the	 Internet	 shifts	 the	“exclusivity”	 of	 these	 roles	 “from	 the	 production	 to	 the	 filtering	 of	 political	information.”	For	Hindeman,	the	infrastructure	of	the	Internet	plays	a	crucial	role	in	 enabling	 some	 sorts	 of	 political	 action	 and	 constraining	 others.	 These	contrasting	dynamics	are	neither	unambiguously	positive	nor	negative:	certainly	they	 are	 not	 inherently	 democratising.	He	 highlights	 hyperlink	 technology	 and	the	pattern	of	linkages	between	websites	that	promotes	some	sites	towards	the	top	of	search	engine	rankings	and	relegates	others	into	general	obscurity.		
As	 anyone	 who	 has	 started	 a	 blog	 on	 a	 whim	 will	 testify,	 there	 is	 a	 huge	difference	between	speaking	and	being	heard.	“On	the	Internet,	the	link	between	the	two	is	weaker	than	it	is	in	almost	any	other	area	of	political	life.”	According	to	Geiger	(2009)	“hierarchies	of	popularity	do	exist,	but	the	common	conception	is	that	 a	 relatively	unpopular	blog	 can…	be	 transported	up	 the	 chain	 to	 the	most	popular	 blogs	 –	 if	 and	 only	 if	 it	 interests	 enough	 bloggers	 in	 the	 middle.”	
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However,	 for	 Hindeman,	 the	 techno-social	 reality	 is	 that	 these	middle	 ranking	blogs	 simply	 do	 not	 exist	 in	 anything	 like	 the	 necessary	 numbers.	 He	 “finds	powerful	 hierarchies	 shaping	 a	medium	 that	 continues	 to	 be	 celebrated	 for	 its	openness”	 (Hindeman	2010,	 18).	 Above	 all	 else,	 he	 argues,	 these	 techno-social	relationships	 are	 complex	 and	 poorly	 understood,	 by	 citizens	 and	 by	 scholars	too.		
Turner	 (2006,	 158)	 also	 cautioned	 that	 “there	 is	 no	 necessary	 connection	between,	on	the	one	hand,	a	broadening	demographic	in	the	pattern	of	access	to	media	representation	and,	on	the	other,	a	democratic	politics.”	Greater	diversity	does	 not	 necessarily	 produce	 democracy,	 partly	 because	 symbolic	 hierarchies	persist	 and	 media	 power	 remains	 concentrated	 in	 institutions	 and	 media	industries.	 While	 YouTube	 may	 enable	 the	 publication	 and	 dissemination	 of	user-generated	 content,	 it	 also	 streams	 commercial	 product,	 re-asserting	 the	primacy	 of	 this	 content	 (while,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 benefitting	 from	 what	 is,	essentially,	vast	amounts	of	free	labour)	(Turner	2010).	
Habermas	thought	that	rather	than	strengthening	the	public	sphere,	“the	rise	of	millions	of	 fragmented	chat	rooms	across	the	world	tend	 instead	to	 lead	to	the	fragmentation	 of	 large	 but	 politically-focused	 mass	 audiences	 into	 a	 huge	number	of	 isolated	issue	publics”	(Habermas	2006,	423).	 It	has	been	suggested	that	 view	 betrays	 a	 fundamental	 lack	 of	 understanding	 about	 Internet	technologies	and	the	people	that	use	them:	“participants	in	online	communities	are	complex…	to	speak	of	them	as	fragmented	and	isolated	ignores	or	rejects	the	reality	 that	especially	online,	 individual	publics	are	multiply	connected”	(Bruns	2007).	 Further,	 as	 Geiger	 (2009)	 notes,	 it	 is	 a	 view	 that	 overlooks	 specific	
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techno-complexities	 of	 the	 Internet.	 “Habermasians	 should	 not	 fear	fragmentation,	 but	 instead	 integration:	 the	 blogosphere	 as	 a	 public	 sphere	 is	constructed	and	unified	not	by	ideal	discourse,	but	algorithms.”	In	other	words,	then,	the	technology	that	makes	a	discursive	public	sphere	possible	is	precisely	the	technology	that	can	undermine	it.		
Dean’s	principal	complaint	was	that	Internet	technologies	do	not	enable	rational	and	deliberative	exchanges	in	the	way	that	the	normative	public	sphere	requires.	In	 one	 sense,	 then,	 it	 is	 a	 complaint	 about	 the	 structural	 and	 environmental	dynamics	of	the	communicative	space,	but	in	another	it	is	a	very	specific	critique	of	 the	 type	of	 communication	 that	 takes	 places	 via	 Internet	 technologies.	 The	broader	question	of	whether	or	not	Twitter	is	respectful,	reasoned,	deliberative	and	rational,	rests	first	and	foremost	on	whether	tweets	–	and	the	meanings	that	users	encode	into	tweets	–	are	those	things.	In	other	words,	the	appropriateness	of	the	normative	assumption	is	 judged	according	to	the	communicated	content.	Certainly,	this	is	an	abstraction	but,	as	Dean	argues,	it	is	an	abstraction	that	is	at	the	heart	 of	 the	public	 sphere	 and,	 it	must	 be	 said,	 a	 necessary	one	 to	 restrict	(and	make	possible)	an	analysis	of	Internet	technologies.		
The	 interweaving	of	 technology,	computer	code	and	socio-democratic	practices	brings	the	discussion	full	circle	back	to	software	studies	and	bloated	technology	(Rieder	 2012).	 It	 articulates,	 quite	 clearly,	 that	 to	 better	 understand	 the	relationship	between	the	Internet	and	democracy,	researchers	must	first	explore	the	complex	interactions	between	code,	devices,	their	users	and	communicative	practices.	 In	 terms	 of	 normative	 deliberative	 models,	 that	 means	 exploring	 in	detail	 the	 technologies	 themselves,	 the	 communication	 that	 takes	place	via	 the	
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technologies,	 the	 structural	 and	 material	 distribution	 of	 resources	 across	 the	public	 sphere	 and	 so	 on.	 It	 is	 a	 multifaceted	 process,	 and	 far	 too	 great	 an	undertaking	 for	 one	 thesis.	 The	 focus	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 restricted	 to	communication	on	Twitter	–	to	describing	content	and	the	dynamics	of	content	flow.		
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CHAPTER	FOUR	
CONCEPTUAL	FRAMEWORK	
INTRODUCTION	
During	the	2011	UK	riots,	a	complex	but	necessary	social	debate	was	reduced	to	a	polarised	and	politicised	language	war	by	mainstream	media	channels	(Kelsey	2012).	 Some	 authors	 have	 claimed	 that	 this	 behaviour	 is	 symptomatic	 of	 a	commercialised	 mass	 media	 (McChesney	 2013,	 Lewis	 2005,	 Kellner	 2004),	 in	which	 the	 pursuit	 of	 profit	 and	 influence	 tends	 to	 override	 any	 editorial	 or	ideological	commitment	to	responsible,	educational	public	discourse.	It	has	been	suggested	 that	 digital	 media	 channels	 could	 restore	 the	 integrity	 of	 mediated	discourse	 (Dutton	 and	 Dubois	 2015,	 Birchall	 and	 Coleman	 2015,	 Shirky	 2011,	Diamond	2010).	The	UK	is	a	modern	digital	society	with	high	numbers	of	social	media	users	–	and	channels	including	Facebook	and	Twitter	were	actively	used	to	 discuss	 the	 riots	 (Ofcom	 2015).	 Even	 so,	 parliament	 reduced	 rioting	 to	something		“criminal”	and	“simple”	and	the	state	responded	with	extraordinary	judicial	sessions	and	unprecedented	punishments	(Beckford	2012).		
There	 is	 a	 suspicion	 that	 cyber-utopians	 have	 overestimated	 the	 restorative	potential	 of	 digital	 technologies.	 Either	 these	media	do	not	 support	 the	 sort	 of	responsible	and	productive	discussions	that	some	have	claimed,	or	they	do	so	in	such	a	way	that	it	does	not	much	influence	(or	improve)	established	democratic	
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procedures	and	 institutions.	 In	order	 to	explore	 these	suspicions,	 two	chapters	were	dedicated	to	reviewing	and	critiquing	existing	literature.			
The	 first	 literature	review	chapter	defined	and	described	digital	media,	both	 in	technological	 terms,	 but	 also	 conceptually.	 It	 found	 that,	 historically,	 a	 lack	 of	specificity	has	been	an	issue	for	Internet	studies,	perhaps	because	the	Internet	is	such	a	complex	assemblage	of	multi-layered	networked	architectures,	 software	and	individual	communication	media.	Consequently,	the	aim	was	to	establish	the	Internet	 as	 an	 object	 to	 be	 studied,	 with	 attributes	 that	 afford	 behaviours.	 It	argued	 at	 length	 that	 technological	 specificity	 is	 a	 necessary	 precursor	 to	 any	description	of	affordances	and	it	introduced	the	concept	of	media	logics	to	help	categorise	technologies	with	similar	affordances.	According	to	the	proponents	of	that	theory,	 the	shared	affordances	of	certain	digital	media	technologies	(social	media)	 shape	 logics	 that	 have	 “changed	 the	 conditions	 and	 rules	 of	 social	interaction”		(van	Dijck	and	Poell	2013,	1).		
The	 chapter	 concluded	 that	 social	 media	 logics	 can	 act	 as	 a	 conduit	 between	robust	 technological	descriptions	and	social	 theory:	 they	define	 the	“processes,	principles,	 and	 practices	 through	 which	 these	 platforms	 process	 information,	news,	and	communication,	and	more	generally,	how	they	channel	social	 traffic”	(van	Dijck	and	Poell	2013,	5).	The	second	review	chapter	argued	 that	a	 lack	of	precision	 in	 this	 framing	 has	 undermined	 some	 digital-political	 theory,	 but	identified	 several	 elements	 of	 social	 media	 logic	 (process,	 principles	 and	practices)	through	which	digital	media	might	influence	democratic	practices.		
These	elements	are	summarised	in	table	1.		
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Logic	 Outcomes	 Mechanism		
Information	access	 • Freedom	of	ideas	
• Greater	pluralism		
• Increased	access/voice	
Communicative	democracy	
Information	overload	 • Deliberation	impossible	 Communicative	democracy	
Digital	divides	 • Internet	 replicates	 socio-economic	barriers	 Institutional/organisational	democracy	
Residual	hegemonies	 • Commercial	web	• State	oversight/control	
• Surveillance/intrusion	
Institutional/	 organisational	democracy	
Digital	dualism	 • Separation	 of	 online/offline	politics	
• Digital	 activism	 does	 not	translate	to	social	outcomes	
Communicative	democracy	
Networked	politics	 • Connective	action	
• Weakening	of	hierarchies	
• Digital	activism	
Action-orientated	democracy	
	
Table	 1:	 a	 summary	 of	 the	 major	 interpretations	 of	 social	 media	 logic	 relevant	 to	
democratic	theory	
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Different	 interpretations	of	social	media	 logic	emphasise	either	 the	networking	affordances	of	digital	media	or	the	communicational	affordances.	This	difference	in	 emphasis	 inevitably	 invokes	 a	 different	 interpretation	 of	 democracy.	 Either	democracy	 is	 conceived	 in	 terms	 of	 organisational	 and	 action-orientated	outcomes	(e.g.	 connective	action),	or	 it	 is	a	communicational	act	–	a	process	of	information	 sharing,	 value	 assignment	 and	 discursive	 legitimacy.	 This	conceptual	 framework	 chapter	 will	 focus	 on	 developing	 a	 rigorous	 account	 of	how	 the	 communicational	 affordances	 of	 digital	 media	 can	 influence	 a	communicational	 interpretation	 of	 democracy.	 Partly,	 this	 is	 because	 there	remain	conceptual	issues	with	a	strict	network-structural	theorisation	of	digital	media.	 Moreover,	 the	 focus	 on	 the	 UK	 riots	 demands	 a	 communicational	approach:	the	central	critical	concern	is	how	state-centric	social	actions	claimed	legitimacy	through	political	discussion	in	the	public	sphere.	
	
THEORISING	TWITTER	AS	A	COMMUNICATION	SYSTEM	
In	simple	terms,	this	conceptual	framework	must	establish	how	best	to	study	the	contribution	that	Twitter	made	to	public-political	discourse	during	the	UK	riots,	given	 the	 normative	 expectations	 of	 communicational	 democracy.	 There	 is	 a	more	fundamental	conceptual	case	for	adopting	a	communicational	approach	to	this	conceptual	framework:	it	 locates	these	efforts	within	a	tradition	of	cultural	research	and	current	academic	efforts	to	understand	modernity.	It	is	beyond	the	scope	 of	 this	 thesis	 to	 theorise	 modernity;	 it	 will	 suffice	 to	 say	 that	representation,	 distanciation	 and	 mediation	 are	 central	 to	 many	 theorists’	
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accounts	 of	 modern	 social	 reality	 (James	 2006,	 Steger	 2005,	 Appadurai	 1996,	1991,	Giddens	1990).	With	that	in	mind,	 it	 is	clear	that	the	Internet	is	centrally	implicated	 in	 globalisation	 processes,	 in	 cultural	 practice,	 in	 national	 and	international	imaginaries	and,	indeed,	in	on-going	attempts	to	rationalise	and	to	theorise	these	phenomena.	
According	 to	 Castells	 (1996),	 the	 development	 of	 networked	 computing	 tools	during	 the	 later	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 heralded	 a	 communication	revolution	that,	in	turn,	reconfigured	all	aspects	of	the	human	social	experience.	The	changes:	
“could	only	be	effectuated	because	they	have	at	their	disposal	the	global	networking	capacity	provided	by	digital	communication	technologies	and	information	systems…	This	is,	 in	fact,	what	separates,	 in	size,	speed,	and	complexity,	 the	 current	 process	 of	 globalization	 from	previous	 forms	 of	globalization	in	earlier	historical	periods.”	(Castells	2009,	24-25).		
James	(2006,	22)	argues	that	these	systems	are	extensions	of	“traditional	global	connection”	and	he	cautions	against	any	attempt	to	“dehistoricize	the	process	of	global	 extension.”	 This,	 perhaps,	 is	 an	 additional	 risk	 of	 over-emphasising	 the	networking	 logics	 of	 digital	media:	 it	 exaggerates	 the	 discontinuity	 of	modern	representational	systems.	 Internet	 technologies	may	destabilise	communicative	representation,	but	reality	–	the	negotiation	of	presence	and	absence	–	has	been	mediated	 since	 the	 evolution	 of	 language	 and	 writing.	 By	 emphasising	 the	communicational	affordances	of	digital	media,	it	becomes	possible	to	draw	on	a	rich	and	detailed	body	of	theoretical	work.		
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For	 instance,	 in	 what	 is	 now	 a	 canonical	 essay,	 Appadurai	 (1991,	 295)	 was	concerned	with	 the	 developing	 “tension	 between	 cultural	 homogenization	 and	cultural	heterogenization.”	The	prevailing	wisdom	among	globalisation	scholars	was	 that	 global	 interconnection	 principally	 meant	 the	 advance	 of	 western	cultural	 hegemony,	 via	westernisation,	 “McDonaldization”	 and	 commiditisation	(Ritzer	1983).	In	contrast,	Appadurai	wanted	to	emphasise	that	these	forces	are	“indigenized”	 when	 they	 are	 brought	 into	 new	 societies.	 “The	 new	 global	economy	 has	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 complex,	 overlapping,	 disjunctive	 order,	which	 cannot	 any	 longer	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 existing	 center-periphery	models	 (even	 those	 that	might	 account	 for	multiple	 centers	 and	 peripheries).”	(Appadurai	1991,	296).	
As	 an	 alternative	 to	 these	 centre-periphery	 models,	 Appadurai	 proposed	 five	dimensions	of	global-cultural	flow.	He	gave	each	one	the	suffix	scape	to	indicate	that	 they	were	 “deeply	 perspectival	 constructs”;	 so	much	 so	 that	 he	 explicitly	described	 these	 scapes	 as	 “imagined	 worlds”.	 The	 five	 scapes	 were:	 the	ethnoscape,	the	mediascape,	the	technoscape,	the	finanscape	and	the	ideoscape.	The	 finanscape,	 for	 instance,	 maps	 pretty	 much	 directly	 on	 to	 the	 economic	dimension.	The	ethnoscape	refers	to	the	global	movement	of	people	as	tourists,	migrants	 and	 refugees,	 and	 the	 disparate	 and	 diverse	 communities	 that	 these	diasporas	 create.	 The	 technoscape,	 quite	 broadly,	 describes	 the	 global	configuration	 of	 all	 technologies,	 including	 industrial	 (steel	 manufacturing),	computational	 and	 so	 on.	 According	 to	 Appadurai,	 the	 distribution	 of	 these	technologies	 is	 increasingly	 driven	 by	 capital	 flows,	 political	 relationships	 and	the	availability	of	high-skill/low-wage	labour	—	a	complex,	causative	matrix	that	
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frequently	confounds	attempts	to	study	it.		
The	mediascape	and	the	 ideoscape	are	deeply	associated	with	each	other:	 they	are	 “closely	 related	 landscapes	 of	 images.”	 (Appadurai	 1991,	 298).	 Essentially,	the	 mediascape	 describes	 the	 private	 and	 public	 electronic	 media	 able	 to	produce	 and	 disseminate	 information	 to	 local,	 national	 and	 transnational	audiences.	To	quote	Appadurai	at	some	length:		
“What	 is	most	 important	 about	 these	mediascapes	 is	 that	 they	 provide	(especially	in	their,	television,	film	and	cassette	forms)	large	and	complex	repertoires	of	images,	narratives	and	‘ethnoscapes’	to	viewers	throughout	the	world,	in	which	the	world	of	commodities	and	the	world	of	‘news’	and	politics	 are	 profoundly	mixed.	What	 this	means	 is	 that	many	 audiences	throughout	the	world	experience	the	media	themselves	as	a	complicated	and	 interconnected	 repertoire	 of	 print,	 celluloid,	 electronic	 screens	 and	billboards.	 The	 lines	 between	 the	 ‘realistic’	 and	 the	 fictional	 landscapes	they	see	are	blurred,	 so	 that	 the	 further	away	 these	audiences	are	 from	the	 direct	 experiences	 of	 metropolitan	 life,	 the	 more	 likely	 they	 are	 to	construct	 ‘imagined	 worlds’	 which	 are	 chimerical,	 aesthetic,	 even	fantastic	 objects,	 particularly	 if	 assessed	 by	 the	 criteria	 of	 some	 other	perspective,	some	other	‘imagined	world’.”	(Appadurai	1991,	299).		
The	 ideoscape	 consists	 of	 “concatenations	 of	 images”	 but	 those	 images	 are	overtly	of	a	political	nature	and	are	 frequently	either	state-driven	or	driven	by	parties	 attempting	 to	 capture	 state	 power.	 According	 to	 Appadurai,	 the	ideoscape	 carries	 “master	 narratives”	 such	 as	 the	 Enlightenment,	 which	 was	“constructed	with	a	certain	internal	logic	and	presupposed	a	certain	relationship	
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between	reading,	representation	and	the	public	sphere”	(Appadurai	1991,	299).	The	 destabilising	 —	 or	 loosening	 —	 of	 this	 particular	 narrative	 since	 the	nineteenth	century,	associated	with	a	concurrent	destabilising	of	Euro-American	hegemony,	 has	 created	 a	 global	 politics	 defined	 by	 micro-struggles	 between	different	 nation	 states,	 political	 cultures	 and	 ‘keywords’”xxv.	 In	 Appadurai’s	account,	then,	the	politics	of	the	ideoscape	assumes	something	akin	to	language	
wars	(Lewis	2005),	 in	which	keywords	battle	 for	meaning	and	prominence	in	a	mediated	 public	 sphere.	 Meta	 narratives,	 political	 posturing,	 and	 struggles	 for	state-legitimised	 power	 are	 contested	 in	 a	 densely	 populated	 mediasphere	where	meaning-making	is	subject	to	disjunctive	interactions	between	producers,	audiences,	governments	and	culture.	
So,	while	the	mass	media	create	and	disseminate	information	that	then	must	be	selected	 and	 filtered	 by	 the	 audience,	 influential	 socio-political	 and	 corporate	forces	 project	 ideologies	 —	 their	 filtering	 structures	 and	 frameworks	 –	 that	compete	for	primacy	in	the	new	global	mediasphere.	As	Lewis	writes:		
“the	transformation	of	the	world	into	a	global	media	sphere	is	the	result	of	a	 dynamic	 interaction	 between	 macro	 processes	 (history,	 economy,	technology,	politics	and	modes	of	social	organization)	and	the	profoundly	intimate	 and	 intricate	microcosms	of	 a	 person’s	 life	—	 the	 realm	of	 the	individual	subject.”	(Lewis	2008,	3-4).	
The	Internet	is	increasingly	a	medium	where	this	cultural	and	symbolic	exchange	takes	 place.	 As	 such,	 the	 affordances	 of	 Internet	 technologies	 have	 profound	implications	for	the	construction	and	the	conceptualisation	of	social	reality.		
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In	 the	 mid-1990s	 the	 MIT	 psychologist	 and	 anthropologist	 Sherry	 Turkle	published	excerpts	 from	her	book	Life	on	the	Screen	 in	 the	popular	 technology	magazine	Wired.	 Turkle	 discussed	 her	 postmodern	 approach	 to	 analysing	 the	Internet	and	 its	 effect	on	users,	 and	described	a	 liminal	moment	–	a	 transition	from	 “a	 modernist	 culture	 of	 calculation	 toward	 a	 postmodernist	 culture	 of	simulation”.	 In	 this	 simulated	 world,	 humans	 were	 able	 to	 experiment	 with	different	 identities,	 playing	 with	 surface	 representations	 of	 themselves	 to	 suit	different	contexts,	and	discovering	that	identity	wasn’t	necessarily	fixed,	but	that	it	 could	 be	 variable	 and	 fluid.	 The	 Internet,	 still	 a	 young	 and	 exploratory	technology,	 appeared	 to	 offer	 “laboratories	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 identity”	(Turkle	1996).	
This	 analysis	 seemed	 to	 endorse	 the	 Internet	 as	 a	 place	 for	 excitement,	exploration	and	liberation.	Following	Lacan,	Turkle	perceived	that	“in	its	virtual	reality,	we	 consciously	 construct	 ourselves”	 (Turkle	1995).	 In	her	more	 recent	writing,	 however,	 the	 Internet	 is	 a	 distracting	 and	 isolating	 technology.	 She	writes:		
“the	heroic	story	 is	not	 the	whole	story.	 In	virtual	worlds	and	computer	games,	people	are	flattened	into	personae.	On	social	networks,	people	are	reduced	 to	 their	 profiles…	We	 are	 increasingly	 connected	 to	 each	 other	but	oddly	more	alone:	in	intimacy,	new	solitudes.”	(Turkle	2011,	19).	
The	promise	of	exploration	and	communion	has	been	replaced	by	a	warning	of	distraction	and	isolation.	“Our	new	devices	provide	space	for	the	emergence	of	a	new	state	of	the	self,	itself,	split	between	the	screen	and	the	physical,	wired	into	existence	 through	 technology.”	 (Turkle	2011,	16).	 In	1996,	Turkle	 thought	 that	
	117 
the	 Internet’s	 simulated	virtual	 reality	made	real	 the	conscious	construction	of	the	self	–	that	is	the	ability	to	explore	and	to	discover	different	interpretations	of	the	 self	 online,	 and	 to	occupy	multiple	 identities,	 variably	 and	 fluidly.	 In	2011,	however,	that	promise	had	become	a	distraction,	a	false	dogma,	which	served	to	deny	the	authentic	or	real	self.		
In	 Turkle’s	 terms,	 computing	 is	 “the	 precedence	 of	 surface	 over	 depth,	 of	simulation	over	real,	of	play	over	seriousness”	(McCorduck	1996).	In	her	account	of	multiple	selves	being	constructed	and	negotiated	online,	there	remains	a	fixed,	modernist	sense	of	real	self	in	the	physical	world.	
The	 central	 critique	 of	 this	 digital	 dualist	 perspective	 is	 that	 it	 imposes	 an	artificial	distinction	on	 two	 types	of	 reality	and	 ties	 that	distinction	 to	 Internet	technologies	 (Jurgenson	 2011a).	 Digital	 dualism	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 internet	exists	in	one	place	but	not	another,	or	that	it	constitutes	a	‘reality’	distinct	from	our	prevailing	reality	–	what	we	might	call	the	offline,	physical	or	natural	world.	“Digital	dualists	believe	that	the	digital	world	is	 ‘virtual’	and	the	physical	world	‘real’”	(Jurgenson	2011b).		
Central	to	this	debate	are	issues	of	representation	and	symbolism:	the	perceived	separation	between	the	digital	sign	and	real	referent.	Understanding	this	issue	of	separation	 is	 central	 to	 understanding	 the	 relationship	 between	 Internet	communication	 and	 democracy	 (and,	 indeed,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	individual	and	the	state).	It	is	directly	relevant	to	the	politics	of	the	UK	riots,	of	course.	 In	 the	 cases	of	 	Perry	Sutcliffe-Keenan	and	 Jordan	Blackshaw,	 the	 state	argued	that	creating	a	riot	Facebook	page	is	exactly	the	same	as	inciting	rioting	in	 the	 physical	 world,	 but	 in	 their	 defences,	 neither	 Sutcliffe-Keenan	 nor	
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Blackshaw	accepted	this	was	the	case.	Much	of	 the	commentary	on	these	cases	struggled	to	reconcile	these	digital	crimes	with	the	severity	of	the	punishments	(Travis	2011).	
The	 idea	 that	 Internet	 democracy	 is	 somehow	 separate,	 or	 less	 real,	 than	 the	physical	 has	 profound	 implications	 for	 an	 analysis	 of	 riot	 discourse.	 Jean	Baudrillard	wrote:		
“it	would	be	 interesting	 to	 see	whether	 the	 repressive	 apparatus	would	not	 react	 more	 violently	 to	 a	 simulated	 holdup	 than	 to	 a	 real	 holdup.	Because	the	latter	does	nothing	but	disturb	the	order	of	things,	the	right	to	 property,	 whereas	 the	 former	 attacks	 the	 reality	 principle	 itself.	Transgression	and	violence	are	less	serious	because	they	only	contest	the	
distribution	of	the	real.	Simulation	is	infinitely	more	dangerous	because	it	always	leaves	open	to	supposition	that,	above	and	beyond	its	object,	law	
and	 order	 themselves	 might	 be	 nothing	 but	 simulation.”	 (Baudrillard	1981/1994,	20).	
These	 concerns	 are	made	 explicit	 in	 the	 logical	 elements	 described	 in	 table	 1.	Some	political	theorists	worry	that	digital	democracy,	if	it	occurs,	will	forever	be	detached	 from	 the	 physical-social	 institutions	 through	 which	 state-centric	democracy	 is	 practised	 (Buchstein	 2002).	 Others	 point	 to	 the	 low-effort,	 low-return	 practices	 of	 digital	 democracy	 –	 so	 called	 clicktivism	 or	 slacktivism	(Gladwell	 2010,	 Granovetter	 1973).	 The	 point	 is	 that	 these	 concerns	 are	 a	response	 to	 the	 communicational	 affordances	 of	 digital	 technologies,	 just	 as	much	as	the	logics	that	emphasise	information	liberation	and	overload.	The	aim	of	 this	 conceptual	 framework,	 then,	 is	 to	 establish	 how	 software	 constructs	
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affordances	 that	 disturb	 or	 disrupt	 established	 processes	 of	 cultural	 and	symbolic	exchange.	In	terms	of	the	globalised	mediasphere,	that	translates	into		a	study	of	representational	flows.		
The	discussion	so	far	has	touched	on	some	complex	ideas,	but	it	has	established	that	the	communicational	logics	unite	around	issues	of	representation,	presence-absence	and	cultural	flow.	These	are	issues	for	all	communication	technologies,	but	 there	 is	 a	 profound	 sense	 that	 the	 Internet	 (a	 manifestation	 of	 late-age	modernity)	 is	 responsible	 for	 new	 types	 of	 communicative	 exchange,	 new	representational	 dynamics	 and	 new	 forms	 of	 simulation.	 Representational	dynamics	 are	 fundamental	 to	 the	organisational	 logics	 of	 digital	 democracy,	 as	well	as	the	communicational	ones.	Either	the	organisational	logics	must	assume	a	 linear,	 effects	 model	 of	 communication,	 or	 they	 must	 first	 resolve	 these	representational	complexities.		
The	theory	being	advanced	is	that	the	dynamics	of	these	representational	flows	will	be	constructed	partly	by	the	affordances	of	technologies	used	to	facilitate	the	flows.	 This	 emphasis	 on	 the	 dynamics	 of	 flow	 is	 supported	 by	 a	 general	agreement	among	globalisation	theorists	that	the	nature	of	change	in	modernity	(that	 is,	 its	rate,	 intensity	and	reach)	 is	 just	as	significant	as	the	type	of	change	being	 described.	 “The	 dynamism	 of	 modernity	 derives	 from	 the	 separation	 of	
time	and	space	and	their	recombination	in	forms	which	permit	the	precise	time-space	‘zoning’	of	social	life”	(Giddens	1990,	16-17).		
In	other	words,	a	conceptualisation	(and	empirical	analysis)	of	Twitter-enabled	discourse	 during	 the	 UK	 riots,	 	 must	 engage	 with	 the	 temporal	 and	 spatial	dynamics	 of	 that	 discourse.	 Not	 only	 do	 time	 and	 space	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	
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theories	 of	 techno-mediated	 modernity,	 the	 communicational	 logics	 of	 digital	democracy	 explicitly	 invoke	 the	 temporality	 (information	 overload)	 and	spatiality	(information	liberation,	dualism)	of		digital	flows.		
	
THEORISING	DIGITAL	TIME-SPACE	
David	Harvey	has	 argued	 that	modern	media	 and	 communication	 technologies	disturb	the	relationship	between	presence	and	absence	in	profound	ways.	Mass	television	 ownership,	 for	 instance,	 is	 responsible	 for	 “collapsing	 the	 world’s	space	 into	 a	 series	 of	 images	 on	 a	 television	 screen”	 (Harvey	 1990,	 292).	 For	Harvey,	simultaneity	 is	contingent	with	time-space	compression	–	ever	present	historically,	 but	 increasingly	 intense	 during	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	century	–	a	process	driven	by	the	“accelerating	turnover”	in	material	production	and	the	“parallel	acceleration	in	exchange	and	consumption”	(Harvey	1990,	285).		
In	order	to	accelerate,	time	cannot	be	absolute	in	a	Newtonian	sense;	it	must	be	relative	and	experiential.	Several	 theorists	have	argued	 that,	 in	 the	human	 life-world,	 time	 and	 space	 are	 produced	 socially	 (Schmid	 2008,	 Lefebvre	 1991).	 It	becomes	possible	to	conceive	different	timescapes	(Adam	1998),	temporal-flows	particular	to	certain	modes	of	existence	and	experience.	Castells	(2010)	refers	to	biological	time	and	glacial	time;	Hassan	(2009)	defines	clock	time,	which	set	the	tempo	 for	 industrialisation	 and	 “began	 to	 supplant	 the	 eons-old	 experiential	(and	 diverse)	 relationships	 that	 humans	 had	with	 time”.	 Indeed,	 “through	 the	convergence	of	the	clock,	industrialization	and	modernity,	time	was	transformed	from	a	mode	of	subjective	experience	into	an	abstract	value.”	(Hassan	2009,	55-
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56).	
For	Castells	(1996,	xxxi)	too,	“major	social	changes	are	ultimately	characterized	by	a	transformation	of	space	and	time	in	the	human	experience.”	Both	time	and	space	are	reconfigured	according	to	the	structural	dynamics	of	the	network.	“The	key	spatial	feature	of	the	network	society	is	the	networked	connection	between	the	local	and	the	global.”	(Castells	1996,	xxxv).	
“Micro-electronics-based	 digital	 communication,	 advanced	telecommunication	 networks,	 information	 systems,	 and	 computerized	transformation…	 transformed	 the	 spatiality	 of	 social	 interaction	 by	introducing	 simultaneity,	 or	 any	 chosen	 timeframe,	 in	 social	 practices,	regardless	of	the	actors	engaged	in	the	communication	process”.	(Castells	1996,	xxxii).	
He	coins	the	term	space	of	flows	to	describe	this	simultaneity	of	social	practices	regardless	 of	 distance,	 contrasting	 it	 against	 a	 space	 of	 contiguity,	 in	 which	communication	 requires	 physical	 proximity	 (a	 theory	 in	 which	 cities	 become	communication	 systems).	 Physical	 and	 electronic	 networks	 coexist,	 so	 that	information	 flows	 in	 local	 (physical)	 and	 distant	 (electronic)	 networks	simultaneously	 and	 interchangeably.	 For	 instance,	 	 Facebook	 seems	 to	 permit	close	 personal	 relationships	 to	 thrive	 at	 distance;	 financial	 exchanges	 are	 pre-programmed	to	proceed	on	foreign	exchanges,	according	to	conditions	in	distant	markets.		
Timeless	 time	 is	 the	 “systematic	 perturbation	 in	 the	 sequential	 order	 of	 the	social	 practices”	 performed	 in	 a	 given	 context	 (Castells	 1996,	 xli).	 Those	
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sequential	 orders	 may	 previously	 have	 been	 dictated	 by	 biological	 or	 natural	rhythms	 (biological	 time),	 by	 industrialisation	 and	 capitalism	 and	 the	mechanisation	 and	 organisation	 of	 time	 (clock	 time),	 or	 even	 by	 long-scale	imaginings	 of	 an	 evolutionary	 future	 and	 past	 (glacial)	 time.	 Timeless	 time	appears	 to	 mean	 the	 attempted	 denial	 of	 these	 timescapes	 in	 favour	 of	 a	technologically-enabled	 annihilation	 of	 time:	 multi-tasking,	 flexible	 working,	instant	messaging,	 hyper-speed	 financial	 transfers,	 electronic	 instant	wars	 and	so	 on.	 The	 underlying	 claim	 is	 that	 socially	 constructed	 time	 is	 increasingly	abstracted	 and	 variably	 collapsing	 towards	 simultaneity;	 that	 advances	 in	technology	enable	this	abstraction;	and	that	there	may	be	conflict	between	this	automated	immediacy	and	more	natural,	evolutionary	timescales.	
The	 emphasis	 on	 simultaneity	 is	 crucial	 for	 the	 intra-referential	 production	 of	time	and	space,	but	 it	 is	also	key	 to	understanding	how	and	why	 time-space	 is	considered	 so	 central	 to	 modernity	 and	 to	 its	 perceived	 discontinuities.	 The	modern	 age	 seems	 to	 be	 characterised	 by	 an	 acceleration	 in	 this	 production	process,	 and	 the	 collapse	 of	 space	 through	 time,	 or	 the	 simultaneity	 of	experience.	
Paul	 Virilio	 has	 argued	 that	 acceleration	 lies	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 modern	 social	organisation	 and	 transformation.	 Dromology,	 that	 is	 the	 “relentless	 logic”	 of	speed,	 underwrites	 measures	 of	 urban	 space	 and	 social	 progress,	 so	 that,	 in	addition	to	a	political	economy	of	wealth,	we	must	also	acknowledge	that	there	is	a	political	economy	of	speed	(Armitage	1999).	In	Virilio’s	telling,	this	is	a	military	logic	also,	 the	creep	of	hyper-fast	warfare	 into	all	 corners	of	 social	governance	and	architectural	planning:	“Everything	in	this	new	warfare	becomes	a	question	
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of	time	won	by	man	over	the	fatal	projectiles	toward	which	his	path	throws	him.”	(Virilio	1977,	46).	The	 logic	 is	 inescapable,	 hardwired	almost	 into	 social	 forms	and	 political	 institutions.	 “Governance	 by	 speed	 (by	 states	 or	 otherwise)	 is	
logistics,	 and	 logistics,	 like	 the	 oceanic	 vectors	 from	 which	 it	 is	 born,	 is	omnidirectional.”	(Bratton	2006,	12).		
Robert	 Hassan	 suggests	 that	 acceleration	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 decline	 of	 Fordist	industrial	models	and	a	 “logic	of	 scale”	 that	 “took	 its	 time	 from	the	rhythms	of	modernity”	 and	was	measured	 by	 the	 clock	 (Hassan	 2009,	 20).	 In	 the	modern	network	 society	 that	 spatial	 (scalar)	 logic	has	been	 superseded	by	a	 temporal-neoliberalism	–	so	 that	 the	 “increasing	 rapidity	at	which	we	produce,	 consume	and	 distribute	 commodities	 is	 now	 the	 core	 process,	 the	 central	 factor	 in	 the	‘economy	of	speed’.”	(Hassan	2009,	21).	Within	this	economy,	speed	is	fetishised	and	technology	is	implicitly	a	part	of	this	dynamic.	
“In	our	culture	of	speed,	almost	every	product	or	service	emanating	from	the	economy	of	speed	is	now	promoted	as	faster	and	more	efficient	with	the	corollary	being	that	we	will	become	faster	and	more	efficient,	more	in	tune	and,	somehow,	lead	better-quality	lives.”	(Hassan	2009,	26).	
This	is	especially	significant	for	the	conceptual	framework	because	of	the	effect	that	it	may	or	may	not	have	on	meaning-making.	Harvey	considered	volatility	a	principal	effect	of	time-space	compression.		
“Time-space	compression	always	exacts	its	toll	on	our	capacity	to	grapple	with	 the	 realities	 unfolding	 around	 us.	 Under	 stress,	 for	 example,	 it	becomes	harder	and	harder	to	react	accurately	to	events…	The	difference	
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this	time	is	that	there	is	not	even	time	to	agonize.	And	the	problems	are	not	confined	to	the	realms	of	political	or	military	decision-making.	For	the	world’s	 financial	 markets	 are	 on	 the	 boil	 in	 ways	 that	 make	 a	 snap	judgement	 here,	 an	 unconsidered	 word	 there,	 and	 a	 gut	 reaction	somewhere	 else	 the	 slip	 that	 can	 unravel	 the	 whole	 skein	 of	 fictitious	capital	formation	and	of	interdependency.”	(Harvey	1990,	306).	
The	 result	 of	 all	 this	 accelerated	 transfer	 is	 a	 temporal	 and	 spatial	 experience	shaped	 by	 the	 dynamics	 of	 communication	 technology.	 Micro-electronic	communication	 technologies	 construct	 hyper-fast,	 polymorphic	 and	networked	temporalities	 that	 have	 a	 self-propelling	 logic.	 Though	 there	 may	 be	 local	variations	 –	 real	 time	 cultures	 –	 the	 temporalities	 of	 different	 communication	software	 (increasingly	 written	 with	 the	 neoliberal	 urgency	 of	 the	 frantic	entrepreneur)	strain	to	synchronise	with	its	pace.			
This	networked	temporality	–	virtual	time	in	Castells’	terminology	–	exaggerates	some	effects	and	flattens	others:	
“the	 mixing	 of	 times	 in	 the	 media,	 within	 the	 same	 channel	 of	communication	 and	 at	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 viewer/interactor,	 creates	 a	temporal	 collage,	 where	 not	 only	 genres	 are	 mixed,	 but	 their	 timing	becomes	 synchronous	 in	 a	 flat	 horizon,	 with	 no	 beginning,	 no	 end,	 no	future.	The	timelessness	of	multimedia’s	hypertext	is	a	decisive	feature	of	our	culture,	shaping	 the	minds	of	and	memories	of	children	educated	 in	the	new	cultural	context.”	(Castells	1996,	492).		
Internet	temporality	–	virtual	 time	–	 is	an	amplification	of	temporal	 trends	that	
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have	long	been	implicit	 in	technological	and	social	development.	There	are	two	critical	 characteristics	 of	 this	 network	 time	 that	 require	 closer	 inspection.	 The	first	is	the	collapse	into	simultaneity	–	the	realisation	of	so	called	‘real	time’.	The	second	 is	 the	 uncertain	 and	 (almost	 certainly)	 uneven	 temporalities	 that	 flow	within	the	overarching	concept	of	network	time.	In	effect,	network	time	requires	some	unpacking	–	 it	 is	a	catchall	 term	for	 the	relative	 ‘flow	speeds’	enabled	by	different	digital	technologies.		
The	idea	of	real	time	has	been	associated	with	temporal	studies	of	the	Internet	since	the	mid-nineties	(Weltevrede	et	al.	2014).	Real	time	is	generally	meant	to	refer	 to	 communicative	 simultaneity,	but	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 there	 is	both	variation	and	nuance	in	its	usage.	As	Weltevrede	et	al.	(2014,	128)	write,	real	time	is	“not	a	concern	of	 immediacy	–	which	 is	 literally	 impossible	–	but	a	question	of	 speed	and	the	organization	of	content	in	relation	to	time.”	Thus,	real	time	is	associated	with	the	modern	web,	where	Asynchronous	JavaScript	and	XML	(AJAX)	permits	web	programs	to	make	server	calls	and	to	update	content	without	user	prompts.	It	was	 less	a	 feature	of	 early	evolutions,	where	 content	 resided	 in	 static	HTML	pages	that	had	to	be	fetched	by	a	browser.		
As	such,	the	notion	of	real	time	is	entangled	with	the	experience	of	information	flows	–	technologies	push	content	at	users,	sometimes	at	speeds	and	in	volumes	that	 defy	 cognitive	 processes	 (information	 overload).	 It	 is	 precisely	 the	 real-timeness	of	digital	technologies	that	some	political	theorists	find	problematic.		
Absolute	immediacy	may	be	literally	impossible,	but	the	speed	of	communication	starts	to	challenge	social,	conceptual	and	experiential	notions	of	temporal	delay.		
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“Of	 course,	 the	 'real-time'	 itself	 is	 a	 mediated	 construct,	 created	 in	software	 and	 managed	 through	 careful	 processing	 and	 presentational	cues	for	the	user.	After	all,	the	mere	passing	through	computation	creates	some	latency,	or	data	lag,	which	is	different	for	each	system,	that	marks	it	as	already	in	the	past	before	the	user	receives	 it	as	a	 feedback	 loop.	But	this	latency	in	 real-time	 response,	 which	may	 be	micro	 or	milliseconds,	may	 also	 be	 disguised	 from	 the	 user	 through	 various	 forms	 of	 design	transitions,	 computational	 techniques	 or	 anticipatory	 processing	 which	makes	 the	 experience	 of	 real-time	 feel	 as	 if	 it	 is	 truly	 real-time.”	 (Berry	2011).	
The	 observation	 that	 Internet	 technologies	 will	 refresh	 and	 update	 content	independent	of	their	users,	and	that	this	updating	proceeds	at	enormous	(but	not	uniform)	 speeds	 and	 in	 volumes	 beyond	 comprehension,	 hints	 at	 an	informational	environment	that	is	both	incredibly	fast,	clearly,	but	also,	in	some	respects,	 timeless.	This	 is	 the	key	point	 for	Castells	and	his	concept	of	 timeless	time.	Though	the	dominant	logic	may	be	acceleration,	collection	and	processing	on	 such	 a	 vast	 scale	 sucks	 and	 assembles	 different	 temporalities	 into	informational	flows,	creating	“a	 ‘timeless	time’	or	a	 ‘non-time’	without	past	and	without	duration”	(Weltevrede	et	al.	2014,	129).		
With	different	software	platforms	enabling	the	flow	of	information	streams,	each	with	a	distinct	temporality,	rhythm	or	update	cycle,	the	networked	mediasphere	contains	 “a	 series	 of	 distinctive	 ‘real-time	 cultures’”	 (Weltevrede	 et	 al.	 2014,	137).	These	real-time	cultures	are	not	fixed	–	there	is	no	determinism	–	but	there	is	 an	 overarching	 logic	 of	 acceleration	 that	 has	 profound	 implications	 for	
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meaning-making	and	for	established	models	of	social	constructionism.	
Ultimately,	to	focus	on	communicational	logics	is	to	engage	with	this	reimagining	of	 digital	 time-space.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 riots	 and	 the	 research	 focus,	 Twitter	constructs	 a	distinctive	 time	 culture	 –	Twitter	 time	–	 that	may	or	may	not	 	 be	compatible	 with	 a	 normative	 framing	 of	 deliberative	 democracy.	 In	 this	reckoning,	 establishing	 Twitter	 (finally)	 as	 an	 objective	 for	 study	 involves	identifying	 and	 describing	 the	 temporalities	 of	 the	 information	 flows	 that	Twitter	supports.		
	
THEORISING	DISCOURSE	AND	MEANING-MAKING	
The	 fundamental	 difference	 between	 the	 organisational	 and	 communicational	logics	 is	 the	 role	 of	 the	 individual	 subject	 or,	 more	 prosaically,	 the	 subjective	representation	 of	 the	 individual	 subject	 within	 the	 networked	 system.	 An	organisational	 logic	 prioritises	 the	 network	 structure	 over	 individual	 nodes;	 a	communicational	 logic	prioritises	 the	human	minds	of	 individual	nodes,	 and	 is	particularly	 interested	 in	 the	messages	 transmitted	between	 those	minds.	This	difference	in	emphasis	has	profound	implications	for	the	explanatory	models	by	which	democracy	is	constructed.		
Lewis	 (2008,	 4-5)	 observes	 that	 societies	 “must	 communicate	 and	 commune	through	the	formation	of	overlapping	or	contiguous	social	imaginings	–	the	sense	of	 participating	 in	 ‘the	 group’	 through	 the	 mutual	 and	 interdependent	construction	 of	 meaning”.	 It	 is	 the	 relationship	 between	 mutual	 and	
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interdependent	meanings	 –	 and	 how	 the	 negotiation	 of	 these	 positions	 can	 be	democratic	–	that	occupies	this	section	of	the	conceptual	framework.		
Deliberative	democracy	relies	on	a	rarefied	form	of	discourse.	Individual	political	positions	 must	 be	 shared,	 disagreements	 must	 be	 resolved	 and	 consensus	reached	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 this	 “interdependent	 construction	 of	 meaning”	achieves	 democratic	 legitimacy.	 Discourse,	 whether	 deliberative	 or	 not,	 is	 the	negotiation	 and	 collectivisation	 of	 individual	 meanings,	 represented	 through	language,	 which	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Twitter	 is	 transcribed	 into	 text	 in	 the	 form	 of	tweets.	As	such,	the	conceptual	framework	must	include	a	textual	framework	for	understanding	 (and	 evaluating)	 how	 individual	 tweets	 can	 represent	 political	ideas.		
The	individual	and	collective	construction	of	meaning	is	the	central	dynamic	in	a	communication	 interpretation	 of	 democracy.	 If	 tweets	 are	 textual	representations	 of	 meaning,	 then	 this	 raises	 an	 obvious	 question:	 what	 are	meanings?	 Furthermore,	 what	 is	 it	 exactly	 that	 is	 being	 communicated	 on	Twitter?	Do	meanings	 have	 any	 sort	 of	material	 or	 representational	 existence,	something	 that	 can	 be	 observed	 and	 studied?	 Assuming	 that	 empirical	observation	is	achievable,	will	it	be	possible	to	differentiate	between	one	type	of	meaning	 construction	 (meaning-making)	 and	 another,	 or	 to	 say	 that	 one	 is	democratic	and	the	other	is	not?			
Sociology	 has	 long	 wrestled	 with	 the	 processes	 that	 somehow	 coordinate	independent	minds	into	collective	social	behaviour.	Meaning	is	established	as	a	fundamental	 concept	 in	 Weber’s	 social	 analysis;	 he	 uses	 it	 to	 differentiate	between	 reactive	 behaviours	 (in	 which	 he	 had	 no	 interest)	 and	 social	 action,	
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which	 involves	 thought	 processes	 (the	 attachment	 of	 subjective	 meaning).	Sociology	is:	“a	science	concerning	itself	with	the	interpretive	understanding	of	social	 action	 and	 thereby	 with	 a	 causal	 explanation	 of	 its	 course	 and	consequences.”	(Weber	1968,	4).	
Durkheim	 also	 grappled	with	 the	 problem	of	 social	 imaginings.	He	 divided	 his	social	 facts	 into	 two	 types:	material	 and	 nonmaterial.	Material	 social	 facts	 are	plainly	visible	and	include	things	like	legal	codes,	technology,	bureaucracies	and	so	 on.	 Nonmaterial	 social	 facts	 have	 no	 physical	 objectivity:	 they	 are	 cultural	values,	norms,	morals	and	prevailing	knowledge	systems.	Individuals	are	bound	by	social	 facts	but	 social	 facts	must	 somehow	exist	 independent	of	 individuals,	what	Durkheim	called	collective	consciousness:	
“The	totality	of	beliefs	and	sentiments	common	to	average	citizens	of	the	same	 society	 forms	 a	 determinate	 system	which	 has	 its	 own	 life…	 It	 is,	thus,	 an	 entirely	 different	 thing	 from	particular	 consciences,	 although	 it	can	be	realized	only	through	them.”	
Beliefs	 and	 sentiments	 are	 subjective	 –	 or,	 in	 other	 words,	 held	 solely	 in	 the	minds	of	individuals	–	but,	for	Durkheim,	they	also	can	be	held	commonly	across	groups.	Once	a	belief	or	a	sentiment	is	shared	across	a	group,	however,	it	“forms	a	 determinate	 system	which	 has	 its	 own	 life”.	 Somehow	meaning	 escapes	 the	individual	subject	and	obtains	an	objective	and	collective	existence	all	of	its	own.	It	is	hard	to	know	where	this	objective	existence	might	be	realised,	however,	or	how	 a	 sociologist	 should	 ever	 gain	 access	 to	 it,	 because	 individual	 minds,	 the	“particular	 consciences”,	 are	 required	 to	 translate	 (or	 realise)	 meaning	 into	social	action.	As	Ritzer	(2012,	126)	suggests,	Durkheim	is	“interested	in	mental	
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processes,	 but	 this	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 psychologists’	 interest	 in	 the	 mind,	personality,	and	so	forth.”		
Durkheim	preferred	the	term	collective	representations	in	his	later	work.	In	many	respects,	 the	two	concepts	are	very	similar,	but	representation	 is	defined	more	narrowly	 than	 conscience,	 and	 as	 a	 result	 it	 is	 easier	 to	 identify	 examples.	Broadly	 speaking,	 a	 representation	 is	 an	 idea	 or	 a	 concept,	 and	 Durkheim	provides	examples	including	symbols	(often	religious),	icons,	myths	and	legends.	Clearly	 meanings	 are	 attached	 to	 these	 material	 symbols,	 which	 can	 often	 be	identified	and	studied	empirically	and	historically.	In	addition,	Durkheim	coined	the	phrase	social	currents	to	refer	to	those	nonmaterial	social	facts	where	there	is	 no	material	 or	 organisational	 representation	 of	 the	 collective	 conscience.	 In	other	words,	social	currents	are:	
“sets	 of	 meanings	 that	 are	 shared	 by	 the	 members	 of	 a	 collectivity.	 As	such,	 they	 cannot	 be	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 mind	 of	 any	 given	individual.	 Individuals	 certainly	 contribute	 to	 social	 currents,	 but	 by	becoming	 social	 something	 new	 develops	 through	 their	 interactions.”	(Ritzer	2012,	83).	
Individually-held	meanings,	when	shared,	create	social	currents	independent	of	any	 single	 individual	 mind,	 with	 coercive	 force	 across	 social	 groups.	 In	 the	simplest	possible	terms,	this	is	the	logic	by	which	Twitter	might	influence	social	processes,	including	processes	specific	to	democratic	decision-making.	It	affects	the	 sharing	 of	meanings,	 either	 by	 enabling	meanings	 to	 be	 shared	with	 some	individuals	 and	 not	 others	 (the	 organisational	 logic)	 or	 by	 shaping	 the	 act	 of	sharing	itself.		
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Meaning	 is	 an	 organising	 force	 within	 society.	 The	 sharing	 and	 making	 of	meanings,	 then,	 is	 exceptionally	 important	 but	 clearly	 complex.	 Language,	arguably,	is	the	primary	and	the	most	influential	variable	in	this	equation.	As	the	social	philosopher	John	Searle	writes:	“You	cannot	begin	to	understand	what	 is	special	 about	 human	 society,	 how	 it	 differs	 from	 primate	 societies	 and	 other	animal	 societies,	 unless	 you	 first	 under-	 stand	 some	 special	 features	 of	 human	language.”	(Searle	2006,	14).	For	Durkheim,	 language	was	the	archetypal	social	fact:	 common	 across	 society,	 independent	 of	 individuals,	 coercive	 and	 only	explicable	by	other	social	factsxxvi.	Language	is	a	thing	(Ritzer	2012,	78)	–	it	has	an	epistemologically-objective	existence	despite	the	fact	that	human	beliefs	and	attitudes	 are	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 that	 existence.	 Language	 can	 be	 coercive	 of	individuals	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 syntax	 and	 lexicon	 of	 individual	 languages	permit	or	restrict	certain	types	of	expression,	and	realisation	that	language	can	permit	 or	 deny	 certain	 kinds	 of	 meaning	 lies	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 structuralist	sociology	and	language	theory.	Language	creates	a	relational	system	for	making	meaning	 in	 society.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 underwrites	 the	 translation	 of	 individual	subjectivity	 into	 collective	 representations	 and,	 ultimately,	 the	 macro	organisational	 structures	 that	 interest	 sociologists.	 “Language	 is	 the	presupposition	of	the	existence	of	other	social	institutions	in	a	way	that	they	are	not	the	presupposition	of	language.”	(Searle	2006,	14).	
Meaning-making	 is	 complex	 and	 context-specific,	 however.	 In	 his	 later	 work,	Wittgenstein	 wrote	 of	 language	 games	 referring	 to	 the	 interplay	 of	 imprecise	meanings	that	can	attach	to	signs	within	a	semantic	system	(Wittgenstein	1922).	While	de	Saussure	 imagined	a	universal	system	for	 the	 formation,	organisation	
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and	operation	of	language,	its	manifestation	was	culturally	specific:	“The	culture	and	 its	 needs	 determine	 the	 categories	 of	 meaning.”	 (Lewis	 2008,	 112).	 The	
langue,	to	use	de	Saussure’s	term,	“is	inevitably	bound	to	the	social	and	cultural	context	 in	 which	 the	 language	 parole	 (specific	 utterance)	 is	 operating.”	 (ibid,	113).		
In	essence,	the	issue	with	a	sociology	centred	on	language	(as	a	social	fact)	is	that	human	 communication	 is	 invariably	 more	 complex	 and	 more	 interactive	 than	universalising	 logic	 can	 allow.	 This	 complexity	 was	 elucidated	 by	 Roland	Barthes,	 who	 argued	 that	 meaning	 accumulates	 over	 and	 above	 structuralist	signification	 through	 a	 process	 he	 called	 connotation	 –	 essentially	 the	 context-specific	 layering	 of	 meaning	 on	 top	 of	 an	 original	 association	 (Barthes	 1988).	What	 this	 does,	 of	 course,	 while	 retaining	 the	 literal	 logic	 of	 structuralism,	 is	allow	 for	 ideological,	 political	 and	 psychological	 aspects	 of	 meaning-making	(Lewis	 2008,	 115).	 This	 layering	 has	 been	 framed	 as	 the	 struggle	 to	 signify	(Lewis	2000,	Hall	1982),	a	phrase	used	already	in	this	thesis	and	a	concept	that	is	central	to	this	understanding	of	how	meaning	is	shared	by	sending	tweets	on	Twitter.		
Language	 wars	 are	 the	 ideological,	 emotional	 and	 psychological	 struggles	 to	attach	 meaning	 to	 signifiers	 (Lewis	 2005,	 Turner	 1996).	 Different	 meanings	struggle	 for	primacy	 in	 the	mediasphere	as	social	actors	 try	 to	 frame	events	 in	terms	of	their	preferences	and	prejudices.	What	does	this	struggle	look	like?	The	effects	model	treated	language	as	a	given	and	the	process	of	communication	as	a	simple	matter	of	message	 transmission,	and	so	a	message	 (and	 its	effect	on	an	audience)	 could	 be	 simply	measured	 by	 the	 application	 of	 objective,	 statistical	
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methods.	 Language	 wars	 demand	 a	 far	 more	 nuanced	 interpretation	 of	 the	communicative	process,	however.		
Stuart	 Hall	 established	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 effects	 model	 when	 he	 portrayed	television	as	a	meaningful	discourse	between	producers	and	audiences	situated	in	independent	meaning	structures.	As	Hall	contends,	the	“degree	of	reciprocity	between	encoding	and	decoding	moments…	is	not	given	but	constructed.”	(Hall	1980,	136).	 In	other	words,	communication	 is	more	a	process	of	 interpretation	(and	 transformation)	 than	 transmission.	 “What	 are	 called	 distortions	 	 or	‘misunderstandings’	arise	precisely	from	the	lack	of	equivalence	between	the	two	sides	in	the	communicative	exchange”	(Hall	1980,	131).	The	struggle	to	signify	is	thus	a	struggle	to	reproduce	constructed	positions	in	such	a	way	as	to	influence	the	 decoding	 moment	 –	 to	 impose	 one	 meaning	 structure	 upon	 another.	According	 to	 one	 perspective,	 rioting	 is	 “wanton	 vandalism	 and	 looting”	(Hansard	 2011,	 1057),	 according	 to	 another	 it	 is	 an	 explicable	 form	 of	 social	protest.	The	difference	in	meaning	between	these	two	positions	legitimises	very	different	types	of	social	action.		
This	interpretation	can	be	formalised	for	the	study	of	meaning-making	through	Twitter.	As	part	of	an	extended	effort	to	frame	meaningfulness	(and	culture)	 in	terms	 of	 evolutionary	 and	 system	 sciences,	 Potts	 and	 Hartley	 (2014)	 theorise	meaning	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 make	 the	 communication	 and	 resolution	 of	meanings	 a	 dynamic	 force	 in	 the	 shaping	 and	 replication	 of	 group	 cultures.	Meaning	is	the	system	of	mappings	that	orientate	language	(the	sign	system)	to	culture;	 culture	 shapes	 how	humans	 form	 groups	 because	 culture	 shapes	 how	humans	share	and	retain	meanings.	The	struggle	to	signify	is	thus	the	struggle	to	
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control	this	mapping	system,	to	assert	a	meaning	structure	on	to	a	sign	and,	thus,	to	influence	how	humans	form	groups	for	social	action.	
Communication	enables	meaning-making,	which	is	the	struggle	to	assign	value	to	different	 mapping	 systems	 within	 culture	 (Hartley	 and	 Potts	 2014).	 This	interpretation	is	potentially	very	useful	for	an	empirical	study	of	Twitter	because	it	 suggests	 that	 it	 may	 be	 possible	 to	 observe	 the	 struggle	 to	 signify	 within	communication	 channels.	 Within	 a	 cultural	 system	 (the	 UK	 riot	 public,	 for	instance)	there	exists	a	multitude	of	possible	mapping	systems	–	many	different	ways	of	orientating	riot	signs	within	a	wider	meaning	structure	(that	 is,	within	ideological,	 emotional	 and	 psychological	 cultures).	 One	way	 of	 conceptualising	this	potential	is	to	recognise	the	many	potential	mapping	systems	that	exist	vis-à-vis	 the	 riots	 –	 the	 riots	 can	mean	 criminality,	 protest,	 hedonism,	 disillusion,	disenfranchisement.	 All	 these	 different	mapping	 systems	 have	 the	 potential	 to	become	meaningful	–	that	is,	to	shape	the	aggregation	of	individuals	into	groups	for	 social	 action	 –	 but	 not	 all	 will	 do	 so.	 In	 theory,	 at	 least,	 it	 is	 through	communication	that	human	minds	decide	how	meaning	should	be	assigned	(or	denied)	 to	 those	different	 interpretations.	This	process,	 the	promotion	of	some	mapping	systems	over	others,	is	what	shapes	meaningfulness	within	groups	and	what	enervates	social	action.		
In	effect,	then,	meaning	is	partly	an	issue	of	attention	–	the	conscious	awareness	of	one	mapping	system	over	another.	To	investigate	how	meaning-making	works	through	Twitter	is	to	investigate	how	the	technology	affords	its	users	to	promote	certain	mapping	systems	and	to	relegate	others.	However,	this	is	only	part	of	the	equation.	Meaning-making	is	not	simply	a	process	of	promoting	some	signs	over	
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others	 because	 the	 signs	 themselves	 can	 change:	 the	 internal	mapping	 system	itself	can	be	reconfigured.	The	instability	of	the	word	is	a	crucial	concept	in	post-structural	cultural	theory	and	does	not	require	further	review	here.	After	all,	this	point	has	already	been	made;	the	struggle	to	signify	involves	both	the	promotion	of	some	meanings	over	others	and	the	struggle	to	shape	the	internal	dynamics	of	those	meanings.		
Dan	 Sperber	 likened	 the	 transmission	 of	meanings	 between	 individuals	 to	 the	spread	of	disease.	A	representation,	 the	term	preferred	by	Sperber:	"involves	a	relationship	between	three	terms:	an	object	is	a	representation	of	something,	for	some	information	processing	device."	(Sperber,	1985:	76).	"The	human	mind	is	susceptible	to	representations,	in	the	way	the	human	organism	is	susceptible	to	diseases."	 (Sperber,	 1985:	 74).	 Human	 populations	 host	 a	 range	 of	representations,	 some	 commonly	 held	 and	 persistent,	 some	 only	 experienced	briefly	by	an	individual.	Representations	can	spread	quickly	(fashions	are	like	an	epidemic)	 or	 slowly	 (traditions	 are	 like	 an	 endemic).	 In	 order	 to	 explain	why	cultures	(that	is,	shared	representations)	persist,	he	argues,	 first	 it	 is	necessary	to	explain	why	some	representations	spread	more	successfully	than	others,	and	that	means	looking	at	patterns	of	spread	and	analysing	the	transmission	process.	
Clearly	 there	 is	 considerable	 overlap	 between	 these	 conceptual	 domains.	Sperber’s	 differentiation	 between	 representations	 (mental	 and	 public)	 is	 not	unlike	Durkheim’s	theories	of	social	currents	and	the	 ‘collective	mind’.	The	aim	here	 is	 not	 to	 re-theorise	 this	 material.	 However,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 for	Sperber	 “an	 epidemiology	 of	 representations	 is	 first	 and	 foremost	 a	 study	 of	their	 transformations;	 it	 considers	 the	 reproduction	 of	 representations	 as	 a	
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limiting	case	of	transformation."	(Sperber,	1985:	75).		
As	noted,	networked	communication	 technologies	 like	Twitter	change	a	crucial	parameter	 compared	 to	mass	media	 logics:	 all	 users	 have	 the	 capacity	 both	 to	receive	and	to	send	messages.	If	a	representation	is	encoded	more	often	by	more	people,	transmitted,	and	then	received	and	decoded	more	often	by	more	people	–	 and	 if	 each	 step	 in	 that	 process	 involves	potential	 transformation	 –	 then	 the	logical	 conclusion	 is	 that	 the	 representation	 should	 transform	more	 quickly;	 it	should	 become	 less	 stable.	 The	 problem	 with	 this	 formulation	 is	 that	representations	 will	 be	 increasingly	 in	 a	 state	 of	 flux,	 transforming	 and	 re-transforming,	 and	 it	 is	 improbable	 that	 representations	 will	 ever	 settle	 or	aggregate	in	a	way	that	might	explain	ideology	or	culturexxvii.	However,	Claidière	and	 Sperber	 (2007,	 91)	 noted	 that	 “at	 the	macro-level,	 cultural	 information	 is	relatively	stable	within	whole	populations	and	often	across	generations.”		
To	 resolve	 this	 paradox,	 Sperber	 (1996)	 introduced	 the	 concept	 of	 cultural	
attractors	 (stable,	 aggregated	 representations	 determined	 by	 psychological,	genetic	 and	 environmental	 factors);	 language	 wars	 recognises	 the	 continuing	struggle	 both	 between	 and	 within	 meanings	 (representations)	 in	 the	 media	sphere.	The	question	becomes	whether	a	communication	channel	is	more	or	less	likely	 than	 another	 to	 influence	 the	 stability	 of	 the	 transmission	process	 or,	 in	other	words,	whether	it	is	ever	possible	for	Twitter	users	to	settle	upon	a	social	current	in	such	a	way	as	to	engender	legitimacy.		
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THEORISING	DEMOCRATIC	COMMUNICATION		
The	 literature	 review	 established	 the	 importance	 of	 Jürgen	 Habermas	 and	 his	normative	 models	 of	 the	 public	 sphere	 and	 deliberative	 discussion.	 It	 is	necessary	now	to	theorise	and	to	contextualise	the	expectations	of	these	models,	and	 to	ensure	 that	 they	 can	 support	 an	empirical	 analysis	of	 the	UK	 riots.	 It	 is	important	 to	 emphasise	 that	 the	 focus	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 on	 the	 appropriateness	and	 the	productivity	of	using	 a	 close	 study	of	 software	 to	 generate	descriptive	analytics	 to	 frame	 an	 exploration	 of	 digitally-mediated	 communication.	 This	thesis	does	not	intend	to	evaluate	(and	certainly	not	validate)	a	singular	model	of	democracy,	 normative	 or	 otherwise.	 Nevertheless,	 a	 democratic	 model	 is	required	 to	narrow	the	scope	of	 the	analysis,	or	else	any	attempt	at	evaluating	the	 democratic	 potential	 of	 the	 communication	 technology	 is	 lost	 in	 a	 debate	about	 how	 democracy	 should	 be	 defined.	 In	 other	 words,	 in	 order	 to	 focus	analysis	 on	 the	 specific	 communication-constructing	 logics	 of	 specific	 digital	tools,	it	is	necessary	to	choose	an	interpretation	of	democracy,	but	doing	so	does	not	validate	the	chosen	model	absolutely	nor	deny	the	existence	of	other	models.	
It	 is	 relatively	 straightforward	 to	 examine	 individual	 blogs,	 forums	 or	 social	media	streams	and	to	identify	departures	from	the	normative	model.	This	thesis	aims	 to	 develop	 a	 situational	 critique	 into	 a	 broader	 theory	 of	 digital	communication.	The	difference	between	 these	 two	approaches	depends	on	 the	potential	of	the	communicational	 logics:	the	thesis	seeks	to	explore	whether	an	empirical	 evaluation	 of	 communication	 during	 the	 riots	 suggests	 (software-enabled)	communicative	logics	that	could	support	deliberation.		
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“Twitter’s	role	is	evaluated	in	terms	of	its	communicative	affordances	and	then	 the	 enabling	 potential	 of	 these	 affordances	 is	 assessed.	 Such	 an	approach	promises	 insights	 that	 are	both	more	definite	 (if,	 for	 instance,	the	 affordances	 of	 Twitter	 are	 found	 to	 preclude	 any	 possibility	 for	normative	 deliberative	 discussion)	 and	 more	 widely	 applicable.”	 (Pond	2015,	143).	
To	permit	such	an	approach,	it	is	first	necessary	to	have	a	detailed	description	of	what	 normative	 deliberative	 communication	 should	 look	 like	 in	 the	 public	sphere.	 Such	 a	 description	 can	 be	 used	 to	 define	 under	 what	 conditions	 the	struggle	to	signify	proceeds	in	such	a	way	as	to	enable	democratic	outcomes.	Put	simply,	 the	 question	 is:	 according	 to	 established	 theory,	 what	 are	 the	characteristics	 of	 communication	 in	 the	 public	 sphere	 necessary	 for	deliberation?	
Habermas	 argued	 that	 governments	must	 engage	 with	 citizens	 in	 deliberative	discourse	if	they	are	to	achieve	democratic	legitimacy:		
“a	 discourse-theoretic	 interpretation	 insists	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 democratic	will-formation	 does	 not	 draw	 its	 legitimating	 force	 from	 a	 previous	convergence	 of	 settled	 ethical	 convictions,	 but	 from	 both	 the	communicative	pre-suppositions	 that	allow	the	better	arguments	 to	come	into	 play	 in	 various	 forms	 of	 deliberation,	 and	 from	 the	 procedures	 that	secure	fair	bargaining	processes.”		(Habermas	1994,	4).			
In	 order	 for	 communication	 to	 be	 deliberative,	 participants	 need	 to	 be	 able	 to	engage	 in	 communicative	 action	 (Jacobson	 and	 Storey	 2004,	 Habermas	 1984).	
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According	 to	 Jacobson	 and	 Pan	 (2008,	 13),	 communicative	 action	 is	 possible	when	 discourse	 satisfies	 both	 Habermas’	 validity	 claims	 and	 his	 ideal	 speech	
conditions.	 The	 validity	 claims	 describe	 “claims	 regarding	 the	 truth,	appropriateness,	 and	 sincerity	 of	 each	 and	 every	 act	 of	 speech,	 even	 lies”.	 In	other	words,	 in	order	 to	pursue	productive	discourse,	 communicators	must	be	free	and	able	to	ask	the	following	questions	of	the	subject	being	debated	–	and	of	claims	about	the	subject	made	by	their	fellow	communicators.		
They	must	be	able:		
1. To	question	what	is	comprehensible	to	them;	
2. to	 determine	 what	 is	 true	 in	 light	 of	 their	individual	and	shared	knowledge;	
3. to	assess	what	is	sincerely	or	truthfully	stated;	
4. to	 decide	 what	 is	 a	 moral	 or	 an	 appropriate	statement	given	the	communicative	situation.			
If	 disagreements	 arise	 over	 a	 validity	 claim,	 then	 reasonable	 deliberation	requires	three	ideal	speech	conditions:	
1. Equal	and	symmetric	opportunities	to	contribute;	
2. the	ability	to	raise	any	proposition	or	position;	
3. a	 “full	 and	 equal”	 consideration	 of	 propositions	and	positions	raised.	(Jacobson	and	Pan	2008,	14)	
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The	 benefit	 of	 such	 a	 framing	 is	 that	 it	 translates	 encompassing,	 complex	 and	amorphous	 questions	 about	 democracy	 into	 more	 manageable	 and	 precise	questions	 about	 the	 communicative	 content	 of	 individual	 tweets	 and	 the	communicative	 relationship	 between	 individual	 tweets	 in	 Twitter’s	 structural	layers.	
The	other	considerable	benefit	 is	 that	the	communicative	action	criteria	can	be	considered	in	light	of	the	communicative	logics	summarised	in	the	table	right	at	the	 start	 of	 this	 chapter.	 There	 is	 a	 tension	 between	 the	 logics	 of	 information	liberation	and	information	overload,	and	it	relates	to	the	speed	and	the	density	of	 Internet-enabled	 information	 flows.	While	 information	 liberation	 relies	 on	 a	organisational-communicational	 hybrid	 logic,	 in	 which	 information	 is	 released	from	 censorship	 and	 freely	 distributable	 to	 all	 citizens,	 information	 overload	posits	 that	 Internet	 technologies	 simply	 run	 too	 fast	 for	 the	 deliberative	processes	they	could	be	supporting.			
In	 other	 words,	 the	 steps	 involved	 in	 normative	 deliberation	 take	 time	 to	perform	 –	 this	 concept	 is	 framed	 hereafter	 as	 the	 deliberative	 period.	 It	 takes	time	to	process	the	validity	claims:	time	to	receive	and	to	comprehend;	time	to	reflect;	 to	 evaluate;	 to	 identify	disagreements	 and	 time	 to	deliberate.	Concerns	about	 information	overload	assume	that	network	 time	stresses	 the	deliberative	
period	 for	 all	 Twitter	 users	 to	 the	 point	 that	 communicative	 action	 becomes	impossible	(Pond	2015).		
The	methodology	proposed	next	seeks	to	adapt	this	conceptual	framing	into	an	empirical	 examination	 of	 Twitter.	 That	 adaptation	 process	 follows	 the	framework	presented	here.	First,	an	attempt	is	made	to	systematically	describe	
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the	 temporal	 and	 spatial	 properties	 of	 the	 communicative-affordances	 of	 the	Twitter	software.	Next,	those	systematic	descriptions	are	used	to	identify	and	to	extract	tweet	streams	–	that	is	samples	of	tweets	collected	from	flows	shaped	by	the	 structural	 dynamics	 of	 Twitter’s	 communicative	 layers.	 Those	 samples	 are	examined	in	the	context	of	the	communicational	logics	and,	finally,	a	systematic	evaluation	of	communicative	action	within	those	samples	is	carried	out.		
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CHAPTER	FIVE	
METHODOLOGY	
INTRODUCTION	
This	 methodology	 chapter	 explores	 the	 critical	 issues	 associated	 with	undertaking	 this	 particular	 research	 project,	 many	 of	 which	 apply	 to	 Twitter	research	 more	 generally.	 It	 is	 an	 extended	 discussion	 because	 many	 of	 these	issues	are	complex	and	have	tended	to	be	overlooked	in	early	research	efforts.	In	addition	to	the	critical	commentary	on	Twitter	and	the	UK	riots,	this	thesis	seeks	to	contribute	to	the	development	of	a	rigorous	empirical	method	–	one	that	can	leverage	big	data	for	the	critical	evaluation	of	digital	communication.		
The	 literature	 review	 and	 conceptual	 framework	 chapters	 sought	 to	 establish	how	 digital	 technology	 might	 shape	 discourse	 so	 that	 it	 is	 more	 reasoned,	responsible	 and	 productive	 than	 the	 commentary	 that	 dominates	 politically	entrenched	 traditional	 media	 channels	 (Kellner	 2004).	 Those	 chapters	concluded	that	the	Internet	is	best	conceived	as	layered:	a	combination	of	a	base	network	 architecture,	 transmission	 protocols,	 Web	 standards	 and	 individual	user-facing	 applications,	 which	 are	 bundles	 of	 software.	 Software	 is	 computer	code	 plus	 intentionality	 and	 design,	 and	 it	 is	 the	 interaction	 between	 the	software	 and	 the	 network	 that	 shapes	 the	 affordances	 of	 an	 application:	 its	propensity	 to	promote	certain	 types	of	 interaction	and	 to	 inhibit	others.	 In	 the	case	of	Twitter,	Bruns	and	Moe	(2014)	describe	how	the	interaction	of	individual	
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affordances	 creates	 communicative	 structures,	 layers	 within	 the	 application	associated	with	specific	practices.		
These	 practices	 shape	 logical	 arguments:	 intersections	 between	 digital	 and	democratic	 theory.	 The	 conceptual	 framework	 argued	 at	 length	 that	 the	temporal	and	spatial	dynamics	of	Twitter’s	communicative	structures	must	play	a	central	role	in	constructing	these	logical	associations:	in	effect,	it	is	digital	time-space	 that	 is	 most	 likely	 to	 influence	 representational	 dynamics	 and,	 by	extension,	the	democratic	potential	of	digital	discourse.		
Having	 found	 an	 organisational,	 network-centric	 emphasis	 problematic,	 the	conceptual	framework	chapter	emphasised	the	communicational	logics	of	digital	democracy:	the	potential,	on	the	one	hand,	for	discourse	to	be	liberated	from	the	controlling	hierarchies	of	traditional	media	institutions	and	the	problem,	on	the	other	 hand,	 of	 making	 digital	 time-space	 compatible	 with	 established	interpretations	of	liberal	democracy.		
The	issue	here	is	not	whether	the	political	and	judicial	response	to	the	UK	riots	was	legitimate,	nor	is	it	whether	digital	media	were	somehow	a	significant	factor	in	the	debates	that	followed	the	riots;	rather,	the	issue	is	whether	or	not	digital	media	tools	were	any	better	than	the	mass	media	at	enabling	the	sort	of	debate	that	could	be	legitimising	according	to	a	normative	deliberative	model.	
There	 are	multiple	 research	 questions	 because	 there	 are	multiple	 variables	 in	this	 logical	 intersection,	 and	 these	 variables	 are	 not	 yet	 well	 understood	themselves.	The	outcome	variable	is	riot	discourse	on	Twitter,	and	this	must	be	understood	in	different	respects.	There	is	the	content	of	discourse,	the	thematic	
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concerns	matter.	It	also	matters	how	those	meanings	are	circulating	and	whether	the	 textual	 representations	 satisfy	 the	 demands	 of	 normative	 deliberative	theory.		 	
On	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 equation,	 the	 input	 variables	 are	 Twitter’s	communicational	 structures:	 the	 tweets,	 hashtags	 and	 other	 affordances	 that	shape	the	way	that	Twitter	users	communicate	with	each	other.	In	particular,	the	temporal	 and	 spatial	 dynamics	 of	 these	 structures	 are	 poorly	 understood,	 but	potentially	highly	significant.		
These	 general	 concerns	 translate	 into	 a	 series	 of	 specific	 research	 questions	that	will	guide	the	development	of	a	research	strategy.	
		
RESEARCH	QUESTIONS	
Question	1:		
What	are	the	features	of	discourse	in	the	riot	public,	and	how	are	these	features	distributed	across	Twitter’s	software-structural	layers?		
Question	2:		
Is	there	evidence	of	deliberation,	or	at	least	of	discourse	that	does	not	preclude	a	normative	deliberative	model?	
Question	3:		
What	 are	 the	 temporal	 and	 spatial	 dynamics	 of	 Twitter’s	 software-structural	
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layers?	
Question	4:		
Can	the	attempts	to	record	Twitter	time	and	to	characterise	discourse	within	the	riot	 public	 be	 combined/synthesised	 to	 interrogate	 the	 central	 claim	 in	 the	conceptual	 framework:	 that	 digital	 technologies	 shape	 communication	environments	that	are	too	fast	for	deliberative	democracy?	
	
METHODOLOGICAL	DISCUSSION	
The	aim	in	this	section	is	to	define	a	method	capable	of	answering	the	research	questions	satisfactorily.	In	one	sense,	this	should	be	a	fairly	straightforward	task.	There	 is	 nothing	 unfamiliar	 or	 controversial	 about	 the	 proposed	 approach:	 in	order	to	assess	discourse,	content	and	thematic	coding	strategies	are	developed	and	 applied.	 The	 evaluation	 of	 deliberative	 potential	 relies	 on	 criteria	 derived	from	a	Habermasian	account	of	communicative	action;	these	criteria	are	used	to	guide	 a	 close	 reading	 of	 tweet	 content.	 With	 the	 outcome	 variables	 assessed,	comparisons	 are	 then	 made	 across	 structural	 categories.	 This	 comparative	analysis	 is	 guided	 by	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 and	 it	 emphasises	 the	temporality	 and	 spatiality	 of	 those	 communicative	 structures.	 Time-space	 is	assessed	independently	–	across	the	entire	data	sample	–	to	try	and	situate	the	time-space	of	the	sample	discourse	within	a	wider	“pattern	of	pace”	–	so	called	Twitter	time.		
There	 are,	 however,	 a	 couple	 of	 issues	 to	 be	 resolved	 before	 this	 analysis	 can	
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proceed,	 and	 they	 are	 sufficiently	 significant	 to	 require	 an	 explanatory	statement.			
	As	 far	 as	 the	 content	 coding	 is	 concerned,	 there	are	 epistemological	questions	relating	 to	 representation;	 the	 limits	 of	 an	 empirical	 classification	 system	 for	subjective	 semantics	 are	 acknowledged	 (Agamben	 1993,	 Lacan	 1977/2002,	1989[1965]).	 These	 are	 longstanding	 methodological	 debates,	 and	 this	 thesis	does	 not	 seek	 to	 resolve	 such	 issues	 beyond	 the	 practical	 imperatives	 of	undertaking	this	particular	research	project.	Content	analysis	is	an	accepted	and	widely	 used	 methodology	 within	 Cultural	 Studies	 and	 mass	 media	 research	(Wimmer	 and	 Dominick	 1994,	 Deacon	 2008);	 certainly,	 it	 is	 a	 reductive	representation	 of	 discourse,	 but	 reduction	 of	 some	 sort	 is	 inevitable,	 and	 it	should	 provide	 a	 sufficiently	 nuanced	 reading	 to	 support	 the	 comparative	analysis.	
The	more	contentious	methodological	 issues	relate	 to	 the	data-driven	methods	proposed	to	frame	the	analysis	of	Twitter:	first,	defining	what	counts	as	relevant	discourse,	then	describing	the	communicative	structures	and,	finally,	developing	an	objective	measure	of	Twitter	time-space.	These	methods	will	be	defined	in	full	in	the	Research	Design	section,	which	situates	individual	methods	in	relation	to	the	research	questions.	In	this	introductory	discussion,	the	aim	is	to	justify	these	methods	in	light	of	the	conceptual	framework	and,	also,	to	acknowledge	a	wider	debate	 within	 the	 social	 sciences	 concerning	 the	 potential	 (and	 potential	provocations)	of	big	data	(boyd	and	Crawford	2011).	
The	 big	 data	 debate	 was	 mentioned	 briefly	 in	 the	 literature	 review	 when	discussing	some	of	the	different	approaches	that	Internet	studies	has	adopted	for	
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defining	and	describing	the	objects	of	study	–	datafication	is	one	of	the	principal	tenets	of	social	media	logic	(van	Dijck	and	Poell	2013).	In	that	discussion,	it	was	noted	 that,	 while	 the	 complexity	 of	 digital	 communication	 systems	 increases	exponentially,	such	systems	paradoxically	seem	tantalisingly	available	for	study	because	 of	 commensurate	 advances	 in	 computing	 power	 and	 database	 design.	This,	 essentially,	 is	 the	 technological	 argument	 for	 big	 data	 analysis:	 it	 is	 done	because	 it	 can	 now	 be	 done	 (Crawford	 et	 al.	 2014).	 The	 mass	 and	 constant	generation	of	digital	 trace	data	make	applications	 like	Twitter	self-reflective,	 in	some	 respects.	 Simply	 by	 functioning,	 by	 encoding	 information	 into	 a	computable	 format,	 operating	 on	 that	 information	 and	 producing	 encoded	outcome	data,	digital	technologies	make	themselves	available	for	study	in	a	way	that	earlier	communication	technologies	simply	did	not.		
For	some	analysts,	this	has	generated	an	unwelcome	and	unproductive	trend	in	social	research:	the	end	of	theory	and	the	rise	of	a	“data/action	nexus”	(Bowker	2014).	 The	 notion	 encapsulated	 here	 is	 that	 social	 and	 academic	 categories,	according	to	which	knowledge,	interaction	and	causation	have	traditionally	been	structured,	are	increasingly	unnecessary,	and	perhaps	even	inhibitory.	In	effect,	the	 data	 archive	 is	 absolute,	 all-encompassing	 and	 all-knowing:	 obtaining	knowledge	simply	becomes	a	process	of	directing	appropriate	questions	at	 the	archive.	“No	semantic	or	causal	analysis	is	required”	(Anderson	2008).		
This	 position	 was	 critiqued	 in	 the	 literature	 review	 and	 it	 has	 been	 critiqued	widely	elsewhere	(boyd	and	Crawford	2011,	Erickson	2012,	Bowker	2014)	and	it	is	not	necessary	to	critique	it	further	here.	Rather,	the	reason	for	recalling	the	generalities	of	this	particular	debate	 is	to	make	a	statement	of	 intent	about	the	
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data-driven	methods	used	 in	 this	 thesis.	The	social	uptake	of	digital	 tools	 is	an	opportunity	 for	 researchers:	 datafication	 happens	 because	 of	 these	 processes	and	practices.	Given	the	appropriate	tools	and	the	correct	approach,	then	surely	this	 abundant	 data	 can	 be	 useful.	 As	 Crawford	 et	 al.	 (2014,	 1665)	 state,	 it	 is	acceptable	 for	 researchers	 to	 “use	 big	 data	 as	 tools	 and	 techniques	 in	 their	everyday	work.	By	analyzing	big	data’s	applications,	methods,	and	assumptions,	they	aim	to	improve	the	way	social	and	cultural	research	is	done.”		
The	 issue,	and	the	risk	for	studies	 like	this	one,	 is	 that	the	researcher	conflates	the	data	 and	 the	phenomenon	 that	 the	data	 represents.	 This	 is	 the	 same	 issue	that	 Erickson	 (2012)	 articulated	 in	 relation	 to	 network	 sociology.	 The	 data	 is	only	 a	 representation	 of	 social	 reality:	 it	 is	 not,	 itself,	 the	 object	 to	 be	 known.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	 problematic	 to	 assume	 that	 the	data	 archive	 is	 absolute,	 all-encompassing	and	all-knowing.	As	has	been	noted,	big	data	can	be	value-laden,	subjective	and	prone	to	privileging	some	assumptions	above	others.	In	addition,	the	 “archive	 cannot	 in	 principle	 contain	 the	 world	 in	 small;	 its	 very	 finitude	means	that	most	slices	of	reality	are	not	represented.	The	question	for	theory	is	what	 the	 forms	 of	 exclusion	 are	 and	 how	 we	 can	 generalize	 about	 them.”	(Bowker	2014).	
The	 research	 design	 outlines	 different	 techniques	 for	 datafying	 Twitter’s	communicative	 structures	 and	 time-space,	 thus	 making	 these	 phenomena	available	 for	 empirical	 study.	However,	 this	 is	 done	 in	 the	 full	 acceptance	 that	this	 datafication	 can	 obscure	 assumptions	 and	 exclude	 certain	 aspects	 of	 the	phenomenon,	 some	of	which	may	never	be	known.	 In	 the	worst	 case	 scenario,	this	 can	 introduce	 confounding	 biases	 that	 will	 confuse	 the	 comparative	
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investigation.			
As	 individual	methods	are	proposed,	 limitations	will	be	noted	and	 implications	discussed.	 There	 are	 particularly	 issues	 in	 terms	 of	 keyword	 sampling,	 for	instance,	and	with	defining	what	constitutes	the	limits	of	the	riot	public	(Schmidt	2014).		
	
DEFINING	TWITTER	AS	AN	OBJECT	FOR	EMPIRICAL	STUDY	
Before	moving	on	to	the	detailed	account	of	the	research	design,	however,	there	is	an	overarching	issue	that	must	be	resolved	and	it	relates	fundamentally	to	the	definition	 of	 Twitter	 both	 as	 a	 communicative	 phenomenon	 and	 as	 an	 object	available	for	social	research.		
A	technological	definition	of	Twitter	has	been	established	(it	is	a	web	application,	a	bundle	of	software	with	certain	affordances,	structures	and	 logics)	but	 if	 that	definition	was	 sufficient,	 then	 Twitter	 could	 be	 studied	 simply	 by	 reading	 and	evaluating	 its	 source	 code.	 The	 conceptual	 framework	 builds	 on	 this	technological	 definition,	 so	 that	 Twitter	 is	 defined	 as	 an	 interaction	 between	software	 and	 users,	 from	 which	 communicational	 logics	 arise	 to	 shape	representational	exchange	(communication)	between	those	users	in	time	and	in	space.	The	object	of	 study,	 then,	must	be	 this	moment	of	 interaction,	when	 the	software	and	the	users	meet.	The	only	other	option	is	to	study	individual	users	removed	from	this	interactive	context,	but	like	the	study	of	source	code,	this	can	only	hope	to	reveal	a	partial	perspective.		
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Herein	 lies	 the	 fundamental	 representative	 issue	 for	 this	 analysis.	 Individual	Twitter	 users	 are	 assumed	 to	 have	 interacted	 (in	 large	 numbers)	 with	 each	other,	using	the	Twitter	application	during	the	UK	riots.	They	exchanged	textual	representations	 encoded	 in	 short	 form	 messages	 called	 tweets.	 These	 tweets	were	aggregated	under	hashtags,	redistributed	via	retweets	and	further	shared	across	Twitter’s	communicative	structures	 (all	 those	communicative	structures	are	ways	of	organising	and	categorising	tweet	flows).	The	analysis	must	proceed	on	 the	 assumption	 that	 these	 communicative	 structures	 represent	 valid	interactive	 phenomena.	 Assuming	 this	 is	 the	 case,	 then	 riot	 discourse	 can	 be	understood	in	terms	of	individual	tweets:	the	riot	public	is	all	tweets	published	in	 a	 specific	 period,	 containing	 riot-specific	 signs,	 and	 aggregated	 according	 to	relevant	communicative	structures.		
If	 the	object	of	study	 is	 reframed	 in	 this	way	–	as	 tweets	rather	 than	Twitter	–	then	 it	 becomes	 far	 easier	 to	 access	 data	 for	 sociological	 study:	 tweets	 are	available	on	request	from	the	Twitter	API.	It	is	important	to	recognise,	however,	that	this	representation	of	Twitter	is	different	from	the	technology	experienced	by	 individual	 Twitter	 users.	 Twitter	 becomes	 the	 streaming	 API,	 a	 massive	sample	 of	 n	 tweets	 generated	 in	 response	 to	 a	 GET	 request	 defined	 by	 the	researcher.	 Tweets	 become	 data	 objects	 instead	 of	 media	 objects;	 they	encompass	metadata	 that	 is	 frequently	used	 to	define	 form	and	 function.	They	are	 studied	 via	 a	 command-line	 interface,	 or	 through	 commercial	 data	processing	 tools,	 in	 ways	 that	 obscure	 mediated	 context:	 tweets	 in	 timelines,	surrounded	 by	 other	 tweets	 and	 a	 fully	 functioning	 user	 interface.	 The	 API	makes	 Twitter	 available	 for	 study,	 but	 it	 also	 abstracts	 it	 in	 ways	 that	 are	
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potentially	significant.		
When	 it	 is	 time	 to	 interpret	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 comparative	 analysis,	 this	abstraction	must	be	recalled.	If	discourse	reveals	evidence	of	deliberation,	then	this	deliberation	must	be	relocated	in	the	experience	of	individual	Twitter	users.	As	 the	 analysis	 progresses	 towards	 that	 point,	 as	 potential	 methods	 are	proposed,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 the	 assumptions	 involved.	 This	 thesis	strives	 for	 an	 empirical	 analysis,	 but	 one	 that	 is	 self-aware,	 reflective,	 and	accepts	the	limits	of	quantitative	framing.		
	
RESEARCH	DESIGN	
DATA	COLLECTION	
As	noted,	collecting	Twitter	data	involves	engaging	with	the	Twitter	API.	It	is	not	necessary	to	reproduce	Twitter’s	documentation	here.	It	is	available	in	full	from	http://dev.twitter.com	and	relevant	features	only	are	discussed.	The	Twitter	API	is	 the	 single	 entry	 point	 for	 sending	 queries	 to	 the	 Twitter	 databases	 and	 for	returning	data	from	those	queries.	There	are	two	parts	to	the	API,	however.	One	is	 the	Search	or	REST	API,	which	exists	at	https://api.twitter.com/1.1/search/,		the	other	 is	 the	 Streaming	API,	which	 requires	 an	ongoing	 connection	 through	https://stream.twitter.com/1.1/.	In	order	to	establish	a	connection,	both	require	an	 exchange	 of	 authentication	 codes,	 which	 must	 be	 generated	 by	 registered	Twitter	 users.	 Beyond	 that,	 however,	 there	 are	 significant	 differences	 between	the	Search	and	the	Streaming	APIs,	and	it	is	worth	dwelling	on	these	differences	
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for	a	moment	because	they	explain	much	about	the	API	functions	and	how	this	affects	data	collection.	
There	 are	 issues	with	 the	 Search	API	 that	make	 it	 problematic	 for	 this	 sort	 of	project.	 First,	 the	 Search	 API	 returns	 results	 by	 relevance	 rather	 than	completeness.	 This	 means	 that	 there	 are	 various	 algorithmic	 filters	 operating	between	 the	 search	 query	 and	 the	 return	 results,	 and	 the	 researcher	 has	 no	access	 to	 them.	 In	 some	 respects,	 this	 is	 not	 an	 especially	 significant	differentiator	between	the	two	APIs.	Twitter	queries	always	involved	fractional	samples	 of	much	 larger	 data	 flows.	 Second,	 the	 Search	 API	 “is	 not	 a	 complete	index	of	all	Tweets,	but	 instead	an	 index	of	recent	Tweets.	At	 the	moment	 that	index	 includes	 between	 6-9	 days	 of	 Tweets.”	 (Twitter	 2015b).	 Longer-term	historical	 queries	 are	 not	 possible.	 Finally,	 the	 Search	 API	 returns	 a	 limited	number	of	results	at	a	time.	That	number	changes	depending	on	the	nature	of	the	request,	but	it	is	never	especially	large	–	a	few	thousand	at	most.	This	is	a	bigger	issue	 for	 researchers.	 Not	 only	 are	 there	 no	 results	 older	 than	 6-9	 days,	 it	 is	incredibly	hard	to	get	at	many	of	the	tweets	that	are	available	in	that	period	–	a	request	will	only	return	n	results,	and	it	will	be	the	same	n	results	each	time.	If	an	event	is	on-going,	then	this	is	a	hopeless	way	of	accessing	tweets;	if	the	event	is	finished,	then	only	those	n	tweets	will	ever	be	available.		
The	alternative	to	the	Search	API	is	the	Streaming	API:	“The	Streaming	APIs	give	developers	low	latency	access	to	Twitter’s	global	stream	of	Tweet	data.”	(Twitter	2015b).	To	request	data	from	the	Streaming	API,	a	researcher	must	maintain	an	open	HTTP	connection	with	the	API,	because	the	Streaming	API	will	only	return	‘live’	 data.	 If	 the	 connection	 breaks,	 then	 the	API	 stops	 transmitting	 and	 those	
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tweets	cannot	be	recovered.	Clearly	this	has	implications	for	research	efforts,	not	least	 that	 the	 researcher	must	 know	about	 an	 event	 in	 advance	 in	 order	 to	 be	ready	to	make	that	HTTP	connection.	That	is	rarely	the	case,	especially	for	acute	events	that	come	with	no	warning.		
Twitter	restricts	access	to	its	API	through	two	methods.	On	the	one	hand,	Twitter	limits	the	rate	at	which	individuals	can	send	queries	to	the	Search	and	Streaming	APIs.	For	the	search	API,	 the	rate	 limits	are	set	at	180	requests/queries	per	15	minutes.	Twitter	doesn’t	publicise	the	rate	limit	for	the	streaming	API,	but	if	too	many	requests	are	sent	too	often,	then	access	is	restricted	and	can	eventually	be	blocked.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 company	 makes	 only	 a	 sample	 of	 tweets	available	 through	 the	 API.	 The	 full	 flow	 of	 Twitter	 data	 is	 shared	 with	 a	 few	partners,	though	it	can	be	purchased	at	considerable	expense	from		commercial	Twitter	 data-suppliers	 like	 GNIP.	 The	 full	 flow	 of	 Twitter	 data	 is	 popularly	known	as	 the	Firehose	and	 is	presumed	 to	 include	billions	of	 tweets	 sent	each	month	 (Twitter	 2012).	 Twitter	 sells	 access	 to	 this	 resource	 to	 corporate	partners,	who	are	permitted	to	sell	on	Gardenhose	(also	called	Decahose)	access,	which	 represents	 a	 random	 10%	 sample	 of	 the	 Firehose	 tweets.	 Gardenhose	access	 is	 sufficiently	 expensive	 to	 be	 beyond	 the	 reach	 of	 most	 academic	researchers,	unless	they	belong	to	a	particularly	well	funded	research	centre	or	a	“key	strategic	partner”	of	either	Twitter	or	GNIP	(Sridharan	2015).		
This	is	a	common	source	of	complaint	for	researches	though	in	many	cases	it	is	hard	 to	 know	 how	 to	 handle	 the	 volume	 of	 data	 that	 even	 the	 Gardenhose	supplies.	Certainly,	for	this	project,	there	are	insufficient	resources	to	store	or	to	process	 Gardenhose	 data,	 and	 there	 are	 few	 academic	 institutions	 sufficiently	
	154 
well	equipped	to	deal	with	the	flow	of	Firehose	data.	Most	researchers	must	be	content	to	access	Twitter	data	through	the	Search	and	Streaming	APIs	–	a	level	of	access	 that	 is	 occasionally	 called	 Spritzer:	 there	 are	 echoes	 of	 dilution	 in	 the	name.	Spritzer	access	represents	an	approximate	1%	sample	of	Firehose	access.	That	means	that	a	connection	to	Streaming	API	that	does	not	specify	any	search	parameters	will	return	approximately	1%	of	all	tweets	published	(Quist	2011).		
If	 a	 researcher	 sends	 a	 query	 string	when	 she	 connects	 to	 the	 Streaming	 API,	then	 the	 situation	 is	 slightly	 different.	 Twitter	 will	 return	 all	 the	 tweets	 that	match	 the	 query	 in	 a	 filtered	 stream,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 total	 number	 of	 filtered	tweets	 does	 not	 exceed	 a	 certain	 percentage	 of	 the	 full	 Firehose	 (Quist	 2011).	Twitter	does	not	publish	the	exact	percentage	(it	seems	sensible	to	work	on	the	assumption	that	filtered	streams	will	be	capped	if	they	exceed	more	than	1%	of	the	total	Firehose	volume).	Consequently,	for	relatively	rare	search	queries,	this	limitation	should	not	be	an	issue.		
With	 these	various	restrictions	and	 limitations	 in	mind,	 it	 is	clear	 that	 the	best	way	 –	 indeed,	 the	 only	way	 –	 for	 an	 independent	 researcher	 to	 query	 Twitter	data	 for	 sociological	 investigation	 is	 to	 request	 tweets	 from	 the	 Streaming	API	during	the	event	being	studied.	The	only	issue	that	remains,	then,	is	whether	it	is	better	to	filter	the	search	using	pre-defined	criteria,	to	request		the	full	Spritzer	stream.	There	are	pros	and	cons	to	both	approaches.	A	filtered	stream	will	return	far	 more	 relevant	 tweets	 than	 an	 unfiltered	 Spritzer	 query.	 If	 the	 focus	 is	 on	tweets	 containing	 the	 #OperationCupOfTea	 hashtag	 (relatively	 rare),	 then	 it	 is	reasonable	to	assume	that	a	filtered	query	will	return	most	of	them.	In	contrast,	a	Spritzer	query	will	only	ever	 return	1%	of	 relevant	 tweets	because	 it	will	only	
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ever	return	1%	of	the	Firehose.	This	difference	alone	would	seem	to	suggest	that	Spritzer	access	is	best	avoided	–	surely	the	better	strategy	is	to	collect	as	much	relevant	data	as	possible?		
However,	 there	 is	 an	 issue	 with	 filtered	 searches.	 Consider	 the	 following	hypothetical	 example.	 A	 researcher	 wants	 to	 collect	 tweets	 while	 Hurricane	Sandy	 rages	 across	 eastern	 US	 states	 in	 October	 2012.	 Specifically,	 she	 is	interested	 in	 the	 geographical	 distribution	 of	 tweets,	 so	 she	 sends	 a	 filtered	query	to	the	Streaming	API	to	return	all	tweets	that	use	the	hashtag	#sandy.	She	maps	these	tweets	using	geo-coded	data	points,	where	available,	and	geographic	information	software,	and	notes	that	during	the	peak	period	of	#sandy	activity,	hardly	 any	 tweets	 at	 all	 were	 sent	 from	 Manhattan	 Island.	 At	 other	 times,	Manhattan	was	responsible	 for	huge	numbers	of	 tweets,	 so	she	wonders:	what	exactly	were	Manhattan	residents	doing	during	the	particular	period	of	 intense	meaning-making	activity?					
The	 problem	 with	 only	 collecting	 tweets	 from	 filtered	 streams	 is	 that	 the	researcher	 cannot	 know	 what	 else	 was	 happening	 on	 Twitter	 during	 those	collection	periods	–	so	she	cannot	explore	properly	the	question	posed	above.	In	short,	if	she	does	not	collect	any	information	on	baseline	Twitter	use,	she	cannot	control	for	confounding	relationships.	Perhaps	the	people	of	Manhattan	were	not	tweeting	 about	 Hurricane	 Sandy	 because	 their	 attention	 was	 elsewhere,	 or	perhaps	it	was	because	they	had	been	without	power	for	48	hours	and	their	cell-phone	batteries	had	died	–	they	weren’t	tweeting	about	anything	at	all,	but	they	were	 still	 very	much	 focused	on	Sandy.	These	 sorts	of	 confounding	 factors	 are	often	very	poorly	understood	in	the	social	sciences.	Systematic	exclusion	at	this	
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stage	could	introduce	all	sorts	of	biases	and	sampling	errors	(Ruths	and	Pfeffer	2014).	 The	 best	way	 to	 identify	 and	 to	 control	 the	 biases	 is	 to	 have	 access	 to	baseline	Twitter	data.	
Baseline	data	 is	 necessary	 to	make	 any	 sort	 of	 adjustment	 or	normalisation	 to	account	 for	 uneven	 Twitter	 use	 across	 the	 population.	 With	 this	 baseline	knowledge,	 the	 researcher	 can	 assess	 whether	 a	 particular	 distribution	 is	 a	characteristic	 of	 riot	 conversation,	 or	 simply	 of	 certain	 groups	 or	 areas	 being	underrepresented	 on	 Twitter,	 or	 of	 gaps	 in	 streaming	 API	 results.	 It	 is	 also	incredibly	 useful	 for	 identifying	 anomalies	 in	 the	 data-collection	 process,	especially	when	sample	data	may	be	relatively	scarce.	Without	baseline	API	data,	it	 would	 be	 impossible	 to	 know	 if	 similar	 gaps	 in	 a	 sample	 of	 #LondonRiots	tweets,	 for	 instance,	 were	 caused	 by	 temporal	 discontinuity	 specific	 to	 that	hashtag,	or	by	more	fundamental	sampling	disruption.	For	this	reason,	if	nothing	else,	 it	 is	 recommended	 to	 collect	 tweets	 via	 an	 open	 connection	 to	 the	 API	stream	 rather	 than	 through	 filtered	 searchers.	 In	 short,	 identifying	 possible	errors	 in	 sampling	 is	 considered	 preferable	 to	 increasing	 total	 filter-specific	sample	size.		
	
EXTRACTING	RIOT	DISCOURSE	
It	 is	 important	 to	establish	how	 the	API	 shapes	data	collection	efforts,	because	these	 effects	will	 ultimately	 influence	how	 tweets	 are	 included	 in	 (or	 excluded	from)	 the	 corpus	 representing	 riot	 discourse.	 A	 filtered	 search	 inevitably	produces	 data	 that	 reflects	 the	 parameters	 and	 presumptions	 of	 the	 search,	
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whereas	the	primary	aim	should	be	to	minimise	the	impact	of	the	researcher	on	data-collection	 efforts.	 Rather	 than	 defining	a	priori	what	 riot	 discourse	might	look	 like,	 the	 aim	 is	 to	 capture	 a	 snapshot	 of	 all	 Twitter	 activity	 during	 the	research	period,	and	to	identify	relevant	tweets	within	that	snapshot.	
According	to	observations	made	for	this	study,	the	Streaming	API	returns	tweets	at	the	approximate	rate	of	50	tweets	per	second.	The	only	thing	that	associates	these	tweets	with	riot	discourse	is	that	they	are	contemporaneous:	this	is	a	real	time	stream	that	returns	tweets	as	they	are	published.	The	sample	will	contain	some	 tweets	 that	 are	 riot-related	 and	 many	 more	 that	 are	 not,	 so	 it	 must	 be	processed,	or	 filtered,	 to	 identify	those	tweets	that	are	relevant	to	the	research	questions.	
Researchers	have	proposed	different	methods	 to	assist	 in	 this	 task	 (Bruns	and	Stieglitz	 2012,	 2013,	 Thelwall	 2014).	 Ultimately,	 this	 is	 an	 issue	 of	 conceptual	framing	 and	 of	 signification:	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 defines	 what	 material	should	 be	 relevant,	 the	 filters	 define	 what	 tweets	 count	 as	 relevant	 material.	There	 is	 a	 tension	 here	 between	 the	 Twitter’s	 assumed	 communicative	structures,	 and	 the	 unstructured	 flow	 of	 tweets	 from	 the	 API.	 Within	 the	 API	stream,	 there	 will	 be	 riot-related	 tweets	 that	 adhere	 to	 structural	 norms,	 and	others	 that	 don’t.	 So,	 for	 instance,	 one	 possible	 way	 to	 identify	 riot-related	discourse,	 is	 to	 focus	 on	 tweets	 that	 include	 a	 riot-specific	 hashtag,	 such	 as	#UKRiots.	However,	 “it	 is	 virtually	 guaranteed	 that	 some	users	 tweeting	 about	the	 topic	 will	 be	 unaware	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 central	 hashtag,	 or	 even	unfamiliar	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 hashtags	 altogether.”	 (Bruns	 et	 al.	 2012).	 So	filtering	by	hashtag	is	likely	to	exclude	many	tweets	that	are	potentially	relevant	
	158 
to	 an	 analysis	 of	 riot	 discourse.	 It	 is	 unlikely,	 perhaps,	 that	 social	 or	 political	meanings	 influence	hashtag	use,	but	 if	 it	were	 the	case,	 then	 this	exclusion	has	the	potential	to	systematically	distort	any	reading	of	discourse.				
An	alternative	is	to	ignore	Twitter	structures	and	to	define	riot	discourse	simply	using	textual	classifiers	or	keywords.	The	logic	behind	a	keyword	search	is	that	it	will	capture	more	riot-related	tweets	than	a	hashtag	filter,	for	the	simple	reason	that	many	users	will	either	be	unaware	or	uninterested	 in	a	hashtag.	 In	 formal	sampling	 terms,	 a	 keyword	 search	will	minimise	 the	 number	 of	 false	 negative	results	 –	 that	 is,	 it	will	 exclude	 fewer	 relevant	 tweets	 than	 a	 hashtag	 or	 user-centred	search.	Having	said	that,	it	is	highly	problematic	to	assume	that	all	riot-focused	 tweets	 will	 be	 included	 in	 the	 sample	 and,	 as	 noted,	 many	 non-riot	focused	tweets	(false	positives)	may	also	find	their	way	in.	
Does	this	matter?	In	terms	of	defining	the	limits	of	riot	discourse,	and	then	later	for	estimating	the	temporality	and	spatiality	of	this	discourse,	it	is	only	an	issue	if	the	relative	number	of	false	negatives	to	false	positives	changes	over	time.	For	instance,	it	is	noted	that	the	New	England	Patriots	played	a	game	on	12th	August	2011.	Most	 likely,	 there	would	 be	many	 tweets	 following	 the	 team’s	 progress,	offering	support	or	opposition,	and	consequently	the	absolute	number	of	Patriot	tweets	 in	 the	 firehouse	 stream	 would	 increase.	 The	 problem	 with	 keyword	filtering	is	that	it	is	very	hard	to	differentiate	between	‘riot’	and	‘Patriot’	tweets:	an	 apparent	 spike	 in	 the	 riot	 discourse	 may	 have	 nothing	 at	 all	 do	 with	 the	London	riots	–	it	may	actually	be	explained	by	the	increase	in	Patriot	tweets.		
An	 additional	 issue	 is	 that	 the	 researcher	 has	 no	 a	 priori	 knowledge	 of	 the	different	 text	 strings	 that	may	 produce	 false	 positive	 results.	While	 it	 may	 be	
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possible	to	plan	and	adjust	for	a	Patriot	game,	a	change	in	the	number	of	Marriott	hotel	 check-ins	 or	 exceptionally	 lively	 parties	 is	 far	 harder	 to	 pre-empt.	Ultimately,	the	only	way	to	check	for	and	to	exclude	all	false	positive	results	is	to	manually	 check	 each	 and	 every	 tweet,	 and	 this	 is	 impractical	 for	 all	 but	 the	smallest	 datasets.	 There	 are	 an	 unknown	 number	 of	 potentially	 confounding	variables	 in	 the	 assumed	 relationship	 between	 the	 keyword	 ‘riot’	 and	 the	temporality	of	riot-specific	discussion	on	Twitter.		
In	order	to	address	these	issues,	and	to	ensure	that	text	analysed	in	questions	1	and	2	best	represents	riot	discourse,	the	hashtag	is	preferred	as	a	macro	signifier	of	riot-related	discourse.	To	 identify	relevant	hashtags,	 the	following	method	is	proposed.	 Tweets	 are	 returned	 from	 the	 API	 via	 an	 unfiltered	 connection;	 all	tweets	returned	from	the	API	will	be	retained.	Hashtags	are	preferred	as	reliable	signifiers	of	 riot-relevant	 tweets	but,	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	 a	 keyword	 filter	will	extract	 all	 tweets	 containing	 the	 riot	 keyword	 from	 the	 baseline	 sample.	 An	algorithm	will	 then	 identify	hashtags	within	 this	 riot	 sample	 and	 rank	 them	 in	terms	of	frequency.	The	most	commonly	occurring	hashtags	will	then	be	used	to	define	riot	discourse.	
The	 central	 research	 aim	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 assess	 the	 extent	 to	which	 tweets	classified	 as	 riot	 discourse	 adhere	 to	 deliberative	 norms	 and	 to	 criteria	 for	productive,	 democratic	 discussion.	 According	 to	 the	 conceptual	 framework,	discourse	 creates	 shared	 meaning.	 “Meaningfulness	 is	 complex	 and	 semiotic”	(Potts	and	Hartley	2014,	45)	–	 the	result	of	assigning	 	 cultural	value	 to	shared	knowledge	(Hartley	and	Potts	2014);	in	order	to	be	deliberative,	discourse	must	assign	value	 in	 certain	ways.	These	processes	have	been	 theorised	extensively,	
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according	to	a	spectrum	of	normative	rationality	(Hartley	and	Potts	2014,	Potts	and	 Hartley	 2014,	 Lewis	 2005,	 Habermas	 1994,	 1991,	 1984),	 and	 following	 a	thorough	review	of	 the	 literature,	alternative	possibilities	have	been	 identified.	On	 one	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum,	 assuming	 a	 logic	 of	 information	 liberation,	 open	access	 and	 equal	 representation,	 communication	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 sharing	 of	meanings	 and	 cultural	 shifts	 in	 the	 attachment	 of	 value	 to	 knowledge	 –	 is	rational	and	deliberative,	producing	reasoned	consensus	and	agreement	in	social	action.	On	the	other,	communication	is	language	wars,	a	violent	political	struggle	to	 signify	 –	 ideological,	 hegemonic	 and	 irrational	 (Lewis	 2008,	 2005,	 Turner	1996,	Hall	1982).	
The	methodological	challenge	is	how	best	to	differentiate	between	these	types	of	discourse.	The	literature	review	summarised	approaches	that	other	researchers	have	taken	to	this	problem	and	identified	considerable	disagreement	about	how	best	 to	 approach	 it.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 consensus,	 it	 is	 proposed	 that	 different	approaches	should	be	attempted,	so	that	they	can	be	evaluated	in	turn,	and	the	most	appropriate	method	can	be	selected.	
	
ANALYSING	DISCOURSE	
Reflecting	 a	 significant	 divide	 in	 the	 literature,	 the	 thesis	 attempts	 both	automated	 textual	 analysis	 and	human-reading.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 the	potential	 of	 automated	 analysis	 because	 it	 provides	 a	 perspective	 on	Twitter’s	communicative	 capacity	 that	 the	 other	 methods	 do	 not.	 It	 must	 also	 be	recognised	that	data-driven	approaches	carry	considerable	currency	within	the	
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prevailing	research	climate,	and	it	is	important	both	to	operate	within	accepted	paradigms	 and	 to	 identify	 the	 limitations	 of	 such	methods,	 if	 and	 where	 they	exist.	Hopefully,	in	such	an	approach,	the	limits	of	one	method	coincide	with	the	potential	 of	 another,	 and	 so	 an	 integrated	 understanding	 of	 Twitter	communication,	formed	across	knowledge	systems,	becomes	possible.		
One	argument	for	automated	techniques	is	that	they	permit	analysis	across	the	entire	sample:	all	contributions	to	riot	discourse	can	be	considered.	It	is	simply	not	possible	 for	a	researcher	to	read	and	to	assess	 thousands	of	 tweets,	but	an	algorithm	can	do	so.	As	such,	there	is	no	need	for	further	sampling,	and	no	risk	of	further	 exclusion.	 The	 counter	 argument	 is	 that	 automated	 techniques	 are	inherently	reductive,	 rendering	complex	representational	structures	 into	single	floating	point	scores,	or	relying	on	nebulous	concepts	like	‘interest’.	Additionally,	then,	there	are	two	methodological	reasons	for	including	automated	techniques	in	 this	 analysis.	 The	 first	 is	 to	 demonstrate	 empirically	 where	 the	 limits	 of	automation	 lie,	 and	 the	second	 is	 to	make	 improvements	 to	 the	method	and,	 if	possible,	to	extend	those	limits	slightly.	
Ultimately,	 the	aim	is	to	assess	the	deliberative	potential	of	discourse	in	such	a	way	 as	 to	 evaluate	 the	 impact	 of	 thematic	 clusters,	 time-space	 and	communicative	structures.	In	addition	to	machine-reading,	tweets	will	be	coded	using	a	system	of	content	categories	modelled	on	an	established	method	(Bruns	et	al.	2012).	Coding	will	attempt	to	establish	what	types	of	message	were	sent	as	part	 of	 the	 riot	 discourse,	 what	 	 were	 the	 thematic	 concerns	 and,	 finally,	 the	deliberativeness	of	both	individual	tweets	and	structural	tweet	flows.	
According	 to	 the	 conceptual	 framework,	 democratic	 communication	 relies	 on	
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deliberativeness,	 which	 is	 a	 rarefied	 form	 of	 exchange,	 with	 certain	preconditions.	 Those	preconditions	were	described	by	 Jürgen	Habermas	 in	 his	theory	 of	 communication	 action,	 and	 they	 represent	 the	 starting	 point	 from	which	the	codes	are	developed	for	this	analysis.	To	reiterate:	this	approach	is	not	intended	to	imply	that	deliberation	in	the	public	sphere	is	the	only	–	or	even	the	best	 –	 model	 for	 framing	 and	 studying	 mediated	 democracy.	 The	 conceptual	framework	 established	 the	 justification	 for	 pursuing	 deliberation	 through	 the	lens	 of	 communicative	 action:	 part	 of	 that	 justification	 is	 that	 the	 Haberasian	model	mechanises	the	communicative	processes	of	deliberation	in	such	a	way	as	to	make	them	available	empirically	(Habermas	2006).	
Communicative	action	(CA)	is	possible	when	discourse	satisfies	both	Habermas’	
validity	 claims	 and	 his	 ideal	 speech	 conditions	 (Jacobson	 and	 Pan	 2008).	 The	validity	 claims	 describe	 “claims	 regarding	 the	 truth,	 appropriateness,	 and	sincerity	of	each	and	every	act	of	speech,	even	lies”	(ibid	13).	In	other	words,	in	order	 to	pursue	productive	discourse,	communicators	must	be	 free	and	able	 to	ask	 the	 following	questions	of	 the	 subject	being	debated	–	and	of	 claims	about	the	subject	made	by	their	fellow	communicators	(Pond	2015).		
In	 order	 to	 develop	 a	 deliberative	 coding	 scheme	 for	 this	 analysis,	 various	attempts	were	made	to	apply	CA	conditions	more	or	 less	directly	 to	 the	text	of	individual	 tweets.	 However,	 these	 efforts	 all	 proved	 unsatisfactory,	 partly	because	of	the	difficulty	in	interpreting	user	positioning	(sincerity,	for	instance)	from	 tweet	 text	 and	 partly	 because	 the	 peculiar	 dynamics	 of	 Twitter	communication	 require	 an	 interpretative	 approach	 that	 sometimes	 extends	beyond	the	individual	tweet.		
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Consequently,	 while	 the	 coding	 framework	 used	 in	 this	 analysis	 originates	 in	Habermas’	 schema	 for	 communicative	 action,	 it	 is	 not	 itself	 a	 framework	 for	testing	for	communicative	action	within	tweets.	Rather,	 it	aims	to	formalise	the	distinction	 first	 made	 in	 the	 content	 coding	 between	 emotive	 and	 productive	contributions	to	discourse.	The	principles	for	doing	so	are	based	on	the	premise	of	communicative	action,	but	the	codes	themselves	are	adapted	and	developed	to	work	in	the	context	of	this	particular	study.		
In	other	words,	from	Habermas’	framework	are	derived	four	questions	that	the	reviewer	 must	 ask	 of	 every	 tweet.	 The	 four	 questions	 are	 asked	 in	 the	 same	order,	each	time,	the	implication	being	that	deliberation	is	a	normative	standard	for	any	 tweet,	and	 that	 reaching	 that	 standard	requires	 that	 the	 tweet	 satisfies	certain	preconditions.	The	four	questions	aim	to	capture	the	conceptual	scope	of	Habermas’	 four	 validity	 claims.	 An	 analysis	 of	 ideal	 speech	 conditions	 is	performed	later	based	on	a	summary	reading	across	the	full	tweet	samples.	
	
MEASURING	TWITTER	TIME-SPACE	
Question	 3	 asks	 what	 are	 the	 temporal	 and	 spatial	 dynamics	 of	 Twitter’s	communicative	structures?	Establishing	an	empirical	description	of	 time-space,	and	then	using	this	description	to	draw	comparisons	within	the	coded	discourse	is	 the	 crux	 of	 the	 research	 effort.	 It	 should	 permit	 an	 empirical	 framing	 of	information	 access,	 diffusion,	 and	 hierarchical	 organisation.	 It	 should	 also	support	 a	 critical	 reading	 of	 the	 communication	 structures	 themselves.	 If,	 as	Bruns	and	Moe	(2014,	17)	argue,	hashtags	 “help	 to	coordinate	 the	exchange	of	
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information	 relevant	 to…	 topics”	 and	 signify	 “a	 wish	 to	 take	 part	 in	 a	 wider	communicative	 process”,	 then	 this	 must	 manifest	 in	 time-space.	 In	 online	communication,	“the	interacting	parties	meet	in	time	rather	than	in	a	place;	for	that	 reason,	 response	 presence	 becomes	 important,	 and	 temporal	 rules	 of	coordination	begin	to	matter”	(Knorr	Cetina	2009,	79).	In	order	to	fulfil	the	role	designated	 to	 them,	 hashtags	 need	 to	 facilitate	 this	 meeting.	 It	 is	 a	 crucial	dynamic	 in	 the	 conceptual	 framing	 –	 it	 is	 this	 temporality,	 this	 synthetic	situating,	that	needs	to	prove	compatible	with	deliberative	processing.		
For	these	reasons,	temporality	takes	precedence	over	spatiality	in	this	analysis.	To	 enable	 a	 standardised	 comparison,	 temporality	 can	 be	 calculated	 as	 a	frequency	measure:	tweets	per	five	minute	period.	This	is	a	simple	solution	to	a	highly	complex	problem.	The	conceptual	 framework	 invokes	a	 social	definition	of	time:	a	product	of	a	material	and	political	economy	of	speed	(Armitage	1999)	and	 a	 user’s	 experiential	 interaction	 with	 that	 economy.	 Following	 Lefebvre	(1991)	 time	 and	 space	 are	 social	 constructs,	 and	 as	 such,	 timescapes	 are	experienced	relative	to	each	other	(Adam	1998).	Twitter	time	is	a	variable	and	fluid	concept,	“qualitatively	different	from	clock	time”	(Hassan	2009,	67),	but	it	will	 be	 produced	 –	 or	 constructed	 –	 differently	 for	 different	 users	 depending	upon	their	individual	Twitter	experiences.		
In	order	to	standardise	temporal	measurement,	however,	Twitter	time	has	to	be	measured	 against	 the	 regular	 periods	 of	 clock	 time.	 This	 approach	 has	 been	demonstrated	 previously	 (Pond	 2015,	 Weltevrede	 et	 al.	 2014),	 but	 there	 is	 a	legitimate	 concern	 about	 whether	 it	 is	 valid	 to	 define	 fluid	 social	 timescapes	according	 to	 Newtonian	 temporality.	 A	 full	 discussion	 of	 that	 concern	 is	 well	
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beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 thesis.	 It	 is	 an	 issue	 for	 philosophy	 and	 theoretical	physics.	It	is	important	to	acknowledge	it,	however,	and	to	clarify	that	clock	time	is	 used	 to	pace	Twitter	 time	 rather	 than	 to	 fix	 it	 in	 absolute	 terms.	Clock	 time	remains	 the	 hegemonic	 standard	 –	 the	 rhythm	 against	which	 social,	 economic	and	 political	 life	 is	 paced;	 it	 provides	 a	 familiar	 reference	 against	 which	 to	measure	these	emergent	networked	timescapes.		
Network	time	is	an	established	research	subject	in	its	own	right	(Castells	2010,	Hassan	2009),	but	the	interest	in	temporality	here	relates	to	its	central	position	in	the	conceptual	framework	and	the	logical	relationship	that	ties	temporality	to	deliberative	potential.	To	 recap,	 the	conceptual	 framework	states	 that	 if	digital	communication	 media	 are	 to	 impact	 on	 the	 processes	 and	 practices	 of	communicative	democracy,	 then	partly	this	will	be	because	digital	 technologies	construct	 information	 flows	 that	 challenge	 established	 mechanisms	 for	deliberation.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 temporality	 invoked	 in	 the	 conceptual	framework	 is	 specific	 to	 those	 information	 flows	 –	 it	 refers	 to	 the	 rate	 of	publication,	 dissemination,	 collation	 and	 access	 of	 tweets	 within	 Twitter’s	overarching	ecosystem.	Consequently,	any	method	for	measuring	and	comparing	temporality	on	Twitter	must	be	aware	of	 the	structural	mechanisms	that	order	and	 shape	 those	 informational	 flows.	 Inevitably,	 this	 will	 involve	 Twitter’s	communicative	 structures:	 temporal	 analysis	 must	 account	 for	 hashtags,	follower	networks	and	retweet	practices.		
Similarly	 spatial	 analysis	 should	 be	 sensitive	 to	 these	 different	 communicative	dynamics.	 It	 is	 simply	 a	 case	 of	 recognising	 that	 Twitter	 supports	 different	communicative	 communities,	 structured	 in	 different	 ways,	 and	 engaging	
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differently	 in	discourse.	Spatiality	 is	also	understood	to	be	constructed	socially,	but	geography	persists	in	ways	that	are	both	measurable	and	corporeal	–	human	bodies	 remain	 situated	 in	 tangible	 physical	 space,	 a	 fleshy	 nexus	 where	“imaginary	 Turing	 machines”	 bloat	 into	 real	 software	 (Rieder	 2012).	 The	reinterpretation	–	the	straining	–	of	the	relationship	between	the	physical	body	and	 the	 phenomenology	 of	 lived	 experience	 is	 central	 to	 conceptualisations	 of	digital	 time-space.	 While	 places	 are	 locked	 into	 a	 physical	 world,	 flows	 move	freely	through	digital	networks:	simultaneous	social	practice	no	longer	depends	upon	proximity.		
A	 full	 empirical	 investigation	 of	 digital	 space	 and	 place,	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	humans	 and	 their	 meanings,	 has	 not	 really	 happened xxviii .	 Networked	information	 has	 tended	 to	 be	 theorised	 as	 detached	 from	 its	 uploaders	 and	downloaders,	sifted	and	sorted	algorithmically	on	ephemeral	servers.	The	rubric	for	judging	digital	democracy,	however,	is	centred	on	human	subjects.	Software	bloats	 in	 human	 hands,	 in	 physical	 rooms	 located	 in	 brick	 and	 mortar	institutions.	 The	 role	 of	 embodied	 individuals	 in	 collective	 meaning-making	should	not	be	overlooked.	
One	issue	is	that	spatial	analysis	is	complicated	by	a	relative	absence	of	data.	If	a	user	 enables	 the	 functionality,	 Twitter	 can	 connect	 to	 a	 smartphone’s	 Global	Positioning	 System	 (GPS)	 hardware,	 triangulate	 the	 user’s	 location,	 and	 attach	the	geo-coordinates	to	the	tweet	through	the	metadata.	The	map	below	shows	a	distribution	of	geo-tagged	tweets	collected	at	baseline	from	the	API.	
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Figure	 1:	 A	map	 showing	 the	 distribution	 of	 all	 geo-tagged	 tweets	 returned	 by	 the	 API	
during	 the	 study	 period.	 The	 search	 is	 unfiltered,	 so	 the	 map	 represents	 baseline	 geo-
location	practices.		
There	 are	 43,997	 tweets	 located	 on	 the	 map	 –	 a	 large	 number,	 certainly,	 but	under	1%	(0.94	%	to	be	precise)	of	the	total	number	of	tweets	collected	in	this	sample.	That	so	 few	tweets,	 relatively,	have	GPS	coordinates	attached	 is	not,	 in	itself,	 an	 insurmountable	 problem.	 In	 statistical	 terms,	 the	 sample	 is	 still	incredibly	large	and	will	generate	sufficient	power	to	draw	conclusions	about	the	population.	A	far	greater	problem	–	the	first	of	two	that	will	be	discussed	here	–	is	 that	 the	 sample	 is	 not	 random.	 Twitter	 users	 must	 choose	 to	 attach	 GPS	coordinates	 to	 their	 tweets	and,	clearly,	very	 few	choose	 to	do	so.	Again	 this	 is	not	 necessarily	 a	 problem,	 as	 long	 as	 there	 are	 not	 systematic	 reasons	 why	Twitter	users	choose	not	to	nominate	their	GPS	coordinates	–	reasons	that	could	confound	 any	 suggestion	 that	 the	 distribution	 of	 tweets	 responds	 to	meaning-making	alone.	 It	 is	quite	 an	assumption,	however,	 that	Twitter	users	nominate	their	GPS	coordinates	quite	randomly.		
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A	cursory	examination	of	 the	map	suggests	 that	Twitter	use	 is	 concentrated	 in	the	 United	 States	 and	 Western	 Europe,	 popular	 in	 parts	 of	 South	 East	 Asia,	especially	 Malaysia	 and	 Indonesia,	 even	 more	 so	 in	 Japan,	 but	 surprisingly	uncommon	in	India,	rare	in	China	and	unknown	in	Iran.	The	denser	end	of	this	distribution	 is	unsurprising,	Twitter	 is	predominantly	an	English-speaking	tool.	It	is	built	by	an	American	company,	was	first	adopted	by	an	American	audience,	and	it	is	deeply	embedded	in	a	Western	media	ecology.	Nevertheless,	it	is	a	little	surprising	to	see	so	few	tweets	located	outside	that	Western	landscape.		
One	explanation	is	that,	despite	political	claims	to	the	contrary,	tweeting	remains	a	 remarkably	 uncommon	 practice	 across	 much	 of	 the	 world.	 Alternatively,	 it	could	be	that	Twitter	use	is	under-represented	in	countries	like	Iran,	Egypt	and	China	 because	Twitter	 users	 there	 deem	 it	 unwise	 to	 attach	 their	 precise	 geo-coordinates	 to	 their	 communications.	 If	 this	 is	 the	 case,	 then	 the	 Western	domination	of	 the	map	may	reflect	Western	cultural,	political	and	social	norms	vis-à-vis	 public-ness	 and	 geo-expression.	 If	 the	 later	 explanation	 is	 the	 more	likely,	 then	 what	 other	 cultural,	 political	 and	 social	 norms	 influence	 an	individual’s	 propensity	 to	 geo-locate	 him	 or	 herself?	 How	 do	 virtual	 proxy	networks	(VPNs)	and	browsers	like	The	Onion	Router	(TOR)	affect	this	dynamic,	given	that	such	masking	practices	are	both	highly	deliberate	and	contextual?	
Given	 such	uncertainty	 it	 is	 really	 very	 difficult	 to	make	 any	 sort	 of	 statement	about	the	distribution	of	global	Twitter	users	based	on	geo-location	information.	Rather,	what	is	available	here	is	a	sample	of	the	geo-located	Twitter	population,	who	may	or	may	not	be	different	from	the	total	Twitter	population.	This,	actually,	is	 not	 an	 insurmountable	 problem	 for	 this	 thesis,	 because	 the	 focus	 is	 on	 the	
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circulation	and	the	distribution	of	meanings	relative	 to	other	meaning	within	a	sample	 –	 it	 doesn’t	 set	 out	 to	describe	 the	 total	 population	of	Twitter	users.	 It	may	 well	 be	 that	 geo-located	 Twitter	 users	 are	 distributed	 differently	 for	 all	sorts	 of	 complex,	 confounding	 reasons,	 but	 what	 matters	 is	 how	 meaning	circulates	within	these	geo-located	users.		
However,	there	is	a	second	problem	and	it	concerns	the	unknown	characteristics	of	even	the	geo-located	Twitter	population.	Put	as	simply	as	possible,	how	likely	is	 it	 that	 certain	 features,	 practices	 and	meanings	 associated	with	 Twitter-use	are	 distributed	 normally	 within	 any	 given	 population	 of	 Twitter	 users?	 On	reflection,	it	seems	quite	unlikely,	especially	given	the	historical	and	sociological	precedent	for	non-normally	distributed	factors	–	wealth,	demography,	culture	–	being	 implicated	 in	 meaning-making	 and	 communicative	 phenomena	 (Lewis	2015,	2008,	Fuchs	2013,	Hall	1982).	If	this	is	the	case,	and	fully	aware	that	such	factors	 can	 cluster	 geographically,	 then	 it	 becomes	 very	 difficult	 indeed	 to	assume	normal	population	distributions,	and	this	has	enormous	knock-on	effects	on	any	assumed	relationship	between	sample	data	and	the	population	it	is	meant	to	 represent.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 be	 extremely	 cautious	 when	discussing	something	like	the	geographical	distribution	of	Twitter	conversations.	
		
METHODS	
The	 tweet	 data	 used	 in	 this	 thesis	 cover	 four	 periods	 during	 the	 week	 after	violence	 erupted	 in	 Tottenham,	 when	 rioting	 spread	 across	 London	 boroughs	and	then	to	other	cities	in	the	UK.	These	four	periods	are	selected	from	a	larger	
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data	collection	effort,	which	started	early	in	the	morning	on	10	August	and	ended	on	 16	 August,	 during	 which	 period	 more	 than	 22	 million	 tweets	 were	downloaded	 from	 the	 Twitter	 API.	 A	 proprietary	 Python	 script	 was	 used	 to	maintain	an	open	connection	to	Twitter’s	streaming	API.	The	API	returns	tweets	as	JavaScript	Object	Notation	(JSON)	objects;	all	data	points	associated	with	each	tweet	 are	 listed	 in	 a	 dictionary-like	 data	 structure.	 These	 JSON	 objects	 were	saved	into	a	NoSQL	Mongo	database	–	a	database	system	that	treats	each	record	as	an	individual	document	rather	than	a	line	in	a	relational	table.	
In	 total,	 22,078,550	 records	 were	 created	 in	 a	 database	 called	 ukriotsdb,	approximately	100gb	large.	Despite	the	nominal	name	of	the	database,	this	tweet	sample	is	not	riot-specific;	rather,	 it	 is	a	snapshot	of	Twitter	activity	during	the	period	 10-16	 August	 2011	 returned	 by	 the	 streaming	 API.	 In	 2011,	 Twitter	claimed	it	was	publishing	200	million	tweets	per	day	(TwitterEng	2011),	which	suggests	that	the	sample	used	here	represents	approximately	two	per	cent	of	all	tweets	 published	 during	 this	 period	 –	 though,	 of	 course,	 this	 is	 a	 very	 rough	estimate.	Of	the	22	million	tweets	downloaded,	60,000	contained	the	string	‘riot’.	
The	gaps	 in	 the	baseline	 stream	are	most	 likely	explained	by	disruption	 to	 the	API	connection	or	rate	limiting	by	Twitter.	The	stability	of	the	stream	during	live	collection	periods	suggests	that	the	sampling	script	was	working	appropriately,	downloading	 a	 steady	 stream	 of	 tweets	 from	 the	 API.	 The	 disruption,	when	 it	occurs,	 stops	 the	 collection	 of	 any	 tweets.	 Such	markedly	 different	 behaviours	strongly	 suggests	 that	 sampling	error	 is	either	present	or	absent	–	 rather	 than	there	being	a	gradient	of	error,	which	would	complicate	any	assumptions	about	sampling	 stability	 during	 the	 ‘live’	 periods.	 It	 also	 suggests	 that	 it	 would	 be	
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inappropriate	 to	 conduct	 any	 sort	 of	 analysis	 across	 the	 full	 duration	 of	 the	collection	 window,	 especially	 if	 that	 analysis	 seeks	 to	 explore	 the	 temporal	distribution	of	tweet	data.		
	
Figure	 2:	 Graph	 showing	 the	 stream	density	 of	 tweets	 (number	 of	 tweets	 published	per	
five-minute	 period)	 returned	 following	 an	 unfiltered	 call	 to	 the	 API	 between	 10	 August	
2011	and	16	August	2011.		
From	the	larger	baseline	sample,	four	periods	were	selected	for	analysis	in	this	thesis.	They	are:	
• 1030	Wednesday	10	August	to	1730	Wednesday	10	August	
• 2000	Wednesday	10	August	to	0200	Thursday	11	August	
• 1030	Thursday	11	August	to	1730	Thursday	11	August	
• 2000	Thursday	11	August	to	0200	Friday	12	August	
These	periods	were	chosen	for	the	following	reasons.	First,	the	connection	to	the	API	 remained	 open	 and	 stable	 throughout	 and	 tweets	 download	 at	 the	 rate	 of	
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approximately	180,000	per	hour.	Second,	these	collection	periods	coincided	with	the	time	parliament	was	being	recalled	for	an	emergency	debate	on	the	riots	on	Thursday	11	August.	As	such,	different	dynamics	within	 the	public	sphere	may	be	 explored,	 as	 both	 British	 political	 and	 civil	 society	 attempted	 to	 construct	meaning	from	–	or,	perhaps,	impose	meaning	upon	–	the	riots.		Third,	there	is	a	certain	logic	in	collecting	tweets	across	a	period	longer	than	twenty-four	hours,	in	case	there	are	diurnal	patterns	in	localised	Twitter	activity.	Of	course,	a	two-day	collection	period	is	too	short	to	control	for	such	variation	satisfactorily,	but	there	is	a	good	sense	still	 in	having	a	starting	point	for	comparison	–a	matched	case-control	logic.	
	
IDENTIFYING	HASHTAGS	
Within	these	baseline	periods,	a	tweet	was	extracted	if	it	included	the	string	‘riot’	is	any	guise.	Python	text	search	differentiates	between	upper	and	lower	case,	so	the	 extraction	 search	 first	 converted	 tweets	 into	 lower-case	 characters	 before	committing	 the	 riot-related	 tweets	 to	 a	 new	database.	 In	 total,	 across	 the	 four	periods,	 25,538	 tweets	 were	 considered	 riot-related,	 based	 on	 this	 simple	screening	 method.	 This	 initial	 meta	 sample	 was	 then	 used	 to	 guide	 further	investigation.	 So,	 for	 instance,	 the	 riot	 tweets	 were	 screened	 to	 explore	 the	frequency	of	different	riot-related	hashtags;	the	results	of	this	exploration	were	used	to	guide	hashtag-specific	searching	in	the	baseline	samples.			
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Table	 2:	 The	 top	most	 frequently	 occurring	hashtag	 variants	 in	 each	 of	 the	 four	 sample	
windows.		
The	values	in	this	table	are	the	result	of	text	searches	on	the	entire	meta	sample,	making	 use	 of	 the	 TextBlob	 library,	 an	 implementation	 of	 Python’s	 NLTK.	TextBlob	 enables	 different	 forms	 of	 text	 processing,	 parsing	 and	 counting.	 It	
WED_DAY	 WED_NIGHT	 THU_DAY	 THU_NIGHT	
Hashtag	 Count	 Hashtag	 Count	 Hashtag	 Count	 Hashtag	 Count	
u'#londonriots'	 952	 u'#londonriots'	 279	 u'#ukriots'	 485	 u'#bbcqt'	 127	
u'#ukriots'	 570	 u'#ukriots'	 203	 u'#londonriots'	 446	 u'#londonriots'	 126	
u'#riotcleanup'	 400	 u'#riots'	 105	 u'#riots'	 291	 u'#ukriots'	 110	
u'#LondonRiot-s'	 331	 u'#LondonRiots'	 92	 u'#LondonRiots'	 141	 u'#riots'	 108	
u'#riots'	 327	 u'#riotcleanup'	 82	 u'#UKriots'	 139	 u'#LondonRiots'	 50	
u'#manchester-riots'	 203	 u'#manchesterrio-ts'	 45	 u'#riotcleanup'	 114	 u'#Patriots'	 37	
u'#UKriots'	 145	 u'#UKRiots'	 40	 u'#Riots'	 82	 u'#UKriots'	 30	
u'#Manchester-Riots'	 134	 u'#UKriots'	 36	 u'#manchesterri-ots'	 65	 u'#patriots'	 26	
u'#UKRiots'	 128	 u'#OperationCupOfTea'	 26	 u'#Londonriots'	 64	 u'#Londonriots'	 22	
u'#birminghamriots'	 97	 u'#birminghamriots'	 23	 u'#UKRiots'	 55	 u'#manchesterriots'	 21	
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vastly	 simplifies	 and	 speeds	 up	 all	 sorts	 of	 coding	 exercises	 and	 can	 break	complex	strings	(like	tweets)	into	component	parts	of	speech.	Individual	tweets	are	 parsed	 into	 individual	words	 –	 that	 is,	 complete	 character	 strings	without	separations	or	spaces	–	before	a	simple	script	checks	every	word	to	see	if	the	‘#’	character	occupies	position	[0]	(the	first	position).	All	of	the	words	that	meet	this	criteria	are	stored	in	a	list	and	then	a	simple	histogram	function	is	used	to	work	through	this	list,	counting	how	many	times	matching	words	reappear.		
Though	these	hashtags	are	the	most	common,	there	are	an	enormous	variety	of	hashtags	 in	 the	meta	sample	–	nearly	 two	thousand	 in	 the	Wed_Day	period	 for	example.	 The	 tail	 of	 the	 distribution	 is	 extremely	 long,	 however,	 and	 most	hashtags	 appear	 just	 once.	 The	 20th	 most	 popular	 hashtag	 in	 the	 Wed_Day	sample	 appeared	 in	 just	 20	 tweets.	 It	 is	 clear,	 also,	 that	 many	 of	 the	 more	common	hashtag	strings	are	variants	on	the	same	theme	–	essentially	the	same	hashtag	 returned	 in	different	ways	by	 the	data	processing	 scripts.	As	 such,	 it’s	possible	 to	 collapse	 several	 of	 the	 rows	 in	 the	 table	 into	 one	 another,	 while	maintaining	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 hashtag	 as	 a	 structural	 communication	coordination	mechanism.			
Cross	referencing	these	variants	against	each	other	identifies	five	hashtags	that	appear	to	play	important	signification	roles	across	all	four	sample	windows:		
• #UKRiots	
• #LondonRiots	
• #Riots	
• #RiotCleanUp	
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• #OperationCupOfTea	
There	are	another	two	hashtags,	which	occur	less	frequently	but	are	potentially	important	for	exposing	localised	publics.	
• #ManchesterRiots	
• #BirminghamRiots	
	
IDENTIFYING	RETWEETS	
There	are	two	possible	methods	to	identify	whether	a	tweet	in	the	API	stream	is	a	 retweet	or	not.	The	 first	 is	 to	ask	whether	 the	 ‘retweet_count’	 field	 returns	a	value	 (0	 is	 nullable)	 and	 the	 second	 is	 to	 search	 through	 the	 text	 field	 of	 each	tweet	looking	for	markers	that	indicate	a	retweet.	As	boyd	et	al.	(2010)	describe,	however,	 the	 “the	 conventions	 for	 retweeting	 are	 hugely	 inconsistent”.	 Those	conventions	have,	perhaps,	 settled	down	somewhat	 in	 the	 five	years	since	 that	study	was	published	but	 there	 are	 still	 different	ways	of	performing	a	 retweet	and	 different	 in-text	 representations	 of	 that	 action.	 By	 far	 the	 most	 common	practice	is	to	mark	a	retweet	using	capitalised	letters	‘RT’	followed	by	the	screen	name	 of	 the	 original	 tweet	 publisher:	RT	@username	 tweet	 text.	 This	 syntax	 is	usually	placed	at	the	start	of	the	tweet	text.	However,	in	a	historical	dataset	like	the	London	riots	sample,	the	full	string	‘retweet’	is	sometimes	used	instead	of	RT	as	 is	 the	practice	of	using	 ‘via	@username’	 to	signify	a	retweet,	often	placed	at	the	end	of	the	tweet	text.		
In	order	 to	 identify	retweets,	 tweet	 text	was	parsed	using	TextBlob	 to	create	a	
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new	data	field:	a	list	of	individual	words.	So,	for	instance,	the	tweet	text:	
“RT	 @username:	 Sign	 the	 petition	 to	 have	 convicted	 rioters	 lose	 all	
government	benefits	
http://t.co/R9CJ2G4	
#ukriots		
#londonriots		
#m	…”	
Becomes:	
WordList([u'RT',	 u'username',	 u'Sign',	 u'the',	 u'petition',	 u'to',	 u'have',	u'convicted',	 u'rioters',	 u'lose',	 u'all',	 u'government',	 u'benefits',	 u'http',	u't.co/R9CJ2G4',	u'ukriots',	u'londonriots',	u’m’])	
By	far	the	most	common	retweet	convention	is	to	begin	a	tweet	with	the	syntax	described	 above:	 RT	 @username…	 Typically,	 this	 syntax	 indicates	 a	 retweet	without	comment	–	a	verbatim	passing	on	of	tweet	content.	A	quick	check	of	the	characters	in	the	first	position	in	the	WordList	field	reveals	that	the	majority	of	retweets	begin	this	way.	The	suggestion,	then,	is	that	in-text	searching	captures	not	 only	 all	 of	 the	 tweets	 that	 meta	 data	 screening	 captures,	 it	 is	 better	 at	identifying	 tweets	 that	use	 the	 same	RT	syntax	and	also	 captures	 those	 tweets	that	use	a	different	RT	syntax.		
One	effect	of	 the	parsing	a	 tweet	 into	words	using	TextBlob	 is	 that	 the	process	removes	all	punctuation	and	non-alphabetical	characters.	Fortunately,	TextBlob	
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also	permits	parts	of	speech	(POS)	tagging,	which	identifies	all	 the	components	of	a	text	string	including	non-alphabetical	characters:		
[(u'RT',	u'NN'),	(u'@',	u'IN'),	(u'username',	u'NN'),	(u'Sign',	u'NNP'),	(u'the',	u'DT'),	 (u'petition',	 u'NN'),	 (u'to',	 u'TO'),	 (u'have',	 u'VBP'),	 (u'convicted',	u'VBN'),	 (u'rioters',	u'NNS'),	 (u'lose',	u'VB'),	 (u'all',	u'DT'),	 (u'government',	u'NN'),	 (u'benefits',	 u'NNS'),	 (u'http://t.co/R9CJ2G4',	 u'NN'),	 (u'ukriots',	u'NNS'),	(u'londonriots',	u'NNS'),	(u'm',	u’NN')]	
The	 POS	 nomenclature	 is	 not	 important	 at	 this	 stage	 but	 now,	 if	 RT	 can	 be	identified	as	the	first	value	returned	by	the	tuple	at	position	x	in	the	list,	as	long	as	 the	 tweet	 follows	 the	RT	@username	 syntax,	 an	@	 symbol	 should	 be	 in	 the	tuple	at	position	x+1.	In	other	words,	a	retweet	should	be	identifiable	regardless	of	commenting	or	unusual	tweet	structure.		
For	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 analysis	 this	 is	 the	 method	 used	 to	 identify	 and	 to	classify	retweets.	Tweet	text	strings	are	parsed	into	POS	using	TextBlob	and	then	a	 search	 is	 conducted	 for	 RT	 at	 position	 x	 and	 @	 at	 x+1.	 The	 function	 that	achieves	the	second	part	of	this	approach	is	included	in	appendix	A.	It	saves	in	a	list	all	tweets	that	contain	the	RT	@	username	syntax	unless	the	tweet	happens	to	end	with	an	RT,	in	which	case	it	prints	out	the	text	of	tweet	for	manual	review.	For	 example,	 it	 is	 not	 uncommon	 for	 a	 user	 to	 end	 a	 message	 with	 a	 call	 to	retweet:	
“#anticuts	 response	 to	 #londonriots	 will	 be	 discussed	 at	 our	 mting	 next	Tues	16/8,	Oxford	House	E2	All	welcome!	http://t.co/8UNFBDd	Pls	RT”	
In	these	cases,	the	tweet	is	added	to	the	rt	sample	only	if	it	includes	a	retweet	as	
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well	as	a	request	to	retweet.	
	
IDENTIFYING	@	REPLIES	
There	is	an	issue	that	makes	the	representation	of	temporality	between	@	reply	exchanges	problematic:	like	retweet	chains,	at	this	micro	level	of	analysis,	data	is	relatively	 scarce.	 In	 total,	 across	 all	 the	 hashtag	 streams,	 there	 are	 446	 tweets	that	Twitter	records	as	being	@	replies.	Text	searching	is	problematic	because	@	reply	 syntax	 is	 so	 variable,	 so	 446	 represents	 the	 number	 of	 tweets	 that	 the	Twitter	API	records	as	being	in	‘reply_to_status_id’.			
The	 issue	 is	 that	 using	 the	 ‘reply_to_status_id’	 to	 search	 the	 meta	 sample	 for	original	 tweets	 returns	 only	 11	 results.	 Such	 small	 samples	 make	 it	 almost	impossible	 to	 represent	 the	 temporality	 of	 these	 exchanges	 in	 any	meaningful	way.	Additionally,	as	can	be	seen	from	the	table	in	appendix	,	it	is	quite	difficult	to	characterise	some	of	the	@	reply	exchanges	as	contributions	to	associated	or	continuing	 discourse.	 It	 appears	 that	 the	 @	 reply	 method	 is	 used	 by	 bots	 to	automate	the	distribution	of	generic	messages.	
Reply	text Original	text 
"@hansyquirk	 Please	 Listen	 to	 the	 official	'STOP	THE	RIOTS'	ANTHEM!	by	@TayongTYN	-	http://t.co/ZZrGNju	#riotcleanup	RT" 
"Absolutely	soaked	to	the	bone	but	never	been	so	pleased	to	see	 it	raining.	Let's	hope	it	keeps	the	morons	indoors	#manchesterriots" 
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"@ungaro	 @democracynow	 Two	 posts	 here	on	 #londonriots	 'the	 fire	 next	 time'	 &	 'dark	days	 ahead'	 read	 more	 here	http://t.co/8rL79" 
'Over	 1000	 Arrested	 in	 UK	 as	 Anger	 over	Inequality,	 #Racism	 Boils	 Ovr	 into	"Insurrection"	 http://t.co/gR6cvJY	 via	@democracynow	#LondonRiots' 
'Gwoon,	winkels	weg.	@KimRoest	dus	die	krijg	k	 er	 niet	 meer	 op?	 Wat	 heeft	 #londonriots	ermee	 te	 maken?	 Snap	 t	 niet?	 #durftevragen	#dtv' 
'@typorist	dus	die	krijg	k	er	niet	meer	op?	Wat	heeft	#londonriots	ermee	te	maken?	Snap	t	niet	helemaal?	#durftevragen	#dtv' 
"@trixylion	 Hey!	 Please	 Listen	 to	 the	 official	'STOP	THE	RIOTS'	ANTHEM!	by	@TayongTYN	-	 http://t.co/EKBMJdj	 Please	 RT	#riotcleanups" 
'http://t.co/N7WFgkw	 #Victim	 in	 #viral	 #riot	#photo	#identified' 
'@AmbushPredator	 Bloody	 Hell	 Downing	Street	 riot!	 #londonriots	 #lfc	http://t.co/YBHqH5e' 
"@woodo79	Not	exactly	like	one.	No-one's	been	shot,	except	by	other	rioters." 
"@aleeshamottram	 Hey!	 Please	 Listen	 to	 the	official	 'STOP	 THE	 RIOTS'	 ANTHEM!	 by	@TayongTYN	 -	 http://t.co/Cel1TCr	Please	RT	#riotcleanups" 
'i	think	this	one	has	got	pre-menstrual-tension.	#ukriots	 #riotcleanup	 #manchesterriots	http://t.co/SuA87zA' 
'#RT	@OrinPhillips	They	even	looted	the	2012	Olympic	 Ring	 during	 the	 #LondonRiots	http://t.co/H9PLrto	[ha,	ha!!]' 
'They	 even	 looted	 the	 2012	 Olympic	 Ring	during	 the	 #LondonRiots	http://t.co/hGYuMX0' 
'@Mike_EH_52	 Bloody	 Hell	 Downing	 Street	riot!	#londonriots	#lfc	http://t.co/0NIEDj7' '"@silner		Banning	"suspected	rioters"	 is	 really	banning	 people	 you	 don\'t	 like	 the	 look	 of	and		...' 
'@chrisshipitv	 Attention:	 Capital	 in	 chaos!!	#ukriots	 #manchesterriots	http://t.co/I8GLscc' 
'Lots	interest	here	in	UK	looking	to	US	for	how	to	control	rioters:	"Time	for	reasoning	is	AFTER	u	controlled	them"	one	analyst	tells	FoxNews' 
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'@Hennasaurus	 Breaking:	 10	 Downing	 Street	Raided!	#riots	http://t.co/D3J7RhR' 'Went	 town	 today,	 SO	many	 shops	boarded	up	Was	quiet.	Not	the	town	I	know,	thanks	rioters	for	ruining	our	home	(Y)' 
u"@londontownleo	 did	 u	 hear	 a	 student	studying	 criminal	 law	 was	 I'm	 court	 today	over	#LondonRiots	that	made	me	laugh" 
'Someone	 I	went	 to	 school	with	mentioned	 on	national	 tv	 as	 one	 of	 those	 going	 to	 prison	 for	looting!	 Shocked	 but	 no	 surprised!	#LondonRiots' 
"@sarahebeid	Check	out	@Bashy's	response	to	the	 #londonriots.	 RT	 to	 spread	 youth	awareness	 of	 political	 problems...	http://t.co/aIMM0Fq" 
'RT	@nadiaaboutaleb:	The	cover	of	this	months	"Time"	 ;	 "The	 decline	 and	 fall	 of	Europe"\nhttp://t.co/jQSPfGP\n#londonriots' 
	
Table	3:	comparison	between	@	reply	tweet	pairs.	The	text	in	the	left-hand	column	is	the	
tweet	marked	 as	 a	 reply	 in	 the	 ‘reply-to-status-id’	metadata	 field.	 The	 text	 in	 the	 right-
hand	column	is		status	id	identified	in	that	same	field.		
	
AUTOMATED	CONTENT	ANALYSIS	
This	 analysis	 makes	 use	 of	 two	 types	 of	 automated	 processing	 techniques:	computer-assisted	 content	 analysis	 and	 sentiment	 analysis	 (Einspänner	 et	 al.	2014,	Thelwall	2014).	The	content	analysis	uses	machine-processing	techniques	and	Python’s	NLTK	 in	order	 to	parse	 and	 to	 count	words,	 but	 there	 is	 nothing	complex	or	hidden	 in	computing	 terms	–	 in	other	words,	programming	 is	used	only	 to	 speed	 up	 tasks	 that	 could	 be	 conducted	 manually.	 Sentiment	 analysis	relies	on	an	algorithm	that	is	trained	to	weigh	the	influence	of	individual	words	and	phrases	within	a	text	string,	and	approximates	a	measure	of	attitude	based	on	the	relationship	between	those	parts	of	speech.	A	sentiment	score	consists	of	
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two	measures:	polarity	is	a	score	between	-1	and	+1	and	is	the	approximation	of	attitude;	subjectivity	 is	a	score	between	0	and	1	and	indicates	confidence	in	the	polarity	score.	A	score	of	1	 is	highly	“subjective”	whereas	a	score	of	0	 is	highly	“objective”.	
Automated	 content	 analysis	 tends	 to	 be	 based	 on	 various	 forms	 of	 word	counting,	 although	 this	 is	 sometimes	 extended	 to	 include	 key	 phrases,	 other	parts	of	speech	and	pattern	matching	(Grimmer	and	Stewart	2013,	Hopkins	and	King	 2010).	 Higher	 level	 techniques	 allow	 the	 processing	 and	 evaluation	 of	embedded	 media	 content	 and	 may	 involve	 classification	 using	 pre-defined	illocutionary	dictionaries	(Einspänner	et	al.	2014).	The	analysis	attempted	here	is	restricted	to	low-level	frequency	plotting	based	on	single	word	signifiers.		
Frequency	plots	are	calculated	for	each	of	the	five	dominant	hashtags	identified	in	 the	meta	 layer.	 First,	 a	 Python	 script	makes	 use	 of	 the	 NLTK	 and	 TextBlob	modules	 to	parse	the	text	of	 individual	 tweets	 into	word	 lists	–	a	word	being	a	distinct	and	complete	string	of	letters	that	can	be	categorised	into	a	pre-existing	type	 class.	 Those	word	 lists	 are	 then	 passed	 to	 a	 separate	 function	 that	 sorts,	counts	 and	 displays	 them	 in	 a	 way	 that	 best	 reflects	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	research	 question.	 At	 the	 hashtag	 layer,	 for	 instance,	 no	 attempt	 is	 made	 to	connect	 temporality,	 spatiality	 and	 meaning-making:	 the	 aim	 is	 simply	 to	demonstrate	 how	keyword	 counting	might	 hint	 at	meaning	within	 a	 corpus	 of	tweets.		
A	word	cloud	is	a	pictorial	representation	of	word	distribution,	in	which	the	size	of	 individual	 words	 is	 adjusted	 to	 reflect	 frequency.	 While	 this	 is	 hardly	 a	powerful	 analytical	 tool,	 it	 can	 provide	 a	 useful	 starting	 point	 for	 identifying	
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recurrent	 signifiers,	 especially	 within	 large	 textual	 samples.	 It	 also	 has	 the	advantage	of	being	easy	to	compute	using	the	WordCloud	module	and	Python’s	2D	plotting	library	(matplotlib).	
CONTENT	CODING	
Tweets	from	all	seven	hashtags	are	considered,	although	the	dominant	hashtags	–	 #LondonRiots,	 #UKRiots	 and	 #Riots	 –	 exert	 considerable	 influence	 over	 the	extraction	 strategy.	 The	 reasons	 for	 this	 are	 obvious.	 First,	 these	 hashtags	represent	the	majority	of	tweets	 in	the	sample	and	second,	because	of	multiple	hashtag	use	and	ambient	discussion,	dominant	hashtags	tend	to	‘drive’	activity	in	other	streams	too.	
	
Figure	3:	Graph	showing	the	sample	windows	from	which	tweets	are	extracted	for	content	
and	 thematic	 coding.	 The	 shaded	 areas	 correspond	 to	 four	 periods	 (11:00am-13:00pm	
and	21:00pm-23:00pm	on	Wednesday	and	Friday),	 selected	because	 they	 correspond	 to	
periods	of	high	and	low	density	flow.		
The	 shaded	 areas	 in	 figure	 3	 represent	 the	 periods	 chosen	 for	 coded	 analysis:	
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1100	to	1300	and	2100	to	2300	on	both	Wednesday	and	Thursday,	four	periods	in	total,	containing	3542	tweets,	which	is	approximately	40%	of	the	total	hashtag	sample	 (n=7474).	 The	 rationale	 behind	 the	 selection	 is	 as	 follows:	 first,	 the	morning	periods	on	both	days	include	high-density	flows	across	all	the	hashtag	streams,	 but	 there	 is	 considerable	 variation	 between	 streams	 in	 terms	 of	 both	maximum	 and	 average	 stream	 densities.	 So,	 while	 the	 #LondonRiots	 stream	regularly	 features	 more	 that	 25	 tweets	 per	 five-minute	 interval,	 the	 localised	hashtags	 (#BirminghamRiots,	 for	 instance)	 rarely	 escape	 single	 figures.	 This	variation	will	allow	both	intra	and	inter	temporal	comparisons	across	hashtags.	
Second,	 while	 it	 may	 be	 tempting	 to	 focus	 on	 very	 brief	 flow	 periods,	 or	 to	compare	only	the	extremes	of	temporal	density,	such	an	approach	would	make	it	very	 difficult	 to	 consider	 ambient	 discourse.	 It	 would	 also	 ignore	 important	affordances	 of	 Twitter,	 essentially	 reducing	 the	 temporality	 of	 a	 tweet	 to	 the	instance	of	 its	publication	–	when,	of	course,	 it	has	been	demonstrated	already	that	tweets	persist	through	the	meso	and	micro	layers	of	exchange,	are	subject	to	algorithmic	sorting	and	promotion	and	so	on.	Finally,	by	extracting	tweets	at	the	same	 times	 on	 both	 days	 there	 is	 an	 element	 of	 control	 for	 possible	 daily	patterns	in	stream	density	and,	possibly,	in	topicality	as	well.			
The	 tweets	 from	 all	 seven	 hashtags	 across	 all	 four	 sample	 periods	 were	combined	 into	 a	 single	 dataset	 and	 transferred	 to	 an	 Excel	 spread	 sheet.	 Each	was	randomly	assigned	a	unique	identifying	number.	These	identifiers	were	then	used	 to	 extract	 a	 random	 sample	 of	 500	 tweets,	which	was	 transferred	 into	 a	separate	 spread	 sheet	 to	 act	 as	 a	 test	 sample	 for	 developing	 and	 validating	coding	criteria.	Next,	1000	tweets	were	randomly	extracted	from	the	remaining	
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dataset	 to	 form	 the	main	 sample	 for	 coded	 analysis.	 The	 fact	 that	 all	 hashtags	were	pooled	 initially	means	 that	 this	 coding	 sample	 should	 reflect	 the	 relative	distribution	 of	 tweets	 between	hashtags.	 Put	 simply,	 there	 should	 be	 far	more	#LondonRiots	 and	 #Riots	 tweets	 than	 there	 are	 #RiotCleanUp	 and	#BirminghamRiot	tweets.		
In	 summary,	 this	 iterative	 process	 of	 sorting	 and	 sampling	 involves	 three	datasets:	 the	 first	 includes	 tweets	 identified	 by	 hashtag	 in	 the	 four	 periods	 of	interest	 (n=3542);	 the	 second	 is	 a	 random	sample	of	 these	 tweets	 (n=500)	 for	developing	 coding	 criteria;	 the	 third	 sample	 (n=1000)	 is	 extracted	 from	 the	remaining	3042	tweets	are	is	the	main	sample	for	coded	analysis.		
Content	analysis	was	conducted	in	three	phases.	Ultimately,	the	aim	is	to	assess	the	 deliberative	 potential	 of	 discourse	 both	 at	 different	 temporalities	 and	 in	thematic	 clusters.	 Before	 that,	 however,	 tweets	 were	 coded	 using	 a	 system	 of	content	 categories	 (Bruns	 et	 al.	 2012).	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 initial	 coding	 was	 to	establish	what	 types	 of	message	were	 sent	 under	different	 hashtags	 as	part	 of	the	London	riot	discourse.		
Initially,	 following	Bruns	et	al.	 (2012),	 the	 first	100	 tweets	 in	 the	development	sample	(n=500)	were	coded	using	the	following	categorisations:		
1. Information	(advice,	situational	information,	requests	for	information).	2. Media	sharing	(news	media,	multimedia).	3. Help	and	fundraising	(help,	fundraising).	4. Direct	experience	(personal	narrative,	eyewitness	reports).	5. Reactions	 and	 discussion	 (adjunctive	 discussion,	 personal	 reaction,	
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thanks,	support).	6. Meta	discussion	(meta	discussion	–	commentary	on	role	of	social	media	in	the	crisis).		
After	 this	 initial	 attempt	 to	 code	 tweets,	 the	 categories	were	adapted	 to	better	reflect	discourse	in	the	riot	public.	These	updated	categories	were	then	applied	to	 the	 next	 100	 tweets	 in	 sample,	 before	 another	 attempt	was	made	 to	 refine	coding	categories.	This	process	was	repeated	until	an	attempt	had	been	made	to	code	 all	 the	 tweets	 in	 the	 development	 sample	 and	 the	 coding	 categories	 had	been	through	five	phases	of	refinement.	Some	categories	were	modified	slightly,	others	were	 dropped	 altogether	 and	 several	were	 added	 to	 reflect	 the	 greater	range	of	discourse	–	especially	 in	terms	of	discussion	and	commentary	–	 in	the	riot	public.	The	final	coding	system	used	to	categorise	content	in	the	test	sample	is	detailed	in	table	4.	
1.	Information 
G.I. General	information 
J.F.I. Jokes,	 satirical	 or	 self-evidently	 false	information 
S.I. Situational	information	and	eye	witness	reports 
R.F.I. Requests	for	information,	personal	or	public 
2.	Media	sharing:	for	any	tweet	that	includes	a	link 
M.M. Multimedia 
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N.M. National	 and	 local	 corporate	 media	(newspapers,	broadcasters)	 
C.M. Citizen	media 
O.M. Other	media 
G.M. Government	media 
3.	Adjunctive	discussion	(opinion	and	commentary) 
P.R.E. Personal	reaction	and	emotion 
P.O. Personal	narrative,	opinion 
P.C. Personal	commentary	and	analysis 
O. Other	–	give	details 
4.	Help	&	support	  
C.T.A. Call	to	action:	social	or	political 
I.A. Issue	 awareness,	 including	 campaigns	 and	fundraising 
E.S. Expressions	of	support	or	solidarity 
5.	Meta	analysis	&	commentary 
M.C. Meta	commentary	on	the	role	of	social	media	in	the	riots	and	in	riot	discussion 
6.	SPAM	  
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7.	OTHER	  
	
Table	4:	Coding	categories	used	to	evaluate	the	content	of	individual	tweets.		
The	 1000	 tweets	 in	 the	 main	 sample	 were	 coded	 twice	 by	 independent	reviewers.	The	content	codes	are	not	mutually	exclusive,	so	several	codes	could	be	 attributed	 to	 the	 same	 tweet.	 Once	 both	 reviewers	 had	 completed	 their	independent	 coding,	 the	 main	 reviewer	 worked	 through	 both	 sets	 of	 codes,	identifying	 discrepancies,	 which	 the	 two	 reviewers	 discussed	 to	 see	 if	 an	agreement	could	be	reached.	If	no	agreement	was	possible,	both	categorisations	were	assigned	to	 the	tweet	 to	reflect	 the	different	reviewer	 interpretations.	So,	for	 instance,	 if	a	hypothetical	tweet	was	coded	OM	+	PRE	by	one	reviewer,	and	OM	 +	 PO	 by	 the	 other,	 and	 no	 agreement	 was	 possible,	 the	 final	 code	 was	recorded	as	OM	+	PRE	+	PO.	
	
THEMATIC	CODING	
Tweets	coded	as	adjunctive	discussion	(ADJ)	were	submitted	to	a	second	round	of	coding	to	identify	thematic	concerns.	During	analysis,	the	different	ADJ	codes	were	hidden	from	reviewers	to	limit	the	potential	for	selection	and	confirmation	biases.	Tweets	were	read	independently	by	two	reviewers.	If	a	tweet	contained	a	link,	an	attempt	was	made	to	follow	the	link	and	to	assess	the	thematic	content	of	the	 destination	 media.	 If	 the	 link	 failed	 or	 the	 media	 had	 been	 removed,	 the	tweet	was	marked	with	a	BKL	 tag.	 For	 each	 tweet,	 the	 reviewer	made	 cursory	notes	 (a	 maximum	 of	 10	 words)	 summarising	 the	 main	 themes,	 opinions	 or	
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arguments	being	made	within	 the	 tweet	or	 in	 the	 linked	media.	Once	 this	 task	had	been	completed	for	all	ADJ	tweets,	the	summary	notes	were	collated	for	each	reviewer.	
These	 summaries	 were	 then	 combined	 and	 read	 closely	 to	 try	 to	 identify	thematic	trends	across	the	dataset;	several	major	themes	were	identified	and	are	summarised	in	table	5.		
Code	 Theme	
POL	 A	tweet	that	implicates	politicians	or	the	political/capitalist	class	as	complicit	in	the	riots,	 often	 citing	 the	 expenses	 scandal,	 banking	 bailouts	 or	 a	 failure	 of	moral/political	leadership.	
SOC	 A	tweet	that	emphasises	complex	social	and	personal	explanations	for	rioting.		
RES	 A	tweet	that	comments	on	supposed	appropriate	or	effective	responses	to	the	riots,	including	calls	for	punishment	and	social	reflection.	
RAO	 Rioter	as	other.	Tweets	that	set	rioters	apart	from	society,	citing	their	behaviour	or	supposed	moral	or	social	failings.		
MC	 Media	 commentary.	 Any	 tweet	 that	 reflects	 on	 media	 coverage	 of	 the	 riots,	 the	apparent	role	of	mediated	communication	within	the	riots	or	the	appropriate	state	response	to	this	communication.	
RED	 Reduction.	 Any	 tweet	 that	 downplays	 the	 social/personal	 explanations	 (SOC)	 of	rioting,	instead	portraying	the	riots/rioters	as	simple	and	criminal.		
NLC	 Neoliberal	 critique.	 A	 tweet	 that	 locates	 the	 riots	 within	 a	 wider	 criticism	 of	consumerism	or	individualism.		
LC	 Liberal	 critique.	 A	 tweet	 that	 locates	 the	 riots	within	 a	wider	 critique	 of	 a	 liberal	society	that	tolerates	riot-encouraging	behaviour.		
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COP	 Any	tweet	that	deals	specifically	with	the	police	or	state	violence.		
SOL	 Any	declaration	of	solidarity.		
O	 A	tweet	that	does	not	fall	into	a	major	code	group,	either	because	the	focus	is	highly	localised	or	poorly	defined.		
NN	 A	tweet	that	does	not	include	thematic	commentary.		
	
Table	5:	A	list	of	thematic	content	(with	codes)	extracted	from	the	adjunctive	discussion	
Independent	 reviewers	 then	 used	 the	 thematic	 coding	 sheet	 to	 reconsider	 all	tweets	in	the	PO+PC	and	PRE	samples,	assigning	a	thematic	code	where	possible	and	marking	those	 tweets	 that	did	not	address	a	major	 theme	Other.	Once	this	task	had	been	completed,	the	codes	from	the	two	reviewers	were	cross	checked,	inconsistencies	were	resolved	and	the	relative	frequencies	of	different	thematic	codes	were	calculated.	
	
DELIBERATIVE	CODING	
Coding	was	performed	independently	by	two	reviewers	on	all	 tweets	originally	coded	 into	 the	 adjunctive	 discussion	 category.	 All	 identifying	 information	external	 to	 the	 tweet	 text	was	 removed,	 as	were	 any	 indications	 of	 previously	applied	 codes,	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 limit	 the	 effect	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 on	 the	reviewers’	 coding	 decisions.	 However,	 deliberative	 coding	 was	 performed	 by	reviewers	who	had	previously	worked	with	 the	 sample,	 so	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	some	 of	 the	 deliberative	 decision-making	 may	 have	 been	 influenced	 by	 prior	
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readings	 of	 individual	 tweets.	 In	 a	 further	 effort	 to	 limit	 this	 effect,	 the	deliberative	 questions	 were	 limited	 to	 yes/no	 responses	 and	 scores	 for	individual	tweets	were	adjusted	based	on	the	contributions	of	both	reviewers.		
Despite	these	precautions,	it	must	be	stated	that	these	are	subjective	readings	of	tweet	 text	 and,	 ultimately,	 subjective	 assessments	 of	 deliberative	 potential.	Partly	 owing	 to	 the	 brevity	 of	 the	 tweet	 format,	 the	 pre-conditional	 logic	 of	deliberation	 is	often	 implied	rather	 than	articulated	 in	 full.	Furthermore,	while	some	tweets	stand	alone	as	independent	meaning-making	statements,	others	are	embedded	 in	@	 reply	 conversations,	 retweet	 chains	or	other	 forms	of	 reactive	commentary.	In	these	cases,	the	individual	reviewer	must	assess	whether	or	not	the	tweet	meets	the	deliberative	criteria	to	his	or	her	own	satisfaction.		
The	 following	 coding	 questions	were	 asked	 of	 every	 tweet	 in	 the	 ADJ	 sample.	Each	question	 carries	 a	 single	 point	 score,	 so	 that	 the	maximum	 score	 for	 any	tweet	is	4.			
Does	the	tweet:	
1. State	 a	 moral,	 political	 or	 intellectual	 position	 relative	 to	 one	 of	 the	thematic	codes?	 In	other	words,	does	 the	user	express	an	opinion	or	an	attitude	 explicitly,	 or	 is	 it	 implicit	 in	 the	 choice	 of	 adjectives.	 So,	 for	instance,	 the	 phrase	 “rioters	 in	 London”	 does	 not	 express	 a	 position,	whereas	“scum	rioters	in	London”	does	(however	reductive).	2. Suggest	 that	 the	 user	 comprehends	 the	 position	 stated	 in	 question	 1,	either	 in	 terms	 of	 causal	 factors	 or	 in	 terms	 of	 significance?	 	 Is	 the	position	supported	by	an	understanding	of	relevant	information	relating	
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to	the	statement	or	to	the	riots	more	widely?		3. Include	 a	 call	 to	 existing	 or	 shared	 knowledge	 or	 cultural	 ‘truth’	 in	support	 of	 the	 position	 stated	 in	 question	 1,	 including	 personal	experience,	 external	 discourse	 or	 existing	 tweets?	 This	 includes	 the	practice	of	retweeting.	4. Use	 language	 and	 form	 appropriate	 given	 the	 prevailing	 culture	 of	 riot	public?	Within	 the	 adjunctive	 discussion	 sample,	 this	 criteria	 applies	 to	pretty	much	every	tweet.	The	few	cases	 in	which	a	point	 is	withheld	for	this	final	criteria	are	discussed	below.		
	Once	 the	 two	 reviewers	 had	 coded	 every	 tweet	 in	 the	 ADJ	 sample,	 these	independent	assessments	were	 combined	and	a	mean	score	was	 calculated	 for	every	tweet.	The	primary	reviewer	then	looked	at	the	whole	sample	as	singular	text,	 searching	 for	 evidence	 of	 ideal	 speech	 conditions.	 Particularly	 close	attention	was	 paid	 to	@reply	 tweets	 and	 retweets	 –	 the	most	 ‘conversational’	dynamics	in	the	riot	public.	
The	appropriateness	criteria	 is	potentially	problematic	because	 it	 is	difficult	 to	judge	what	defines	a	prevailing	culture	and	it	 is	difficult	 to	define	what	may	or	may	not	be	appropriate	given	that	culture,	especially	in	the	context	of	a	hashtag,	which	 is	 such	 a	malleable	 signifier	 for	 constructing	 discourse.	 In	 one	 sense,	 it	could	be	 argued	 that,	 given	 the	user-generated	nature	of	Twitter	discourse,	 all	tweets	 are	 potentially	 appropriate.	 Alternatively,	 perhaps	 a	 reviewer	 should	refer	to	Twitter’s	terms	and	conditions	defining	“content	boundaries	and	use	of	Twitter”.	 The	 rules,	 however,	 are	 platform	 specific	 and	 ignore	 the	 fact	 that	cultures	 of	 appropriateness	 can	 be	 hashtag	 and	 context-specific.	 Given	 this	
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specificity,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 define	 a	 priori	 what	 constitutes	 an	 appropriate	culture	for	the	riot	public.		
Given	 the	 prevailing	 culture	 of	 Twitter,	 a	 tweet	 will	 need	 to	 be	 fairly	transgressive	to	be	deemed	inappropriate,	and	this	is	unlikely	given	the	sample	only	 includes	 tweets	 that	 received	 an	 adjunctive	 discussion	 content	 code.	Consequently,	 a	 normative	 definition	 is	 preferred:	 effectively,	 this	 is	 how	 a	productive,	 deliberative	 communicative	 culture	 should	 look	 if	 it	 is	 going	 to	function	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 enable	 communicative	 action.	 Under	 such	 a	definition,	 a	 tweet	 fails	 to	meet	 the	 appropriateness	 criteria	 if	 it	 undermines	 a	“culture	of	commitment	to	deliberation”.	That	culture:	
• Does	 not	 preclude	 humour	 or	 satire,	 as	 long	 as	 that	 humour	 or	 satire	contributes	to	a	rhetorical	statement.	
• Does	not	necessarily	preclude	profanity.	
• Does	 preclude	 offensive	 or	 aggressive	 statements,	 including	 profanity	deemed	offensive	or	aggressive.		
• Does	preclude	statements	that	are	purely	emotive.	
	
MEASURING	TWITTER	TIME-SPACE	
Weltevrede	 et	 al.	 (2014,	 136)	 theorised	 network	 time	 in	 terms	 of	 platform-specific	content	flows	–	that	is,	“the	pace	at	which	various	devices	presented	new	content”.	 In	 their	 analysis	 temporality	 is	 visualised	as	 looking	 somewhat	 like	a	barcode:	each	result	is	represented	as	a	single	line,	and	as	the	rate	of	result	flow	increases,	lines	cluster	in	ever-denser	blocks.	
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There	are	two	issues	that	prevent	exactly	the	same	approach	being	adopted	here.	First,	 the	period	of	study	spans	days	rather	than	hours.	To	enable	visualisation	across	 longer	 intervals	 it	 makes	 sense	 to	 deal	 with	 clock-time	 periods	 rather	than	absolute	values.	 In	all	 the	charts	presented	here,	 temporality	 is	visualised	using	five-minute	periods.	It	is	necessary	to	maintain	the	same	period	length	as	a	denominator	when	 comparing	 tweet	 streams,	 but	 otherwise	 period	 length	 can	change	so	that	a	visualisation	best	 ‘represents’	stream	density	(Thelwall	2014).	This	 is	 a	 subjective	 decision,	 a	 trade-off	 between	 how	 best	 to	 represent	 the	temporal	characteristics	of	the	stream	and	comparability	requirements,	and	has	the	potential	to	influence	visual	interpretation.	
Second,	with	larger	datasets	like	those	used	here,	it	is	quite	likely	that	tweets	are	published	 with	 the	 same	 timestamp.	 This	 complicates	 a	 barcode	 visualisation	because	 content	 is	 meant	 to	 be	 represented	 independently:	 to	 represent	 two	tweets	 with	 the	 same	 timestamp	 requires	 either	 doubling	 the	 width	 of	 a	 line	(interfering	 with	 and	 misrepresenting	 the	 primary	 visualisation	 of	 pace)	 or	doubling	 the	 height	 of	 the	 line	 –	 in	 effect,	 producing	 a	 histogram.	 That	 is	 the	option	preferred	here.	Line	width	–	the	x-axis	variable	–	is	kept	constant	and	line	height	is	used	to	visualise	the	pace	of	flow.		In	such	circumstances,	it	makes	sense	to	 drop	 references	 to	 pace,	 which	 can	 be	 problematic,	 and	 speak	 instead	 of	densities	of	flow.	
Consequently,	the	temporality	of	different	structural	flows	is	measured	in	terms	of	tweets	per	five-minute	period.	This	is	achieved	using	a	short	Python	program	that	 parses	 tweets	 according	 to	 the	 ‘created_at’	 data	 point	 and	 then	 performs	frequency	calculations.	All	of	the	programming	scripts	used	in	this	research	are	
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included	for	inspection	in	appendix	A.		
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CHAPTER	SIX	
FINDINGS	
DESCRIBING	DISCOURSE	IN	THE	RIOT	PUBLIC	
For	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 analysis,	 the	 riot	 public	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 collection	 of	unique	 Twitter	 accounts	 contributing	 to	 public,	 riot-specific	 discourse	 at	 the	macro	 level,	 through	the	use	of	one	or	more	major	riot-related	hashtags.	There	are	seven	such	hashtags,	identified	by	an	automated	frequency	analysis	of	every	tweet	 containing	 the	 character	 string	 ‘riot’.	 A	 summary	 analysis	 of	 all	 seven	hashtags	is	provided	in	table	6.		
Hashtag Total	tweets Unique	Users Locations 
#UKRiots 2199 2018 1110 
#LondonRiots 2998 2803 1493 
#Riots 1175 1105 650 
#BirminghamRiots 169 143 90 
#ManchesterRiots 353 303 163 
#RiotCleanUp 743 665 378 
#OperationCupOfTea 514 499 299 
	
Table	6:	A	summary	of	the	seven	major	hashtag	streams	identified	with	the	API	stream	
This	section	outlines	the	findings	of	the	qualitative	coding	and	quantitative	data	
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analysis:	 it	 also	 comments	 on	 the	 methodology	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 research	questions	 and	 conceptual	 framework.	 For	 certain	 metrics,	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	perform	analysis	across	the	entire	riot	public	–	that	is,	to	include	all	tweets	from	all	 seven	 hashtags.	 Other	 metrics	 are	 more	 appropriately	 applied	 to	 certain	hashtags	 and,	 in	 certain	 cases,	 the	 data	 sample	 is	 limited	 for	 illustrative	purposes.	In	each	instance,	sampling	logic	is	explained	before	the	presentation	of	findings.		
To	reiterate	briefly,	there	are	four	principal	aims	to	the	analysis	presented.	The	first	 is	 to	 describe	 and	 to	 evaluate	 the	 content	 of	 discourse	 in	 the	 riot	 public,	including	 the	major	 thematic	 concerns	 represented	 in	 tweets.	The	 second	 is	 to	describe	and	to	evaluate	the	deliberativeness	of	the	public,	both	in	terms	of	the	representational	 meaning	 within	 tweets	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 interaction	 between	tweets	 (and,	 by	 extension,	 Twitter	 users).	 The	 third	 is	 to	 describe	 the	temporality	 and	 spatially	 of	 the	 riot	 public	 in	 general	 terms,	 but	 also	 more	specifically,	corresponding	to	the	structural	flows	that	constitute	the	public.	The	fourth	is	to	observe	and	to	question	any	interaction	between	these	variables,	to	conduct	 comparative	 analysis	 if	 possible,	 and	 to	 explore	 the	 assertion	 that	 the	time-space	 of	 structural	 flows	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 framing	 and	 shaping	discourse.		
Accordingly,	 findings	 are	 presented	 in	 response	 to	 the	 first	 three	 research	questions	 that	 capture	and	 formalise	 these	principal	 aims.	The	 fourth	 research	question,	 which	 requires	 a	 comparative	 and	 critical	 cross-referencing	 of	 these	different	 variables,	 is	 taken	 up	 in	 the	 next	 chapter	 as	 part	 of	 the	 analytical	discussion.		
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AUTOMATED	CONTENT	ANALYSIS	
This	analysis	is	presented	separately	for	individual	hashtags;	follower	networks	are	 studied	 through	 their	 interaction	 with	 macro	 and	 micro	 publics.	Furthermore,	retweet	chains	are	not	very	suited	to	automated	content	analysis,	mostly	because	a	retweet	chain	is,	effectively,	the	same	tweet	repeated	multiple	times	with	only	minor	editing.	As	such,	it	is	perfectively	possible	to	human-read	the	retweet	samples	and	automated	coding	adds	very	little	value.	
Sentiment	analysis	is	conducted	at	the	level	of	the	hashtag	because	the	hashtag	is	considered	 a	 topical	 organisational	 signifier,	 via	 which	 Twitter	 users	 can	contribute	 to	 a	 wider	 public	 discourse.	 In	 theory,	 tracking	 sentiment	 may	identify	macro	changes	in	attitude	or	opinion	(meaning)	over	time,	as	sentiment	becomes	more	or	less	polarised,	or	even	changes	polarity:	perhaps	an	indicator	of	public	mood.	
The	 graph	 below	 includes	 positive	 and	 negative	 polarity	 scores	 only	 if	 the	corresponding	 subjectivity	 score	 is	 less	 than	 0.5,	 that	 is	 tending	 towards	objective.	The	0.5	threshold	is	arbitrary.	With	a	much	larger	data	sample	it	might	be	 possible	 to	 plot	 only	 the	 most	 objective	 (confident)	 polarity	 scores	 –those	with	 a	 subjectivity	 score	 less	 than	 0.1,	 for	 instance.	 The	 polarity	 scores	 are	adjusted	to	account	for	population	size.	The	adjustment	process	is	very	simple:	if	10	 tweets	 average	 a	 modest	 positive	 score	 (e.g.	 0.2),	 the	 value	 plotted	 in	 the	graph	 is	10	x	0.2	=	2;	 if	 two	tweets	average	-0.8,	 the	value	plotted	 is	 -1.6.	Both	positive	and	negative	become	less	polarised,	and	positive	sentiment	neutralises	at	a	faster	rate.	
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Figure	4:	Graph	showing	sentiment	scores	calculated	for	each	5	minute	interval.	Scores	are	adjusted	
according	to	the	number	of	tweets	published	in	each	interval	and	positive	and	negative	scores	are	
displayed	separately.		
Word	 clouds	 for	 all	 the	 major	 hashtags	 are	 included	 in	 appendix	 B.	 The	 first	image	is	generated	from	tweets	within	the	#LondonRiots	streamxxix.		
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Figure	 5:	 Word	 Cloud	 generated	 from	 frequency	 analysis	 of	 all	 tweets	 within	 the	
#LondonRiots	stream.	The	larger	the	word,	the	more	frequently	it	occurs	in	those	tweets.		
The	second	image	is	generated	from	the	#UKRiots	hashtag.		
	
Figure	6:	Word	Cloud	generated	from	frequency	analysis	of	all	tweets	within	the	#UKRiots	
stream.	
The	hashtags	return	seemingly	distinct	word	sets,	which	supports	the	structural	logic	of	 conducting	analysis	at	 the	macro	 level.	 If	hashtags	were	arbitrary	 then	presumably,	 over	 this	 large	 a	 sample,	 it	would	 be	more	 difficult	 to	 distinguish	
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differences	between	word	distributions.		
Beyond	 this	preliminary	observation	 there	 is	 clearly	much	 to	debate	about	 the	quality	 or	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 knowledge	 that	 these	 word	 clouds	 produce.	Certainly	 the	 automated	 (and,	 by	 definition,	 obscured)	 generation	 of	 these	images	 is	problematic	 for	 the	 average	 reader	who	may	 lack	 access	 to	both	 the	algorithms	 and	 the	 processing	 scripts	 that	 make	 use	 of	 these	 algorithms.	 The	hidden	 sampling,	 coding	 and	weighting	 of	 individual	 character	 strings	 inhibits	much	in	the	way	of	quantitative	conclusions	and	this	technique	is	too	reductive	to	 permit	 much	 in	 the	 way	 of	 textual	 interpretation.	 Consequently,	 the	commentary	 offered	 here	 probably	 approaches	 the	 limit	 of	 what	 is	 advisable:	word	clouds	suggest	possibilities	for	further	research	but	invariably	raise	more	questions	than	they	answer.		
It	could	be	argued,	for	instance,	that	the	word	clouds	presented	here	validate	the	structural	 logic	 of	 analysing	 hashtags,	 or	 at	 least	 contribute	 evidence	 towards	that	validation.	The	fact	 that,	qualitatively	at	 least,	different	hashtags	appear	to	support	thematic	word	distributions	lends	credence	to	the	idea	that	hashtags	are	topical	 signifiers,	 but	 in	 itself	 this	 observation	 does	 nothing	 to	 illuminate	 how	those	word	distributions	are	constructed.	This	makes	it	difficult	to	make	any	sort	of	claim	about	how	meanings	are	being	exchanged	and	transformed	within	 the	hashtag	 culture.	 The	 communicative	 practices,	 the	 encoding	 and	 decoding	 of	meaning	 around	 thematic	 markers,	 and	 the	 discursive	 structures	 of	 the	 riot	public	are	beyond	the	reach	of	this	sort	of	automation.		
However,	it	is	worth	noting	that,	as	yet,	automated	content	coding	has	not	been	applied	 to	 explore	 the	 temporal	 dynamics	 of	 discourse.	 Such	 an	 approach	 is	
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possible	 as	 long	 as	 keywords	 are	 accepted	 as	 a	 reasonable	 approximation	 of	meaning.	While	 such	 an	 assumption	 is	 clearly	 reductive,	 automated	 frequency	analysis	 is	 increasingly	employed	 in	social	and	 textual	 research,	as	researchers	gain	access	to	software	that	supports	such	approaches	(Einspänner	et	al.	2014).	
This	analysis	does	not	presume	that	automated	reading	can	reveal	complex	and	detailed	textuality	but	rather	that	keyword	frequencies,	in	aggregate	and	across	big	data	samples	may	 indicate	macro	characteristics	of	discourse	 that	could	be	explored	 further.	 So,	 for	 example,	 word	 frequencies	 for	 the	 three	 hashtags	#LondonRiots,	 #UKRiots	 and	 #Riots	 are	 calculated	 within	 each	 five	 minute	interval	used	to	generate	the	stream	density	metric,	so	that	for	each	period	in	the	density	plot	there	is	a	corresponding	histogram	containing	every	word	in	every	tweet	 sent	 during	 that	 period,	 recording	 the	 number	 of	 times	 each	 word	 is	repeated.	 In	 the	 first	 interval,	between	10:30	and	10:35	on	10	August,	 a	 list	of	630	words	 is	 produced,	 and	 the	number	of	 repeat	 occurrences	 is	 recorded	 for	each	word.		
This	permits	two	potential	avenues	of	enquiry.	First,	with	this	data	available,	 it	becomes	 possible	 to	 track	 the	 occurrence	 of	 keywords	 –	 or	 sets	 of	 related	keywords	–	over	time,	so	that	thematic	trends	might	be	investigated.	Second,	 it	allows	 a	 researcher	 to	 focus	 in	 on	 periods	 of	 dense	 stream	 flow	 and	 look	 for	trends	of	themes	in	the	frequency	of	key	signifiers.	For	instance,	suppose	that	it	is	possible	to	track	representations	of	the	state	on	Twitter	by	identifying	a	list	of	keywords	 that	might	 reasonably	 be	 assumed	 to	 signify	 state	 power	 and	 state-centric	activity.	Now,	clearly,	this	is	quite	a	supposition	but,	as	suggested	early,	it	is	 not	 so	 radically	 different	 from	 the	 categorisation	work	 behind	 the	 semantic	
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web.	A	study	of	the	word	clouds	already	presented	produces	a	list	of	candidate	words.	In	the	three	riot	streams,	there	are	relatively	few.	
Word Signifying 
Strong	association 	
Cameron (David)	 Cameron;	 Prime	 Minister;	 human	embodiment	of	state	power.	 
Police Agency	 administering	 state	 power;	 pursuit	 of	order. 
Downing The	geographical	centre	of	state	power;	personal	attachment	to	Prime	Minister.	 
Weak	association 	
Social Social	as	collective	rather	than	state	 
Society Emphasis	 on	 shared	 relationships;	 us;	 collective	project. 
Prison Representation	 of	 state	 power/violence;	 non-specific;	supra-state. 
	
Table	7:	Candidate	keywords	representing	the	state	and	state	power	in	discourse.	
The	 graph	 in	 figure	 7	 tracks	 the	 combined	 temporality	 of	 the	 three	 strong	association	keywords,	presenting	this	temporality	as	a	fraction	or	percentage	of	the	total	hashtag	flow.	
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Figure	 7:	 graph	 displaying	 the	 temporality	 of	 two	 streams.	 In	 green,	 the	 total	 stream	
density	of	the	#LondonRiots,	#UKRiots	and	#Riots	hashtags,	and	in	purple	the	percentage	
of	those	tweets	that	contain	the	keywords	‘Cameron’,	‘Downing’	and	‘Police’.		
There	is	a	marked	difference	in	the	distribution	of	these	keywords,	as	a	fraction	of	 the	overall	 stream	density,	 comparing	Thursday	 to	Wednesday.	This	may	be	coincidental	 but	 on	 Thursday	 11	 August	 parliament	was	 recalled	 for	 a	 special	sitting	and	the	state	 formally	detailed	 its	response	to	events	of	preceding	days.	Breaking	 down	 this	 collected	 representation	 of	 the	 state	 and	 looking	 at	keywords	separately,	 it	becomes	clear	that	there	is	a	shift	 in	the	representative	dynamic.		
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Figure	 8:	 graph	 showing	 the	 relative	 frequency	 of	 two	 state-centric	 keywords	 over	 the	
two-day	study	period.	
On	Wednesday,	 the	 riot	 public	 consistently	mentions	 the	police	more	 than	 the	Prime	Minister	but	on	Thursday	this	trend	is	reversed.	There	are	plenty	of	fairly	obvious	 explanations	 for	 why	 the	 police	 may	 be	 more	 prominent	 in	 the	 riot	public	 on	 Wednesday,	 not	 least	 that	 rioting	 continued	 to	 trouble	 UK	 cities	through	Tuesday	night	and	into	Wednesday	morning	–	it	was	in	the	early	hours	of	 Wednesday	 morning	 that	 three	 men	 died	 trying	 to	 protect	 community	property	 from	 rioters	 in	 Birmingham.	 The	 police,	 far	 more	 than	 the	 prime	minister,	perhaps,	represent	a	public-facing,	interactive	and	interventionist	state.		
Perhaps	 Cameron’s	 increased	 profile	 on	 Thursday	 is	 representative	 of	 a	more	concerted	and	managed	attempt	to	reassert	central	state	authority,	and	how	this	might	 have	worked	within	 different	mediated	 contexts.	 For	 instance,	 does	 the	
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returning	spectacle	of	parliamentary	democracy	boost	Cameron’s	profile	–	 that	is,	 mediated	 and	 managed	 institutional	 discourse	 operating	 in	 a	 normative	fashion	 –	 which	 would	 imply	 that	 the	 digital	 riot	 public	 is	 very	 much	 an	extension	 and	 a	 reflection	 of	 broadcast	 forms?	 Is	 it	 indicative	 of	 the	 prime	mister’s	media	management	policies,	which	included	a	concerted	effort	to	assert	authority	 over	 the	 struggle	 to	 signify,	 and	 a	 corresponding	 drive	 to	 capture,	process	and	punish	rioters?	Certainly	these	questions	seem	worth	exploring,	as	does	the	possibility	that	Cameron’s	apparent	dominance	on	Thursday	(at	least	in	terms	of	state-centric	discourse)	 is	a	trend	unique	to	Twitter	rather	than	being	something	indicative	of	wider	societal	processes.		
	
CONTENT	CODING	
The	 relative	 frequency	 of	 the	 different	 content	 types	 (tweets)	 is	 displayed	 in	figure	8.	The	chart	demonstrates	that	a	tweet	is	a	far	more	complex	signification	system	 than	 the	 usual	 140-character	 string	 definition	 would	 allow.	 There	 are	several	 reasons	 for	 this,	 including	 user-defined	 syntactical	 conventions	(hashtags,	 @	 tagging,	 non-alphabetical	 characters	 and	 emoticons),	 but	 the	practice	 of	 hyperlinking	 via	 embedded	 (and	 often	 shortened)	 URLs	 is	particularly	 important	 in	 this	 respect.	 Nearly	 two-thirds	 of	 tweets	 in	 the	main	coding	sample	contain	a	link	to	another	form	of	media.	
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Figure	9:	bar	chart	displaying	the	relative	frequency	of	the	different	content	categories	in	
the	coding	sample	(n=1000).		
Previous	 analyses	 of	 the	 London	 riots	 have	 suggested	 that	 Twitter	 played	 an	influential	role	in	organising	and	mobilising	not	the	riots	themselves	but	the	civil	response	 after	 the	 riots,	 including	 efforts	 to	 clean	 up	 and	 repair	 damaged	communities	 (#RiotCleanUp	 and	 #OperationCupOfTea)	 (P	 Lewis	 et	 al.	 2011).	The	content	analysis	here,	however,	suggests	that	if	Twitter	contributed	to	these	efforts	 it	 was	mostly	 indirectly.	 Only	 16%	 of	 tweets	 contain	 content	 coded	 as	Help	&	Support;	only	half	of	these	tweets	(8%	of	the	main	sample)	contain	direct	calls	to	action.	Efforts	to	mobilise	Twitter	users	involve	calls	to	identify	rioters,	either	 formally	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 police	 or	 through	 social	 media,	 requests	 to	promote	 the	#OperationCupOfTea	hashtag	and	attempts	 to	drive	 isolated	 issue	awareness.	In	other	words,	there	is	hardly	overwhelming	evidence	that	Twitter	
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was	being	used	intentionally	as	a	tool	for	connective	action.	This	does	not	mean,	of	 course,	 that	Twitter	did	not	 support	 connective	action	via	 indirect	methods,	either	 through	 the	 sharing	 of	 relevant	 information	 or	 by	 creating	 an	 ambient	discourse	 encouraging	 such	 efforts.	 It	 does	 mean	 that	 there	 is	 little	 empirical	evidence	to	support	claims	of	linear	intentionality	(an	effects	model)	connecting	Twitter	and	post-riot	civil	mobilisation.		
Three	 types	 of	 content	 appear	 to	 dominate	 the	 riot	 public:	 media	 sharing,	adjunctive	 discussion	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 news	 or	 information	 defined	according	to	various	subcategories.	It	is	worth	taking	some	time	to	explore	these	categories	in	isolation,	though	of	course	this	is	an	artificial	separation	–	often	the	adjunctive	 discussion	 is	 part	 of	 the	 embedded	 media	 or	 is	 explicitly	 tied	 to	information-sharing	 practices.	 It	 is	 convenient,	 however,	 to	 establish	 what	 is	happening	within	each	category	before	exploring	how	the	categories	interact.		
A	 key	 claim	 about	 the	 communicative	 potential	 of	 social	 media,	 especially	 in	times	of	crisis	or	social	disturbance	–	so	called	acute	events	–	has	always	been	that	it	affords	the	exchange	of	“hyper-local	and	context-specific”	information	in	a	way	 that	 national	media	 structures	 do	 not	 (Sarter	 and	Woods	 1991,	 55).	 This	contribution	 to	 situational	 awareness	 is	 particularly	 valued	 by	 crisis	communication	scholars	(Vieweg	et	al.	2010)	but	has	implications	for	social	and	political	 communication	 theory	 as	 well.	 The	 opening	 of	 new	 communication	channels	 within	 the	 public	 sphere,	 operating	 alongside	 but	 independent	 of	traditional	media,	and	capable	of	supporting	independent	communicative	flows,	forms	 the	 basis	 of	 many	 information	 liberation	 arguments.	 In	 effect,	 for	information	 hungry	 citizens,	 social	 media	 enables	 alternative	 pathways	 for	
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accessing	 information,	 many	 of	 which	 operate	 beyond	 the	 oversight	 of	formalised	media	gatekeepers.		
In	the	riot	public,	however,	situational	 information	accounts	 for	only	a	tenth	of	information	 sharing	 activity	 and	 only	 4%	 of	 all	 Twitter	 activity.	 Indeed,	 fewer	than	a	third	of	tweets	share	information	in	the	sense	that	they	report	directly	on	(or	 cite	 other	 reports	 of)	 contemporaneous	 social	 action.	 The	 vast	majority	 of	these	are	coded	as	general	information	–	that	is	information	that,	while	local	in	focus,	perhaps,	is	not	obviously	local	to	the	Twitter	user	or	his	or	her	followers.	Most	 of	 these	 report	 on,	 or	 share	 links	 to,	 information	 in	 the	 national	 media	category	 –	 national	 media,	 according	 to	 the	 coding	 system,	 is	 professional	content	provided	by	commercial	news	gathering	and	distributing	organisations.	The	 few	 situational	 reports	 that	 do	 occur	 tend	 to	 link	 to	 user	 generated	multimedia	 content	 –	 videos	 and	 photographs	 of	 riot	 activity	 or	 riot-damaged	communities.	These	multimedia	reports	are	coded	as	situational	either	because	they	appear	to	have	been	self-created	by	the	Twitter	users	or	because	they	are	hyper-local	in	focus.		
It	is	perhaps	unsurprising	that	situational	information	is	fairly	scarce	in	the	main	coding	 sample	 because	 by	Wednesday	10	August	 and	Thursday	 11	August	 the	riots	were	not	breaking	news	in	the	sense	that	they	had	been	a	few	days	earlier.	That	 is	 not	 to	 suggest	 that	 there	 was	 not	 news	 breaking	 during	 this	 period,	however.	 In	 the	early	hours	of	Wednesday	morning,	Shazad	Ali,	Abdul	Musavir	and	Haroon	Jahan	died	in	the	singularly	most	violent	and	confronting	episode	of	the	entire	riot	period	(Butt	and	Wainwright	2011).	By	this	time,	however,	several	other	things	had	happened.	First,	riot	activity	across	London	had	either	slowed	
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or	stopped	entirely;	second,	broadcast	media	had	mobilised	across	the	country,	so	that	the	riots	and	the	riot	response	had	become	a	national	media	event;	third,	emergency	 judicial	procedures	were	starting	and	 there	was	an	 increased	 focus	both	on	this	response	and	on	the	profiles	of	the	accused	rioters;	fourth,	most	riot	activity	was	highly	localised	and	happened	at	night,	which	must	have	limited	the	number	of	Twitter	users	present	to	record	situational	information.		
Another	important	observation	about	the	tweets	coded	as	‘informational’,	either	because	 they	 provide	 or	 request	 information,	 is	 that	 provision	 occurs	 almost	solely	 through	 embedded	 hyperlinks.	 Very	 few	 tweets	 are	 standalone	informational	 statements,	 and	 those	 that	 are	 tend	 to	 include	 personal	commentary	 on	 the	 information	 being	 reported.	 While	 this	 raises	 interesting	questions	 regarding	 the	 informational	 affordances	 of	 the	 140-character	restriction	for	tweets,	more	obviously	it	underlines	the	importance	of	Twitter	as	a	 linking	 and	 media-sharing	 service.	 As	 noted	 already,	 this	 complicates	 the	temporal	 and	 informational	 bounding	of	 individual	 tweets,	 but	 it	 also	 suggests	another	 possibility	 for	 analysis,	 namely	 an	 exploration	 of	 the	 relationship	between	 tweet	 purpose	 (whether	 information	 or	 rhetorical)	 and	 the	 coded	classification	of	embedded	media.		
As	 noted	 earlier,	 nearly	 two-thirds	 of	 tweets	 in	 the	main	 coding	 sample	 carry	links	to	other	media.	The	coding	system	differentiates	between	five	categories	of	media.	 An	 important	 distinction	 is	 made	 between	 citizen	 and	 national	 media	types.	In	broad	terms,	the	citizen	media	code	is	assigned	when	the	media	source	is	 a	 blog	 or	 another	 social	media	 channel	 –	 in	 other	words,	 the	 author	 of	 the	content	 is	 not	 obviously	 a	 professional	 journalist	 or	 official	 commentator	 and	
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when	the	website	is	not	obviously	a	commercial	operation.	There	is	occasionally	overlap	between	these	categories,	if	for	example	a	commercial	website	seeks	to	profit	from	volunteer	content,	as	The	Huffington	Post	does,	or	when	the	‘official’	or	professional	status	of	the	author	may	not	be	absolutely	clear.	Importantly,	the	citizen	and	national	media	codes	are	assigned	to	textual	content	only.	A	separate	multimedia	 tag	 is	 assigned	when	 the	 tweet	 links	 to	 a	 photograph	 or	 video.	 In	cases	 where	 that	 multimedia	 is	 obviously	 the	 product	 of	 citizen	 (amateur)	 or	professional	effort,	tags	are	combined.		
The	are	a	few	reasons	for	distinguishing	between	content	like	this.	First,	there	is	the	 simple	 fact	 that	 textual	 content	 seems	 to	 persist	 longer	 on	 the	 web	 than	photographs	 or	 video	 content.	 Links	 to	 textual	 content	 tend	 to	 work,	 even	several	 years	 after	 the	 initial	posting,	whereas	multimedia	 links	are	 frequently	broken	or	the	media	is	missing.	This	makes	it	very	hard	to	assess	the	thematic	or	rhetorical	 position	 of	 the	 media,	 complicating	 any	 attempt	 at	 comparative	analysis.	Second,	the	author	(and,	quite	often,	the	origin)	of	multimedia	content	is	often	difficult	to	ascertain.	Partly	because	of	the	media,	and	partly	because	of	the	 affordances	 of	 different	 media	 hosting	 services,	 photographs	 and	 video	circulate	on	Twitter	with	far	less	identifying	information	attached	to	them.	This	has	 implications	beyond	simply	classifying	authors	as	amateur	or	professional:	an	 analysis	 of	 multimedia	 tweets	 sent	 during	 hurricane	 Sandy,	 for	 instance,	found	that		that	more	than	10,000	contained	fake	images	(Gupta	et	al.	2013).	
The	 most	 frequently	 used	 codes	 are	 multimedia	 (MM:	 38%)	 	 national	 media	(NM:	29%)	and	citizen	media	 (CM:	14%),	 though	 there	 is	considerable	overlap	within	these	categories.	A	few	tweets	link	directly	to	government	websites:	two	
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in	 particular	 are	 noteworthy.	 A	 tweet	 by	 Greater	 Manchester	 Police	 (GMP)	 is	widely	 retweeted	 and	 links	 through	 to	 a	 Flickr	page,	 seemingly	 created	by	 the	GMP	in	2011	to	publish	photographs	of	suspected	rioters,	mostly	captured	from	close-circuit	television	(CCTV).	The	tweets	that	link	to	this	site	mostly	contain	an	implicit	call	to	contact	GMP	with	information	about	individual	identities	and	an	explicit	 call	 to	 retweet	 and	 circulate	 more	 widely	 (coded	 CTA	 in	 the	 Help	 &	Support	category).	Looking	more	closely	at	the	@gmpolice	account	for	the	period	in	 question,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 GMP	 were	 particularly	 active	 on	 social	 media,	using	Flickr,	Facebook	and	Twitter	to	publish	information	about	suspect	rioters	and	 to	 encourage	 citizens	 to	 “Shop	 a	 Looter”	 (@gmpolice	 2011).	 These	 social	media	 efforts	 happened	 in	 conjunction	 with	 physical	 attempts	 to	 publish	 and	circulate	photographs	of	suspected	looters:	billboards	and	advertising	vans	were	used	by	police	forces	including	the	GMP.		
Another	link	that	appears	in	several	tweets	directs	users	to	a	petition	on	the	UK	Government	 and	Parliament	 Petitions	 website	 (https://petition.parliament.uk)	for	 a	 petition	 titled	 “Convicted	 London	 rioters	 should	 loose	 [sic]	 all	 benefits”	(Parliament	2011).	The	petition	received	258,276	signatures	before	the	closing	deadline	 on	 9	 February	 2012	 and	 was	 thus	 considered	 by	 the	 Backbench	Business	 Committee	 in	 the	 House	 of	 Commons	 for	 debate	 in	 parliament.	 It	 is	relevant	 to	 note	 that	 the	 circulation	 of	 the	 link	 to	 this	 petition	 on	Twitter,	 the	relative	 frequency	 of	 the	 circulation,	 and	 the	 commentary	 and	 positional	statements	accompanying	the	link,	are	highly	suggestive	in	terms	of	the	struggle	to	signify.	These	attitudes	or	meanings	will	also	be	analysed	in	more	detail	later	in	this	chapter.			
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Initially,	 the	 coding	 system	 distinguishes	 between	 seven	 different	 types	 of	meaning-making	grouped	under	the	category	of	adjunctive	discussion.	The	name	of	 this	 category	 is	 borrowed	 from	 Bruns	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 and	 suggests	 that	discussion	 is	 somehow	 a	 secondary	 or	 subordinate	 affordance	 of	 Twitter,	 an	adjunct	 to	 the	 primary	 function	 of	 media	 sharing.	 Of	 course,	 this	 is	 not	necessarily	the	case,	not	least	because	the	act	of	media	sharing	is,	in	many	ways,	also	an	act	of	discourse.		
Some	 tweets,	 however,	 are	 generated	 automatically	 by	 blogs	 and	 websites	 to	publicise	 content.	 In	 order	 to	 be	 coded	 as	 adjunctive	 discussion,	 a	 tweet	must	demonstrate	 some	 form	of	 commentary,	 analysis	or	 rhetoric	beyond	 the	act	of	information	or	media	sharing.	It	is	notable	that	of	the	tweets	coded	as	adjunctive	discussion,	 half	 contain	 links	 to	 other	 media.	 Of	 these	 media-linking	 tweets,	approximately	20%	link	to	citizen	media	–	slightly	higher	than	the	main	sample	but	not	dramatically	so.		
Meanings	 are	 pursued	 through	 just	 one	 hyperlink,	 to	 the	media	 directly	 cited	within	 the	 tweet	 text.	 There	 are	 two	 reasons	 for	 this,	 the	 first	 of	 which	 is	practical.	It	is	already	a	significant	undertaking	to	locate	and	describe	this	media,	given	 the	 high	 percentage	 of	 tweets	 that	 include	 links.	 This	 task	 is	 performed	manually,	both	because	broken	links	and	shifting	content	complicate	any	attempt	at	 automation	 and	 because	 including	 destination	media	 in	 the	 coding	 process	requires	manual	reading.	Second,	 it	seems	more	 likely	 that	when	Twitter	users	choose	to	embed	links	in	their	tweets,	they	do	so	based	on	the	meaning	attached	to	 the	 immediate	 text,	 and	 do	 not	 think	 too	 much	 about	 the	 vast	 webs	 of	hyperlinked	meanings	embedded	 in	 that	 text.	This	 is	an	assumption,	of	 course,	
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but	 it	 seems	 like	 a	 reasonable	 assumption,	 if	 only	 because	most	 users	 do	 not	have	endless	hours	to	pursue	meanings	through	infinite	hyperlinks.	
Within	 the	 adjunctive	discussion	 category	 the	different	 codes	 are	not	mutually	exclusive,	 so	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 code	 content	 as	 both	 social	 and	 political	commentary,	or	to	temper	a	PRE	code	with	the	addition	of	a	PO	code.	PRE	is	the	code	 for	 personal	 reaction	 and	 emotion	 and,	 in	 many	 respects,	 it	 is	 the	 most	distinguishing	 code	 in	 the	 category.	 The	 difference	 between	 a	 PRE	 code	 and	personal	opinion	(PO)	is	the	emphasis	on	reaction	and	emotion	–	in	other	words,	the	PRE	 code	 is	meant	 to	distinguish	 comment	without	 consideration;	 it	 limits	the	 potential	 for	 rational	 or	 deliberative	 reconsideration.	 PRE	 is	 the	 code	 also	used	for	 tweets	that	are	discursive	but	off-topic	or	self-evidently	not	sincere	 in	their	positioning:		
“I	think	Team	India	is	planning	for	Tea	Party	#OperationCupOfTea”	
“Give	police	a	paintball	gun	and	shoot	them	all	 in	colours	that	don't	wash	off...	#Londonriots”	
“this	 is	 absolutly	 terrible.	 i	 close	 my	 eyes	 and	 pray.	 #londonriots	#prayforlondon”	
PO,	 by	 contrast,	 is	 reserved	 for	 statements	 that,	 in	 the	 simplest	 terms,	 display	some	 evidence	 of	 rationalisation	 (of	 considered	 opinion):	 they	 are	 productive	because	they	do	not	preclude	deliberative	reconsideration.		
"I	disagree	with	DC,	i	dont	think	society	is	broken,	if	anything	#riotcleanup	shows	that	its	anything	but!	And	there's	only	a	small	minority"	
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	“@username	Sadly,	ongoing	social	problems	are	rarely	considered	in	"law	and	order"	policy.	It's	all	about	the	short	term	fixes.	#ukriots”	
Often,	this	is	not	an	easy	distinction	to	make,	which	is	why	tweets	can	be	coded	PRE,	PO	to	reflect	uncertainty	about	the	productive	intent	of	the	original	author.	Intent	must	 be	 guessed,	 of	 course,	 there	 is	 no	 objective	 test	 for	 distinguishing	between	productive	and	non-productive	content.	Furthermore,	it	is	reductive		to	frame	productivity	in	binary	terms:	Twitter	users	can	hold	a	range	of	positions	in	terms	 of	 productivity,	 topicality	 and	 reason-giving.	 As	 such,	 a	 third	 code	 is	available	 in	 this	category,	 to	assign	 if	a	 tweet	–	or	 the	media	embedded	within	the	tweet	–	demonstrates	greater	thematic	engagement	with	the	key	concerns	of	the	 thesis:	 explanations	of	 rioting	 in	 a	 socio-political	 context.	A	 tweet	qualifies	for	 PC	 (political	 commentary)	 code	 if	 it	 demonstrates	 extended,	 official	 or	informed	 discussion	 of	 topics	 including	 (but	 not	 limited	 to)	 the	 causes	 of	 the	riots,	 the	 status	 or	 intent	 of	 rioters,	 the	 complicity	 of	 the	 political	 class,	 state	reaction	or	mediated	discussion.	
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Figure	10:	 bar	 chart	 displaying	 the	 relative	 frequency	 of	 different	 adjunctive	discussion	
categories.	662	codes	were	assigned	to	593	tweets.		
The	 personal	 narrative	 (PN)	 code	 is	 used	 for	 tweets	 where	 the	 scope	 of	commentary	is	limited	to	individual	experience	or	self-reflection.	The	scarcity	of	PN	 tweets	 suggests	 that	 the	 supposed	 introspective,	 self-narrating	 aspects	 of	micro-blogging	–	always,	perhaps,	more	of	a	presumption	than	an	actuality	–	are	particularly	 rare	 within	 the	 riot	 public.	 This	 lends	 credence	 to	 the	 idea	 that	certain	hashtag	cultures	are	more	deliberately	or	intentionally	public	than	others	–	the	hashtags	analysed	here	are	overwhelmingly	used	to	express	public-facing	opinions	 rather	 than	 to	 describe	 personal	 experience	 of	 the	 riots.	Of	 course,	 it	may	 also	 be	 that	 the	 riots	 were	 always	 more	 localised	 and	 sporadic	 than	 the	national	broadcast	media	portrayed	them	to	be	(Bassel	2012,	Greenslade	2012),	limiting	the	number	of	people	to	experience	them	first-hand.		
0
100
200
300
400
PRE PO PC PN DA
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Adjunctive discussion codes
	216 
The	act	of	assigning	codes	and	categorising	tweets	is	only	a	productive	exercise	if	those	 codes,	 once	 assigned,	 reveal	 something	 tangible	 and	 useful	 about	communicative	 practices	 within	 the	 riot	 public.	 Simply	 describing	 codes,	 and	explaining	 how	 they	 can	 be	 assigned,	 is	 not,	 in	 itself,	 particularly	 revelatory.	What	the	assignment	does,	however,	is	establish	foundations	for	further	enquiry.	Differentiating	 between	 tweets	 that	 simply	 share	 information	 and	 tweets	 that	contribute	adjunctive	discussion	is	an	important	first	step	because	it	is	through	adjunctive	 discussion	 that	 subjective	 meanings	 are	 traded,	 transformed	 and	assigned	value	–	at	 least	 in	 terms	of	 liminal,	public	discourse.	The	second	step,	equally	important,	is	to	explore	how	this	process	happens,	and	to	ask	whether	it	can	be	considered	productive	or	deliberative	in	democratic	terms.		
In	 order	 to	 achieve	 this,	 tweets	 undergo	 another	 round	 of	 coding	 and	 are	subjected	to	close	textual	reading.	Tweets	coded	PRE,	PO	and	PC	are	collated	and	read	closely	with	the	following	objectives:		
1. To	identify	and	to	extract	thematic	exchanges.	2. To	 evaluate	 tweet	 content	 in	 terms	 of	 productive	 and	 deliberative	potential.	
 
THEMATIC	CODING		
Thematic	coding	was	performed	on	all	tweets	that	received	an	ADJ	code	during	content	 coding.	 The	 results	 of	 thematic	 coding	 are	 displayed	 in	 figure	 10,	 in	which	 the	 initial	 ADJ	 codes	 have	 been	 reapplied,	 so	 that	 PO+PC	 tweets	 (the	productive	 sample)	 are	 displayed	 in	 purple	 and	 PRE	 tweets	 are	 displayed	 in	
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green.	 The	 height	 of	 the	 individual	 bars	 represented	 an	 adjusted	 measure	 of	frequency,	which	takes	into	account	the	total	numbers	of	codes	assigned	across	the	PO+PC	and	PRE	samples	respectively.			
	
Figure	11:	Chart	showing	the	relative	frequency	of	the	different	thematic	codes	(see	table	
4)	 assigned	 to	 tweets	 already	 coded	 as	 adjunctive	 discussion.	 The	 frequency	 scores	 are	
adjusted	so	that	the	height	of	each	column	represents	the	fraction	of	total	codes	assigned	
(rather	than	an	absolute	number).	
The	most	 common	code	assigned	across	both	 samples	 is	O	 (other,	 n=146)	 and	this	 code	 is	 assigned	 almost	 exclusively	 to	 PRE	 tweets	 (n=145).	 This	 disparity	deserves	 comment	 both	 because	 it	 suggests	 something	 interesting	 about	 how	tweets	 are	 composed	 to	 convey	meaning	 but	 also,	 of	 course,	 about	 the	 coding	methods	used	 to	distinguish	between	 tweets.	The	 large	number	of	O	 tweets	 in	the	 PRE	 sample	 is	 simply	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 logic	 applied	 during	 the	 content	coding.	Within	 the	 ADJ	 category,	 an	 attempt	was	made	 to	 identify	 tweets	 that	
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made	considered,	riot-specific	comments	(PO	+	PC).	It	is	hardly	surprising	that	in	the	 subsequent	 thematic	 analysis,	 those	 tweets	 return	 more	 focused	 thematic	engagement.	What	 is	 potentially	more	 notable,	 however,	 is	 that	 the	 difference	between	productive	and	non-productive	content	was	supposedly	determined	by	the	type	of	engagement	(emotional	versus	rational)	rather	than	the	topicality	of	that	engagement.			
This	 suggests	 two	 things.	 First,	 clearly,	 it	 is	worth	 looking	more	 closely	 at	 the	other	 codes.	 So	 many	 PRE	 tweets	 fall	 into	 this	 category,	 it	 is	 important	 to	ascertain	whether	 this	 is	 simply	 a	mass	 of	 unfocused	 emotive	 expression	 or	 if	there	 are	 more	 nuanced	 communicative	 practices	 happening	 that	 were	overlooked	 in	 the	 initial	content	parsing.	Second,	depending	on	the	outcome	of	this	 closer	 inspection,	 the	O	 code	may	 suggest	 that	 the	original	 content	 coding	achieved	 precisely	 what	 it	 was	 meant	 to	 achieve,	 in	 that	 it	 has	 differentiated	between	riot-specific	meaning-making	in	a	potentially	productive	or	deliberative	context,	 and	 less	 focused,	 less	 political	 communicative	 practices	 that	 just	happened	 to	 be	 attached	 to	 the	 same	 hashtag.	 In	 short,	 it	 suggests	 that	 the	distinction	 between	 PRE	 and	 PO+PN	 tweets	 is	 a	 distinction	 worth	 making,	though	 it	 will	 be	 necessary	 to	 also	 consider	 how	 the	 different	 hashtags	 are	distributed	between	the	categories.			
The	 full	 list	 of	 coded	 tweets	 (content	 and	 thematic)	 is	 available	 in	 appendix	C,	including	 the	 O	 coded	 PRE	 tweets.	 It	 shows	 that	 this	 code	 has	 been	 applied	across	 a	 range	 of	 speech	 acts	 and	 Twitter-specific	 activity.	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	summarise	 or	 to	 categorise	 them	 in	 any	 logical	 or	 consistent	 way.	 What	 this	suggests,	of	course,	is	that	Twitter	supports	a	range	of	communicative	practices	
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and	that	deliberation	and	reasoning	account	for	only	a	fraction	of	these	different	expressive	moments.	Indeed,	given	the	character	limitations	of	the	Twitter	form,	it	 is	 perhaps	 a	 little	 surprising	 that	 quite	 so	 many	 tweets	 manage	 to	 focus	thematically.			
Across	 the	 other	 thematic	 codes,	 a	 pattern	 emerges.	 Unsurprisingly,	 there	 is	generally	more	thematic	engagement	in	the	productive	(PO	+	PC)	sample	than	in	the	PRE	sample,	because	this	separation	is	exactly	what	the	content	coding	was	meant	 to	 achieve.	 Tweets	 coded	 as	 personal	 opinion	 (PO)	 or	 personal	commentary	(PC)	focus	on	several	themes:	the	social	complexity	of	the	riots,	the	difficulty	of	formulating	a	response	and	cross-social	responsibility	for	the	riots	–	especially	 the	complicity	of	 the	political	and	professional	class	 in	setting	moral	and	social	norms.		
There	are	 a	 couple	of	 reversals	 to	 this	pattern,	however.	 First,	 two	 codes,	COP	and	 SOL,	 are	 relatively	 more	 frequent	 in	 the	 PRE	 sample	 than	 in	 the	 PO+PC	sample.	 COP	 tweets	 include	 claims	 or	 comments	 about	 the	 police,	 either	 as	 a	generic	institutional	entity	or	in	terms	of	individual	police	forces.	There	are	not	many	of	these	tweets,	and	they	include	both	expressions	of	recommendation	or	support	for	police	tactics,	especially	violent	ones	,	but	also	concerns	about	police	activity.	
“http://lockerz.com/s/128298401		
The	police	are	kicking	ass.	
#Birminghamriots	#Londonriots		
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#Liverpoolriots”	
“looks	like	another	quiet	night	on	the	#londonriots	front.		Well	done	police	I	say.		loads	of	them	around	by	us...”	
“you	dont	fuck	with	the	GMP	or	the	GMP	fuck	with	you	http://t.co/sm2JQXs	#manchesterriots”	
"Will	any	MP	mention	the	IPCC	&	most	people's	belief	it	is	not	independent	from	Met?	#londonriots	#ukriots	#Cameron"	
SOL	 tweets	 express	 solidarity,	most	 often	with	 victims	of	 rioting	 but	 also	with	efforts	 to	restore	order	and	to	clear	up	after	 the	riots.	Within	 this	category	the	role	 of	 the	 #OperationCupOfTea	 hashtag	 is	 worth	 note.	 A	 Twitter-specific	campaign,	 #OperationCupOfTea	 began	 with	 a	 tweet	 from	 a	 YouTube	 video	blogger	 called	 Sam	 Pepper,	 who	 had	 over	 200,000	 followers,	 establishing	 the	hashtag	as	an	anti-riot	campaign:	
“nearly	3,000	people	supporting	our	anit-riot	campaign	by	drinking	tea	at	8.30pm	 show	 your	 support	 here	 >>	http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=261568193854371	 …	#londonriots”	
Whether	or	not	this	is	type	of	campaign	qualifies	as	legitimate	political	activism	–	or	slacktivism	(Gladwell	2010)	–	it	appears	as	though	the	hashtag,	if	nothing	else,	afforded	other	Twitter	users	a	way	of	collectivising	an	identity	 in	opposition	to	the	rioters	–	one	that	emphasised	an	imagined	British	stoicism	in	the	face	of	the	
	221 
rioting	and	served,	in	certain	respects,	to	define	a	normative	group	in	opposition	to	the	homogenous	rioters.		
"I've	decided	to	join	in	with	#OperationCupOfTea	what	else	is	there	to	do	when	the	world	is	in	a	mess!!!!!"	
“#OperationCupOfTea	 A	 very	 British	 way	 of	 handling	 things!	http://t.co/btHTYkC”	
"#OperationCupOfTea	 and	 #riotcleanup	 are	 trending,	 that's	 really	 good	:)"	
	Solidarity	codes	were	also	assigned	to	several	tweets	expressing	dismay	at	the	deaths	 of	 Shazad	 Ali,	 Abdul	 Musavir	 and	 Haroon	 Jahan	 in	 Birmingham	 in	 the	early	hours	of	Wednesday	morning.	Many	of	these	tweets	express	sympathy	for	the	men	and	their	families.		
Also	more	 common	 in	 the	PRE	 sample	 are	RAO	 tweets,	 so	 coded	because	 they	place	 the	 rioters	outside	of	 the	 individual	Twitter	user’s	 own	 social	 and	moral	collective.	 Tweets	 coded	 as	 RAO	 were	 typified	 by	 derision,	 type-casting	 (all	rioters	are	the	same),	anger,	frustration	and,	often,	confusion.	They	include	many	examples	of	the	types	listed	below:	
"Give	police	a	paintball	gun	and	shoot	them	all	 in	colours	that	don't	wash	off...	#Londonriots"	
“i	 keep	 hearing	 about	 all	 the	 #londonriots	 blokes	 calling	 themselves	"freedom	fighters"	and	all	i	can	think	of	is	Braveheart	but	w/	chavs”	
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“Chav	 of	 the	 week	 award?	 http://t.co/ii8lHpw	 Bloody	 morons	 the	 lot	 of	them	#londonriots”	
"seriously....	one	person	in	the	dock	this	morning	was	a	31	year	old	teacher	for	looting	richer	sounds	Croydon?!	Can't	be	right	#londonriots”	
“Some	of	 the	 sentences	 for	 rioters,	4mths,	3mths,	8mths,	10weeks,	Wot	a	big	FUCK	U	from	the	govt	to	the	innocent	people	affected	#londonriots”	
“UK	 PM	 considers	 banning	 suspected	 rioters	 from	 social	 media	http://t.co/jytQVaK	#londonriots	 agree	w/	 revoking	 benefits,but	 not	 free	speech”	
"RT	 @username:	 Brendan	 O'Neill	 says	 there's	 nothing	 political	 about	#LondonRiots,	which	are	being	carried	out	by	a	mollycoddled	mob	h	...”	
'"Riots	 were	 best	 protest	 ever"	 moron	 on	 #bbcnews	 re	 #ukriots.	 What	proves	is	they	got	some	free	stuff	&	don't	understand	the	word	"protest"'	
What	all	the	RAO	tweets	have	in	common	is	an	attempt	to	externalise	the	rioters,	perhaps	through	the	juxtaposition	of	the	pronouns	us	and	them,	or	through	the	diagnosis	of	collective	fault	or	responsibility.	Within	these	tweets	there	is	also	a	marked	 homogenisation	 of	 rioters,	 a	 supposition	 that	 all	 receive	 “benefits”	 or	state	welfare	or	are	“chavs”	or	even,	in	the	words	of	one	Daily	Mail	commentator:	“They	are	essentially	wild	beasts”	 (Hastings	2011).	What	many	of	 these	 tweets	also	share	is	that	they	reduce	any	complexity	of	rioting	behaviour,	as	though	to	recognise	nuance	or	uncertainty	would	be	in	some	way	to	legitimise	or	to	excuse	rioting.	In	some	respects,	these	tweets	echo	the	language	of	Prime	Minister	David	
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Cameron,	 who	 sought	 to	 portray	 rioting	 as	 “criminality	 pure	 and	 simple”	(Cameron	2011a,	 b).	 In	 another,	 they	 are	 reflective	 of	 a	 far	deeper,	 ideological	condemnation	of	the	rioters:		
“An	 underclass	 has	 existed	 throughout	 history,	 which	 once	 endured	appalling	privation.	 Its	 spasmodic	 outbreaks	 of	 violence,	 especially	 in	 the	early	 19th	 century,	 frightened	 the	 ruling	 classes.	 Its	 frustrations	 and	passions	were	kept	at	bay	by	force	and	draconian	legal	sanctions,	foremost	among	them	capital	punishment	and	transportation	to	the	colonies.	Today,	those	 at	 the	bottom	of	 society	 behave	no	better	 than	 their	 forebears,	 but	the	welfare	state	has	relieved	them	from	hunger	and	real	want.”	(Hastings	2011).	
The	 significance	of	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 type	of	 emotive	 expression	 in	the	PRE	sample	and	the	concentration	of	RAO	tweets	remains	to	be	seen.	For	a	liberal	 reviewer	 it	 is	 tempting	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 condemnation	 and	externalisation	of	rioters	is	inherently	less	considered,	productive	or	rational.	At	this	stage,	however,	such	a	conclusion	would	be	premature.		
It	is	true,	however,	that	tweets	emphasising	the	social	complexity	of	rioting	tend	to	group	in	the	productive	sample	rather	than	the	PRE	sample	and	tend,	also,	to	include	more	in	the	way	of	detailed	analysis	or	commentary.	The	SOC	code	was	assigned	128	times	to	tweets	in	the	productive	sample,	and	there	are	another	48	examples	 of	 Twitter	 users	 assigning	 some	 responsibility	 for	 the	 riots	 to	 the	political	and	professional	classes.	It	is	also	the	case	that	169		(64%)	tweets	in	the	productive	sample	contained	links	to	external	media,	whereas	only	95	(29%)	did	
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in	 the	 PRE	 sample.	While	many	 of	 the	 SOC	 tweets	 depend	 on	 their	 embedded	media	to	articulate	fully	a	critical	position,	others	do	so	wholly	within	the	tweet:	
"I	disagree	with	DC,	i	dont	think	society	is	broken,	if	anything	#riotcleanup	shows	that	its	anything	but!	And	there's	only	a	small	minority"	
"Violence	won't	end	anyone's	disenfranchisement,	it	only	gives	the	powers	that	be	an	excuse	to	ignore	&	not	resolve	legit	grievances	#ukriots"	
"KidsCo	 Camila	 making	 interesting	 point	 about	 use	 of	 war	 language	 by	politicians.	Reminds	me	Bush's	war	on	terror	rhetoric	#bbcqt	#UKRiots"	
'"Part	of	 the	problem	 is	absent	 fathers"Cameron	 is	 talkin	rubbish!	 I	know	plenty	of	children	without	dads	but	they	dont	loot	shops!	#UKriots'	
Other	 tweets	emphasise	or	support	an	argument	being	made	elsewhere	on	 the	Web:	
"He's	 got	 this	 spot	 on.	 #londonriots	 #manchesterriots	 #liverpoolriots	#BirminghamRiots	#riots		http://t.co/2ZUOB9K"	
“An	excellent	read	for	both	left	and	right.	UK	riots:	political	classes	see	what	they	want	to	see	http://t.co/WAbaB6v	#ukriots”	
“Over	1000	Arrested	in	UK	as	Anger	over	Inequality,	#Racism	Boils	Ovr	into	"Insurrection"	http://t.co/gR6cvJY	via	@username	#LondonRiots”	
The	assignment	of	PRE,	PO	or	PC	codes	depends	upon	the	individual	reviewer’s	reading	of	a	tweet	and	his	or	her	interpretation	of	the	coding	criteria.	The	media	codes,	 however,	 are	 a	 far	 more	 objective	measure:	 either	 a	 tweet	 includes	 an	
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embedded	 link	 or	 it	 does	 not	 –	 there	 is	 no	 room	 for	 reviewer	 interpretation.	What	 is	 clear,	 then,	 from	 comparing	 those	 tweets	 that	 do	 contain	 embedded	links,	 is	 that	 relatively	 few	 of	 the	 embedded	 texts	 are	 constructing	 arguments	within	the	RAO,	RED	or	LC	codes.	In	other	words,	the	writers,	commentators	and	citizens	 cited	 by	 Twitter	 users	within	 their	 tweets	 tend	 to	 be	 arguing	 that	 the	riots	 are	 a	 complex	 phenomenon	 with	 complex	 social	 and	 moral	 causes.	 It	 is	indicative	 of	 the	 somewhat	 entrenched	 roles	 within	 the	 British	 public	 sphere	that	 RAO	 arguments,	when	 they	 do	 appear,	 tend	 to	 be	 being	made	 by	writers	working	 for	 traditional	 right	wing	 newspapers,	 such	 as	 the	Daily	Mail	 and	 the	Telegraph.	 It	 is	 also	 notable	 that	 the	 tweets	 that	 share	 these	 texts	 are	 not	necessarily	supportive	of	the	RAO	position.		
“@username	instead	@number10gov	seems	intent	on	ignoring	lessons	and	playing	to	the	Daily	Mail	agenda	http://t.co/wtKp3zH	#riots”	
“#DamianThompson	 of	 #Telegraph	 is	 #RACIST	 http://t.co/I4E1NsM	#Londonriots	Libya,	#Africa,”	
“RT	@username:	Max	Hastings	seems	to	think	that	the	riots	were	caused	by	people	having	sex	with	animals.	http://t.co/ZPg1sJ0		#riots	...”	
The	distribution	of	thematic	codes	across	content	categories	is	a	product	of	both	Twitter	 users’	 communicative	 preferences	 and	 the	 experimental	 method	 by	which	 those	 tweets	 are	 coded	 into	 categories.	 This	 limits	 how	 much	 can	 be	concluded	 from	 the	 different	 associations	 between	 codes	 across	 categories.	 It	does	seem,	however,	that	there	are	different	forms	of	communicative	expression	taking	place	(different	forms	of	meaning–making	)	and	that	these	different	forms	
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cluster	 around	 thematic	 streams.	 The	 exact	 nature	 of	 this	 clustering	 requires	further	exploration,	but	really	it	should	not	be	surprising.	The	flow	metaphor	is	useful	for	capturing	the	fluidity	and	the	unpredictability	of	the	mediasphere,	but	a	limiting	aspect	of	the	metaphor	is	that	it	 	is	flattening:	it	implies	an	equal	and	indiscriminate	 potential	 for	 movement	 across	 the	 system,	 so	 that	 any	information	can	flow	anywhere	at	any	time	through	any	channel.	
Even	 a	 cursory	 examination	 reveals	 that	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case.	 Culture	 and	meanings	concentrate	in	groups	(Potts	and	Hartley	2014),	in	institutions	(Lewis	2005)	 in	practices	and	performances.	The	question	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	whether	or	not	meanings	 also	 concentrate	 in	 response	 to	 software	 –	 temporally,	 spatially	and	structurally.		
Figure	 12:	 Graph	 showing	 the	 distribution	 of	 coded	 tweets	 across	 the	 seven	 major	
hashtags.			
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The	temporal	and	spatial	dynamics	of	clustering	are	still	 to	be	explored,	but	by	comparing	thematic	and	content	codes,	it	is	possible	to	say	something	about	the	structural	 distribution	 of	 meanings.	 Figure	 11	 below	 shows	 the	 relative	frequency	 of	 different	 hashtags	 across	 all	 1002	 tweets	 selected	 for	 content	coding.		
In	 figures	 13	 and	 14,	 the	 same	 seven	 hashtags	 are	 displayed	 but	 these	 two	graphs	are	based	on	the	ADJ	category	only,	and	within	that	category	PRE	tweets	are	differentiated	from	PO+PN	tweets.	For	each	hashtag	in	each	graph,	there	are	two	columns.	The	purple	column	displays	the	observed	frequency	of	the	hashtag	within	 the	 sample;	 the	 green	 column	 displays	 the	 frequency	 that	 would	 be	expected	 based	 on	 the	 relative	 frequency	 of	 hashtags	 in	 the	 total	 sample.	 In	theory,	 if	 there	 is	no	 relationship	between	hashtags	and	 the	 type	of	 adjunctive	discussion,	 then	 there	 should	 be	 no	 difference	 between	 the	 heights	 of	 the	 two	columns.	 If	 there	 is	a	difference,	 then	 it	 suggests	 that	 the	relationship	between	hashtags	 and	 the	 type	 of	 discussion	 is	 not	 random:	 perhaps	 something	 more	complex	is	happening.		
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Figure	13:	The	graph	shows	the	difference	between	the	observed	and	expected	frequency	
of	 the	 seven	 major	 hashtags	 within	 tweets	 coded	 as	 productive	 adjunctive	 discussion.	
Expected	 values	 are	 calculated	 based	 on	 the	 frequency	 of	 each	 hashtag	 in	 the	 coding	
sample	(n=1000).				
It	 is	 possible	 to	 quantify	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 height	 of	 the	 purple	 and	 green	columns	beyond	a	visual	interpretation.	A	simple	chi	squared	test	can	assess	the	differences	 between	 observed	 and	 expected	 values	 across	 the	 hashtags:	 the	calculation	 of	 that	 chi	 squared	 test	 is	 available	 in	 table	 form	 in	 appendix	D.	 It	suggests	 that	 there	 is	a	 significant	 relationship	between	 the	hashtag	categories	and	 the	 PRE	 and	 PO+N	 categories	 (Χ2	 =	 50.72).	 Considering	 hashtags	individually,	 the	#UKRiots	appears	to	be	dramatically	under-represented	in	the	PRE	 sample	 and	 over-represented	 in	 the	 PO+C	 sample.	 This	 suggests	 the	possibility	 that	 #UKRiots	 may	 be	 being	 used	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	 significantly	
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different	 from	 the	 other	 major	 hashtags	 within	 the	 riot	 public:	 to	 support	meaning-making	 practices	 that	 are	 more	 productive	 and	 more	 engaged	 than	those	observed	in	the	majority	of	tweets.		
Figure	14:	The	graph	shows	the	difference	between	the	observed	and	expected	frequency	
of	 the	 seven	 major	 hashtags	 within	 tweets	 coded	 as	 emotional	 adjunctive	 discussion.	
Expected	 values	 are	 calculated	 based	 on	 the	 frequency	 of	 each	 hashtag	 in	 the	 coding	
sample	(n=1000).				
To	further	explore	this	possibility,	a	comparative	analysis	is	performed	on	those	tweets	 within	 the	 PRE	 (n=75)	 and	 PO+C	 (n=109)	 samples	 that	 contain	 the	#UKRiots	 hashtag.	 The	 main	 purpose	 of	 this	 analysis	 is	 to	 explore	 how	 the	thematic	codes	are	distributed	under	the	#UKRiots	tag	in	the	two	samples.	There	are	two	steps	to	this	simple	comparison.	First,	the	#UKRiots	tweets	are	extracted	from	 the	 two	 samples	 and	 second	 the	 frequency	 of	 the	 different	 codes	 is	
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analysed	 within	 each	 set	 of	 #UKRiots	 tweets.	 The	 graph	 in	 figure	 14	 displays	these	relative	frequencies	of	the	different	thematic	codes	side	by	side	for	the	two	samples.		
Figure	15:	a	comparative	analysis	of	 thematic	concerns	 in	 the	productive	and	emotional	
adjunctive	discussion	samples.	
While	 it	 appears	 that	 this	 graph	 is	 superficially	 similar	 to	 the	 thematic	 graph	computed	 for	 all	 hashtags,	 there	 are	 some	 subtle	 but	 significant	 differences.		While	there	are	still	differences	between	the	SOC,	RAO	and	O	column	pairs,	these	differences	are	less	extreme.	So	for	instance,	the	difference	between	the	relative	frequency	of	the	SOC	code	is	approximately	0.2	(0.32-0.13)	and	the	difference	in	the	 RAO	 code	 is	 0.1.	 Across	 all	 hashtags,	 these	 differences	 are	 0.32	 and	 0.19	respectively.	In	other	words,	across	the	productive	and	non-productive	samples,	#UKRiots	tweets	are	more	similar	thematically	than	any	other	hashtag.		
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	Could	 this	 finding	 imply	 that	 of	 all	 the	 hashtags	 observed,	 #UKRiots	 is	 used	more	 for	 productive	 discussion,	 analysis	 and	 commentary?	 This	 in	 turn	might	imply	 the	existence	of	hashtag	 cultures:	 the	 construction	and	differentiation	of	meaning-making	practices	within	Twitter’s	structural	 layers.	Unfortunately,	 the	implications	of	these	observations	are	truly	difficult	to	assess.	It	is	not	known,	for	instance,	 whether	 these	 decimal	 differences	 in	 relative	 frequencies	 are	 in	 any	way	significant	in	terms	of	actual	discourse	–	they	could	simply	be	artifices	of	the	coding	 and	 categorisation	 processes.	 What	 is	 interesting	 though	 is	 that	 when	examined	 from	 a	 variety	 or	 perspectives,	 it	 does	 appear	 that	 meaning	 is	 not	uniformly	 or	 flatly	 distributed	 on	 Twitter.	 To	 explore	 this	 distribution	 further	still,	and	to	fully	examine	the	implications	for	deliberative	democratic	models,	a	closer	 and	 more	 specific	 reading	 of	 communicative	 practices	 within	 tweets	 is	necessary.		
	
DESCRIBING	THE	DELIBERATIVENESS	OF	TWEETS	
Tweets	were	 coded	on	an	 individual	basis	 and	as	 in	earlier	 coding	 rounds,	 the	tweet	was	defined	to	include	both	the	tweet	object	and	the	primary	destination	of	any	links	embedded	within	that	object.	In	all	cases,	a	reasonable	attempt	was	made	to	retrieve	text	and	multimedia	content	from	links	but	broken	or	missing	links	were	excluded	from	coding:	no	attempt	was	made	to	approximate	or	to	re-create	missing	content.	Only	certain	coding	questions	could	be	answered	based	on	 the	 destination	 text,	 however.	 Reviewers	were	 instructed	 to	 award	 a	 point	score	 for	 question	 1,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 destination	 text	 articulated	 a	 moral	 or	
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political	position,	but	could	not	be	used	as	evidence	of	assumed	comprehension	(question	2).	The	existence	of	the	link	could	be	counted	as	evidence	of	external	knowledge	for	question	3.	
The	logic	behind	this	approach	is	simple.	Deliberative	coding	aims	to	assess	the	commitment	 to	 deliberation	 of	 Twitter	 users	 rather	 than	 the	 distribution	 of	deliberative	texts	more	widely	on	the	web.	As	such,	the	personal	voice	or	active	engagement	 of	 the	 Twitter	 user	 is	 paramount.	 It	 would	 be	 inappropriate,	 for	instance,	 for	a	tweet	to	score	full	points	based	on	a	nuanced	political	argument	made	 by	 a	 newspaper	 columnist,	 which	 appears	 on	 Twitter	 only	 through	automated	forwarding	or	 flagging	services.	 In	such	a	case,	 there	would	be	 little	evidence	that	the	text	contributed	to	the	deliberative	practices	of	human	Twitter	users	within	the	riot	public.		
Consequently,	 at	 some	point	 in	 the	 coding,	 there	needs	 to	be	an	assessment	of	the	user’s	own	engagement	with	the	position	being	stated	within	the	tweet.	That	point	 is	 located	 in	 question	 2.	 In	 order	 to	 demonstrate	 comprehension,	 the	Twitter	user	must	represent	him	or	herself	in	relation	to	the	position	somehow	in	the	tweet	text.	To	illustrate,	consider	the	following	two	tweets.			
“A	 different	 take	 on	 the	 #londonriots.	 PLEASE	 NOTE:	 not	 my	 view.	http://t.co/gj5iora”	
“Excellent	commentary	on	the	#UKRiots:	"People	with	a	job,	a	home	and	a	future	don't	riot."	---&gt;	http://bit.ly/nOfDjT”	
There	is	inevitably	difficulty	is	deciding	whether	or	not	there	is	sufficient	in	the	tweet	text	to	signify	that	the	Twitter	user	commends	or	supports	a	position,	but	
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in	 both	 of	 the	 above	 examples	 a	 personal	 statement	 is	 clearly	 attached	 to	 the	link-sharing	syntax.	In	other	tweets,	the	lack	of	personal	voice	is	relatively	clear.		
“Blog	 post	 on	 the	 riots	 -	 The	 England	 Riots	 http://t.co/npmT3cr	#riotcleanup	#OperationCupOfTea	#Riots”		
In	this	tweet	the	attached	text	“Blog	post	on	the	riots”	reveals	nothing	about	the	user’s	positioning	in	this	context.	In	some	tweets,	however,	the	attachment	of	a	position	to	support	comprehension	is	less	clear.		
“My	 view	 on	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 England	 riots	 available	 on	 my	 blog	 -	http://t.co/RgTI5fc	Just	a	sign	of	things	to	come?	#ukriots”	
The	 question	 is	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 phrase	 “Just	 a	 sign	 of	 things	 to	 come?”	attaches	the	user	to	the	positioning	in	the	link	in	such	a	way	as	to	score	a	point	for	question	2.	Taking	the	tweet	text	at	 face	value,	 this	a	 link	to	the	user’s	own	blog,	 and	as	 such	 it	 seems	 sensible	 to	assume	 that	he	or	 she	 comprehends	 the	arguments	being	made	there.	However,	these	codes	are	intended	to	evaluate	the	commitment	to	deliberation	on	Twitter	and,	as	such,	personal	voice	is	required	to	be	 Twitter	 specific.	 As	 such,	 this	 tweet	 fails	 to	 score	 a	 point	 for	 question	 2,	because	 the	 comprehension/articulation	 of	 the	 political/moral	 position	 is	 not	made	within	the	tweet	itself.			
"I	say	'#ukriots'	-	Scotland	doesn't	have	a	Tory	administration.	Things	seem	pretty	quiet	up	here	so	far.	#maybenotunrelated"	
The	 above	 tweet	 scores	 three	 on	 the	 coding	 scale	 because	 it	 satisfies	 every	criteria	except	the	call	to	empirical	evidence	or	cultural	knowledge.	It	combines	a	
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rhetorical	point	with	tweet-specific	syntax.	First,	there	is	a	comment	on	national	politics	 that	 implies	 that	 the	 riots,	 at	 least	 in	part,	have	a	political	 explanation.	Second,	 and	 linked	 to	 this	 first	 point,	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 political	 statement	 being	made	 within	 the	 tweet	 –	 that	 the	 Tory	 administration	 (and,	 by	 extension	presumably,	 its	 policies	 and	 practices)	 are,	 in	 some	 way,	 an	 explanation	 for	rioting	in	England.	The	absence	of	a	Tory	administration	in	Scotland	is	linked	to	the	absence	of	rioting	via	an	appropriated	hashtag:	#maybenotunrelated.	There	is	 nothing	 in	 the	 tweet	 text	 to	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	 not	 appropriate	 given	 the	prevailing	 (normative)	 culture	 of	 the	 (deliberative)	 riot	 public.	 	 A	 point	 is	withheld	 for	question	3	but	 there	 is	a	 case	 that	a	 call	 to	external	knowledge	 is	being	made:	through	the	factual	statement	about	the	Scottish	administration,	the	suggestion	that	other	users	reflect	upon	what	constitutes	a	‘Tory	administration’	or,	 indeed,	why	 such	 an	 administration	might	 cause	 rioting.	 For	 this	 reviewer,	these	calls	to	external	knowledge	are	not	sufficiently	explicit	to	warrant	a	point	for	this	criteria.		
The	 results	 of	 the	 deliberative	 coding	 exercise	 are	 part	 of	 the	 spread	 sheet	included	 in	 appendix	 C.	 In	 the	 summary	 document,	 the	 hashtag,	 content	 and	thematic	codes	are	all	displayed	together.	There	is	a	significant	difference	in	the	mean	 deliberative	 scores	 between	 the	 PRE	 and	 PO+C	 content	 categories.	 PRE	tweets,	 which	 are	 those	 that	 were	 originally	 coded	 as	 emotive	 or	 reactive	average	1.7	on	the	deliberative	coding	scale.	The	PO+C	tweets	average	2.9.	The	difference	is	unlikely	to	have	arisen	by	chance	(z	=	22.7,	p	<	0.0001).		
The	more	relevant	comparative	analysis	is	between	the	thematic	and	structural	dynamics	 represented	 within	 the	 sample;	 an	 exploration	 of	 these	 dynamics	
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requires	a	repeat	of	the	steps	followed	in	the	previous	section.	For	this	analysis,	no	 distinction	 is	 made	 between	 PRE	 and	 PO+C	 tweets:	 that	 is	 a	 distinction	imposed	on	the	dataset	by	the	coding	process,	it	is	superseded	now	by	the	more	specific	deliberative	scores.		
First,	the	600	tweets	were	sorted	into	hashtag	sets	and	mean	deliberative	scores	were	calculated	for	each	hashtag.	The	results	of	those	calculations	are	displayed	in	figure	16.		
Figure	16:	mean	deliberative	scores	for	each	hashtag	(maximum	score	=		4).	
Next,	 mean	 deliberative	 scores	 were	 calculated	 for	 the	 different	 thematic	concerns	 (no	distinction	 is	made	 for	hashtags).	A	 tweet	 can	 receive	more	 than	one	 thematic	code	–	 it	may	deal	with	both	 the	complex	causes	of	 the	riots	and	critique	neoliberal	orthodoxy,	 for	 instance,	so	there	 is	some	double-counting	of	tweets	 within	 the	mean	 calculations.	 Results	 for	 this	 process	 are	 displayed	 in	figure	17.		
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Figure	17:	mean	deliberative	scores	for	the	thematic	concern	categories	(maximum	score	
=	4).	
It	 appears	 that	 deliberativeness,	 like	 meaning	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 is	 not	uniformly	 distributed	 across	 the	 riot	 public.	 Some	 hashtags	 are	 more	deliberative	 than	others,	 and	certain	 themes	appear	 to	attract	 specific	 types	of	discussion.	 It	 is	unsurprising,	 for	 instance,	 that	expressions	of	solidarity	should	score	 relatively	 low	 in	 the	deliberative	 coding	 –	 after	 all,	 such	 expressions	 are	not	contributions	to	deliberation	–	but	it	is	perhaps	more	significant	that	tweets	coded	 RAO	 should	 also	 score	 quite	 so	 poorly.	 Indeed,	 the	 graph	 in	 figure	 17	suggests	 that	 the	 most	 deliberative	 discussion	 is	 taking	 place	 around	 the	complexity	 of	 causation,	 the	 influence	 of	 neoliberal	 materialism	 and	 the	behaviour	of	the	political	and	professional	classes.		
Indeed,	if	the	y	axis	in	the	above	graph	was	a	scale	of	liberal	political	values,	then	
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the	 thematic	 codes	might	well	be	ordered	 similarly.	Of	 course,	 this	may	 reflect	the	 subjectivity	 of	 the	 coders,	 but	 it	may	 also	 imply	 that	 different	 subjects	 are	discussed	 in	 different	 ways,	 and	 that	 deliberative	 practices	 are	 particularly	dependent	 on	 the	 preferences	 and	 attitudes	 of	 the	 Twitter	 users	 engaging	 in	discussion.	
Replicating	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 previous	 section,	 the	 #UKRiots	 hashtag	 is	judged	the	most	deliberative.	The	sample	sizes	are	large	enough	here	to	ensure	that	the	differences	between	hashtags	are	unlikely	to	be	chance	happenings	(e.g.	#UKRiots	vs	#LondonRiots,	z	=	2.71,	p	<	0.01).	Rather	the	relative	scores	of	the	different	 hashtags	 are	 likely	 either	 to	 be	 artifices	 of	 the	 coding	 process,	 or	indicators	 of	 genuinely	 different	 meaning-making	 practices	 under	 different	hashtags.		
There	are	two	reasons	to	be	optimistic	that	the	latter	is	the	case.	First,	there	is	a	logic	to	this	conclusion:	different	hashtags	are	associated	with	different	thematic	content.	Even	 if	a	 liberal	 reviewer	scored	 the	deliberativeness	of	 liberal	 tweets	more	 highly,	 there	 remain	 real	 differences	 between	 the	 content	 and	 focus	 of	hashtags.	This	implies	that	hashtags	are	being	used	differently	and	intentionally	–	they	are	not	arbitrary	signifiers	–	and	so	it	makes	sense	that	certain	hashtags	might	 appeal	 to	 users	wanting	 to	 engage	 in	deliberative	 exchange.	 Second,	 the	content	 and	 the	 deliberative	 coding	 was	 performed	 independently	 and	 a	reasonable	 attempt	 was	 made	 to	 blind	 reviewers	 to	 any	 association	 between	these	coding	practices.		
The	 results	 of	 the	 deliberative	 coding	 make	 sense	 in	 light	 of	 the	 content	 and	thematic	coding.	The	#UKRiots	hashtag	was	over-represented	in	the	productive	
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sample;	the	same	hashtag	scores	the	highest	in	terms	of	deliberative	coding;	the	SOC	 thematic	 code	was	 also	over-represented	 in	 the	productive	 sample	 and	 in	the	deliberative	coding	tweets	dealing	with	the	social	complexity	of	the	riots	also	scored	highly.	In	short,	then,	it	appears	that	within	the	riot	public,	both	meaning	and	deliberativeness	concentrate	around	certain	subjects	and	certain	structural	affordances.	The	challenge,	of	course,	is	to	explain	why	this	might	happen.		
	
DESCRIBING	TWITTER	TIME-SPACE	
It	 is	 important	 to	 continue	 to	emphasise	 the	 roles	 that	 the	 software,	 the	users,	the	 API	 and	 the	 researcher	 all	 play	 in	 constructing	 these	 representations	 of	temporality.	 The	 task	 ahead	 is	 not	 to	 determine	 which	 measure	 is	 the	 best	approximation	of	Twitter’s	 true	temporality;	rather	the	task	 is	 to	explore	these	different	 interpretations	 of	 temporal	 representation	 and	 to	 identify	 which	 is	most	appropriate	for	the	analysis	–	to	define	a	specific	and	credible	framework	through	which	temporality	might	influence	communicative	democracy.			
At	 baseline,	 there	 were	 43,997	 geo-located	 tweets,	 under	 1%	 (0.94	 %	 to	 be	precise).	The	tweets	were	plotted	on	the	map	in	figure	1.	The	map	in	figure	18	makes	use	of	the	same	baseline	data,	but	instead	of	simply	mapping	each	tweet,	it	applies	a	clustering	algorithm,	which	overlays	a	colour	gradient	to	differentiate	between	areas	of	 high	 and	 low-tweet	density.	 Clustering	 analysis	 is	 performed	using	 the	open	source	geospatial	 software	QGIS.	First,	 it	 calculates	a	 clustering	coefficient	 –	 effectively	 a	measure	 of	 the	 distance	 between	 tweets	 –	 and	 then	shades	the	map	differently	based	on	this	clustering	measure.	The	more	densely	
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tweets	 are	 clustered,	 the	more	 the	 shading	 changes	 from	blue	 to	 red.	 It	 shows	clustering	in	the	United	States	and	in	the	United	Kingdom	especially,	with	Brazil	and	South	East	Asia	providing	other	areas	of	dense	Twitter	activity.		
	
Figure	18:	a	map	of	geo-located	 tweets	 in	 the	API	sample.	Areas	of	denser	 tweet	activity	
are	coloured	red.		
There	were	only	216	geo-located	tweets	that	contained	the	key	word	‘riot’	(the	crudest	but	most	inclusive	measure	of	the	riot	public).	Whereas	the	baseline	map	suggests	 that	 geo-located	 tweeting	 is	 a	 common	 practice	 in	 only	 a	 few	 areas,	those	areas	are	spread	across	continents,	at	least	to	the	extent	that	there	are	red	areas	in	North	and	South	America,	Europe	and	Asia.	In	the	riot	sample	however,	the	only	red	area	is	the	UK,	suggesting	that	among	geo-locating	Twitter	users,	at	least,	the	riots	remain	predominantly	a	local	–	that	is	to	say,	national	–	concern.		
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Figure	19:	geo-located	tweets	that	contained	the	keyword	‘riot’.	
Within	the	UK,	it	is	possible	to	map	individual	geo-located	tweets	and,	indeed,	to	append	 text	 interactively:	 there	 are	 sufficiently	 few	 tweets	 to	 distinguish	between	individual	data	points.	Figure	20	displays	UK	tweets.		
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Figure	20:	map	of	geo-located	tweets	with	coordinates	within	the	UK.		
There	are	149	tweets	on	the	map	above,	and	only	three	are	false	positive	results:	one	a	tweet	in	Filipino	that	includes	the	phrase	“pinaka-riot	na	kasalan	ng	taon”	(most	 riot	wedding	of	 the	 year)	 and	 two	 that	make	 reference	 to	 a	 riot	 in	non-specific	sense:		
“Neighbours	in	the	next	villa	are	very	loud	and	unfuuny.	I	might	start	and	finish	a	wee	riot	@CenterParcsUK.	Nae	contest”	
In	comparison	over	50%	of	those	tweets	sent	by	users	not	physically	in	the	UK	are	false	positive	results	(n=37),	indicating	not	only	the	unreliability	of	key	word	selection	 but	 also	 a	 considerable	 and	 significant	 discontinuity	 in	 the	 focus	 of	discourse	 in	 the	 riot	 stream.	 Though	 further	 enquiry	 is	 necessary,	 it	 seems	 on	
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first	glance	that	the	riot	public	–	that	is,	users	engaged	in	riot-specific	discourse	–	is	primarily	a	national	public,	so	that	while	Twitter	undoubtedly	enables	globally	distributed	meaning-making,	 in	 terms	 of	 focus	 during	 the	 riots,	 it	 remained	 a	national	sphere	of	exchange.			
It	 has	 been	 established	 that	 global	 geographies	 are	 increasingly	 fluid;	 people	move	 rapidly	 over	 considerable	 distances,	 media	 flows	 across	 national	boundaries	and	so	on.	It	 is	an	open	question	whether	or	not	 it	actually	matters	where	a	user	is	physically	located	when	he	or	she	composes	a	tweet;	what	may	be	 more	 significant	 is	 the	 home	 location	 or	 locations	 with	 which	 that	 user	chooses	 to	 identify.	Given	an	underlying	space	of	 flows,	 it	could	be	argued	that	the	 riot	 public	 remains	 a	 national	 public	 as	 long	 as	 it	 conceives	 of	 itself	 as	national.	 It	 is	 instructive	 to	 look	 at	 the	 relationship	 between	 coordinates	 and	locations	in	the	two	samples.	The	ratio	of	matching	locations	is	displayed	in	table	7.		
Coordinates	 Tweets	 Loc_UK	 Loc_Int.	 Loc_None	
In	UK	 149	 127	 2	 20	
Not_UK	 69	 3	 51	 15	
	
Table	8:	table	detailing	the	relationship	between	a	tweet’s	geo-coordinates	and	the	‘home’	
location	provided	in	the	user	profile.		
Of	 these	 tweets,	 149	 can	 be	 located	within	 the	 national	 borders	 of	 the	 UK.	 Of	those	tweets,	127	users	list	their	location	as	clearly	being	within	the	UK,	just	two	claim	to	be	located	internationally	(both	in	Dublin)	and	20	users	do	not	provide	
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usable	 location	 information.	 For	 the	 internationally	 located	 group,	 only	 three	users	 have	 UK-specific	 profile	 locations,	 and	 of	 course	 they	 may	 well	 be	 UK	citizens	 abroad.	 So	 for	 the	 respective	 samples,	 85%	 and	 74%	 of	 users	 have	profile	 locations	that	match	their	geo-locations,	at	 least	as	far	as	the	dichotomy	between	UK	and	non-UK	located	users	is	concerned.	
	
HASHTAG	TEMPORALITY	
Figure	21	plots	temporal	flows	for	the	three	most	common	hashtags	in	the	four	sample	periods.	Only	three	hashtags	are	displayed	to	simplify	the	graph	visually.	The	higher	the	line	reaches	on	the	y-axis	the	denser	the	flow	of	tweets	in	that	five	minute	 period.	 The	 term	 stream	 density	 is	 used	 to	 describe	 this	 frequency	plotting:	 the	 denser	 the	 flow	 of	 tweets,	 the	 faster	 the	 receptive	 experience	 of	Twitter	time.	In	order	to	display	all	four	periods	on	the	same	graph,	the	x-axis	is	compressed	 and	 five-space	 intervals	 represent	 the	 periods	 between	 data-collection	windows.	
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Figure	 21:	 graph	displaying	 stream	densities	 (tweets	 /	 five	minutes)	 for	 the	 three	most	
common	hashtags	in	the	riot	public	over	the	four	sample	windows.	
One	 approach	 to	 exploring	 the	 influence	 of	 Twitter	 temporality	 is	 to	 compare	discourse	within	hashtags	at	different	temporalities.	For	instance,	tweet	content	is	coded	and	interpreted	at	periods	of	high	density	flow	(#LondonRiots	between	midday	 and	 3pm	 on	 10	 August,	 for	 example)	 and	 then	 compared	 to	 tweet	content	 at	 lower	 flow	 densities	 (Pond	 2015,	 Pond	 et	 al.	 2013).	 This	 thesis	proposes	 an	 additional	 approach,	 in	 which	 topic-specific	 discussions	 –	 that	 is,	unified	 meaning-making	 exchanges	 –	are	 both	 understood	 and	 categorised	 in	terms	of	temporal	taxonomies.	
Individual	 users	 interact	 with	 hashtags,	 timelines,	 notifications	 and	 direct	messages	 –	 structural	 affordances	 of	 an	 application	 that	 support	 flows	 of	discordant	 and	 interactive	 meaning-making.	 What	 is	 required,	 then,	 when	
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classifying	tweets,	is	a	balance	between	the	macro	meaning-making	potential	of	the	 application	 and	 the	more	 limited	 practices	 of	 individual	 users.	 boyd	 et	 al.	(2010)	seek	to	describe	ways	in	which	Twitter	activity	may	be	seen	to	resemble	familiar	 communication	 practices,	 including	 conversational	 exchange.	 	 A	significant	 affordance	 of	 Twitter,	 however,	 is	 that	 it	 enables	 both	 user-to-user	conversational	 exchange	 but	 also	 the	 mass	 broadcast	 of	 meaning.	 Twitter’s	structure:	
“disperses	 conversation	 throughout	 a	 network	 of	 interconnected	 actors	rather	 than	 constraining	 conversation	 within	 bounded	 spaces	 or	 groups,	many	 people	may	 talk	 about	 a	 particular	 story	 at	 once,	 such	 that	 others	have	a	sense	of	being	surrounded	by	the	story,	despite	perhaps	not	being	an	active	contributor	in	the	conversation”	(boyd	et	al.	2010,	1).	
In	 order	 to	 capture	 this	 potential,	 a	 classification	 system	must	 respond	 to	 the	many	different	ways	in	which	tweets	can	be	topically	aligned.	At	the	micro	level	of	 @replies	 and	 user	 to	 user	 exchange,	 topical	 classification	 is	 relatively	straightforward.	 It	 is	 possible	 to	 identify	 both	 sender	 and	 receiver	 from	 tweet	syntax	and	to	trace	the	back-and-forth	flow	of	messages	between	them.	Grouping	tweets	in	this	way	is	relatively	easy,	then,	though	not	especially	efficient	in	terms	of	API	queries,	and	it	necessitates	a	type	of	analysis	that,	while	specific,	will	not	much	illuminate	the	ambient	flows	of	meaning-making	that	boyd	describes.	The	sense	of	being	surrounded	by	the	story	comes	from	follower-following	networks,	retweets	and	hashtag	flows.	
When	users	meet	online,	the	act	of	meeting	in	this	sense	becomes	a	“synthetic”	on-screen	projection	of	coordination	and	interaction	(Knorr	Cetina	2009).		Given	
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what	is	known	about	Twitter’s	structural	communication	layers	–	the	hashtags,	follower	 networks	 and	 user-to-user	 exchanges	 –	 coordination	 becomes	 a	function	 of	 two	 primary	 mechanisms:	 one	 is	 established	 follower-following	networks	 and	 the	 other	 is	 topicality.	 In	 other	 words,	 a	 Twitter	 user	 is	surrounded	 by	 a	 story	 either	 because	 it	 is	 a	 specific	 concern	 of	 his	 or	 her	proximal	 network,	 or	 because	 the	 story	 is	 sufficiently	 prominent	 at	 the	macro	level.	 It	 is	 this	second	case	–	effectively	the	density	of	macro	flows	–	that	has	a	distinct	temporal	dimension.		
The	 three	 hashtags,	 #LondonRiots,	 #UKRiots	 and	 #Riots	 are	 plotted	 again	 in	figure	 22	 below,	 though	 in	 this	 graph	 the	 y-axis	 is	 truncated	 so	 that	 only	 the	Wed_Day	period	is	shown.	In	addition	to	the	fluctuating	stream	densities,	linear	regression	 is	used	 to	 calculate	 lines	of	best	 fit	 and	 these	are	plotted	 too	 in	 the	same	colours	as	the	hashtag	streams.	
Figure	22:	stream	density	(SD)	for	the	three	common	riot	hashtags	in	the	Wed_Day	period.		
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The	respective	R2	values	for	the	three	streams	are:	0.5098,	0.3729	and	0.5858.	Visually,	 at	 least,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 relatively	 high	 degree	 of	 association	between	all	three	streams.	Compare	this	to	the	figure	below,	in	which	the	density	of	 the	 #londonriots	 stream	 is	 plotted	 against	 the	 #fail	 hashtag	 –	 a	 common	example	 of	 “non-topical	 hashtags,	which	 are	mainly	 used	 as	 emotive	markers”	(Bruns	and	Moe	2014,	18).	In	theory,	the	two	hashtags	should	be	independent	of	each	other	–	there	is	no	obvious	reason	why	#LondonRiots	and	#Fail	should	be	correlated,	given	 that	 the	 latter	 is	generally	 interpreted	as	an	 independent	 (i.e.	topically	unspecific)	emotive	marker.		
Figure	23:	stream	density	(SD)	for	two	hashtags	that,	in	theory	at	least,	should	be	topically	
unrelated.		
If	hashtag	streams	are	related	–	that	is,	if	the	hashtags	support	meaning-making	specific	 to	 a	 topic	 or	 event	 –	 then	 the	 temporality	 of	 those	 hashtag	 streams	should	also	be	related.	Periods	of	dense	flow	will	coincide	because	there	will	be	
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both	 an	 independent	 increase	 in	 all	 hashtags	 attached	 to	 specific	 meaning-making	 processes	 and	 also	 an	 increase	 in	 explicit	 hashtags	 association	 by	inclusion	in	the	same	tweet	text	e.g.	“tweet	on	topic	A	#hashtagB	#hashtagC”.	In	effect,	 and	 in	 response	 to	 the	 research	 question,	 it	 is	 proposed	 that	 temporal	alignment	 becomes	 a	 key	 indicator	 for	 identifying	 and	 categorising	 tweets	 for	analysis.		
The	 temporality	 represented	 in	 the	preceding	 graphs	 is	 the	 rate	 at	which	new	tweets	are	published	under	a	hashtag,	and	when	that	rate	increases	the	density	of	the	hashtag	stream	increases	also.	Denser	streams	push	more	content	at	users	more	quickly,	become	more	noticeable	 in	 timelines,	 are	promoted	by	Twitter’s	Trends	 algorithms	 and,	 in	 more	 general	 terms,	 surround	 more	 users	 in	 the	trending	story.		
The	problem	is	that	to	represent	temporality	in	this	way	is	to	ignore	many	of	the	affordances	 of	 the	 Twitter	 application:	 not	 all	 tweets	 are	 created	 equal.	Temporality	may	 be	 constructed	 at	 the	macro	 level	 through	 hashtags	 but	 it	 is	also	 constructed	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 individual	 tweet;	 in	 fact,	 it	 is	 constructed	across	 all	 the	 structural	 layers.	Within	 the	 #LondonRiots	 stream,	 for	 instance,	one	 published	 tweet	 may	 never	 be	 seen	 by	 human	 eyes	 (especially	 if	 it	 is	published	by	a	user	with	few	followers)	while	another	(from	a	celebrity	account,	perhaps)	 lingers	 long	 in	a	million	 timelines,	 is	 retweeted	widely	and	promoted	algorithmically	owing	to	 its	 inherent	visibility.	To	 ignore	these	differences	 is	 to	ignore	how	Twitter	works,	and	risks	a	representation	of	temporality	that	it	is	too	reductive	to	be	of	any	great	value	to	the	underlying	research	question.		
Stream	density	does	not	differentiate	between	a	sample	of	100	tweets	published	
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by	100	users	and	a	stream	containing	the	same	number	of	tweets,	but	with	just	a	couple	of	publishers.	The	two	cases	produce	the	same	number	of	 tweets	 in	 the	same	 period	 but	 imply	 very	 different	 types	 of	 communicative	 practice.	Furthermore,	stream	density	assumes	that	users	contribute	tweets	to	a	hashtag	in	 normally	 distributed	 ways	 both	 within	 the	 same	 hashtag	 but	 also	 across	different	hashtags.		
Stream	density	should	therefore	be	adjusted	to	account	for	the	number	of	users	contributing	to	a	hashtag	during	any	given	period	–	an	adjustment	that	assumes	there	is	a	relationship	between	the	size	of	the	hashtag	public	and	the	number	of	contributors	to	that	hashtag.	A	failure	to	adjust	is	to	assume	the	opposite	–	that	there	 is	 no	 relationship	 between	 contributors	 and	 potential	 viewers.	 Such	 an	adjustment	is	fairly	simple	to	make.	It	is	a	case	of	counting	the	number	of	unique	users	 in	 each	 period,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 total	 number	 of	 tweets	 sent,	 and	calculating	the	ratio	of	one	to	the	other.	This	ratio	can	then	be	used	to	adjust	the	initial	 stream.	 The	 adjustment	 is	 applied	 to	 all	 the	major	 hashtag	 streams:	 the	Wed_Day	period	is	plotted	in	figure	24.	
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Figure	24:	stream	density	(SD)	for	the	three	common	riot	hashtags	in	the	Wed_Day	period,	
adjusted	to	account	for	the	number	of	unique	users	contributing	to	the	hashtag	stream	in	
each	five-minute	interval.	
The	 first	 observation	 to	 note	 is	 that	 this	 graph	 is	 hardly	 different	 from	 its	predecessor.	The	vast	majority	of	 adjustments	 are	minor.	 In	 the	#LondonRiots	stream,	 for	 instance,	 the	 adjustment	 ratio	 across	 the	 whole	 period	 is	 1.007,	implying	a	 less	 than	one	per	cent	adjustment	 in	 total.	On	the	whole,	across	 the	major	hashtags,	in	five-minute	periods,	almost	every	tweet	has	a	unique	point	of	origin:	there	are	very	few	users	responsible	for	multiple	tweets.	This	implies	that	the	riot	public	is	pretty	diverse	in	terms	of	contributing	users,	that	the	hashtags	are	 performing	 as	might	 be	 expected	 for	 a	 national	 conversation	 at	 the	macro	level,	and	also	that	the	stream	densities	plotted	so	far	are	probably	valid	without	adjustment.		
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However,	 this	 initial	 user-focused	 adjustment	 is	 really	 just	 a	 first	 step	 in	deconstructing	tweet	temporality.	Stream	density	takes	no	account	of	 temporal	construction	 at	 the	 meso	 and	 the	 micro	 structural	 layers	 of	 Twitter	communication:	 the	 interactivity	of	 tweet	 flows,	 the	 influence	of	user	networks	and	the	specifics	of	user-to-user	interaction.		
The	primary	aim	for	a	meso-level	adjustment	is	to	unflatten	these	differences:	to	represent,	 somehow,	 the	 effect	 that	 follower-following	 networks	 have	 on	 the	temporality	 of	 tweet	 streams.	 In	 order	 to	 do	 this,	 a	 new	 concept	 is	 useful:	
persistence.	Persistence	is	an	attempt	to	acknowledge	and	to	explore	the	role	that	follower	 relationships	 play	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 temporality	 on	 Twitter.	Follower-following	 networks	 are	 one	 of	 “the	 most	 fundamental	 affordances	which	determine	the	flow	on	information	on	Twitter”	(Bruns	and	Moe	2014,	16).	Schmidt	(2014,	4)	has	argued	that	“the	basic	concept	guiding	Twitter	use	is	the	idea	 of	 ‘following’”,	 placing	 these	 relationships	 at	 the	 very	 centre	 of	 a	communicative	 structure,	 that	 “is	 affording	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 new	 type	 of	publicness:	the	 ‘personal	public’”.	To	state	the	very	obvious,	Twitter	users	have	vastly	different	numbers	of	followers:	the	most	followed	account	on	the	platform	belongs	to	singer	Katy	Perry	and	had	74.9	million	followers	in	September	2015	(Statista	 2015b);	 the	 average	 number	 of	 followers	 in	 the	 meta	 sample	 in	 this	analysis	 is	 956.	 The	 variable	 size	 of	 these	 networks	 are	 likely	 to	 effect	significantly	the	temporality	of	any	given	hashtag	stream.	
Persistence	 recognises	 that	 a	 consequence	 of	 differences	 in	 follower	 network	size	is	that	some	tweets	will	persist	for	far	longer	on	the	Twitter	platform,	both	because	they	are	published	to	more	individual	timelines	and	also	because	of	the	
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cumulative	 effect	 of	 this	 exposure,	 which	 is	 to	 promote	 tweets	 more	 widely	across	 the	 platform	 through	 user	 practices	 (retweets,	 replies)	 and	 algorithmic	selection.		
In	order	 to	calculate	persistence,	an	adjustment	 is	necessary	to	account	 for	 the	distribution	 of	 followers	 between	 unique	 users.	 To	 illustrate,	 persistence	adjusted	 stream	 density	 is	 calculated	 for	 the	 #LondonRiots	 stream	 during	 the	Wed_Day	period.	 In	 the	 first	 instance,	 the	number	of	unique	users	contributing	tweets	within	each	five-minute	period	is	counted.		
So,	 for	 instance,	 in	a	hypothetical	scenario,	between	9:00:00am	and	9.04:59am,	five	different	users	each	 contribute	 two	 tweets	 and	 then,	between	9.05:00	and	9.09:59am,	another	10	unique	users	each	contribute	a	single	tweet:	both	periods	have	a	stream	density	equal	to	10.	However,	 if	every	user	represented	in	these	two	samples	ech	has	10	 followers,	 then	 in	 the	 first	window,	 the	10	 tweets	will	reach	 50	 followers,	whereas	 in	 the	 second	window,	 the	 tweets	will	 reach	 100	followers.	 Consequently,	while	 the	 stream	density	 is	 the	 same	 in	both	periods,	the	visibility	of	the	respective	sets	of	10	tweets	is	potentially	quite	different.		
In	a	persistence	calculation,	the	followers	of	any	user	who	contributes	multiple	tweets	are	only	counted	once	within	each	five-minute	interval.	If	the	user	sends	a	second	 tweet	 20	 minutes	 later,	 then	 his	 or	 her	 users	 are	 counted	 again.	 The	assumption	is	that	over	a	short	period,	multiple	tweets	from	the	same	user	are	more	likely	to	be	associated	and	less	likely	to	be	persistent	than	tweets	sent	over	a	much	longer	interval.	The	shifting	dynamics	of	follower	attention	are	also	likely	to	 play	 a	 role	 here.	 It	 is	 also	 assumed	 that	 over	 longer	 intervals	 a	 greater	percentage	 of	 the	 follower	 network	 will	 have	 logged	 into	 Twitter,	 thus	
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actualising	 the	 temporality	 of	 the	 tweets.	 In	 simple	 terms,	 that	 calculation	assumes	 that	 it	 is	 the	 same	 users	 reading	 the	 tweet	 in	 the	 short	 term;	 in	 the	longer	term	this	assumption	probably	doesn’t	hold,	so	users	are	counted	again.		
The	graph	in	figure	25	shows	the	#LondonRiots	Wed_Day	stream,	initially	in	its	original	 form	in	blue	and	then	adjusted	for	persistence	in	pink.	Persistence	is	a	relative	rather	than	absolute	measure,	so	it	can	be	scaled	to	fit	on	the	same	axis	as	stream	density,	in	this	case	by	a	factor	of	10	^	4.		
Figure	25:	Graph	comparing	 the	stream	density	 for	#LondonRiots	on	Wednesday	and	an	
adjusted	persistence	measure	for	the	same	hashtag	over	the	same	period		
Persistence	 has	 the	 general	 effect	 of	 making	 the	 stream	 more	 spiky,	 but	 a	difference	between	these	two	measures	is	particularly	notable	during	a	couple	of	periods,	 one	 in	 the	morning	 and	 the	 other	 in	 the	 afternoon	on	August	 10.	 The	question	that	needs	addressing	here	is	what	that	distance	represents	in	terms	of	meaning-making	practices.	
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The	 theory	 behind	 persistence	 is	 quite	 simply	 that	 an	 important	 element	 of	temporality,	certainly	at	the	level	of	the	individual	tweet,	is	the	number	of	times	that	the	tweet	appears	in	visible	form	in	the	timelines	of	different	users.	This	is	how	 tweets	 come	 into	 existence:	 that	 are	 composed	 in	 the	 minds	 and	 on	 the	screen	 of	 users	 and	 projected	 on	 to	 the	 screens	 (and	 into	 the	minds)	 of	 their	followers.	Figure	26	presents	the	adjusted	persistence	streams	for	all	five	major	hashtags	 across	 the	 entire	 sample	 period.	 Three	 spikes,	 two	 in	 the	 #UKRiots	stream	and	one	in	the	#Riots	stream,	illustrate	the	enormous	effect	that	a	single	user	 account	 can	have	on	 the	persistence	 adjustment.	 The	 first	 spike,	 between	10:45	 and	 10:50	 on	 Wednesday	 is	 caused	 by	 comedian	 Tim	 Minchin,	 who	contributed	 a	 link	 under	 the	 #UKRiots	 hashtag	 and,	 at	 the	 time,	 had	 208,106	followers.	 The	 second	 spike,	 24	 hours	 later,	 results	 from	 a	 tweet	 from	 a	Philippines	news	station	referencing	an	Al	Jazeera-led	story.	In	the	#Riots	stream	it	 is	 a	 tweet	 from	@BBCWorld,	 the	 corporation’s	 official	 world	 news	 account,	that	sends	persistence	skyrocketing.		
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Figure	 26:	 persistence	 calculations	 for	 five	 hashtags	 across	 the	 study	 period	
demonstrating	the	enormous	influence	that	a	tweet	from	an	account	with	many	followers	
can	have	on	the	temporality	of	a	hashtag.		
More	than	anything,	these	outlying	values	emphasise	the	role	that	users	play	in	constructing	 the	 affordances	 and	 the	 logics	 of	 Twitter	 and	Twitter	 time.	 A	 full	account	 of	 temporality	must	 also	 take	 into	 account	micro-level	 exchanges:	 the	retweets,	@replies	and	other	affordances	reveal	a	little	about	how	users	interact	with	meanings	and	with	each	other	on	Twitter.		
	
RETWEET	TEMPORALITY	
According	to	Bruns	and	Moe	(2014,	22)	retweets	“constitute	a	mechanism	which	is	inherently	designed	to	move	tweets	across	layer	boundaries”.	They	note	how	the	 retweet	 is	 a	 tool	 for	 controlling	 visibility:	 a	 user	 promotes	 a	 micro	 level	
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exchange	 to	 his	 or	 her	 followers,	 for	 instance.	 However,	 here	 the	 retweet	 is	included	 with	 micro	 level	 user-to-user	 conventions	 because,	 just	 like	 these	affordances,	the	retweet	is	the	product	of	direct	user-to-tweet	activity.	It	implies		a	 level	 of	 interaction	 above	 and	 beyond	 both	 macro	 and	 the	 meso	 exchanges	described	 so	 far,	 which	 play	 more	 of	 an	 implicit	 structural	 role	 in	 terms	 of	Twitter’s	communicative	structures.			
The	#LondonRiots	 hashtag	 (n	 =	 2998)	 is	 used	 to	 illustrate	 the	 complexities	 of	exploring	 retweet	 temporality.	 Searching	 the	 meta	 data	 returns	 a	 sample	 of	retweets	(a,	n=733)	whereas	searching	the	text	of	tweets	returns	a	much	larger	sample	 (b,	 n=1181).	All	of	 the	733	meta	data	 tweets	are	present	 in	 the	 second	sample,	 so	at	 least	 the	 searches	are	not	wholly	 contradictory	but	 it	 seems	 that	either	Twitter’s	own	retweeting	counting	mechanism	misses	some	retweets,	or	that	there	are	retweets	that	are	not	really	retweets	–	they	contain	RT	for	some	other	reason.		
The	method	 for	 identifying	retweets	and	calculating	retweet	 temporality	 is	not	straightforward.	The	code	is	included	and	explained	in	appendix	A.	It	produces	a	retweet	sample	(n	=	1198)	 for	 the	#londonriots	stream.	Figure	27	displays	 the	temporality	of	the	retweet	stream.			
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Figure	27:	graph	displaying	the	stream	densities	of	the	overall	#LondonRiots	stream	and	
the	retweet	stream	sent	under	the	same	hashtag.	
A	retweet	chain	may	contain	just	one	generation	of	retweets	–	that	is,	the	same	tweet	 passed	 on	 independently	 by	 different	 users	 –	or	 it	 may	 include	 many	iterations	of	a	tweet,	either	in	linear	or	intersecting	chains.	It	may	include	both.	Representing	temporality	in	such	circumstances	is	always	going	to	be	reductive,	not	least	because	it	is	so	difficult	to	find	linear	chains	for	processing.	The	method	suggested	 here	 makes	 no	 attempt	 to	 differentiate	 between	 types	 of	 retweet	within	the	same	chain.		
Retweet	chains	were	extracted	from	the	five	major	hashtag	streams.	A	summary	of	those	extractions	is	presented	in	table	8.	The	temporality	of	individual	retweet	chains	is	represented	as	the	average	lag	between	tweets	in	the	chainxxx.	In	other	words,	if	there	is	a	five-minute	delay	between	tweets	in	a	chain	two	tweets	long,	then	that	 is	 the	 lag.	 If	10	tweets	are	sent	 in	the	same	period,	 then	the	 lag	 is	30	
0
12.5
25
37.5
50
Aug 10 10:30 Aug 10 15:30 Aug 10 22:30 Aug 11 11:30 Aug 11 16:30 Aug 11 23:30
St
re
am
 d
en
sit
y
Time (UCT)
LondonRiots/retweets LondonRiots
	258 
seconds,	 regardless	 of	 how	 those	 tweets	 cluster	 in	 that	 period.	 This	 approach	ensures	 that	 lag	 calculations	 are	 relatively	 straightforward	 but	 does	 risk	exaggerating	 the	 influence	 of	 outlying	 tweets.	 If,	 for	 instance,	 in	 a	 chain	 seven	tweets	 long,	 six	 tweets	 are	 published	 within	 a	 five-minute	 period,	 but	 the	seventh	is	published	three	hours	later,	then	lag	is	calculated	across	a	three-hour	and	five-minute	period.	To	 limit	this	distortion,	 for	retweet	chains	greater	than	five	 tweets	 in	 length,	 the	 earliest	 and	 latest	 tweets	 are	 not	 included	 in	 lag	calculations.		
Hashtag Number	 of	 RT	
chains 
Longest	 chain	
length 
Lag	score 
#londonriots 136 37 1:14:17 
#ukriots 96 72 0:43:07 
#riots 33 53 0:32:29 
#riotcleanup 28 35 1:01:58 
#operationcupoftea 24 39 1:37:05 
	
Table	 9:	 the	 characteristics	 of	 retweet	 chains	 extracted	 from	 the	 five	 most	 frequent	
hashtags.	Lag	is	the	average	delay	between	individual	tweets	in	the	chain.	
The	length	of	a	retweet	chain	is	a	fairly	poor	representation	of	discourse,	in	that	it	can	be	heavily	influenced	by	a	single	user	having	a	large	number	of	followers.	The	longest	chain	in	any	of	the	hashtags,	for	instance,	at	72	tweets	long,	features	71	copies	of	the	following	tweet	object:	
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“RT	 @timminchin:	 Sorry,	 probably	 late	 to	 this:	 http://t.co/vdmIfWl	 ...	humiliating	looters	via	the	magic	of	photoshop.	#ukriots	(via	@jus	...”			
The	 account	 @timminchin,	 belonging	 to	 the	 Australian	 comedian,	 had	 over	200,000	 followers	 in	 August	 2011.	 The	 tweet	 itself	 links	 to	 a	 Tumblr	 site	featuring	 apparent	 photographs	 of	 rioters,	 digitally	 manipulated	 for	 comedic	effect.	While	 it’s	quite	possible	that	such	content	was	popular	 in	the	riot	public	purely	because	of	the	meanings	it	signified,	it	is	also	possible	that	Tim	Minchin’s	celebrity	profile	helped	drive	some	of	that	popularity.	Table	9	shows	the	length	of	the	longest	retweet	chains	in	the	#LondonRiots	stream	and	the	corresponding	lag	for	each	of	those	chains.		
Retweet	Text Chain	length	 Lag	score 
"RT	@Gerard_McCarthy:	I'm	actually	speechless	at	the	stupidity	of	this	guy....	#LondonRiots		http://twitpic.com/63x4bl" 
7 0:21:38 
“RT	@sampepper:	Everyone	tweet	@BBCNews	and	tell	them	to	"	check	out	#OperationCupOfTea	our	solution	to	the	#londonriots	http://t.co/1bf0	...” 
19 0:47:48 
“RT	@CitizenRadio	ICYMI:	New	#CitizenRadio:	#ALEC\u2019s	prison	slave	labor,	#Londonriots,	Mississippi	hate	crime	killing	http://bit.ly/r3DeJQ” 
37 0:00:13 
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“RT	@Prince_of_Wales:	Mother	is	thinking	of	putting	these	posters	up	around	Buckingham	Palace!	#londonriots	#riotsuk		http://t.co/EAYaYZ4” 
6 0:56:42 
"Lmao.	RT	@ged:	Nigeria's	President	Goodluck	Jonathan	deploys	MOPOL	to	London	[SATIRE]	http://pastebin.com/Zbe5iTBL	#londonriots	#ukriots" 
6 0:01:05 
“RT	@toastlovesyou:	Brilliant!	people	are	getting	creative	with	the	photos	of	looters!	http://t.co/jD4BxDK	#OperationCupOfTea	#londonriots” 
6 0:14:32 
"RT	@GdnPolitics:	Full	text	of	Cameron's	speech	on	#ukriots	#londonriots	now	up	on	No	10	website	http://bit.ly/nhmzdk" 
7 0:07:25 
“RT	@PeterTatchell:	Cameron	wants	looters	jailed.	Let’s	start	with	MPs	who	looted	the	expenses	system	#londonriots	#UKriots	#duggan	#Love	...” 
7 0:33:54 
"RT	@guardian:	Full	text	of	Cameron's	speech	on	#ukriots	#londonriots	now	up	on	No	10	website	http://bit.ly/nhmzdk" 
6 0:09:16 
"RT	@GdnPolitics:	Full	text	of	Cameron's	speech	on	#ukriots	#londonriots	now	up	on	No	10	website	http://bit.ly/nhmzdk" 
8 0:06:11 
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"RT	@majorityfm:	BBC	Doesn't	Want	to	Hear	the	Real	Reasons	for	the	London	Riots	-	VIDEO:	http://on.fb.me/o0WG66	#p2	#londonriots	#ukriots" 
23 0:38:16 
	
Table	10:	 table	showing	the	tweet	 text	responsible	 for	 the	 longest	retweet	chains	within	
the	#LondonRiots	stream.  
The	relationship	between	chain	length	and	lag	period	suggests	little	evidence	of	any	 association:	 longer	 retweet	 chains	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 demonstrate	systematically	 shorter	 or	 longer	 lag	 periods.	 This	 could	 suggest	 one	 of	 two	things.	Either	the	delay	between	retweets	in	a	chain	is	a	poor	representation	of	engagement	 or	meaning-making	within	 that	 chain,	 or	 it	 is	 a	 valid	measure	but	only	a	small	part	of	a	much	larger	picture.	It	is	also	possible,	of	course,	that	down	at	the	micro	level	of	analysis,	the	riot	dataset	is	too	limited:	for	what	it’s	worth,	the	 logic	 of	 big	 data	 analysis	 relies	 on	 the	 dataset	 remaining	 large	 to	 identify	systematic	 patterns.	 The	 graph	 in	 figure	 28	 shows	 the	 chain	 length-lag	relationship	for	retweet	chains	across	all	the	hashtag	streams.		
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Figure	28:	scatter	graph	showing	 the	relationship	between	retweet	chain	 length	and	 the	
lag	between	individual	retweets	within	that	chain	
The	 graph	 implies	 a	 very	 mixed	 picture,	 with	 huge	 variation	 in	 lag	 period	especially	 for	 shorter	 retweet	 chains.	As	 chain	 length	 increases,	 however,	 over	five	 tweets	 and	 especially	 over	 10,	 then	 lag	 periods	 become	predictably	 short.	This	 suggests	 that	 retweet	 temporality	 is	 both	 very	 unstable	 –	 or	 hard	 to	approximate	 for	 short	 chains	 –	 but	 also	 that	 the	 temporality	 of	 retweeting	practices	may	be	hard	to	conceptualise	in	a	linear	way.		
An	honest	appraisal	must	conclude	that	retweet	temporality,	conceptualised	and	measured	 in	 this	 way,	 is	 unlikely	 to	 support	 productive	 and	 insightful	investigation.	 Even	 the	 10	 longest	 chains	 exhibit	 considerable	 variation	 in	 lag	scores	and	there	is	simply	no	way	of	knowing,	at	this	stage,	whether	a	lag	score	of	9	minutes	49	seconds	(chain	=	72)	is	demonstrably	different	from	a	lag	score	
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of	15	minutes	26	seconds	(chain	=	9).	As	such,	 retweet	 temporality	will	not	be	used	 to	 pursue	 and	 categorise	 meaning	 in	 the	 subsequent	 analysis.	 Far	 more	work	 –	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 conceptualisation	 and	 calculation	 –	 is	 required	 to	develop	this	metric,	and	that	work	is	beyond	the	scope	of	what	is	possible	here.			
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CHAPTER	SEVEN	
DISCUSSION	
INTRODUCTION	
This	 discussion	 chapter	 aims	 to	 tackle	 each	 of	 the	 research	 questions	 in	 turn,	providing	 a	 summary	 of	 major	 findings,	 conceptual	 implications	 and	recommendations	for	further	investigation.	In	doing	so	it	will	reflect	extensively	on	the	analytical	work	conducted	in	chapter	six,	before	applying	that	work	to	a	substantive	discussion	of	Twitter	and	communicative	democracy.	It	will	describe	and	 critique	 Twitter-enabled	 discourse	 during	 the	 London	 riots	 and	 situate	meaning-making	within	the	wider	struggle	to	signify.		
	
QUESTION	 1:	 WHAT	 ARE	 THE	 FEATURES	 OF	 DISCOURSE	 IN	 THE	 RIOT	 PUBLIC,	 AND	
HOW	ARE	THESE	FEATURES	DISTRIBUTED	ACROSS	TWITTER’S	SOFTWARE-STRUCTURAL	
LAYERS?		
Working	towards	an	understanding	of	how	software	might	shape	communicative	democracy	is	an	incremental	process.	Part	of	this	process	involves	recording	and	classifying	 discourse	 on	Twitter.	Until	 this	 step	 is	 complete,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	determine	 whether	 or	 not	 meaning-making	 might	 reasonably	 be	 called	democratic,	 let	 alone	 determine	 what	 role	 software	 plays	 in	 calibrating	 that	democratic	potential.		
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In	 order	 to	 assess	 the	 feature	 of	 discourse	 in	 the	 riot	 public,	 a	 combination	 of	methods	were	applied	at	the	different	structural	layers.	These	methods	included	automated	machine-reading	techniques,	content	and	thematic	coding,	and	close	textual	 reading	 to	 score	 democratic	 potential.	 Clearly	 this	 approach	 has	 the	benefit	 of	 being	 comprehensive	 though	 could	 be	 critiqued	 for	 not	 being	especially	discerning.	There	is,	however,	a	good	reason	for	experimenting	with	a	variety	of	approaches	for	exploring	and	analysing	discourse.		
As	 the	 literature	 review	 demonstrated,	 there	 is	 not	 yet	 a	 methodological	consensus	 about	 the	 social	 study	 of	 Internet	 technologies	 –	 researchers	 have	tended	to	use	tools	and	techniques	that	are	available	and	appealing	to	them	on	an	 individual	basis.	 Some	researchers	have	called	 for	a	more	 standardised	and	comparable	set	of	methodological	frameworks	(Bruns	and	Stieglitz	2013,	2012)	but	as	yet	there	is	no	consensus	in	the	area.	Furthermore,	ideology	underwrites	many	of	 the	 logics	used	to	promote	particular	methodologies:	 the	power	of	big	data	 (Bowker	 2014,	 Crawford	 et	 al.	 2014,	 boyd	 and	 Crawford	 2011,	 Anderson	2008),	for	instance,	or	the	typology	of	Web	2.0	(Morozov	2013b,	a).	In	addition	to	 an	 exploration	 of	 riot	 discourse,	 then,	 this	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 contribute	 to	 a	methodological	 consensus	 project	 through	 the	 evaluation	 of	 different	methodologies.	
Machine-reading	 techniques	 are	 inherently	 limited	 by	 the	 need	 to	 reduce	complex	 representational	 systems	 into	 computable	 logics.	 Put	 simply,	 when	countless	 ideologies,	 value	 assignments	 and	 signification	 struggles	 must	 be	rendered	into	floating	point	sentiment	scores	or	a	human-readable	word	cloud,	it	is	 inevitable	 that	 nuance	 will	 be	 lost	 and	 systemic	 complexity	 will	 be	
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underestimated.	This	proves	to	be	the	case	in	the	riot	public	but	 	attempting	to	calculate	and	 track	sentiment	over	 time	reveals	some	 important	 insights	about	the	sentiment-scoring	method.		
1. Tracking	 average	 sentiment	 over	 time	 fails	 to	 distinguish	 between	highly	 polarised	 and	 broadly	 consensual	 discourse	 streams.	Hashtag	streams	 can	 support	 a	 range	 of	 attitudes	 attached	 to	 the	 same	signifier.	 Average	 sentiment	 scoring	 ignores	 this	 variation	 and	 can	make	very	different	forms	of	discourse	effectively	appear	the	same.		
Within	 the	major	 riot	 hashtags,	when	 sentiment	 scores	 are	 adjusted	 to	 reflect	both	 polarised	 sentiment	 and	 the	 number	 of	 contributing	 tweets	 a	 complex	picture	emerges:	both	positive	and	negative	sentiment	appear	to	trend	towards	zero,	which	suggests	that	the	different	meanings	represented	in	those	sentiment	(anger,	 frustration,	 excitement?)	 may	 become	 less	 extreme	 over	 the	 study	period.	 There	 is	 also	 some	 evidence	 of	 a	 relationship	 between	 retweeting	practices	and	sentiment:	 longer	retweet	chains	with	shorter	 lag	periods	appear	to	 be	 less	 subjective.	 However,	 these	 are	 not	 judged	 to	 be	 substantive	conclusions	 –	 rather	 they	 reflect	 the	 reductive	 uncertainty	 of	 the	 sentiment	method.	 While	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 suggest	 useful	 improvements	 to	 average	sentiment	 scoring,	 considerable	 work	 is	 still	 required	 to	 develop	 automated	sentiment	scoring	into	a	productive	tool	for	social	and	cultural	analysis.		
Some	 of	 the	 limitations	 of	 keyword	 signification	 have	 already	 been	 discussed,	and	 those	 limitations	 apply	 to	 the	 language	 processing	 engines	 used	 to	 drive	automated	 content	 analysis.	 Word	 clouds	 permit	 a	 summary	 perspective	 on	relative	representation	at	the	hashtag	level,	but	are	reductive	and	require	a	great	
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deal	 of	 interpretative	 reading.	 This	 interpretative	 reading	 can	 be	 applied	comparatively,	however,	to	look	for	shared	themes	across	hashtags.	
2.	 Automated	 content	 analysis	 suggests	 that	 key	 themes	 in	 the	 riot	public	 include	 the	 rioters	 themselves,	 framed	more	as	 looters	 rather	than	 protesters,	 and	 the	 role	 of	 state,	 especially	 as	 represented	 by	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron	and	the	police.	
This	comparative	word	cloud	analysis	was	used	to	inform	the	periodic	tracking	of	 specific	 keyword	 frequency.	 Again,	 this	 tracking	 relies	 on	 a	 fairly	 reductive	interpretation	of	the	relationship	between	keyword	and	meaning,	but	it	reveals	some	 curious	 trends	within	 the	 broader	 signification	 categories.	 An	 important	question	 for	 this	 thesis	relates	 to	 the	way	that	 the	UK	state	worked	to	reassert	control	 over	 its	 rioting	 citizens,	 and	 the	 mediated	 struggle	 to	 legitimise	extraordinary	 and	 punitive	 judicial	 procedures.	 Within	 this	 broader	 narrative	conflict,	 two	 competing	 signification	 struggles	 are	 important.	 First,	 it	 is	 clearly	beneficial	to	the	conservative	state	to	define	the	rioters	as	transgressive	others:	as	 criminals	 and	 looters.	 Second,	 to	 reassert	 its	own	 legitimacy,	 the	 state	must	establish	and	publicise	 its	power	 to	 resolve	 the	 transgression:	 to	 arrest	 and	 to	punish	the	rioter.		
Within	 this	 narrative	 framework,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 prime	 minister	 becomes	particularly	 important	and	this	 is	reflected	 in	 the	riot	public.	David	Cameron	 is	the	 wounded	 state	 personified,	 and	 as	 the	machinations	 of	 state	 power	 creak	into	 action	 (an	 emergency	 parliamentary	 session,	 extraordinary	 police	deployments,	 special	 judicial	 procedures),	 the	 keyword	 ‘cameron’	 becomes	relatively	more	dominant	in	the	hashtag	streams.	
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This	 raises	 an	 important	 question	 about	 the	 interaction	 of	 the	 riot	 public	 on	Twitter	with	other	domains	in	the	mediasphere	and	with	formalised	institutional	democracy.	 It	 is	 misleading	 to	 suggest	 that	 Twitter	 supports	 discourse	 in	isolation	 –	 it	 is	 deeply	 embedded	 in	 the	wider	media	 ecology,	meaning	 that	 it	interacts	with	other	media	forms	and	with	mediated	public	discourse.	Temporal	changes	 in	 relative	 keyword	 frequencies	 must	 be	 interpreted	 in	 light	 of	 the	dynamics	of	this	wider	public	discourse.		
3.	 Tweets	are	textually	and	temporally	far	more	complex	than	previously	assumed.	The	notion	of	the	tweet	as	a	unified	and	contained	object,	in	terms	 of	 software,	 meaning	 or	 time-space,	 breaks	 down	 on	 closer	examination	of	tweet	form	and	signification.			
Nearly	 two-thirds	of	 the	 tweets	 (61.4%)	sampled	 for	 content	 coding	 contained	links	to	external	media	objects,	that	is	text,	images	or	video	stored	elsewhere	on	the	web.	 For	 each	 tweet	 containing	 a	hyperlink,	meaning	 resides	partly	within	the	 tweet	 object	 itself	 and	 partly	 within	 the	 external	 media.	 Within	 these	external	media	objects,	there	may	be	other	links	to	further	media.	The	deferral	of	meaning	has	implications	for	the	tweet	as	a	unified	temporal	object	as	well.		
Tweet	temporality	must	involve	a	negotiation	of	these	different	locales.	A	tweet	that	links	to	an	image	of	a	burned	building	engages	with	many	temporal	scapes:	the	 immediacy	of	 the	hashtag	stream,	 the	 longevity	of	 the	 image,	 the	building’s	architectural	and	social	past	and	an	unknown	burned-out	future.	Even	ignoring	these	 complex	 social	 and	 psychological	 evocations	 of	 time,	 the	 act	 of	 user-interaction	with	the	tweet	 is	complicated	by	the	 link	to	the	 image.	Temporality	will	depend	upon	whether	or	not	the	link	is	clicked,	or	if	the	image	is	viewed,	or	
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if	 the	 tweet	 contains	 commentary	 that	 invites	 reflection	 or	 feedback.	 In	 short,	much	like	any	sign,	the	tweet	resides	within	a	system	of	meaning	and	temporal	deferrals.	 The	 stubbornness	 of	 the	 system	 to	 defy	 categorisation	 is	 an	 open	question:	certainly	its	complexity	is	resistant.		
It	 is	 important	 not	 to	 deny	 this	 complexity	 –	 to	 recognise	 that	 tweets	 are	unstable	 signification	 objects	 –	 because	 it	 is	 a	 reminder	 that	 simple	categorisations	 of	 meaning	 (sentiment,	 keywords,	 content	 codes),	 while	appealing,	 may	 also	 be	 misleading.	 However,	 it	 is	 also	 necessary	 to	 limit	 this	complexity	somehow,	to	permit	the	construction	of	knowledge	categories	and	to	make	Twitter	discourse	available	for	study.		
In	this	thesis,	hyperlinks	are	followed	to	their	immediate	destination	and	linked	media	 is	 included	 in	 any	 analysis	 of	 content,	 themes	 or	 deliberative	 potential.	This	decision	is	justifiable:	by	including	a	link	within	a	tweet,	a	Twitter	user	can	reasonably	be	assumed	to	be	assigning	value	 to	 the	destination	media,	but	any	further	deferral	involves	too	many	assumptions	about	user	intentions.		
4.	 Twitter	was	primarily	used	for	link	sharing	and	adjunctive	discussion	during	the	later	stages	of	the	2011	UK	riots.		
There	 is	 surprisingly	 little	 in	 the	 way	 of	 informational	 or	 organisational	communication	in	the	riot	public	during	the	study	period,	which	would	tend	to	contradict	 those	 democratising	 logics	 of	 social	 media	 that	 emphasise	 the	coordinating	 potential	 of	 the	 technology.	 As	 far	 as	 research	 into	 the	 riots	 is	concerned,	there	has	never	been	any	evidence	that	Twitter	was	used	to	organise	rioting,	 though	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 did	 appear	 to	 raise	 this	 possibility	 in	
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parliament	and	suggest	that	the	police	could	be	authorised	to	“close	them	down”	(Hansard	2011,	1077).	
	The	 riot	 clean-up	 movement	 was	 associated	 with	 Twitter	 in	 a	 great	 deal	 of	media	coverage	(Davies	et	al.	2011),	but	though	the	hashtag	is	certainly	present	in	the	data	samples,	 there	 is	 little	evidence	of	 it	being	used	to	drive	connective	action.	 This	 may	 be	 because	 these	 tweet	 samples	 do	 not	 coincide	 with	 the	organisational	 phase	 of	 the	 clean-up	 movement	 (in	 London,	 certainly,	 many	clean-up	 groups	 began	 to	 be	 organised	 on	 Monday,	 though	 clean-up	 efforts	continued	through	the	study	period	and	were	only	 just	beginning	elsewhere	 in	the	 country).	Alternatively,	 it	may	be	 that	 the	#RiotCleanUp	hashtag	–	 cited	as	evidence	 of	 the	 coordinating	 effect	 (Ball	 2011)	 –	 was	 misinterpreted	 as	 a	signification	tool.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	#OperationCupOfTea	hashtag,	itself	a	Twitter	campaign,	seemed	to	serve	primarily	as	a	tool	to	help	users	collectivise	an	identity	in	opposition	to	the	rioters.			
Similarly,	 there	 is	 little	 evidence	 that	 Twitter	 was	 used	 to	 provide	 situational	information	or	to	facilitate	hyper-local	communicative	exchange.	While	this	may	be	 explained	 by	 the	 timing	 of	 the	 sampling	 periods,	 there	 is	 also	 an	 argument	that	 Twitter’s	 macro-level	 affordances	 work	 against	 local	 coordination	 and	situational	 information	 exchange	 in	 all	 but	 exceptional	 circumstances.	 Put	simply,	as	soon	as	a	hashtag	stream	reaches	a	certain	level	of	activity,	it	ceases	to	be	 an	 efficient	 tool	 for	 sourcing	 and	 sharing	 local	 information.	 Situational	exchange	requires	relatively	few	users	contributing	and	responding	to	tweets	–	so	that	each	tweet	has	a	chance	to	be	seen	and	each	user	has	a	chance	to	identify	relevant	information.			
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5.	 The	 situational	 efficacy	 of	 a	 hashtag	 is	 inversely	 proportional	 to	 its	popularity	–	to	the	density	of	discourse	flow.		
Many	of	the	links	shared	through	the	riot	public	direct	users	not	to	informational	content	 but	 to	 some	 form	 of	 adjunctive	 discussion.	Within	 this	 broad	 content	category,	 tweets	 are	 further	 distinguished	 by	 being	 either	 productive	 or	 non-productive,	and	by	their	thematic	content.	The	difference	between	a	productive	and	a	non-productive	tweet	 is	unavoidably	a	matter	of	reviewer	interpretation.	The	 coding	 criteria	 are	 relatively	 simply,	 however.	 A	 productive	 tweet	 must	include	 some	 form	of	 commentary	or	opinion,	while	 a	non-productive	 tweet	 is	purely	an	emotional	reaction.	Within	the	adjunctive	discussion	category	(n=593)	there	are	266	tweets	categorised	as	non-productive	and	327	productive	tweets.	Across	the	coding	sample,	then,	33%	of	tweets	are	coded	as	making	some	sort	of		productive	contribution	to	riot	discourse.		
Both	productive	and	non-productive	discussion	tweets	are	interpreted	as	being	contributions	to	riot	discourse	–	the	term	is	used	in	its	general	sense,	to	describe	shared	 meaning-making	 practices,	 rather	 than	 Foucault’s	 narrower	 definition,	which	is	concerned	specifically	with	power.	In	order	to	contribute	to	discourse,	a	tweet	 must	 represent	 an	 individually	 held	 meaning	 (i.e.	 it	 must	 assign	 some	value	 to	some	form	of	knowledge).	This	representational	assignment,	however,	does	not	on	 its	own	 imply	a	productive	or	deliberative	 contribution.	Assigning	value	can	be	rational	and	considered	but	it	can	also	be	emotive	and	reactive.			
The	 distinction	 between	 productive	 and	 non-productive	 tweets	 does	 not	influence	 subsequent	 coding	 strategies:	 all	 adjunctive	 discussion	 tweets	 are	evaluated	for	thematic	content	and	deliberative	potential.	There	are	two	reasons	
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why	the	distinction	is	useful	however.	First	it	assists	in	the	initial	content	coding	process:	 being	 able	 to	 distinguish	 between	 types	 of	 discussion	 helps	 construct	the	broader	discussion	categories.	Second,	it	is	useful	to	have	this	distinction	to	return	 to	 after	 thematic	 coding	 and,	 especially,	 after	 deliberative	 scoring,	because	 it	 can	act	 as	 a	validation	mechanism	–	a	 reference	point	 to	make	 sure	that	later	coding	decisions	do	not	contradict	earlier	readings.		
6.	 There	are	two	dominant	thematic	concerns	in	the	riot	public:			
• Discussing	 the	 social,	 moral	 and	 cultural	causes/explanations	for	the	riots.	
• Establishing	 the	 rioters	 as	others:	 a	 group	external	 to	 and	transgressive	of	social	and	cultural	norms.		
It	 is	 worth	 reflecting	 on	 the	 different	 emphases	 within	 these	 two	 thematic	categories.	 The	 semiotic	 struggle	 around	 the	 word	 ‘rioter’	 is	 particularly	significant	 in	 light	of	 the	corresponding	political	 struggle.	The	 tension	between	the	 different	 representational	 positions	 –	 rioter	 as	 criminal	 versus	 rioter	 as	protester	 –	 plays	 out	 in	 predictable	 fashion,	 with	 conservative	 politicians	 and	newspapers	 emphasising	 destruction	 and	 looting,	 while	 liberal	 commentators	urge	contextual	understanding.		
7.	 Social	 complexity	 arguments	 are	 over-represented	 in	 the	 productive	discussion	category	while	rioter	as	other	claims	are	over-represented	in	the	non-productive	category.		
Tweets	that	share	media	content	tend	to	promote	socially	complex	explanations	of	 rioting.	 An	 analysis	 of	 media	 content	 within	 the	 productive	 ADJ	 category	
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reveals	 that	49%	of	 tweets	containing	 links	are	coded	SOC,	 implying	that	some	sort	of	constructivist	argument	is	being	made.	The	SOC	and	RAO	codes	are	also	distributed	 differently	 across	 software-structures:	 the	 #UKRiots	 hashtag,	 in	particular,	contains	more	SOC	tweets	than	might	be	expected	and	the	hashtag	is	over-represented	 in	 the	 productive	 compared	 to	 the	 non-productive	 sample.	Further	investigation	is	required	to	explain	why	this	might	be,	but	it	is	clear	that	discourse	flows	are	not	flat	on	Twitter.		
8.	 Content	 codes	and	 thematic	 categories	are	not	evenly	distributed	on	Twitter;	 they	 appear	 to	 concentrate	 in	 software-structural	 layers	(hashtags)	in	ways	that	appear	associated	with	the	type	of	adjunctive	discussion	within	tweets.		
The	 #UKRiots	 hashtag,	 for	 instance,	 has	 far	 more	 SOC	 tweets	 than	 any	 other	thematic	 category,	 but	within	 the	 hashtag,	 the	 differences	 between	 productive	and	non-productive	frequencies	are	less	than	the	averages	for	the	whole	coding	sample.	This	observation	is	 important	for	a	couple	of	reasons.	First,	 it	confirms	that	 there	 is	 an	 association	 between	 the	 thematic	 subject	 –	 social	 causes	 of	rioting	 –	 and	 the	 interpretative	 coding	 (productivity).	 Second,	 it	 suggests	 that	there	 may	 be	 a	 relationship	 between	 the	 #UKRiots	 hashtag	 and	 productive	intentionality.	 This	 might	 imply	 the	 existence	 of	 hashtags	 cultures:	 the	construction	 and	 differentiation	 of	 meaning-making	 practices	 within	 Twitter’s	structural	layers.	
Over	half	of	the	tweets	examined	during	the	close	reading	phase	of	analysis	were	assigned	an	adjunctive	discussion	code.	In	itself	this	is	a	significant	observation,	because	while	Twitter	is	used	extensively	as	a	link	and	information	exchange,	it	
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clearly	also	enables	users	to	engage	in	meaning-making	practices.	Not	all	of	this	meaning-making	 is	 productive,	 and	 certainly	 not	 all	 of	 it	 is	 deliberative	 –	 the	struggle	to	signify	is	emotional	and	reactive	at	times	–	but	a	significant	number	of	 tweets	 are	 productive.	 Even	with	 the	 140-character	 limit,	 Twitter	 users	 are	able	 to	 state	 a	 range	 of	 value	 positions	 and	 to	 support	 those	 positions	 with	personal	commentary	and	calls	to	shared	knowledge.		
The	 major	 hashtags	 support	 discourse	 across	 a	 range	 of	 concerns	 and	 it	 is	noteworthy	that	certain	themes	and	certain	types	of	tweet	concentrate	in	certain	hashtags.	The	full	 implications	of	that	observation	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section:	 it	 appears	 that	 Twitter’s	 software-structures	 not	 only	 enable	 different	types	of	speech	act,	but	that	they	may	do	so	in	systematic	ways	–	or,	at	least,	in	ways	 that	 can	 be	 described	 systematically,	 or	 categorised,	 at	 the	 different	structural	levels.		
There	 are	 several	 important	 thematic	 concerns	 in	 the	 riot	 public.	 The	 first	 is	establishing	 some	sort	of	 causal	 framework	 to	explain	 riot	 activity	–	 a	popular	sociology	 of	 the	 riots	 and	 the	 rioters.	 The	 second	 thematic	 category	 is	constructed	 around	 claims	 that	 rioting	 is	 a	 reductive	 act	 and	 that	 rioters	transgress	the	social	collective,	not	only	through	their	rioting	but	through	their	social	action	more	generally:	 through	their	cultural	norms,	 their	perceived	 lack	of	 morality,	 their	 economic	 dependency	 and	 so	 on.	 It	 is	 easy	 to	 frame	 this	position	 in	opposition	to	 the	 first,	 to	cast	an	empathetic	 liberal	group	against	a	reactionary	conservative	one,	but	this	risks	both	reducing	the	complexity	of	the	discourse	and	imposing	tired	political	tropes	on	discourse	that	is	far	more	alive	and	engaged	than	this.	
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In	addition	to	this	tension	between	a	complex	and	reductive	sociology	of	rioting,	a	large	number	of	tweets	question	the	appropriate	response	to	the	riots,	though	within	 this	 category	 positions	 vary	 dramatically	 –	 there	 are	 angry	 attempts	 to	incite	the	state	into	violence	and	warnings	that	such	reactions	risk	social	schisms	and	 escalations	 of	 violence.	 Another	 important	 theme	 for	 Twitter	 users	 is	 the	culpability	 of	 the	 political	 and	 professional	 class:	 clearly	 the	 global	 financial	crisis	(2008)	and	the	political	expenses	scandal	(2009)	remain	raw	wounds	for	the	 riot	 public	 –	 a	 live	 and	 present	 history,	 as	 it	 were.	 These	 events	 are	 used	repeatedly	 to	 implicate	 politicians	 and	 bankers	 in	 their	 own	 form	 of	 looting,	often	 as	 part	 of	 a	 rhetorical	 attempt	 to	 undermine	 a	 hard-line	 or	 reactionary	politics.		
A	final	thematic	category	discusses	the	role	of	the	media	during	the	riot.	Within	this	category	there	are	 independent	concerns,	one	of	which	is	the	role	of	social	media,	 including	 Twitter	 itself.	 Several	 tweets	 address	 David	 Cameron’s	apparent	 lack	of	understanding	of	Twitter	–	a	claim	that	 is	made	repeatedly	 in	response	to	his	statement	in	parliament	in	which	he	discussed	authorising	police	to	intervene	in	social	media	channels.		
What	this	very	brief	summary	of	riot	discourse	illustrates	is	that	there	are	both	a	range	 of	 views	 and	 topics	 being	 represented	 and,	within	 this	 representational	spectrum,	 some	 important	 categories	 in	 which	 the	 struggle	 to	 signify	 is	particularly	active	or	engaged.	Furthermore,	discourse	is	not	flat,	which	is	to	say	that	meaning	does	not	 flow	randomly	across	hashtags,	 follower	networks,	 time	and	space.	Rather,	what	appears	to	be	happening,	is	that	discourse	concentrates	in	certain	channels:	certain	types	of	tweet	dealing	with	certain	types	of	content	
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are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 found	 under	 certain	 hashtags	 at	 certain	 times.	 It	 is	 not	sufficient	 to	 rely	 solely	 on	 software-structures	 to	 explain	 this	 phenomenon	 –	why	should	#UKRiots	signify	a	forum	for	productive	exchange	more	so	than	any	other	hashtag.	A	relationship	may	have	been	established	but	there	is	not,	as	yet,	any	 form	 of	 explanation	 for	 the	 relationship.	 To	 develop	 an	 explanation,	 it	 is	necessary	to	combine	insight	from	the	first	two	research	questions	and	to	pursue	a	temporal-spatial	analysis	of	meaning-making.	
	
QUESTION	2:	IS	THERE	EVIDENCE	OF	DELIBERATION,	OR	AT	LEAST	OF	DISCOURSE	THAT	
DOES	NOT	PRECLUDE	A	NORMATIVE	DELIBERATIVE	MODEL?	
The	deliberative	analysis	attempted	to	apply	an	interpretation	of	communication	based	on	Habermas’	normative	validity	 claims,	using	 criteria	developed	 to	 suit	the	 requirements	 of	 the	 research	 questions	 and	 adapted	 to	 respond	 to	 the	peculiarities	 of	 tweet	 utterances.	 Such	 an	 approach	 assumes	 that	 tweets	represent	individual	positional	statements	vis-a-vis	the	thematic	concerns	of	the	riot	public.	Deliberative	potential	is	thus	dependent	on	the	mode	of	engagement	between	tweet	and	thematic	concern:	the	more	criteria	that	the	tweet	satisfies,	the	more	deliberative	it	is	assumed	to	be.		
This	 approach	 reveals	 structural	 differences	 between	 hashtags:	 some	 are	consistently	and	systematically	more	deliberative	than	others.		
9.	 In	 terms	 of	 a	 riot	 public,	 the	 #UKRiots,	 #LondonRiots	 and	 #Riots	hashtags	 were	 the	 most	 deliberative,	 with	 #OperationCupOfTea	
	277 
scoring	significantly		lower	
It	appears	therefore	that	deliberation	 is	associated	with	thematic	concerns	and	that	 certain	 hashtags	 have	 specific	 thematic	 intent.	 In	 other	 words,	 both	deliberation	and	thematic	discourse	tends	to	aggregate	within	some	riot-related	hashtags	but	not	all.	#OperationCupOfTea,	for	instance,	was	used	for	a	particular	non-deliberative	purpose:	 for	displaying	weak-tie	solidarity	with	a	campaign	of	representational	resilience.	
More	 generic	 hashtags	 tend	 to	 be	 appended	 to	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 thematic	messages,	and	so	have	the	potential	to	be	associated	with	deliberative	discussion	in	a	way	 that	#OperationCupOfTea	does	not.	 It	 is	 tempting	 to	 suggest	 that	 this	specificity	 is	 directly	 proportional	 to	 the	 deliberativeness	 of	 hashtags,	 but	 the	relationship	 is	 too	 inconsistent	 to	 assert	 this	 with	 any	 confidence,	 and	 the	specificity	of	a	hashtag	is	an	interpretative	assignment.	So,	while	the	three	lowest	scoring	 hashtags	 in	 terms	 of	 deliberativeness	 were	 #OperationCupOfTea,	#ManchesterRiots	 and	 #BirminghamRiots	 (which	 for	 different	 reasons	 signify	quite	specific	contexts),	#Riots	(the	most	generic	hashtag)	is	not	much	used	for	linking	 and	 #LondonRiots	 (again,	 seemingly	 specific)	 is	 used	more	 heavily	 for	linking,	but	is	not	as	deliberative	as	#UKRiots.		
The	fact	that	external	media	may	be	responsible	for	certain	hashtags	appearing	more	 deliberative	 than	 others	 does	 not	 necessarily	 condemn	 the	 legitimacy	 of	the	tweet	as	deliberative	utterance,	but	it	does	underline	the	importance	of	this	particular	 affordance	 in	 the	 riot	 public.	 It	 also	 raises	 questions	 about	 the	temporality	of	deliberation.	The	real-timeness	of	the	tweet	may	be	at	odds	with	the	 enlightenment	 principles	 of	 normative	 deliberation;	 it	 is	 when	 the	
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temporality	 of	 the	 tweet	 can	 be	 extended	 (through	hyperlinking	 and	unfurling	texts)	 that	 deliberation	 seems	 more	 probable.	 Paradoxically,	 this	 unfurling	defers	meaningxxxi	–	 there	 is	 always	 another	 link	 to	 click,	 another	 argument	 in	another	text	–		which	presumably	makes	consensus	all	the	more	difficult.		
However,	deliberation	is	distributed	unevenly	across	thematic	concerns	as	well	as	 hashtags.	 Certain	 positions	 are	 associated	with	 deliberativeness,	 and	 others	are	 not.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 reiterate	 that	 this	 association	 could	 be	 a	 product	 of	reviewer	 political	 preferences	 (favoured	 arguments	 are	 coded	 as	 more	deliberative),	 but	 the	 specificity	 of	 the	 criteria	 and	 the	 double-blind	 scoring	should	have	mitigated	against	this.		
The	neoliberal	critique	code	(NLC)	was	scored	the	most	deliberative	followed	by	the	 liberal	 critique	 (LC),	 as	 should	be	expected,	 given	 that	 these	 codes	 imply	a	relatively	advanced	form	of	political	critique.	Neither	were	assigned	particularly	often,	 however.	 Their	 high	 deliberative	 scores	may	 be	 partly	 explained	 by	 the	relative	 infrequency	 of	 assignment.	 The	 same	 cannot	 be	 said	 for	 the	 social	complexity	(SOC)	and	political	responsibility	(POL)	codes,	which	were	assigned	far	more	frequently.		
Perhaps	 those	 Twitter	 users	 who	 hold	 politically	 liberal	 ideas	 are	 genuinely	more	deliberative	than	conservatives,	but	these	observations	raise	an	important	question:	do	 the	scoring	criteria	–	and	by	extension	 the	normative	deliberative	model	 itself	 –	 favour	 liberal	 ideology?	 In	 other	 words,	 will	 an	 argument	 that	emphasises	 the	 complexity	 of	 causation	 and	 assigns	 cross-class	 responsibility	always	seem	more	deliberative	than	one	that	reduces	responsibility	to	individual	agents	 and	 blames	 moral	 failings?	 This	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 question	 about	
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communicative	 action	 and	 the	 scoring	 	 model.	 Many	 of	 the	 more	 deliberative	tweets	scored	highly	because	they	included	links	to	external	media	texts,	which	called	 on	 external	 knowledge	 to	 make	 complex	 statements	 of	 comprehension	and	 explanation.	Many	of	 these	 texts	were	written	by	 ‘professional’	 journalists	and	 commentators	 for	 liberal	media	 outlets.	 There	 is	 a	 distinct	 possibility	 that	deliberation,	 as	 identified	 and	 scored	 here,	 simply	 characterises	 a	 culture	 and	style	 of	 discourse	 among	 certain	 commentators	 in	 a	 certain	 domain	 of	 the	mediasphere.		
If	 this	 is	 a	 particularising	 style	 of	 discourse,	 then	 it	 suggests	 that	 rather	 than	enabling	 engagement	 between	 liberal	 and	 conservative	 positions,	 Twitter	permits	these	positions	to	circulate	independent	of	each	other.		
10. The	hashtag	suggests	coordination	but	the	association	may	be	illusory:	within	 hashtags	 there	 are	 discourse	 cultures	 that,	 effectively,	 speak	different	 langues.	 Deliberation,	 then,	 rather	 than	 being	 a	 democratic	ideal,	 is	 simply	 a	 dialect	 within	 wider	 language	 wars.	 There	 is	 no	evidence,	even,	that	different	dialects	speak	to	each	other:	deliberation	may	be	a	marker	of	difference	rather	than	a	route	to	consensus.			
Much	 of	 this	 discussion	 is	 speculative	 –	 from	 an	 empirical	 perspective,	conclusions	 from	 the	 deliberative	 scoring	 must	 be	 cautious	 and	 contextual.	Deliberation	varies	between	communicative	structures	and	thematic	concerns.	It	seems	 that	 both	 meaning	 and	 deliberativeness	 concentrate	 around	 certain	subjects	and	certain	structural	affordances.		
However,	the	discussion	so	far	has	approached	deliberation	from	the	perspective	
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of	Habermas’	validity	claims	only	and	has	made	no	mention	of	his	 ideal	speech	conditions.	 This	 is	 a	 reductive	 interpretation	 of	 communicative	 action	 and	 a	reductive	 exposition	 of	 Twitter’s	 affordances.	 Deliberation	 depends	 on	 more	than	 individual	Twitter	users	engaging	 fully	with	thematic	concerns:	 they	must	also	 engage	 with	 each	 other	 productively.	 Ideal	 speech	 requires	 that	 Twitter	users:	
• Have	equal	and	symmetric	opportunities	to	contribute.	
• Have	the	ability	to	raise	any	proposition	or	position.	
• Allow	 a	 “full	 and	 equal”	 consideration	 of	 propositions	 and	positions	raised.	(Jacobson	and	Pan	2008).		
An	assessment	of	 ideal	speech	requires	an	overview	of	discourse	–	a	review	of	these	 three	 criteria	 across	 the	 riot	 public.	 In	 turn,	 that	 requires	 some	 thought	about	 the	 affordances	 that	 enable	 Twitter	 users	 to	 engage	 with	 each	 and	 the	distribution	of	those	affordances	across	the	structural	layers.		
First,	is	there	evidence	of	equal	and	symmetric	opportunities	to	contribute?	The	evidence	collected	so	 far	 rather	suggests	not.	Specifically,	 it	has	been	observed	that	follower	numbers	have	an	overriding	influence	on	the	persistence	of	tweets.	Hashtag	streams	are	dramatically	reshaped	by	tweets	from	popular	users	–	the	personal	public	dominates	 the	macro	public.	Furthermore,	 these	popular	users	stimulate	far	greater	engagement	with	their	tweets:	the	longest	retweet	changes	started	 with	 celebrity	 and	 institutional	 accounts.	 An	 analysis	 of	 follower	numbers	 in	the	riot	public	reveals	 that	 there	are	only	nine	accounts	with	more	than	 50,000	 followers.	 One	 of	 those	 accounts	 belongs	 to	 a	 celebrity	 comedian,	
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one	a	celebrity	YouTube	blogger,	and	the	others	are	all	media	‘institutions’.	This	raises	a	significant	challenge	to	the	idea	that	Twitter	liberates	information	flows	from	established	hierarchies:	the	accounts	that	dominate	in	the	Twitter	network	tend	to	be	influential	offline	too.	
Account	 Followers	
timminchin	 208106	
WTFSexFacts	 69168	
TelegraphNews	 54843	
ANCALERTS	 287419	
ZDFonline	 54460	
BBCWorld	 915703	
cnntech	 52608	
MotherJones	 66488	
sampepper	 205492	
	
Table	11:	the	most	frequently	followed	user	accounts	in	the	riot	public	are	predominantly	
celebrity	and	media	accounts.	
Second,	 does	 Twitter	 permit	 users	 to	 raise	 any	 proposition	 or	 position?	 This	would	appear	a	straightforward	question,	in	that	Twitter	places	few	restrictions	
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on	the	utterances	of	its	users,	and	hardly	any	tweets	failed	the	appropriateness	test	(which,	in	any	case,	was	a	coding	test	and	not	an	extrapolation	of	Twitter’s	permissions	 system).	However,	 as	Geiger	 (2009)	has	argued,	digital	media	 like	Twitter	 are	 complex	 algorithmic	 systems	 for	 promoting	 content	 differentially:	while	some	tweets	reach	large	audiences,	others	do	not.	While	transmission	may	be	 egalitarian,	 reception	 can	 be	 discriminatory.	 If	 this	 discrimination	systematically	 silences	particular	propositions	or	particular	persons	or	groups,	then	 Twitter	 does	 not	 permit	 any	 person	 to	 contribute	 any	 proposition	 to	 the	public	 forum:	 in	 other	 words,	 ideal	 speech	 requires	 that	 Twitter’s	communicative	layers	interact	deliberatively:	all	tweets	must	be	born	equal.	
Clearly	 this	 is	not	 the	 case.	As	van	Dijck	and	Poell	 (2013)	note,	popularity	 is	 a	central	 driver	 of	 content	 sharing,	 and	 Twitter’s	 follower-following	 dynamics	ensure	 that	 popularity	 is	 inherent	 to	 position	 and	 status.	 Furthermore,	 the	algorithms	that	promote	tweets,	including	those	that	identify	trending	topics	and	suggest	 content,	 operate	 according	 to	 metrics	 that	 are	 part	 popularity-based,	part	commercial	and	part	unknownxxxii.	
In	other	words,	if	Twitter	prevents	a	full	and	equal	consideration	of	propositions	(criteria	three),	then	this	in	turn	undermines	criteria	two,	because	the	difference	between	speaking	and	being	heard	is	greater	and	more	complicated	because	of	systematic	and	algorithmic	differentiation,	much	of	which	may	be	hidden	 from	users.		
Having	 said	 that,	 Twitter	 does	 not	 have	 to	 satisfy	 every	 normative	 ideal	 to	surpass	 existing	 media	 channels	 in	 terms	 of	 deliberativeness,	 and	 more	deliberative	 (even	 a	 little	 more)	 is	 theoretically	 better	 for	 democracy.	 So	 the	
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question,	really,	should	be:	does	Twitter	offer	more	opportunities	for	more	users	to	raise,	consider	and	respond	to	propositions	compared	to	alternative	media?	
This	question	asks	for	affordance-specific	analysis.	To	be	properly	deliberative,	a	hashtag	 needs	 to	 support	 different	 thematic	 concerns,	 to	 satisfy	 the	 validity	claims	and	to	display	sufficient	evidence	of	user-user	interaction	(@	replies)	and	interaction	between	 the	structural	 layers	 (retweets)	 (Bruns	and	Moe	2014).	At	the	same	time,	the	retweets	and	@	replies	need	to	suggest	that	Twitter	is	doing	more	than	other	media	to	limit	structural	bias	(for	example,	ignoring	low	status	users	with	few	followers).		
	
Figure	 28:	 graph	 showing	 the	 percentage	 of	 the	 combined	 #LondonRiots	 and	 UKRiots	
streams	that	are	retweets	
It	makes	sense	 to	conduct	such	an	analysis	on	the	hashtag	streams	that	scored	best	in	the	validity	claim	coding:	#UKRiots	and	#LondonRiots.	First	the	numbers	
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of	 retweets,	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	 total	 tweets,	 for	 the	 combined	 streams	 is	displayed	 in	 figure	28.	Across	 the	entire	 study	period,	 there	were	5197	 tweets	sent	under	these	two	hashtags,	of	which	2145	(41%)	were	retweets.	The	other	five	 hashtags	 combined	 (n=2948)	 contained	 1066	 retweets	 (36%).	 So	 in	 the	more	deliberative	hashtag	streams,	there	is	some	evidence	that	users	are	doing	more	to	transfer	tweets	between	structural	layers,	the	suggestion	being	that	this	implies	reception,	consideration	and	some	sort	of	recommendation	(or	criticism,	if	 for	 instance	 the	 original	 tweet	 is	 edited	with	 commentary).	 As	 ever,	 though,	these	quantitative	measures	should	be	treated	with	some	caution.			
It	 is	 more	 difficult	 to	 count	 user-user	 engagement	 within	 the	 #UKRiots	 and	#LondonRiots	streams	because	of	the	more	general	syntax	involved	and	the	way	that	 Twitter	 encodes	 this	 interaction	 into	metadata.	 There	 is	 a	 data	 field	 that	records	 a	 direct	 reply	 to	 a	 previous	 tweet,	 but	 this	 does	 not	 capture	 the	 full	extent	 of	 user-user	 interactions,	 only	 those	 that	 operate	 through	 Twitter’s	 in-built	 retweet	 methods.	 There	 are	 240	 replies	 in	 the	 combined	 stream	 (5%),	which	suggests	that	there	is	little	in	the	way	of	inter-user	dialogue	(and,	indeed,	less	 than	 under	 the	 other	 hashtags	 –	 9%).	 Such	 low	 user-user	 interaction	replicates	findings	from	other	studies	(e.g.	Pond	2015)	and	is	clearly	problematic	for	a	literal	interpretation	of	ideal	speech.	If	Twitter	is	enabling	deliberation	then	it	is	through	a	distanciated		process	of	exchange	and	reflection	at	the	meso	and	macro	levels.	
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QUESTION	 3:	 HOW	 DO	 THE	 SOFTWARE-STRUCTURES	 OF	 TWITTER	 SHAPE	 THE	
TEMPORAL	AND	SPATIAL	DYNAMICS	OF	COMMUNICATION	IN	THE	RIOT	PUBLIC?	
The	third	research	question	seeks	to	emphasise	the	role	that	software	can	play	in	shaping	 interactions	 between	 human	 users	 and	 digital	 communication	technologies.	According	to	the	conceptual	framework,	that	role	can	be	imagined	via	categories	of	 logic,	of	which	two	broad	types	emerge:	communicational	and	organisational.	 Organisational	 logics	 are	 those	 that	 supposedly	 connect	 and	coordinate	 the	 Twitter	 public.	 Communicational	 logics	 influence	 the	 way	 that	communication	happens	within	that	public,	both	in	terms	of	engaging	individual	users	in	collective	discourse	and	shaping	the	type	of	discourse	that	happens.		
The	investigative	and	analytical	work	aimed	to	elucidate	these	communicational	logics,	emphasising	the	role	of	certain	communicative	structures	–	the	outcomes	of	 interactions	 between	 human	 users	 and	 software-enabled	 affordances	 –	including	hashtags,	 follower	networks	 and	 retweet	practices.	 Several	 empirical	measurement	techniques	(metrics)	were	developed	to	frame	the	study	of	these	different	structures.	Those	measures,	and	the	outcomes	of	their	application,	are	reviewed	in	this	phase	of	concluding	discussion.	
The	conceptual	framework	also	established	that	temporal	and	spatial	dynamics	are	 particularly	 important	 for	 understanding	 the	 relationship	 between	communicative	structures	and	meaning-making.	Pursuing	that	logic,	the	analysis	began	by	 trying	 to	 arrange	 riot-related	discourse	 into	 categories	 that	 could	 be	described	 temporally.	 These	 attempts	 produced	 an	 early	 methodological	conclusion:	
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11.	Key	words	 are	 poor	 signifiers	 for	meaning	when	 defining	 a	 Twitter	public	and	requesting	information	on	that	public	from	the	API.		
The	elusiveness	and	instability	of	the	sign	is	well	established	in	communication	theory	 –	 there	 is	 nothing	 surprising	 about	 this	 first	 conclusion	 (Lewis	 2008).	However,	 there	 are	 practical	 implications	 because	 of	 this	 instability,	 mostly	because	 keyword	 searching	 is	 a	 staple	 of	 Internet	methods	 (where	 admittedly	methodological	rigour	must	be	balanced	against	the	practical	possibilities	of	data	capture).	It	 is	relatively	easy	to	submit	a	keyword	(or	a	matrix	of	keywords)	to	an	 API	 and	 then	 to	 analyse	 the	 resulting	 data	 as	 though	 it	 were	 somehow	 a	unified	 and	 coherent	 public.	 However,	 the	 attempt	 to	 replicate	 this	 approach	with	 the	 riot	 keyword	 clearly	 illustrated	 its	 limits,	 which	 included	 both	 a	propensity	 to	 identify	 false	 positive	 tweets	 and	 considerable	 issues	 with	representation	(relating	data	to	actually	meaning-making	practices).			
12.	Hashtags	 are	 a	 more	 reliable	 signifier	 of	 discourse	 on	 Twitter	 but	there	 are	 temporal	 complexities	 that	 challenge	 the	 established	perception	 that	 hashtags	 “help	 to	 coordinate	 the	 exchange	 of	information	relevant	to…	topics”	and	signify	“a	wish	to	take	part	in	a	wider	communicative	process”	(Bruns	and	Moe	2014,	17-18).			
The	logic	for	the	hashtag	as	a	coordination	mechanism	for	deliberative	discourse	depends	upon	two	factors.	First,	Twitter	users	must	knowingly	use	the	hashtag	to	 align	 their	 tweets	with	 topics	 or	with	wider	 communicative	 processes,	 and	second	other	Twitter	users	must	be	able	to	use	the	hashtag	to	find,	consider	and	to	 evaluate	 those	 tweets	 as	 part	 of	 their	 own	 communicative	 reasoning.	 The	issue	here	is	that	there	is	potentially	a	disconnect	between	how	Twitter	presents	
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to	researchers	through	its	API	and	the	communicative	practices	of	actual	human	users.	 If	 coordination	 is	 neither	 intentional	 nor	 recognised,	 then	 there	 is	 a	epistemological	challenge	to	the	status	of	that	coordination.		
This	uncertainty	 is	emblematic	of	a	 recurrent	 issue	 in	big	data	 research.	While	the	 abundance	 of	 data	 points	 promises	 to	 reveal	 ‘deep	 truths’	 about	communication	 and	meaning-making,	 it	 is	 often	 difficult	 to	 align	 these	 ‘truths’	with	conceptual	frameworks	and	real	activity	in	the	human	lifeworld	(Crawford	et	al.	2014).	The	hashtag	is	easily	accessible	through	the	Twitter	API,	an	obvious	way	to	collate	like	Tweets,	easy	to	represent	in	a	database	and	consequently	easy	to	search	during	analysis.	This	is	not	to	claim	that	the	hashtag	is	simply	a	digital	or	 data-processing	 artefact:	 it	 was	 conceived	 and	 developed	 by	 Twitter	 users,	initially	 with	 a	 function	 something	 like	 tagging,	 and	 only	 later	 did	 Twitter’s	developers	formalise	this	functionality.	Twitter	now	uses	the	hashtag	to	drive	its	Trends	algorithms.		
Nevertheless,	the	difference	between	the	hashtag	‘as	studied’	and	the	hashtag	‘as	lived’	should	not	be	 flattened,	reduced	or	 ignored.	This	claim	is	best	 illustrated	by	an	example.	In	each	of	the	sample	periods,	there	are	potentially	hundreds	of	hashtags	that	could	contribute	to	the	riot	public,	 in	that	they	appear	to	be	used	intentionally	 to	 signify	 meaning	 as	 part	 of	 a	 wider	 topical	 discourse.	 Even	limiting	the	analysis	to	major	or	common	hashtags,	there	are	still	seven	hashtags	with	different	emphases:	locale,	scale	and	intent.	This	plurality	of	signifiers	calls	into	 question	 the	 coordinating	 potential	 of	 hashtags:	 whom	 are	 they	coordinating	and	how	are	they	doing	 it?	Are	they	coordinating	human	users	or	textual	meanings?	If	it	is	users,	how	are	those	users	aware	of	each	other,	and	if	it	
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is	 text,	 in	 what	 sense	 does	 the	 coordinated	 text	 represent	 discourse	 between	human	users?		
13.	The	 temporality	of	hashtag	streams	may	reveal	 something	about	 the	dynamics	of	discourse	coordination.			
Stream	density	records	the	number	of	tweets	published	under	a	given	hashtag	in	a	 predetermined	 period.	 According	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 stream	 densities	 for	 the	major	 hashtags	 in	 the	 riot	 public,	 certain	 hashtags	 are	 aligned	 temporally	 far	more	closely	than	others.	This	raises	the	possibility	that	discourse	streams	could	be	identified	by	their	rate	of	flow	in	addition	to	textual	signifiers.		
This	 is	 a	 significant	 insight:	 stream	density	does	not	 supersede	 text,	 nor	 can	 it	replace	 text	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 discourse	 streams.	 Rather,	 stream	 density	represents	the	temporality	of	discourse	around	text	or,	indeed,	around	any	other	structural	or	semiotic	classifiers.	The	technology	contributes	to	the	construction	of	 this	 temporality,	 shaping	 the	 flow	of	discourse	streams,	but	so	does	 the	 text	itself,	as	do	human	users	situated	within	social	and	cultural	networks.	 In	some	respects,	 it	 is	misleading	 to	 talk	of	Twitter	 time	or	network	 time,	more	widely,	because	such	terminology	 implies	 that	 temporality	 is	somehow	a	characteristic	of	 the	 technology,	 whereas	 in	 fact	 temporality	 is	 a	 characteristic	 of	 practices	enabled	 or	 supported	 by	 the	 technology.	 To	 emphasise	 stream	 density	 is	 to	recognise	 that	meaning-making	practices	 have	 a	 temporal	 dimension,	 and	 that	this	temporal	dimension	can	help	differentiate	between	practices.		
Temporal	 classification	 cannot	 precede	 textual	 classification	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	API.	 In	 short,	 temporality	 will	 always	 be	 subordinate	 to	 primary	 structural	
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classifiers.	 There	 are	 two	 reasons	 for	 this.	 First,	 the	 temporality	 of	 the	 API	 is	rate-limited	and	constant:	 the	spritzer	stream	returns	15,000	tweets	every	 five	minutes	 –	 there	 is	 no	 access	 to	 the	 temporality	 of	 the	Twitter	 stream.	 Second,	temporality	is	a	relative	measure,	a	marker	of	difference	between	one	construct	and	another.	It	has	no	absolute	value.		
14.	Twitter	 time	 is	 a	 complex	 assemblage	 of	 relative	 flows	 in	 different	structural	and	textual	layers.		
Macro	 level	 textual	 signifiers	 (hashtags)	 are	 required	 to	 identify	 broadly	contextual	 meanings	 among	 the	mass	 flows	 from	 the	 API;	 within	 these	 broad	categories,	 stream	 density	 can	 differentiate	 between	 the	 relative	 frequency	 of	different	 textual	 signifiers.	 Such	differentiation,	 however,	 only	 captures	part	 of	the	 story:	 the	 structural	dimensions	of	Twitter	 construct	 temporalities	of	 their	own,	which	can	distort	the	temporality	of	hashtag	flows.	Clearly	it	is	important	to	identify	 the	 appropriate	 aspect	 from	which	 to	 observe	 these	 shifting	 temporal	flows;	equally,	it	is	important	to	recognise	that	the	study	of	Twitter	is	really	the	study	of	structural	and	textual	interactions	within	the	Twitter	ecosystem.			
15.	Within	the	meso	and	micro	layers,	users	with	large	follower	numbers	appear	 to	 distort	 stream	 density,	 primarily	 through	 increasing	 the	persistence	of	individual	tweets.	
The	ability	to	follow	a	registered	Twitter	user	is	among	the	primary	and	defining	features	 of	 the	 software.	 Following	 functionality	 enables	 Twitter	 users	 to	construct	a	personalised	stream	of	tweets,	which	is	typically	the	central	feature	of	 the	 user	 interface	when	 accessing	 the	 software	 through	 a	 browser	 or	 via	 a	
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smartphone	application.		As	Schmidt	(2014,	4)	notes,	this	following	functionality	has	 enabled	 “a	 new	 type	 of	 publicness”,	 through	 which	 a	 Twitter	 user	 may	address	 a	 personalised	 audience	 of	 voluntary	 subscribers.	 However,	 the	voluntary	 aspect	 of	 subscription	 produces	 huge	 differentials	 in	 public	 size,	 in	which	 vast	 audiences	 (many	 millions)	 aggregate	 around	 very	 few	 prestige	accounts,	 typically	 celebrities,	 opinion	 leaders	 and	 corporate	 and	 media	institutions.	 In	 the	 riot	 public,	 the	 average	 number	 of	 followers	 was	approximately	 1000,	 but	 the	 most	 followed	 account	 had	 nearly	 one	 1	 million	followers.				
These	 differentials	 further	 challenge	 any	 notion	 of	 unified	 stream	 temporality:	not	 all	 tweets	 are	born	 equal.	A	 fundamental	 condition	 for	Habermasiam	 ideal	speech	 is	 that	 all	 propositions	 have	 an	 equal	 opportunity	 to	 be	 heard:	 this	 is	clearly	 not	 the	 case	 on	 Twitter.	 Persistence	 calculations	 demonstrate	 the	enormous	 impact	 that	 a	 prestige	 account	 can	have	 on	 a	 discourse	 stream,	 and	raise	complex	questions	about	 the	nature	of	 temporality	 itself.	Primarily,	 these	questions	relate	to	whether	discourse	 is	situated	(and	bound)	within	the	tweet	object	itself	or	if,	through	publication	and	the	transfer	to	other	structural	layers,	meaning	somehow	escapes	the	tweet	to	become	ambient	on	Twitter.	If	meaning	is	 seen	 to	reside	solely	 in	 the	 immediate	context	of	 its	 textual	 signification	(i.e.	within	 the	 tweet),	 then	 persistence	 is	 highly	 relevant	 to	 an	 interpretation	 of	discourse	 –	 some	 tweets	 will	 be	 far	 more	 visible,	 far	 louder,	 in	 the	communicative	exchange	than	others.	If,	however,	discourse	is	located	in	macro-structural	 flows,	 in	 ambient	 streams,	 then	 subsidiary	 network	 structures	 are,	perhaps,	less	relevant	to	interpretation.				
	291 
16.	Persistence	 is	 a	 metric	 better	 suited	 to	 interpreting	 the	 relative	frequency	of	positional	representations	within	hashtag	flows.		
In	 terms	 of	 this	 thesis,	 interest	 is	 primarily	 focused	 on	 macro-level	 meaning-making	 and	 the	 notion	 of	 ambient	 discourse	within	 the	mediasphere.	What	 is	most	 relevant	 to	 this	 focus	 is	 the	 interaction	 between	 stream	 density	 and	persistence	 –	 to	 a	 certain	 extent,	 any	 effect	 of	 follower	 differentials	 on	 topical	discourse	 should	 be	 implicit	 later	 on	 in	 the	 stream.	 So,	 for	 instance,	 if	 a	 tweet	from	a	prestige	account	drives	discourse	towards	a	particular	position,	then	that	position	 should	 be	 represented	 accordingly	 in	 subsequent	 tweets	 within	 the	same	topical	stream.	
At	 the	micro	 structural	 layer,	 temporality	 is	 influenced	by	 retweeting,	 replying	and	 recommending	 practices.	 Analysis	 of	 retweeting	 in	 the	 riot	 public	 reveals	that	retweets	are	a	significant	factor	in	the	construction	of	stream	density:	nearly	40%	of	tweets	in	the	#LondonRiots	stream	are	retweets,	for	instance,	and	43%	of	tweets	in	the	#UKRiots	stream	are	retweets.	Retweeting	has	previously	been	used	 as	 a	 proxy	 measure	 for	 engagement	 (Chen	 and	 Pirolli	 2012)	 and	 the	implications	 for	 gauging	 the	 deliberative	 potential	 of	 discourse	 will	 be	considered	shortly.	In	terms	of	constructing	stream	temporality,	a	retweet	can	be	theorised	 as	 having	 a	 persistence	 equivalent	 to	 a	 unique	 tweet	 from	 the	 same	user.	 The	 practice	 of	 retweeting	 itself	 does	 not	 dramatically	 distort	 the	temporality	 of	 the	 published	 object;	 although	 there	 may	 be	 temporal	discontinuities	for	the	user,	in	terms	of	tweet	composition,	these	are	unknowable	post-publication.	 There	 may	 be	 user-specific	 Twitter	 practices	 that	 do	 distort	this	 temporality	 –	 a	 user	 can	 track	 his	 or	 her	 retweets	 for	 evidence	 of	
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engagement,	for	instance	–	but	these	specialist	uses	are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.			
In	 addition	 to	 the	 influence	 of	 retweeting	 on	macro-level	 discourse	 streams,	 it	must	also	be	recognised	that	micro-level	structures	construct	micro-level	flows.	These	 flows	 are	 evident	 in	 retweet	 chains,	 @	 reply	 conversations,	 lists	 of	favourite	tweets	and	so	on.	An	analysis	of	retweet	chains	revealed	little	that	was	linear	or	predictable	about	 the	 relationship	between	 retweet	practices	and	 the	temporality	 of	 those	 practices.	 At	 the	 micro-level	 the	 influence	 of	 other	structural	dynamics	is	likely	to	be	proportionally	far	greater.		
As	 predicted,	 it	 proved	 difficult	 to	 describe	 Twitter’s	 spatial	 dynamics	satisfactorily.	 While	 there	 is	 clearly	 potential	 to	 develop	 research	 methods	 to	explore	 the	 spatiality	 of	 discourse	 flows	 on	 Twitter	 –	 and,	 by	 extension,	 to	interrogate	 concepts	 like	 Castells’	 space	 of	 flows	 –	 there	 is	 considerable	 work	required	to	develop	and	calibrate	natural	language	processing	libraries	to	work	with	Twitter’s	spatial	nomenclature.	Only	at	the	meta	level	are	sufficient	Tweets	geo-located	 to	 allow	 a	 meaningful	 geographical	 investigation	 –	 and	 there	 are	reasons	 to	 suspect	 that	 this	 subset	 may	 be	 atypical	 among	 Twitter	 users.	Nevertheless,	 comparing	 these	 geo-located	 tweets	 and	 all	 those	 geo-located	 at	baseline,	 suggests	 some	 important	 conclusions	 about	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	riot	public.			
17.	The	 riot	 public	 is	 predominantly	 a	 national	 public,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	physical	 geography	 (available	 from	 geo-located	 tweets)	 and	 geo-political	 alignment	 (available	 from	 location	 strings).	 While	 there	 is	clearly	 potential	 for	 the	 globalisation	 of	 riot-related	 flows,	 discourse	
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remains	principally	a	national	concern.		
Beyond	 this	 conclusion	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 infer	 much	 about	 the	 spatiality	 of	 riot	discourse	 or,	 indeed,	 about	 the	 Twitter	 population	 engaged	 in	 that	 discourse.	Retweet	chains,	for	instance,	were	studied	with	the	hope	that	they	might	reveal	logical	 structures	 behind	 discourse	 flows	 between	 specific	 users	 and,	 by	extension,	 about	 the	 structural	 relationships	 between	 those	 users.	 However,	 it	was	not	possible	to	discern	any	clear	relationship	between	the	length	of	retweet	chains	and	their	spatiality,	nor	between	the	lag	values	between	retweets	and	the	distance	 of	 travel.	 Perhaps	 this	 undermines	 those	 representative	 measures,	perhaps	 data	 samples	 were	 too	 limited	 or	 perhaps	 the	 lack	 of	 clear,	 linear	relationships	 makes	 any	 structural	 logic	 problematic.	 Further	 research	 is	necessary	in	this	area.	
There	is	some	compelling	evidence	that	Twitter	software	is	shaping	discourse	on	the	 platform,	 especially	 the	 temporal	 dynamics	 of	 that	 discourse,	 but	 the	relationship	 between	 the	 two	 is	 neither	 linear	 nor	 simple.	 Twitter	 time	 is	 a	complex	assemblage	of	streaming	temporalities,	as	multi-layered	and	interactive	as	the	code	in	which	it	is	instantiated.	It	is	tempting	to	consider	the	temporality	of	 hashtags	 or	 retweet	 chains	 as	 though	 those	 things	 were	 separate,	 unified	objects	within	 the	Twitter	ecosystem,	but	 this	 is	a	misrepresentation.	They	are	not	 fixed	 or	 immutable	 objects	 –	 they	 are	 ever-changing,	 shaping	 information	flows	 but	 also	 being	 shaped	 by	 those	 information	 flows.	 Furthermore,	 that	instantiation	 is	 dependent	 on	 human	 users	 and	 their	 own	 interactions	 with	Twitter	code	and	with	each	other.	Marking	Twitter	time,	then,	is	a	daunting	task.	It	 can	 be	 inferred	 but	 not	 observed	 through	 the	 API,	 but	 only	 in	 a	 computed,	
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processed	and	packaged	form,	and	any	inference	must	account	for	the	multiple	structures	and	actors	involved	in	its	construction.		
Can	anything	useful	be	concluded	then	from	the	analysis	of	Twitter	time?		
Certainly.	Even	the	observation	stated	above,	that	Twitter	time	is	neither	flat	nor	uniform,	 is	 valuable	 and	has	 far	 reaching	 implications	 for	 theories	 of	 time	 and	time-space	 in	 the	 hyper-connected	 global	 modernity.	 The	 fact	 that	 discourse	flows	 on	 Twitter	 are	 so	 uneven,	 so	 associated	 with	 software	 (and	 social)	structures,	has	far	reaching	consequences	for	theories	of	information	liberation,	for	the	political	economy	of	speed	and,	indeed,	for	the	space	of	flows,	because	all	these	 theories	 rely,	 more	 or	 less,	 on	 a	 reductive	 flattening	 of	 time	 –	 on	 the	annihilation	of	 time	(Castells	2010,	1996)	or	the	relentless	 logic	of	speed	(Gehl	2011,	Hassan	2009).		
Time	 may	 fracture	 on	 Twitter	 but	 it	 does	 not	 disappear.	 It	 is	 not	 annihilated	(Castells	2010).	The	regular	rhythms	of	the	clock	may	be	challenged	by	multiple	and	 interactive	 rates	 of	 communicative	 flow,	 but	 really	 this	 is	 not	 a	 new	phenomenon.	 A	 social	 theory	 of	 time	 accepts	 competing	 temporal	 scapes	 and	recognises	 that	 complementary/discordant	 interactions	happen	between	 them.	The	 mediasphere	 has	 always	 been	 an	 assemblage	 of	 multiple	 communicative	temporalities:	 conversations	happened	 in	person	and	 in	print.	There	should	be	nothing	 particularly	 challenging	 in	 the	 recognition	 that	 Twitter	 is	 a	 multi-temporal	 device	 capable	 of	 supporting	 multi-temporal	 discourse,	 unless	 of	course	a	theory	depends	on	the	denial	of	this	multi-temporality.		
Furthermore,	 it	 is	 fairly	 clear	 from	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 different	 structural	
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temporalities	 that	 some	 software	 structures	 exert	 far	more	 influence	 over	 the	flow	 of	 discourse	 than	 others.	 The	 hashtag	 is	 a	 dominant	 object	 in	 the	construction	of	public	discourse	and	hashtags	have	the	potential	to	be	extremely	fast:	all	of	the	major	hashtag	stream,	at	certain	times,	flow	at	a	rate	that	exceeds	human	processing	capacity	–	at	least,	human	capacity	as	it	is	understood	by	this	author.	The	most	common	hashtags	–	#LondonRiots,	#UKRiots	and	#Riots	–	are	all	 regularly	 collating	 tweets	 at	 a	 rate	 that	 must	 surely	 challenge	 models	 of	normative	democratic	communication.		
In	addition	to	the	hashtag,	individual	users	with	large	numbers	of	followers	exert	considerable	influence	over	discourse	streams	–	an	influence	that	was	captured	in	 the	 concept	 of	 persistence.	 A	 textual	 approach	 to	 studying	 this	 effect	 might	involve	tracking	the	tweets	of	these	users	through	their	followers,	or	observing	how	 textual	 representations	 replicate	 and	 spread.	 A	 temporal	 approach	recognises	that	the	effect	of	 these	users	extends	beyond	what	 is	or	 isn’t	said	 in	the	text	of	their	tweets	–	they	interact	with	discourse	streams	in	other	ways	too,	bringing	fresh	eyes	to	a	hashtag,	amplifying	the	rate	of	flow	at	certain	times	(and	not	others)	and	increasing	the	rate	of	interaction	between	the	macro,	meso	and	micro	layers.		
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QUESTION	4:	CAN	THE	ATTEMPTS	TO	RECORD	TWITTER	TIME	AND	TO	CHARACTERISE	
DISCOURSE	 WITHIN	 THE	 RIOT	 PUBLIC	 BE	 COMBINED/SYNTHESISED	 TO	 INTERROGATE	
THE	CENTRAL	CLAIM	IN	THE	CONCEPTUAL	FRAMEWORK:	THAT	DIGITAL	TECHNOLOGIES	
SHAPE	 COMMUNICATION	 ENVIRONMENTS	 THAT	 RUN	 TOO	 FAST	 FOR	 DELIBERATIVE	
DEMOCRACY?	
The	 final	research	question	mobilises	 the	conceptual	 framework	to	explore	 the	deliberative	 potential	 of	 the	 communication	 technology.	 The	 task	 is	 absolutely	necessary	in	order	to	interrogate	the	logical	dynamics	of	digital	deliberation,	and	to	 make	 empirical	 statements	 that	 have	 utility	 beyond	 the	 confines	 of	 this	project.	 It	 involves	 the	 application	 of	 temporal	 metrics	 to	 frame	 comparative	discourse	analysis.		
According	 to	 the	 conceptual	 framework,	 there	 are	 two	 categories	 of	 logic	 by	which	 software	 can	 shape	 communication	 practices.	 Organisational	 logics	influence	 the	 formation	and	coordination	of	networks,	dismantling	hierarchies,	widening	 participation	 and	 engaging	 actors	 in	 new	 forms	 of	 collective	 action.	They	may	also	broaden	the	actors	engaged	in	discourse.	Communicational	logics	shape	 meaning-making	 processes	 within	 the	 riot	 public;	 they	 underwrite	 the	flow	of	 text	 (speech	acts)	 and,	 in	 turn,	 shape	 the	dynamics	of	 signification	and	representation	 attached	 to	 those	 texts.	 Communicational	 logics	 rely	 on	 the	assumption	 that	 not	 all	 types	 of	 meaning-making	 are	 possible	 in	 all	communicative	 environments	 –	certain	 conditions	 preclude	 some	communicative	norms	but	encourage	others.	In	this	understanding,	the	temporal	and	 spatial	 dynamics	 of	 mediated	 discourse	 are	 particularly	 important.	 A	
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communicational	logic	is	used	to	claim	that	digital	media	undermines	democratic	discourse	because	the	flow	of	media	is	too	fast	–	it	overloads	the	capacity	of	the	human	 brain	 to	 receive,	 process	 and	 respond	 deliberatively	 (Hassan	 2012,	Barber	 2006).	 Similarly,	 some	 theorists	 point	 to	 the	 uncertain	 ontological	relationship	between	 the	online	and	offline	selves	and	argue	 that	digital	media	somehow	 disconnects	 the	 actor	 from	 the	 discourse,	 complicating	 the	relationship	between	signification	and	social	action	(Carr	2013).		
These	two	examples	of	communicational	logic	are	very	different.	Digital	dualism	involves	a	highly	theoretically	and	speculative	reading	of	digital	time-space,	but	the	logic	behind	information	overload	is	effectively	linear	(and,	consequently,	far	more	 comprehensible).	 It	 states,	 simply,	 that	 network	 time	 is	 too	 fast	 for	democratic	 practices	developed	 in	 a	 pre-digital	 age:	while	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 talk	about	politics	 (and	democracy)	on	Twitter,	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	do	 so	 in	 a	way	that	is	actually	democratic.		
The	 network	 time-information	 overload	 argument	 lends	 itself	 to	 an	 empirical	methodology.	Assuming	that	network	time	can	be	observed	(and	measured)	and	assuming	 that	 discourse	 can	 be	 assessed	 for	 its	 deliberative	 potential,	 then	 it	should	 also	 be	 possible	 to	 explore	 the	 effect	 of	 one	 variable	 upon	 the	 other.	Clearly,	 the	 previous	 research	 questions	 were	 concerned,	 primarily,	 with	establishing	 these	observational	possibilities:	 first	with	describing	discourse	 in	the	 riot	 public	 and	 second	 with	 measuring	 network	 time.	 That	 is	 why	 the	methodology	 was	 careful	 to	 establish	 the	 empirical	 limits	 of	 the	 different	analytical	 tools.	The	aim	–	the	original	 intent	–	was	to	describe	Twitter	 time	 in	such	a	way	that	it	could,	with	confidence,	be	applied	to	an	analytical	reading	of	
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discourse.	
That	aim	relied	upon	the	linear	association	between	time	and	discourse	and	that,	in	 turn,	 relied	 upon	 a	 linear	 interpretation	 of	 network	 time.	 According	 to	 the	literature	 on	 the	 subject,	 such	 an	 interpretation	was	hardly	 fanciful	 –	 network	time	 is	 meant	 to	 be	 relentlessly	 fast,	 compressing	 and	 accelerating	communicative	 practices,	 advancing	 a	 relentless	 economy	 of	 speed.	 Several	authors	 had	 used	 the	 logic	 of	 information	 overload	 to	 argue	 against	 the	deliberative	potential	of	digital	communication	tools	(Buchstein	2002).		
The	issue	is	that	the	early	analytical	findings	made	problematic	any	assumption	of	 a	 linear	 association	 between	 network	 time	 and	 deliberation	 –	 it	 also	undermined	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 unified	 and	 linear	 network	 time.	 Instead,	 it	 was	observed	 repeatedly	 that	 the	 Twitter	 timescape	 was	 multi-layered	 (multi-dimensional),	 interactive	 and	 perspectival.	 Any	 attempt	 to	 fix	 Twitter	 time	 to	clock	 time	 is	 thus	 fraught	 with	 difficulties.	 First,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 associate	temporality	with	different	Twitter	practices	happening	at	the	different	structural	layers:	 should	Twitter	 time	start	with	 the	hashtag	or	 the	retweet?	Second,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 know	 the	 representational	 importance	 of	 these	 different	 practices:	does	 hashtag	 temporality	 have	 any	meaning	 for	 Twitter	 users	 or	 is	 it	 only	 an	issue	for	researchers	asking	questions	of	the	API?	Third,	it	is	difficult	to	construct	a	theory	of	temporality	based	on	objects	that,	 themselves,	have	highly	unstable	and	 irregular	 moments	 or	 periods.	 It	 makes	 sense	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 tweet	 for	communicative	 analysis,	 but	 the	 temporality	 of	 tweets	 is	 highly	 uncertain:	 it	depends	both	upon	the	tweet	object	itself,	the	human-tweet	interaction	and	also	upon	the	life	or	the	behaviour	of	the	tweet	object	in	the	‘Twittersphere’.		
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18.	The	notion	of	a	unified	Twitter	 time	 is	unhelpful.	Twitter	supports	a	range	 of	 communicative	 practices,	 each	with	 its	 own	 temporality.	 A	temporal	framing	of	Twitter	discourse	is	only	possible	given	a	specific	and	justifiable	limitation	of	temporality.		
How	can	temporality	be	used	to	frame	discourse	when	the	notion	of	temporality	itself	 is	 so	multi-faceted?	There	are	 two	possible	answers	 to	 this	question.	The	first	 is	 that	 rather	 than	 focus	 on	 Twitter	 time	 –	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 platform	instantiates	 a	 pattern	 of	 pace	 –	 it	 is	 better	 to	 focus	 upon	 individual	 discourse	streams	that	can	be	associated	with	a	unified	timescape.	In	theoretical	terms,	it	seems	 quite	 likely	 that	 there	 is	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 a	 unified	 timescape,	 but	 in	practical	 terms	 a	 unified	 timescape	 is	 one	 that	 can	 be	 shown	 to	 represent	 a	temporal	 experience	 that	 can	 be	 reasonably	 plotted	 on	 a	 linear	 temporal	 axis	(that	 is,	 in	 terms	of	clock	 time).	Working	 to	 this	definition,	a	unified	 timescape	will	 almost	 certainly	 have	 to	 be	 local	 enough	 to	 account	 for	 the	 practices	 of	individual	 users	 and,	 as	 such,	 it	 demands	 an	 entirely	 different	 approach	 to	analysis.		
Instead	of	beginning	a	study	with	macro-level	API	queries,	it	will	be	necessary	to	locate	analysis	first	in	the	experiences	of	individual	users	and	then	to	collectivise	these	 observations	 into	 an	 understanding	 of	 constructed	 discourse.	 Such	 an	approach	could	begin	by	identifying	Twitter	users	engaged	in	the	relevant	type	of	democratic	action	–	participation	 in	a	riot	clean-up	event,	 for	 instance	–	and	then	 re-creating	 their	 individual	 engagements	with	 the	 #RiotCleanUp	 hashtag,	gradually	piecing	together	a	picture	of	collective	meaning-making.	Clearly,	such	an	approach	contradicts	some	aspects	of	the	big	data	paradigm.		
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The	second	answer	is	to	operate	with	a	far	looser	interpretation	of	this	pattern	of	pace.	Rather	than	trying	to	objectify	the	relationship	between	Twitter	time	and	discourse,	 Twitter	 time	 is	 interpreted	 as	 an	 ambient	 temporality:	 a	 macro	pattern	of	pace	 that	broadly	 (that	 is,	 generically,	 and	without	 specifics)	 shapes	the	 temporalities	 of	 specific	 discourse	 flows	 that	 occur	 within	 the	 timescape	(Weltevrede	et	al.	2014).	For	example,	using	this	approach,	it	can	be	noted	that	#LondonRiots	 is	 the	 densest	 hashtag	 stream	 in	 the	 riot	 public.	 Consequently,	discourse	streams	that	engage	with	this	hashtag	–	either	because	they	tweet	into	it	 directly,	 or	 through	 retweeting	 or	 following	 –	 will	 be	 quickened	 by	 the	association	more	 so	 than	 with	 a	 slow	 hashtag.	 This	 approach,	 most	 probably,	precludes	 any	 sort	 of	 quantitative	 analysis	 of	 time-space-discourse,	 but	 does	suggest	a	potential	for	nuanced	qualitative	readings.		
 This	idea	of	ambient	temporality	needs	some	development.	Clearly	it	is	derived	from	 the	 concept	 of	 ambient	discourse	 (boyd	 et	 al.	 2010)	 –	 the	 sense	of	 being	surrounded	 by	 a	 story	 or,	 more	 exactly,	 by	 a	 topical	 struggle	 to	 signify	 –	 and	clearly	that	sense	of	being	surrounded	happens	when	a	particular	theme	or	topic	begins	to	dominate	flows	across	Twitter’s	software-structural	layers.	At	baseline,	Twitter	time	is	effectively	constant:	the	API	streams	the	same	number	of	tweets	per	second	all	of	 the	time:	 the	spritzer	stream	returns	3000	tweets	per	minute	every	minute.	Of	course,	that	does	not	mean	that	every	Twitter	user	is	exposed	to	3000	tweets	per	minute	–	exposure	will	depend	on	individual	users	and	their	following	 preferences.	 The	 point	 is	 that	 if	 all	 3000	 tweets	 are	 about	 the	 riots,	then	 regardless	 of	 the	 preferences	 of	 individual	 Twitter	 users,	 the	 riots	 will	dominate	tweet	streams	at	every	structural	level.		
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Ambience	is	thus	the		fractional	representation	of	any	given	topic	within	the	total	flow	of	tweets	in	the	study	period.	This	would	suggest	that	macro	flows	are	the	best	indicator	available	of	ambient	discourse	and	that	hashtag	stream	density	
is	the	most	appropriate	measure	for	approximating	the	temporality	of	this	
discourse.	 So,	 for	 instance,	 returning	 to	 the	 hashtag	 stream	 graphs	 first	calculated	in	the	methods	section,	and	collating	all	seven	major	hashtag	streams	into	one	ambient	flow,	produces	the	graph	in	figure	29.	
Figure	 29:	 graph	 showing	 combined	 stream	 density	 for	 all	 seven	 major	 riot	 hashtags	
across	all	four	sample	periods.		
The	maximum	stream	density	values	all	occur	 in	the	first	 few	hours	of	the	first	sample	period	on	Wednesday.	The	maximum	value	is	112	tweets	in	five	minutes.	In	terms	of	ambience,	this	is:	
	 112	/	(3000	x	5)	=	0.007	
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In	 terms	 of	 baseline	 ambience	 then,	 the	 riot	 public	 is	 extremely	 small	 –	 it	accounts	 for	 fewer	 than	 1%	 of	 total	 tweets	 sent.	 This	 is	 not	 the	 full	 picture,	however.	 It	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 riot	 public	 is	 predominantly	 a	national	 public	 –	 geo-located	 users	 are	 concentrated	 in	 the	 UK.	 This	concentration	is	significant	because	the	delivery	or	visibility	of	tweets	is	hugely	affected	by	 the	accounts	 that	an	 individual	Twitter	user	chooses	 to	 follow.	 It	 is	highly	probable	–	both	theoretically	and	through	the	interpretation	of	the	data	–	that	UK-located	Twitter	users	are	more	likely	to	follow	UK	accounts	than	users	located	internationally	(Kwak	et	al.	2010).	There	are	many	reasons	for	this:	the	dominant	 role	 of	 celebrity	 accounts	 and	 the	 national	 media	 structures	 that	promote	 those	 celebrities,	 the	 contiguity	 between	 physical	 and	 digital	geographies,	 the	 still	 dominant	 roles	 of	 national	media	 institutions	 and	 so	 on.	The	 result	 is	 that	 riot	discourse	 is	 likely	 to	be	over-represented	within	 the	UK	Twitter	 public:	 it	 will	 be	 more	 visible	 in	 the	 ambient	 stream.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	conceptual	 framework,	 this	 suggests	 that	ambient	 temporality	on	Twitter	 is	an	outcome	of	both	the	communicational	and	the	organisational	logics.		
19.	A	temporal	representation	of	ambient	discourse	requires:	
• A	measure	of	discourse	stream	density.	
• A	measure	of	homophily:	that	is,	a	measure	of	the	density	of	relationships	between	users	contributing	to	the	discourse.		
Of	course,	there	is	nothing	particularly	surprising	in	the	finding	that	temporality	on	Twitter	is	constructed	by	software,	software-human	interactions	and	human-human	 interactions	 as	 well:	 it	 is	 exactly	 what	 a	 constructionist	 perspective	
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would	 expect	 to	 be	 the	 case.	 Social	 network	 analysis	 offers	 several	 ways	 to	measure	or	approximate	this	relationship	clustering:	typically,	something	like	in-
degree	 is	 used	 to	 approximate	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 members	 of	 a	 group	 are	connected	 to	each	other	(Hansen	et	al.	2011).	A	 full	 integration	of	 the	network	and	 temporal	 approaches	 is	 a	 complex	 undertaking,	 however,	 and	 beyond	 the	scope	 of	 this	 thesis.	 Establishing	 a	 fully	 integrated	 framework	 should	 be	 a	priority	for	future	work.		
This	 integrated	 dynamic	 has	 been	 recognised	 already.	 The	 significance	 of	follower-following	networks	was	 implicit	 in	 the	development	 of	 persistence	 as	an	adjusted	measure	of	hashtag	temporality.	Persistence	makes	two	adjustments	to	stream	density:	first	it	adjusts	for	the	number	of	unique	users	contributing	to	the	 stream	 (it	 accounts	 for	 concentration	 of	 accounts	 within	 the	 stream)	 and	second	 it	 adjusts	 for	 the	 number	 of	 followers	 of	 each	 of	 those	 accounts.	 The	result	 is	 a	 metric	 that	 is	 a	 good	 deal	 easier	 to	 interpret	 in	 terms	 of	 ambient	effects.	A	higher	persistence	score	suggests	two	things:	first	that	there	is	a	high	degree	 of	 plurality	 within	 the	 hashtag	 stream	 –	 several	 unique	 contributions	rather	 than	 a	 few	 –	 and	 second	 that	 there	 is	 a	 large	 primary	 audience	 for	 the	tweets	within	the	stream.		
Given	that	the	riot	public	has	been	shown	to	be	a	national	public,	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	the	primary	audience	will	predominantly	be	a	national	audience.	As	 such,	 the	 higher	 the	 persistence	 value,	 the	 larger	 the	 potential	 audience	within	 the	 national	 public:	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 higher	 the	 persistence	 of	 a	hashtag,	the	greater	the	likelihood	that	tweets	contributed	to	the	hashtag	will	be	seen	by	Twitter	users	in	the	UK.			
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Hassan	 (2009)	 discussed	 hegemonic	 timescapes	 and	 it	 is	 an	 idea	 that	 can	 be	extended	 to	 the	 interactive	 temporalities	 on	Twitter.	 There	 are	many	different	temporalities	 on	 Twitter,	 but	 one	 may	 be	 more	 dominant	 than	 the	 others	 in	terms	of	shaping	discourse	and	enabling	(or	inhibiting)	deliberation.	
Macro	streams	–	both	unadjusted	hashtag	streams	and	persistence	–	are	likely	to	be	 far	 more	 influential	 in	 terms	 of	 shaping	 ambient	 discourse	 than	 retweet	chains	 or	 @	 reply	 conversations.	 In	 large	 part,	 this	 is	 simply	 the	 tyranny	 of	numbers.	The	interaction	between	the	macro	and	meso	layers	involves	far	more	tweets	and	far	more	accounts	that	the	interaction	between	the	meso	and	micro-layers.	 Attempts	 to	 analyse	 the	 temporality	 of	 meso-micro	 interactions	 were	hampered	 by	 the	 limited	 availability	 of	 data.	 So	while	 the	 interactions	may	 be	highly	 significant	 for	 individual	 users	 in	 individual	 contexts,	 they	 are	 less	relevant	in	terms	of	ambient	discourse.		
At	 the	 macro	 level	 there	 are	 two	 interpretations	 of	 temporality,	 both	 tied	 to	hashtags,	one	of	which	(stream	density)	does	not	account	for	follower-following	relationships	while	 the	other	(persistence)	does.	There	 is	an	opportunity,	 then,	to	apply	both	interpretive	framings	to	a	textual	reading,	and	to	try	and	determine	which	has	more	explanatory	power.	This	comparison	may	also	reveal	something	about	the	influence	of	software-user	interaction	in	Twitter	communication.			
	
This	 type	 of	 comparative	 analysis	 requires	 that	 both	 stream	 density	 and	persistence	 can	 be	 aligned	 with	 discourse,	 represented	 by	 the	 tweets	 in	 the	coding	sample,	but	this	raises	an	issue.	It	is	challenging	to	align	temporality	and	
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discourse.	 This	 is	 best	 illustrated	 with	 an	 example.	 Figure	 30	 displays	 the	persistence	scores	for	the	three	dominant	riot	hashtags	in	the	Wed_Day	period.	It	is	possible	 to	 identify	several	 large	spikes:	high	persistence	scores	caused	by	a	large	number	of	 tweets	or	a	 large	number	of	 followers	or	a	combination	of	 the	two.	For	each	of	these	spikes,	it	is	assumed	that	the	riots	are	more	ambient	than	at	other	times,	but	what	effect	is	this	likely	to	have	on	discourse,	and	when	will	that	effect	happen?	Should	it	be	supposed,	for	instance,	that	between	10:55	and	11:00,	when	 the	#ukriots	 stream	 is	 responsible	 for	a	 surge	 in	persistence,	 that	users	tweeting	in	this	period	are	overloaded	by	ambient	flow,	and	consequently	cannot	deliberate?	
	
Figure	 30:	 combined	 persistence	 scores	 for	 the	 #UKRiots,	 #LondonRiots	 and	 #Riots	
hashtags 
The	first	issue	with	this	interpretation	is	that	it	assumes	reception,	deliberation	
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and	 response	all	 occur	within	 the	 same	 five-minute	window	and	doesn’t	 allow	for	 the	 probability	 that	 users	 will	 read	 tweets	 for	 a	 while,	 then	 publish	 or	retweet,	 	 and	 then	 read	 some	 more.	 In	 effect,	 it	 compresses	 artificially	 the	deliberative	period.	If	there	is	an	effect	following	a	spike	in	the	ambient	density	of	 a	 hashtag	 then	 it	 might	 not	 be	 felt	 (or	 recorded)	 immediately.	 The	 second	issue	 is	 that	 there	 is	 likely	 to	be	association	between	 spikes.	By	 increasing	 the	visibility	of	the	#UKRiots	hashtag,	that	first	spike	may	be	partly	responsible	for	the	 second	 spike	 an	 hour	 or	 so	 later.	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 temporal	 lags	recorded	in	retweet	chains.	The	stream	constructs	its	own	temporality,	and	so	no	period	within	 the	 stream	 can	 be	 considered	 independent	 –	which	 undermines	any	 hope	 of	 using	 periodic	 spikes	 to	 explain	 variation	 in	 deliberation	 (Pond 
2015). 
The	 final	section	of	 this	conclusion	considers	 two	approaches	to	a	comparative	application	 of	 stream	 density	 and	 persistence	 to	 explain	 the	 thematic	 and	deliberative	analysis	of	 tweets.	The	analysis	 focuses	on	tweets	collected	during	two	four-hour	windows	(11.30	–	15:30)	on	Wednesday	and	Thursday.		There	are	several	reasons	for	the	timing	and	duration	of	these	windows.	First,	during	these	periods,	 more	 tweets	 are	 sent	 than	 at	 any	 other	 time,	 so	 the	 thematic	 and	deliberative	 data	 is	 far	 richer.	 These	 periods	 correspond	 with	 the	 middle	 of	working	day	UK	time	and	the	height	of	the	24-hour	news	cycle.	Second,	the	four-hour	 period	 is	 considered	 sufficiently	 long	 to	 allow	 temporality	 to	 influence	discourse	(if	 it	 is	going	to	do	so)	but	sufficiently	short	to	focus	analysis.	Clearly	this	is	speculative:	there	is	little	in	the	way	of	research	about	how	often	people	use	Twitter,	and	there	is	clearly	great	variation.	According	to	Pew		(Duggan	et	al.	
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2015)	a	fifth	of	Twitter	users	visit	the	platform	multiple	times	each	day,	but	that	is	 an	 American	 audience	 and,	 presumably,	 does	 not	 take	 into	 account	 the	influence	of	acute	events.	Four	hours	is	deemed	sufficiently	long	at	that	time	of	day	 for	 an	 engaged	 user	 –	 that	 is	 someone	 who	 uses	 Twitter	 to	 engage	 in	discourse	–	to	visit	the	site	and	to	interact	with	the	riot	public.	
The	graphs	in	figures	31	and	32	display	the	stream	density	for	the	two	periods.		
Figure	 31:	 graph	 comparing	 the	 stream	 densities	 for	 the	 #UKRiots,	 #LondonRiots	 and	
#Riots	hashtags	during	the	Wed_Day	period.		
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Figure	 32:	 graph	 comparing	 the	 stream	 densities	 for	 the	 #UKRiots,	 #LondonRiots	 and	
#Riots	hashtags	during	the	Thu_Day	period.		
All	three	tweet	streams	decrease	slightly	in	both	windows,	but	that	may	simply	reflect	 local	 temporal	patterns	of	Twitter	use	 (the	 riot	public	 is	predominantly	national	but	 the	 spritzer	 stream	 is	 global).	 It	 is	 surely	more	 significant	 that	on	Thursday	the	#UKRiots	and	#LondonRiots	stream	are	much	more	closely	aligned	to	each	other	than	they	are	on	Wednesday.	The	#Riots	stream	is	still	persistently	lower	 on	 the	 density	 axis,	 but	 there	 is	 again	 more	 overlap	 than	 there	 is	 on	Wednesday.	 It	 may	 also	 be	 recalled,	 that	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 two	 days,	sentiment	 scores	 trended	 towards	 agreement.	Does	 this	 translate	 into	 a	 closer	alignment	in	discourse?		
Compare	 these	 two	 graphs	 to	 figures	 33	 and	 34	 below,	 which	 display	 the	corresponding	persistence	streams	for	the	same	periods.		
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Figure	33:	graph	comparing	the	persistence	calculations	for	the	#UKRiots,	#LondonRiots	
and	#Riots	hashtags	during	the	Wed_Day	period	
	
Figure	34:	graph	comparing	the	persistence	calculations	for	the	#UKRiots,	#LondonRiots	
and	#Riots	hashtags	during	the	Thu_Day	period.	
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As	was	 noted	 earlier,	 persistence	 offers	 a	 different	 perspective	 on	 temporality	because	it	differentiates	between	users:	in	effect,	persistence	spikes	when	a	user	with	 a	 large	 number	 of	 followers	 engages	 with	 a	 hashtag.	 The	 effect	 of	 this	engagement	is	that	more	Twitter	users	are	potentially	exposed	to	the	hashtag	–	the	hashtag	has	a	great	chance	of	being	seen	–	it	is	more	ambient.	Consequently,	what	is	most	relevant	in	a	visual	reading	of	these	graphs	is	the	number	of	spikes	during	the	observation	periods	and,	of	course,	the	magnitude	of	those	spikes.	To	better	 illustrate	 the	 difference	 between	 the	Wednesday	 and	Thursday	 periods,	the	hashtags	are	pooled	and	persistence	is	plotted	for	Wednesday	and	Thursday	on	the	same	graph.		
	
Figure	35:	graph	comparing	persistence	calculations	for	the	combined	#LondonRiots	and	
#UKRiots	on	Wednesday	and	Thursday	
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deviation	is	nearly	double	that	on	Thursday),	spikes	are	more	extreme	(there	are	five	 greater	 than	 two	 times	 the	 standard	deviation	 above	 the	mean;	 only	 3	 on	Thursday)	 and	 the	magnitude	 of	 those	 spikes	 is	 also	 larger.	 This	 suggests	 that	there	are	more	high	profile	users	contributing	to	the	riot	public	on	Wednesday	as	 opposed	 to	Thursday.	 If	 it	were	more	users	 in	 general	 then	 the	Wednesday	average	would	be	higher	but	the	standard	deviation	not	necessarily	so.		
The	graph	in	figure	35	displays	on	the	same	axis	the	persistence	calculations	and	the	 tweet	 stream	 for	 the	#UKRiots	 and	#LondonRiots	 hashtags	 combined.	 The	tweet	stream	declines	gradually	across	all	four	sample	windows,	in	a	way	that	is	familiar	 from	other	 stream	density	 graphs.	 So	 far,	 it	 has	 only	 been	 possible	 to	speculate	 in	 general	 terms	 why	 this	 might	 be	 –	 diurnal	 patterns,	 heightened	Twitter	 activity	 in	 the	 mornings,	 and	 so	 on.	 However,	 the	 addition	 of	 the	persistence	calculations	reveals	 that	at	 the	beginning	of	both	 the	Wed_Day	and	Thu_Day	periods	there	is	an	enormous	spike	in	persistence.	Could	it	be	that	this	spike	 –	 this	 dramatic	 and	 instantaneous	 increase	 in	 ambient	 temporality	 –	 is	partly	 responsible	 for	 the	 elevated	 activity	 that	 is	 observed	 between	 10:30am	and	1:30pm	on	both	Wednesday	and	Thursday?		
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Figure	36:	 graph	displaying	on	 the	 same	axis	 the	persistence	 calculations	and	 the	 tweet	
stream	for	the	#UKRiots	and	#LondonRiots	hashtags	combined.	
If	this	were	the	case,	then	it	would	support	the	assertion	that	speech	conditions,	whether	 ideal	or	not,	 are	being	 constructed	via	a	 complex	 interaction	between	Twitter	time	and	Twitter’s	communicative	structures.		
It	is	possible	to	extend	the	retweet	analysis	from	the	previous	section	to	explore	the	influence	of	temporality	on	discourse	at	the	macro	level	–	that	is,	in	terms	of	hashtag	 publics.	 A	 focus	 on	 retweets	 corresponds	 to	 a	 focus	 on	 ideal	 speech	conditions:	the	retweet	continues	to	be	used	as	a	rudimentary	indicator	of	“full	and	 equal”	 consideration.	 While	 temporality	 may	 well	 influence	 the	 other	conditions,	it	is	the	effect	on	the	deliberative	period	(i.e.	the	period	required	for	full	 and	 equal	 consideration)	 that	 is	 most	 clearly	 defined	 in	 the	 conceptual	framework.		
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Retweeting	is	an	indication	that,	at	the	very	least,	an	utterance	has	been	received	and	 decoded.	 The	 more	 retweets	 within	 a	 hashtag	 stream,	 then	 the	 more	indication	there	is	that	Twitter	users	are	engaging	with	each	other.	The	analysis	discussed	here	continues	to	focus	on	the	#UKRiots	and	#LondonRiots	hashtags,	though	comparisons	are	drawn	with	the	less	deliberative	streams.	Retweets	are	identified	using	 the	 same	 function	as	before,	 taking	advantage	of	TextBlob	and	predictable	 syntax	 to	 extract	 both	 automated	 and	 edited	 retweets.	 The	 aim	 of	this	analysis	 is	 to	see	how	the	volume	of	retweets	(as	a	percentage	of	 the	 total	stream)	responds	to	the	temporality	of	the	hashtag	stream.	
In	the	 first	 instance,	 the	hashtags	are	combined	and	both	the	total	and	retweet	streams	are	displayed	for	the	Wed_Day	period.		
	
Figure	 37:	 graph	 showing	 the	 total	 stream	 density	 and	 retweet	 stream	 density	 for	 the	
#LondonRiots	and	#UKRiots	hashtags	combined	on	Wednesday.	
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Overall,	 retweets	account	 for	42%	of	 the	stream,	but	 this	number	 is	effectively	meaningless	–	 it	 cannot	be	known	whether	or	not	42%	 is	 sufficient	 to	 indicate	deliberation.	 What	 is	 far	 more	 meaningful	 is	 how	 this	 percentage	 changes	relative	to	overall	stream	density.	Therefore,	a	quantitative	analysis	of	the	above	graph	should	seek	to	assess	the	gap	between	the	two	lines,	relative	to	the	total	density	 of	 the	 stream.	 This	 difference	 can	 be	 calculated	 using	 the	 following	simple	equation:	
	 (total	stream	density	-	retweet	stream	density)	/	total	stream	density	
If	total	stream	density	(temporality)	were	shaping	the	number	of	retweets,	then	across	 the	 sample	 window	 (in	 which	 stream	 density	 declines	 gradually	 but	consistently),	 then	 it	might	be	expected	 that	 the	gap	or	difference	between	 the	total	 and	 hashtag	 streams	 decreases.	 In	 other	 words,	 at	 higher	 temporalities,	according	 to	 the	 logic	 of	 information	 overload,	 then	 retweeting	 should	 be	suppressed	 by	 weight	 of	 information	 flow.	 Conversely,	 as	 temporality	 slows,	then	 retweeting	 should	 increase	within	 the	 stream,	 indicating	 that	more	 users	are	 able	 to	 decode,	 process	 and	 respond	 to	 utterances.	 However,	 across	 the	period,	there	is	no	suggestion	that	this	is	happening:	the	difference	between	total	tweets	and	retweets	remains	constant	(though	highly	variable,	there	is	no	trend	either	 up	 or	 down).	 Does	 this	 suggest	 that	 temporality	 is	 having	 no	 effect	 on	retweet	practices?		
One	factor	that	has	not	yet	been	considered	is	that	there	is	a	threshold	density,	above	 which	 deliberation	 is	 markedly	 harder.	 If	 this	 were	 the	 case,	 then	assuming	 that	 the	 #UKRiots	 and	 #LondonRiots	 streams	 remained	 consistently	above	 this	 threshold,	 then	 it	would	explain	why	retweeting	does	not	appear	 to	
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respond	 to	 temporality:	 the	 streams	 are	 consistently	 too	 fast	 to	 support	 ideal	speech	conditions.	One	way	of	exploring	this	possibility	is	to	limit	the	analysis	of	retweets	 to	 those	 five-minute	 intervals	 when	 stream	 density	 falls	 below	 this	threshold.	The	issue	is	that	there	is	no	a	priori	knowledge	of	what	that	threshold	might	be.		
Figure	 38	 displays	 the	 same	 calculation	 for	 every	 interval	 in	 the	 study	 period.	Retweets	 actually	 account	 for	 a	 lower	 percentage	 of	 the	 hashtag	 stream	 on	Thursday	evening/night	(when	overall	stream	density	is	lowest)	than	they	do	at	any	other	time.	Across	the	full	study	period,	the	gap	between	stream	density	and	retweets	actually	trends	upwards:	in	other	words,	despite	stream	density	falling,	there	 is	 no	 quantitative	 evidence	 that	 this	 is	 having	 the	 effect	 of	 increasing	retweet	practices.		
Figure	 38:	 graph	 displaying	 the	 relative	 difference	 between	 total	 and	 retweet	 stream	
densities	over	the	study	period.		
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This	could	imply	several	things.	It	could	be	that	retweeting	is	either	random	or	constant:	Twitter	users	retweet	each	other	at	a	fixed	or	variable	rate	regardless	of	 thematic,	 structural	 or	 temporal	 stimuli.	 Alternatively,	 retweeting	 could	 be	associated	with	thematic	or	structural	stimuli	but	not	temporality,	or	it	could	be	that	temporality	does	have	an	effect,	but	that	it	is	more	complex	than	the	stream	density	 measure	 allows.	 It	 has	 been	 established	 already	 that	 persistence	 is	 a	better	 approximation	 of	 ambient	 temporality,	 so	 is	 there	 any	 evidence	 that	persistence	influences	retweet	practices?	
The	 graph	 below	 displays	 persistence	 (adjusted)	 and	 the	 relative	 weight	 of	retweets	 in	 the	 hashtag	 stream	 (i.e.	 number	 of	 retweet	 /	 total	 tweets)	 on	 the	same	axis.	
Figure	39:	graph	comparing	persistence	(adjusted)	and	the	relative	weight	of	retweets	in	
the	 hashtag	 stream	 (i.e.	 number	 of	 retweets	 /	 total	 tweets)	 for	 #LondonRiots	 and	
#UKRiots	across	the	whole	study	period.	
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In	short,	there	doesn’t	appear	to	be	much	evidence	that	temporality	–	at	least	as	it	 is	measured	 in	 this	 study	–	has	much	 influence	on	 retweeting	practices.	The	persistence	spikes	that	appeared	to	increase	the	hashtag	stream	density	appear	to	 have	 no	 effect	 on	 the	 relative	 frequency	 of	 retweets.	 This	 would	 tend	 to	suggest	that	ideal	speech	conditions,	whether	they	exist	or	not,	do	not	respond	to	ambient	temporality.			
If	 retweets	 are	 used	 as	 a	 barometer	 of	 ideal	 speech	 conditions,	 then	 it	 would	appear	 that	 these	 conditions	 are	 not	 responding	 to	 temporal	 variations	 in	hashtag	flow:	it	may	be	that	the	riot	public	is	too	fast	for	ideal	speech,	or	it	may	be	that	the	communicative	logic	(information	overload)	is	flawed,	either	because	no	relationship	exists	or	because	the	relationship	 is	 far	more	complex	than	the	directional	logic	allows.		
Retweets	 were	 studied	 because	 they	 were	 considered	 a	 precursor	 to	 full	 and	equal	consideration	–	an	indicator,	at	least,	that	Twitter	users	were	reading	each	others’	tweets	and	considering	the	content.	There	is	no	doubt,	however,	that	this	is	a	highly	reductive	approach,	used	mainly	because	it	 is	convenient	for	macro-level	data	processing.	A	more	nuanced	evaluation	of	deliberative	consideration	must	 call	 on	 Habermas’	 validity	 claims.	 That,	 in	 turn,	 requires	 a	 temporal	assessment	of	the	deliberative	coding	performed	earlier.	
	 Wednesday Thursday 
#LondonRiots 2.01 2.39 
#UKRiots 2.23 2.58 
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#Riots 2.09 2.48 
Total 2.09 2.50 
	
Table	 12:	 a	 summary	 of	mean	 deliberative	 scores	 for	 the	 three	most	 common	 hashtags	
comparing	the	Wednesday	and	Thursday	periods.	
During	the	Wed_Day	period,	 the	#UKRiots	stream	scores	significantly	higher	 in	the	deliberative	reading	than	the	other	two	hashtags	–	 in	 fact,	 the	difference	 in	deliberative	 scores	 is	 more	 marked	 in	 this	 period	 than	 at	 any	 other	 time.	Variation	between	 the	hashtags	decreases	across	 the	 four	sample	periods	until	Thu_Night,	when	the	deliberative	scores	were	effectively	the	same.	The	#UKRiots	stream	 is	 not	 the	 densest	 during	 this	 period	 (the	 #LondonRiots	 stream	consistently	records	more	tweets	per	minute)	but	it	is	the	most	persistent:	both	in	 terms	of	 a	 visual	 interpretation	of	 the	 above	 graph	 and	 in	 terms	of	 average	persistence.		
Figure	 40	 breaks	 down	 those	 average	 scores	 into	 individual	 categories	 and	demonstrates	that	there	is	a	reversal	across	the	scoring	criteria.	In	other	words,	no	one	category	assignment	is	responsible	for	the	these	different	averages.	
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Figure	40:	relative	frequency	of	deliberative	codes	across	the	two	days	
The	difference	in	both	the	individual	code	frequencies	and	the	mean	deliberative	scores	are	unlikely	to	be	caused	by	chance	alone	(x̅	Wed_Day vs	x̅	Thu_Day,	z	=	-4.63,	p	<	 0.0001).	 There	 genuinely	 does	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 difference	 in	 the	 type	 of	communication	 taking	 place	 in	 the	 Wednesday	 and	 Thursday	 samples.	 To	conclude	that	this	is	somehow	caused	by	the	reduced	ambience	of	the	riot	public,	however,	 would	 be	 exceedingly	 premature.	 There	 are	 many	 reasons	 why	deliberativeness	 could	 change	 from	 Wednesday	 to	 Thursday,	 not	 least	 that	Twitter	users	would	have	had	an	extra	day	 to	consider	 the	 riots,	develop	 their	views	and	to	assign	value.		
Earlier	it	was	suggested	that	discourse	constructs	its	own	temporality	–	the	idea	being	that	whatever	 is	discussed	in	period	x	will	 influence	what	 is	discussed	in	period	x	+	n.	 The	obvious	extension	of	 the	 idea	 is	 that	Twitter	 time,	 as	well	 as	
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being	a	software-social	construct,	is	also	a	textual	construct	–	a	metric,	perhaps,	for	identifying	deliberative	discourse,	but	not	for	explaining	it.	Part	of	the	issue	is	that	a	summary	score	of	deliberativeness,	averaged	across	a	four-hour	period,	is	an	extremely	limited	indicator	of	communicative	happenings.	To	better	explore	the	relationship	between	temporality	and	discourse,	then,	it	is	necessary	to	have	a	closer	look	at	what	the	discourse	involves.		
	
Figure	 41:	 graph	 comparing	 the	 relative	 frequency	 of	 the	 different	 thematic	 codes	 on	
Wednesday	and	Thursday.	
Primarily	 that	 involves	 closer	 consideration	 of	 the	 thematic	 coding	 and	 the	deliberative	 scoring.	 Figure	 41	 displays	 a	 breakdown	 of	 the	 thematic	 codes	across	 the	 two	periods.	 If	 there	were	no	 thematic	differences	between	 the	 two	periods,	 then	 it	 would	 be	 easier	 to	 implicate	 ambient	 temporality	 in	 an	explanation	 of	 deliberative	 variation	 (because	 textual-thematic	 variation	 could	
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be	discounted).	As	it	is,	there	are	plainly	differences	in	thematic	focus	across	the	two	periods:	most	notably,	 there	are	 increases	 in	 social	 complexity,	 in	political	commentary,	response	consideration	and	media	commentary	codes,	whereas	the	rioter	as	other	category	falls.			
It	has	been	established	already	that	tweets	that	focus	on	the	social	complexity	of	the	 riots	 tend	 to	 score	 more	 highly	 on	 the	 deliberative	 scale,	 especially	 in	comparison	 to	 RAO	 tweets.	 It’s	 all	 been	 established	 that	 the	 #UKRiots	 stream	tends	 to	 be	 more	 productive	 than	 the	 other	 hashtags	 and	 that	 on	 Thursday	#UKRiots	stream	density	often	exceeds	#LondonRiots	(previously	the	dominant	stream).	 It	 is	 possible,	 then,	 to	 characterise	 discourse	 on	 Thursday	 and	 to	compare	 it,	 in	 thematic	 terms,	 to	 Wednesday.	 On	 Thursday,	 there	 is	 greater	interest	 in	exploring	a	range	of	explanations	for	rioting;	there	is	a	considerable	widening	 of	 culpability,	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 implicating	 politicians	 and	 the	professional	 classes;	 there	 is	 far	 more	 concern	 with	 what	 constitutes	 an	appropriate	response;	and	there	is	much	more	reflection	on	the	role	of	the	media	–	 and	 especially	 social	media	 –	 during	 these	 types	 of	 acute	 event.	 It	 should	be	noted	 that	a	 lot	of	 the	 tweets	providing	media	commentary	are	 in	 some	way	a	response	to	comments	made	by	David	Cameron	to	parliament.		
On	 Thursday,	 discourse	 involves	 less	 emotional	 reaction,	 more	 in	 the	 way	 of	productive	comment,	and	a	greater	percentage	of	tweets	that	score	three	or	four	points	 on	 the	 deliberative	 criteria	 scale.	 In	 terms	 of	 temporality,	 the	 major	hashtags	are	closer	aligned,	stream	density	is	lower,	and	there	are	fewer	cases	of	individual	tweets	and	individual	users	engaging	in	those	hashtags	and	distorting	the	 ambient	 visibility	 (which,	 of	 course,	 contradicts	 any	 sense	 of	 equal	 or	
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symmetrical	contributions).	In	terms	of	a	summary	picture,	then,	it	appears	that	deliberation	 and	 temporality	 are	 aligned,	 but	 this	 is	 not	 necessarily	 an	endorsement	of	the	conceptual	framework.	The	conclusion	chapter	of	this	thesis	explains	why	Twitter	time	is	less	a	shaper	of	discourse	than	shaped	by	it.	
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CHAPTER	EIGHT	
CONCLUSION	
INTRODUCTION	
On	 the	 afternoon	 of	 August	 4	 2011,	 London	 police	 officers	 shot	 dead	 Mark	Duggan,	a	black	man	 from	the	borough	of	Tottenham	 in	 the	city’s	north.	There	followed	a	period	of	 intense	civil	disorder:	 rioting,	 looting	and	violence	spread	first	across	the	capital	and	then	to	other	cities	across	the	UK.	Three	men	died	in	Birmingham	and	another	in	Croydon.	The	police	made	thousands	of	arrests,	the	Prime	Minister	 recalled	 parliament	 and	 specially	 convened	Magistrates	 Courts	stayed	open	around	the	clock	to	administer	punishment	to	the	rioters.	The	public	sphere	 was	 intensely	 engaged	 in	 debating	 the	 causes,	 meanings	 and	consequences	 of	 the	 riots	 and	 in	 demanding	 certain	 types	 of	 response	 (and	punishment).	 However,	 rather	 than	 facilitating	 a	 reasoned,	 informed	 and	responsible	 reading	of	 the	 riots,	 broadcast	 and	print	media	were	 implicated	 in	spreading	 misinformation,	 exacerbating	 disagreements,	 and	 enforcing	 highly	political	accounts	of	the	riots	(Bassel	2012,	Kelsey	2012).		
Such	activity	is	hardly	ideal	for	a	normative	model	of	communicative	democracy:	it	undermines	 the	efficacy	of	 the	public	sphere.	More	widely,	political	 theorists	have	 recognised	 that	 widespread	 dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 political	 and	professional	 classes,	 and	 with	 the	 media	 too,	 has	 damaging	 implications	 for	democracy	 and	 civil	 society.	 One	 response	 to	 these	 concerns	 has	 been	 to	
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emphasise	 the	 potentially	 transformative	 effect	 of	 digital	 media	 on	 political	voice,	civil	engagement		and,	by	extension,	the	strength	of	the	public	sphere.		
In	 broad	 terms,	 the	 primary	 aim	 of	 this	 thesis	 was	 to	 explore	 the	 quality	 of	discourse	 in	 the	 digital	 public	 sphere	 during	 the	 UK	 riots.	 It	wanted	 to	 assess	whether	 or	 not	 digital	 media	 channels	 supported	 normative	 deliberative	communication.	In	order	to	pursue	that	aim,	it	needed	to	develop	a	coherent	and	rigorous	 conceptual	 framework	 and	 it	 sought	 to	 establish	 a	 replicable,	extendable	empirical	method.	
To	 that	 end,	 it	 reviewed	 conceptual	 and	 critical	 contributions	 to	 the	technological	 and	 theoretical	 understanding	 of	 digital	 media:	 the	 Internet,	networking	 protocols	 and	 the	world	wide	web	 (WWW).	 It	 identified	 potential	problems	 caused	 by	 too	 little	 specificity	 (and	 too	 much	 assumption)	 in	 the	observation	 and	 analysis	 of	 these	 technologies,	 and	 proposed	 a	 model	 of	interpretation	 that,	 while	 underwritten	 by	 a	 technological	 understanding	 of	underlying	 architectures	 and	 protocols,	 emphasised	 the	 specific	 affordances	 of	individual	software	applications.			
That	 layered	 understanding	 of	 interactive	 affordances	 informed	 a	 reading	 of	digital	 democratic	 theory,	 much	 of	 which	 is	 focused	 on	 the	 communicative	potential	of	 the	media	–	 that	 is,	 its	potential	 to	enable	and	 to	 support	 rational,	productive	discussion	and	to	contribute	to	the	public	sphere.	Once	again,	it	was	shown	 that	 a	 lack	of	 consensus	 (and	 specificity)	 around	 conceptual	 definitions	has	 undermined	 efforts	 to	 develop	 coherent	 and	 transferrable	 theory.	 For	instance,	 uncertainty	 about	 exactly	 what	 constitutes	 deliberative	 discussion	 –	what	 is	 required,	 by	 whom	 and	 to	 what	 purpose	 –	 has	 produced	 a	 raft	 of	
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situational	 reports	 but	 little	 agreement	 about	 the	 deliberative	 potential	 of	different	applications	(either	individually	or	in	aggregate).		
In	response	to	the	literature	review	chapters,	the	conceptual	framework	set	out	an	 interpretation	 of	 logical	 interaction	 between	 technology	 and	 democracy,	emphasising	the	communicative	dynamics	of	both	concepts.	It	argued	that	while	foundational	 structures	 may	 shape	 the	 affordances	 of	 individual	 applications,	this	 influence	 can	only	be	 revealed	by	 specific,	 contextual	 analyses	of	 software	applications	 in	 action.	 It	 particularly	 emphasised	 the	 temporal	 and	 spatial	dynamics	 of	 communicative	 flow,	 arguing	 that	 these	 dynamics	 were	 clearly	shaped	 by	 the	 affordances	 of	 software	 as	 well	 as	 impacting	 directly	 on	 the	normative	expectations	of	deliberative	 theory.	 In	short,	 it	argued	 that	software	applications	 are	 implicated	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 communicative	 flows;	deliberative	 theory	 requires	 that	 these	 flows	 are	 temporally	 and	 spatially	conducive	to	normative	discussion.				
The	 perceived	 benefit	 of	 this	 approach	 is	 that	 it	 should	 support	 an	 empirical	analysis	 of	 communicative	 practices	 and,	 theoretically,	 it	 is	 applicable	 across	contexts:	 different	 applications	 enable	 communicative	 flows	 with	 different	temporal	 and	 spatial	 dynamics.	 If	 these	 dynamics	 can	 be	 observed,	 then	 the	democratic	potential	of	different	technologies	can	be	estimated	according	to	the	same	 logics	 of	 temporal	 and	 spatial	 flow.	 Furthermore,	 if	 deliberation	 can	 be	observed	 (and	 assessed)	 within	 these	 contextual	 flows,	 then	 a	 theoretically	justified,	empirical	test	of	deliberative	potential	becomes	a	real	possibility.		
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The	methodology	chapter	explained	how	such	an	empirical	 test	of	deliberation	could	 be	 conceived	 and	 applied	 using	 the	micro-blogging	 service	 Twitter.	 The	emphasis	on	time	and	space	helped	to	situate	Twitter	as	an	object	to	be	studied.	Twitter	 is	 understood	 as	 interacting	 structural	 layers	 of	 communicative	exchange,	 each	 with	 temporal-spatial	 effects	 to	 be	 observed	 and	 interpreted.	Deliberation	is	assessed	through	meaning	–	 	that	is,	value	or	attention	assigned	to	distinct	 signifiers	–	and	an	 interpretation	of	 communicative	action	based	on	Habermas’s	validity	claims	and	principles	of	ideal	speech.		
The	findings	of	this	analysis	were	presented	and	discussed	for	each	of	the	major	research	questions.	 In	very	general	 terms,	 it	might	be	said	 that	 the	 textual	and	thematic	analysis	of	discourse	provided	some	evidence	that	Twitter	users	were	deliberating	 according	 to	 the	 validity	 claims,	 but	 it	 was	 more	 difficult	 to	 find	evidence	of	 ideal	 speech	 conditions.	There	was	 evidence	 that	Twitter	 software	shapes	the	flow	of	discourse	between	users	of	the	application,	and	in	ways	that	are	 both	 temporally	 distinct	 and	 appear	 to	 correspond	 to	 thematic	 and	deliberative	 discontinuities.	 The	 relationship	 between	 these	 observations,	however,	is	complex	and	requires	critical	dissection	–	that	is	the	purpose	of	this	discussion	chapter.		
	
CRITICAL	REVIEW	OF	MAJOR	FINDINGS		
The	UK	riots	were	extraordinary	for	many	reasons.	Most	obviously,	thousands	of	people	 rioted	 in	 cities	 across	 the	 UK,	 engaging	 in	 various	 forms	 of	 disruptive	activity,	including	legitimate	protest,	property	destruction,	looting	and	violence.	
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In	 the	 words	 of	 one	 judge,	 this	 was	 “collective	 insanity”.	 The	 riots	 were	 also	extraordinary,	 however,	 for	 the	 way	 that	 the	 state	 generally	 and	 the	 prime	minister	 specifically,	 sought	 to	 shape	 the	 public-discursive	 interpretation	 of	these	 events:	 “opportunist	 thugs	 in	 gangs…	 looting,	 violence,	 vandalising	 and	thieving”	 (Cameron	 2011a).	 This	 discourse	 fed	 into	 a	 draconian	 judicial	response,	 characterised	 by	 supposed	 deterrent	 	 sentencing,	 which	 resulted	 in	exceptional	 rates	 of	 incarceration,	 often	 for	 offences	 that	 would	 normally	 be	treated	as	minor.		
Clearly,	there	are	multiple	concerns	here,	though	they	may	be	related.	There	is	a	concern	that	the	state	and	political	machinery	can	exert	undue	influence	over	the	public	sphere	for	political	gain.	There	is	a	concern	that	the	state	and	the	judiciary	are	not	sufficiently	held	to	account	for	acting	extraordinarily.	There	is	a	concern	that	mass	media	 is	not	 fulfilling	 the	role	assigned	 to	 it	by	 the	4th	Estate	model,	perhaps	even	abusing	its	position	as	the	dominant	conduit	for	public	discourse.	Moreover,	there	is	a	general	concern	that	print	and	broadcast	technologies	are	ill	equipped	 to	 support	 discourse	 during	 acute	 events	 –	 rapid-moving,	 intensely	political	 and	 disruptive	 social	 happenings.	 It	 is	 structurally	 questionable	whether,	 during	 such	 events,	 fully	 reasoned,	 democratic	 legitimacy	 is	 even	possible.			
Kellner	 (2004)	 suggested	 that	 where	 (and	 when)	 mass	 media	 inevitably	descends	 into	 hysteria,	 Internet	 media	 can	 provide	 a	 “wealth	 of	 opinion	 and	debate”	 to	 inform,	 educate	 and	 motivate	 citizens.	 In	 other	 words,	 digital	technologies	have	been	held	up	as	a	more	democratic	alternative,	better	suited	to	 productive	 discourse	 during	 complex,	 fast-moving	 social	 events.	 In	 the	
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simplest	 terms,	 this	 is	 the	hypothesis	under	review	 in	 this	project	–	during	 the	UK	riots,	did	digital	media	enable	rational,	productive	discussion	any	better	than	the	mass	media	channels?	This	is	not	an	attempt	to	explain	the	state	response	to	the	 riots,	 nor	 a	 critique	 of	 state	 or	 political	 influence	 over	 public	 discourse	 –	there	 is	no	 suggestion	 that	digital	media	 channels	were	dominant	 in	 the	UK	 in	2011.	 Rather,	 this	 is	 a	 hypothesis	 about	 the	 potential	 of	 digital	 media	 to	eventually	meet	a	democratic	requirement	that	is	not	being	met	satisfactorily	at	present.		
A	 summary	 reading	 of	 the	 research	 findings	 and	 analysis	 suggests	 that	complexity	–	both	in	terms	of	 framing	Twitter	and	democracy	for	study,	and	in	unpicking	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 two	 phenomena	 –	 is	 unavoidable	 and	critically	 important.	Furthermore,	both	the	 literature	review	work	and	the	case	study	 analysis	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	 fundamentally	 misleading	 and	 unhelpful	 to	construct	 a	 binary	 dynamic	 in	 which	 democracy	 is	 either	 present	 or	 absent,	enabled	 or	 inhibited	 by	 digital	 technology.	 A	 technology	 like	 Twitter	 is	 more	likely	 to	 make	 differential	 contributions,	 strengthening	 some	 aspects	 of	democracy,	 according	 to	 some	 interpretations	 of	 communicative	 norms	 and	some	 deliberative	 practices,	 but	 weakening	 others.	 Consequently,	 even	 a	simplified	 account	 of	 Twitter	 and	 democracy	 must	 recognise	 this	 nuance	 and	uncertainty.		
The	 issue	 is	 that	nuance	and	uncertainty	 tend	 to	 resist	neat,	 linear,	 concluding	statements.	 Even	 with	 democracy	 restricted	 to	 a	 deliberative	 model,	 and	assessed	using	a	narrow	interpretation	of	communicative	action,	 it	 is	clear	that	Twitter	had	both	enabling	and	inhibiting	influences	during	the	riots.	How	should	
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those	 different	 (sometimes	 contradictory)	 effects	 be	 synthesised	 into	 in	 a	coherent	 (and	 urgent)	 conclusion?	 Furthermore,	 a	 comprehensive	 literature	review	is	sufficient	to	establish	that	digital	politics	is	a	complex	field	of	enquiry	that	has	defied	simplistic	frameworks	and	logics	–	what	value	is	there	in	a	study	that	repeats	this	generally	accepted	conclusion?		
One	response	to	this	challenge	is	that	there	is	surely	more	value	in	recognising	and	exploring	complexity	than	there	is	in	denying	it	(an	important	realisation	for	media	 studies	 more	 generally).	 Furthermore,	 the	 complexity	 itself	 reveals	something	 important	 about	 the	 dynamics	 connecting	 digital	 technology	(especially	software)	and	democratic	processes.	Consider,	 for	 instance,	 the	way	that	different	 thematic	codes	were	distributed	between	different	hashtags.	The	finding	that	it	 is	more	productive	to	analyse	discourse	at	the	level	of	 individual	hashtags	(software	structures)	rather	than	at	the	platform	or	application	level	is	a	useful	one.	 It	underlines	the	 importance	of	reading	and	interpreting	software	for	study,	and	supports	a	wider	argument	for	greater	specificity	and	precision	in	Internet	studies.		
Moreover,	 the	 different	 behaviour	 of	 different	 hashtags	 suggests	 that	 Twitter	cannot	be	viewed	as	 a	unified	 sphere	of	public	 exchange	 (as	 it	 often	 is).	A	key	finding	 underlined	 in	 the	 discussion	was	 that	 the	 hashtag,	 rather	 than	 being	 a	coordinator	 of	 discourse,	may	 serve,	 in	 part	 at	 least,	 to	 inhibit	 deliberation	 by	keeping	 separate	 opposing	 views	 and	 different	 methods	 of	 argument.	 In	 this	respect,	Twitter	replicated	the	behaviour	of	the	(politicised)	print	media	during	the	riots.	Clearly	the	link-sharing	functionality	of	Twitter	is	highly	significant	in	this	 respect,	 and	 highlights	 the	 extent	 to	which	 Twitter	 remains	 embedded	 in	
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existing	 media	 systems.	 In	 some	 respects,	 it	 is	 a	 misrepresentation	 to	 ask	whether	Twitter	is	more	or	less	democratic	than	other	media	types,	because	to	a	great	 extent,	 traditional	 and	 digital	 media	 are	 simply	 components	 of	 a	 larger	media	system.		
This	point	deserves	further	consideration	because	it	has	implications	beyond	the	narrow	 deliberative	 framing	 of	 democracy.	 An	 important	 claim	 about	 the	democratic	 potential	 of	 social	 media	 concerns	 the	 way	 that	 it	 enables	 a	more	diverse	 and	 plural	 audience	 to	 engage	 in	 discourse,	 and	 yet	 the	 influence	 of	traditional	media	over	the	riot	discourse	on	Twitter	is	inescapable.	Nearly	two-thirds	of	 the	 tweets	 in	 the	coding	sample	shared	external	media	of	one	sort	or	another,	and	a	third	of	these	linked	directly	to	national	media	content,	much	of	which	 was	 online	 copy	 from	 traditional	 print	 publications.	 In	 addition,	 many	tweets	that	do	not	include	links	are	comments	on	national	media	texts.			
It	is	unsurprising,	then,	that	the	thematic	concerns	of	the	riot	public	on	Twitter	replicated	 those	 in	 the	 wider	mediasphere.	 The	 close	 thematic	 analysis	 found	that	discourse	was	dominated,	 on	 the	one	hand,	by	 commentary	on	 the	moral,	social	 and	 political	 causes	 of	 the	 riots,	 and	 on	 the	 other	 by	 attempts	 to	externalise	the	rioters,	to	define	them	by	their	transgressions	and	to	locate	them	beyond	the	moral	and	cultural	norms	of	society.	To	a	large	extent,	these	thematic	concerns	were	dictated	by	the	links	embedded	within	tweets,	so	Twitter,	in	part	at	 least,	 acted	 as	 an	 echo	 chamber	 for	 established,	 often	 professional,	 media	voices.	 Whether	 or	 not	 these	 voices	 were	 wholly	 representative	 of	 the	 mass	mediasphere	cannot	be	determined	from	the	Twitter	sample	alone	–	a	survey	of	print	and	broadcast	texts	beyond	Twitter	would	be	required	as	well.		
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It	 is	 possible,	 however,	 to	 observe	 differences	 between	 these	 thematic	categories:	 social	 complexity	 tweets	 (69%)	 tend	 to	 link	 to	 external	 media	 far	more	 that	 RAO	 tweets	 (43%).	 Social	 complexity	 tweets	 were	 also	 more	productive	 (not	 emotional)	 and	 more	 deliberative	 according	 to	 the	 coding	criteria.	 In	 part,	 the	 concentration	 of	 productive	 and	deliberative	 codes	within	the	SOC	category	may	have	been	caused	by	the	coding	method	–	the	embedded	media	tends	to	give	the	impression	of	greater	consideration	and	reason	giving	–	but	 only	 in	 part.	 The	 deliberative	 coding,	 especially,	 demanded	 evidence	 of	personal	 voice	 (commentary)	 within	 the	 tweet	 text.	 The	 association	 between	external	media	and	the	more	complex	social	causation	arguments	is	interesting,	therefore,	both	for	what	it	suggests	about	Twitter	users	politically	and	for	what	it	says	about	how	users	tend	to	make	different	types	of	political	argument.		
Communicative	 action	 prioritises	 reason-giving,	 considered	 and	 respectful	exchange	and	calls	 to	external	or	existing	social	and	cultural	knowledge.	 In	 the	riot	 public,	 this	 type	 of	 persuasion	 tended	 to	 be	 used	 to	 emphasise	 the	 social	complexity	of	rioting	–	the	myriad	causes,	the	possible	motivations	of	rioters,	the	wider	responsibility	for	social	disorder.	Consequently,	SOC	contributions	tended	to	include	calls	to	external	arguments	and	links	to	evidence	of	complexity.	RAO	tweets	 were	 less	 concerned	 with	 these	 normative	 ideals,	 more	 often	 making	reductive	 claims	 about	 cause	 and	 responsibility,	 often	 without	 normative	construction.		
This	does	not	mean,	however,	that	the	SOC	tweets	were	any	more	successful	or	persuasive	in	terms	of	the	wider	riot	discourse.	Indeed,	for	those	who	hope	that	normative,	deliberative	digital	discussion	might	effect	social	and	political	action	
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in	 the	wider	public	 (and	political)	 sphere,	 these	 findings	may	not	be	especially	encouraging.	As	was	noted	in	both	the	findings	and	analytical	discussion,	the	fact	that	content,	thematic	and	deliberative	codes	tended		to	be	distributed	unevenly	across	 hashtags	 is	 concerning	 for	 a	 deliberative	model.	 It	 suggests	 that,	 rather	than	coordinating	and	encouraging	deliberative	exchange	between	users	holding	different	 points	 of	 view,	 Twitter	 allows	 these	 positions	 to	 circulate	independently	 of	 each	 other.	 To	 repeat	 an	 important	 conclusion	 from	 the	discussion	chapter:		
The	 hashtag	 suggests	 coordination,	 but	 the	 association	 may	 be	 illusory:	within	 hashtags	 there	 are	 discourse	 cultures	 that,	 effectively,	 speak	different	 langues.	Deliberation,	then,	rather	than	being	a	democratic	 ideal,	is	simply	a	dialect	within	wider	language	wars.	There	is	no	evidence,	even,	that	different	dialects	speak	to	each	other:	deliberation	may	be	a	marker	of	difference	rather	than	a	route	to	consensus.			
The	study	found	evidence	of	problematic	conditions	for	ideal	speech	within	the	riot	public,	which	 further	 calls	 into	doubt	 the	deliberative	potential	of	Twitter.	Could	 it	be	that	despite	his	perceived	 lack	of	 Internet	expertise,	Habermas	was	prescient	 when	 he	 claimed	 that	 digital	 mediation	 would	 cause	 “the	fragmentation	 of	 large	 but	 politically	 focused	 mass	 audiences	 into	 a	 huge	number	of	isolated	issue	publics”	(Habermas	2006,	423).	
A	 possible	 counter	 argument	 could	 be	 made	 based	 on	 the	 (albeit	 limited)	evidence	that,	over	time,	discourse	flows	in	the	riot	public	became	less	polarised	and	more	 deliberative.	 	 Sentiment	 analysis	 was	 employed	 sparingly,	 owing	 to	concerns	 about	 its	 efficacy	 and	 reductive	 tendencies,	 but	 the	 linear	 tracking	of	
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matched	positive	and	negative	sentiment	suggested	that	the	public	became	more	consensual	over	time.	Both	positive	and	negative	become	less	polarised,	though	positive	sentiment	neutralises	at	a	faster	rate.	This	raises	several	questions.	Are	Twitter	users	calming	down,	their	opinions	becoming	 less	extreme	and	moving	towards	rational	consensus?	Alternatively,	does	this	normalisation	suggest	that,	as	fewer	people	use	a	hashtag,	views	inevitably	become	less	extreme	–	in	other	words,	 do	 topical	 hashtags	 become	 progressively	 less	 representative	 of	 public	attitudes	and	opinions	as,	over	time,	the	public	takes	its	views	elsewhere?		
It	 is	 a	 considerable	 assumption	 that	 a	 hashtag	 should	 perform	 the	 same	coordinating	 function	 in	 the	 same	way	 from	one	day	 to	 the	next.	Hashtags	 are	software-user	 constructions	 –	 they	 are	 not	 fixed	 objects,	 and	 so	 the	function/effect	of	this	construction	can	presumably	change	over	time.	 
All	the	hashtags	analysed	were	more	deliberative	on	the	Thursday	compared	to	the	 Wednesday,	 at	 least	 in	 terms	 of	 validity	 claim	 coding.	 There	 is	 also	 a	narrowing	of	temporal	disparities	between	hashtag	streams,	the	implications	of	which	 were	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	 These	 findings	 might	 suggest	greater	consensus	over	 time;	certainly,	discourse	on	Thursday	was	 found	to	be	more	productive	and	deliberative	and	more	closely	aligned	within	the	SOC,	POL	and	RES	codes	(generally,	the	more	liberal	and	deliberative	codes).		
It	would	 not	 be	 appropriate,	 however,	 to	 conclude	 that	 these	 findings	 validate	the	 deliberative	 potential	 of	 Twitter	 –	 the	 evidence	 is	 too	 sparse	 and	 the	discussion	 far	 too	speculative.	Having	said	 that,	 it	 is	worth	commenting	on	 the	comparison	between	the	discourse	in	the	riot	public,	especially	associated	with	the	 #UKRiots	 hashtag,	 and	 the	 arguments	 presented	 to	 parliament	 during	 the	
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emergency	 sitting	 on	 Thursday	 11th	 August.	 After	 all,	 parliament	 (with	 its	ritualised	format	for	debate,	 its	codes	of	etiquette,	address	and	phraseology,	 its	temporal	 rhythms	 and	 its	 formalised	mechanisms	 for	 reaching	 and	 expressing	consensus)	 should	 be	 the	 archetypal	 deliberative	 setting.	 It	might	 be	 expected	that	 professional	 representatives	 from	 across	 the	 political	 spectrum	 would	produce	gold	standard	deliberative	discourse,	consider	a	full	range	of	positions	and	engage	fully	in	productive,	reasoned	debate.		
A	 full	 critical	 reading	 of	 parliamentary	 discourse	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	conclusion	 chapter,	 but	would	 be	 a	 valuable	 undertaking	 for	 a	 future	 research	project.	 Once	 again,	 the	 task	 should	 not	 be	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 deliberative	binaries,	 but	 rather	 in	 terms	 of	 relative	 deliberative	 practices:	 how	 do	 digital	channels	compare	to	formal	political	channels	in	terms	of	normative	practices?	It	is	possible	to	comment	briefly	from	a	summary	reading	of	the	Hansard	recording	of	the	debate.		
The	 tone	 for	 that	 session	 was	 set	 by	 the	 Prime	Minister’s	 statement,	 parts	 of	which	have	been	commented	upon	already,	but	what	is	remarkable	is	the	lack	of	variety	 in	 the	questions	and	 statements	made	 to	 the	house.	The	parliamentary	discourse	aligns	closely	with	the	findings	of	the	Riots	Communities	and	Victims	Panel	 (RCVP),	 which	 was	 widely	 criticised	 for	 its	 “Victorian”	 interpretation	 of		social	 ills,	 its	persistent	paternalism	and	its	reductive	and	conservative	critique	of	rioters	and	rioting	(Bridges	2012).	
On	the	rare	occasion	that	a	member	of	parliament	(MP)	did	raise	the	possibility	of	 deeper	 social	 complexity	 (and	 complicity)	 to	 the	 rioting,	 these	 ideas	 were	quickly	 dismissed	 by	 the	 government	 (and	 the	 dominant	 discourse).	 Consider	
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the	following	exchange:	
Mr	Elfyn	Llwyd	 (Dwyfor	Meirionnydd)	 (PC):	Does	the	Prime	Minister	realise	 that	 in	 times	 of	 economic	 downturn	 acquisitive	 crime	 always	increases?	The	difference	this	week	was	that	it	was	backed	up	by	extreme	violence	 and	 perpetrated	 by	 mobs.	 In	 that	 light,	 may	 I	 ask	 him	 to	reconsider	the	cuts	to	police	budgets?	He	will	be	seen	as	giving	in	not	to	mob	violence,	but	to	common	sense.	
The	 Prime	 Minister:	 I	 simply	 do	 not	 accept	 this	 determinism	 that	changes	 in	 the	 economy	 mean	 automatic	 changes	 in	 the	 levels	 of	criminality.	 Indeed,	 the	 figures	 for	 the	 last	 recession	 disprove	 that.	We	should	be	clear	in	this	House	that	it	is	criminals	who	are	responsible	for	crime.	 It	 is	an	 individual	act,	and	we	should	hold	people	responsible	 for	their	acts.	(Hansard	2011,	column	1068)	
Using	 the	 same	 coding	 criteria	 as	 the	 Twitter	 analysis,	 the	 dominant	 thematic	concerns	appear	 to	be	defining	rioters	as	others;	expressions	of	solidarity	with	the	 police,	 especially,	 but	 also	 with	 the	 law	 abiding;	 a	 generalist	 neoliberal	critique	–	more	accurately,	 a	paternalist	 emphasis	on	personal	 responsibility	 –	and	 condemnation	 of	 the	 disruptive	 influence	 of	 digital	 technology,	 especially	social	 media.	 In	 other	 words,	 parliamentary	 discourse	 was	 aligned	 far	 more	closely	with	 the	 thematic	 concerns	 that	were	 the	 least	 deliberative	 in	 the	 riot	public.		
The	 simple	 fact	 that	 Twitter	 enabled	 the	 publication	 and	 dissemination	 of	alternative	arguments	–	a	broader	range	of	 thematic	concerns	–	 is	perhaps	 the	
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most	powerful	endorsement	of	its	democratic	potential,	especially	because	other	spheres	of	 public	 discourse	manifestly	 failed	 to	deliver	 reasoned,	 nuanced	 and	exploratory	debate.	While	many	of	these	concerns	originated	in	external	media	texts,	these	concerns	were	often	the	subject	of	adjunctive	discussion,	which	was	productive	 and	 deliberative	 in	 certain	 codes	 especially,	 suggesting	 that	 an	engaged	 and	 informed	 public	 were	 using	 Twitter.	 The	 question,	 then,	 is	 not	whether	Twitter	 has	 the	 potential	 for	 deliberation	 –	 this	 potential	 presumably	exists	anywhere	there	are	humans	prepared	to	deliberate	–	but	rather:	does	the	software	actively	facilitate	this	deliberation?	
This	 raises	 another	 important	 question:	 why	 should	 it	 be	 supposed	 that	 any	communication	technology	will	automatically	or	inevitably	enable	deliberation?	As	 Graham	 (2015)	 notes,	 fully	 normative	 deliberation	 is	 a	 	 rarefied	communicative	practice	–	it	is	hardly	likely	to	occur	in	the	everyday	discussions	and	exchanges	that	occupy	the	public	sphere.	Such	communication	is	“not	bound	to	 any	 formal	 agendas	 or	 outcomes,	 and	 political	 talk	 that	 emerges	 in	 these	spaces	is	often	spontaneous	and	tends	to	lack	any	direct	purpose”	(ibid	250).	In	other	 words,	 is	 it	 somewhat	 unfair	 to	 judge	 Twitter’s	 democratic	 potential	against	such	a	demanding	set	of	normative	criteria?	
Furthermore,	despite	a	 longstanding	supposition	 that	 Internet	 technologies	are	structurally	 suited	 to	 deliberative	 practices,	 this	 sort	 of	 determinism	 is	problematic.	 Deliberative	 practices	 are	 not	 “naturally	 occurring	 and	 universal”	but	rather	“constructed	and	contingent”	(Coleman	and	Moss	2012).			
“Rather	than	thinking	of	deliberation	as	an	objective	or	formulaic	practice	in	which	one	kind	of	technical	platform	can	serve	the	needs	of	all	citizens	
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and	all	of	 the	vast	 range	of	 subjects	 they	might	want	 to	discuss,	 it	makes	sense	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 different	 social	 groups	 behave	 differently	 in	varying	online	spaces.”	(Birchall	and	Coleman	2015,	267)	
If	 deliberation	 is	 hard	 to	 achieve,	 and	 if	 different	 groups	 require	 different	communicative	environments	in	order	to	deliberate,	then	it	is	highly	problematic	to	 assume	 any	 unifying,	 deterministic	 deliberative	 logic.	 The	 deliberative	environment	 becomes	 something	 that	 must	 be	 carefully	 designed,	 something	tailored	and	particular	and	constructed	locally,	rather	than	a	generic	property	of	digital	technology.	As	Birchall	and	Coleman	(2015,	268)	claim,	“designers	should	acknowledge	 the	 nuances	 of	 cultural	 practice	 and	 expressive	 habit	 that	 frame	deliberative	interaction,	rather	than	expecting	such	habits	and	practices	to	bend	to	 the	 rigours	 of	 deliberative	 theory”.	 They	 proceed	 to	 describe	 several	principles	that	might	be	considered	by	designers	looking	to	develop	deliberative	spaces.		
The	 idea	 that	 technology	must	be	designed	 to	encourage	deliberation	reframes	any	 question	 about	 Twitter’s	 deliberative	 potential.	 While	 Twitter	 may	 have	been	called	a	digital	town	square	(Leetaru	2015),	there	is	little	suggestion	that	it	was	 conceived	 or	 designed	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 intentionally	 encourage	deliberation.	It	hardly	makes	sense,	then,	to	question	whether	or	not	Twitter	(or	any	generic	social	media	technology)	delivers	deliberation	–	there	is	little	reason	to	assume	that	 it	should.	 It	 is	more	reasonable	to	 focus	on	the	affordances	that	seem	to	best	support	deliberation,	and	to	ask	how	they	might	be	appropriated	by	an	intentionally	deliberative	design.		
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Consider,	for	instance,	the	hashtag	–	an	affordance	that	is	supposed	to	contribute	to	 the	 creation	 and	 the	 coordination	 of	 issue	 publics	 (Bruns	 and	 Moe	 2014,	Schmidt	2014).	In	some	respects,	the	analysis	in	this	project	supports	this	claim:	hashtags	appear	to	be	a	significant	structure,	shaping	ambient	flows	and	topical	concerns,	 helping	 to	 construct	 a	 communicative	 community	 while	 supporting	considerable	 plurality.	 More	 compellingly,	 deliberative	 discussion	 was	distributed	unevenly	across	hashtags:	some	hashtags	were	more	productive	than	others,	 and	 these	 differences	were	 associated	with	 thematic	 discontinuities.	 It	might	well	be	supposed	that,	were	a	designer	seeking	to	develop	a	deliberative	space,	then	he	or	she	might	consider	making	use	of	the	hashtag	–	or	a	hashtag-like	function	–	to	coordinate	discussion	groups.			
The	 issue	 is	 that	 the	 analysis	 also	 suggested	 that	 hashtags	 tend	 to	 be	 less	effective	 coordinators	 the	 more	 popular	 they	 become.	 The	 temporality	 of	 the	hashtag	is	critical	in	this	respect.	Specifically,	there	is	evidence	that	temporality	and	 deliberation	 align	 and	 that	 higher	 temporalities	 undermine	 ideal	 speech	(there	may	be	a	temporal	threshold	above	which	information	flows	become	too	dense,	 and	 full	 and	 equal	 consideration	 becomes	 impossible).	 However,	 the	discussion	 chapter	 concluded	 that	 this	 alignment	 cannot	 be	 read	 as	 an	endorsement	of	the	conceptual	framework:	temporality	may	shape	discourse	but	it	is	equally	possible	that	discourse	shapes	temporality.	
This	is	a	familiar	issue,	first	introduced	at	the	start	of	chapter	two.	If	deliberation	is	socially	constructed	then	it	 is	problematic	to	assume	that	deliberative	spaces	can	ever	be	designed:	such	logic	always	risks	determinism.	The	great	benefit	of	the	 temporal	 approach	 is	 that	 it	 illustrates	 the	 fluidity	 and	 the	malleability	 of	
	339 
hashtag-enabled	 discourse:	 hashtag	 temporality	 changes	 and	 so	 does	 the	deliberativeness	of	discourse.	The	evidence	indeed	suggests	that	any	association	between	 affordance	 and	 deliberation	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 highly	 contextual.	 In	 other	words,	 if	 there	 is	 deliberation,	 then	 it	 comes	 from	 the	 users	 and	 not	 from	 the	hashtag.	 
What	are	the	implications,	then,	for	the	democratic	potential	of	Twitter,	and	for	digital	media	more	 generally?	 Any	 attempt	 to	 apply	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 riot	analysis	 to	 other	 contexts	 must	 be	 cautious	 and	 fully	 aware	 that	 deliberation	seems	to	depend,	first	and	foremost,	upon	the	intentions	and	the	commitment	of	human	users.	Furthermore,	while	there	is	value	in	these	contextual	descriptions	of	 deliberative	 construction,	 what	 is	 arguably	 more	 important	 is	 the	 gradual	development	of	a	historical	record	of	software-enabled	deliberation.	If	there	are	stable	 logics	connecting	software	and	deliberation,	then	they	are	more	likely	to	be	 revealed	 by	 a	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 discourse	 across	 many	 different	contexts.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 development	 of	 a	 reliable	 and	 replicable	comparative	 method	 becomes	 especially	 important.	 This	 study	 attempted	 to	develop	a	temporal	measure	of	software-discourse	interaction	to	facilitate	such	a	comparative	 approach.	 The	 next	 section	 will	 reflect	 upon	 the	 success	 of	 this	approach.		
In	 conclusion,	 the	 idea	 that	 a	 combination	 of	 careful	 design	 and	 social	 media	logic	will	automatically	encourage	deliberation	is	too	deterministic,	an	example	of	 technological	 solutionism.	 Deliberation	 is	 complex,	 it	 requires	 commitment	from	 the	 deliberators	 (in	 addition	 to	 political	 engagement,	 it	 demands	commitment	 to	 a	 mode	 of	 engagement),	 and	 deliberative	 spaces	 tend	 to	 be	
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carefully	 constructed	 and	 rule-bound.	 Consequently,	 if	 the	 aim	 is	 to	 encourage	deliberation,	 then	 this	 analysis	 suggests	 that	 time	would	 be	 better	 invested	 in	education	and	engagement	programs.	Attempts	to	‘outsource’	this	work	to	digital	technologies	are	unlikely	to	be	wholly	successful.		
	
LIMITATIONS	AND	SUGGESTIONS	
One	of	the	great	challenges	for	researchers	seeking	to	develop	the	applied	study	of	Internet	technologies	–	that	is,	those	who	want	to	explore	the	social	as	well	as	the	 technological	 dynamics	 of	 digital	 computers	 –	 is	 how	 to	 conceptualise	 the	digital	 object	 as	 something	 to	 be	 studied.	 The	 literature	 review	 chapters	established	 that	 there	 remains	 considerable	 disagreement	 about	 how	 best	 to	achieve	this,	not	only	between	disciplines	but,	quite	often,	within	them	too.	It	is	clearly	difficult	to	frame	the	digital	object	in	a	way	that	is	sufficiently	definite	to	be	transferrable	between	contexts	without	becoming	deterministic.		
	
A	 possible	 solution	may	 lie	 at	 the	 temporal	 intersection	of	 digital	 and	political	phenomenology.	Much	like	Internet	theory	as	a	whole,	the	temporal	approach	is	not	well	developed	as	yet.	There	are	theories	of	network	time,	timeless	time	and,	more	 broadly,	 of	 time-space	 compression	 driving	 (and	 being	 driven	 by)	 the	complex	 interaction	between	global	 cultural	 flows.	 In	 short,	 there	 is	 a	 sense	of	quickening,	 of	 established	 rhythms	 being	 disrupted,	 and	 this	 disruption	 is	increasingly	 a	 concern	 for	 both	 the	 digital	 and	 political	 sciences.	 Both	
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communicative	 technology	 and	 communicative	 democracy	 necessarily	 involve	the	meeting	of	human	minds	–	a	meeting	that	must	be	constructed	in	both	time	and	 space.	 Castells	 (2010)	 has	 described	 the	 city	 as,	 first	 and	 foremost,	 a	communication	system	because	of	 the	way	 it	 facilitates	multifarious	 interactive	settings;	 in	 the	digital	 context	Knorr	Cetina	 (2009)	has	described	 the	synthetic	situating	 of	 the	 communicative	 act	 –	 the	 meeting	 of	 minds	 via	 an	 onscreen	projection	of	those	minds	(in	text,	images	or	video).		
The	 conceptual	 framework	 chapter	 concluded	 that	 the	 temporal	 approach	was	potentially	 a	 productive	 one	 –	 a	 way	 of	 moving	 the	 communicative	 study	 of	digital	politics	on	from	narrow	contextual	description	(or	polemics)	and	towards	a	 more	 general	 and	 applicable	 theory	 of	 democracy	 in	 digital	 time-space.	 A	method	was	developed,	drawing	on	the	central	dynamics	of	temporal	theory	and	the	few	studies	that	have	attempted	an	empirical	reading	of	network	time.	It	 is	important	to	reflect	briefly	on	the	success	of	that	method,	and	to	consider	what	the	experience	in	this	project	suggests	for	the	temporal	method	in	future.		
This	was	not	an	attempt	to	argue	that	the	temporal	approach	is	the	only	way	–	or	even	the	best	way	–	to	establish	digital	communication	as	an	object	in	the	world	to	be	studied	by	political	scientists,	and	it	should	not	have	been	read	as	such.	Of	course,	 there	 are	 other	 approaches,	 including	 network	 theory,	 anthropological	and	 ethnographic	 framings	 as	 well	 as	 innovative	 cultural,	 economic	 and	evolutionary	 methodologies.	 Rather,	 this	 was	 an	 attempt	 to	 provide	 a	perspective	 on	 the	 digital	 object	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	 replicable	 and	 theoretically	justified	 cross-contextually.	 It	 is	 a	 perspective	 that	 should	 be	 particularly	applicable	to	the	study	of	digital	democracy,	especially	the	deliberative	practices	
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frequently	cited	as	central	to	that	concept.	Furthermore,	if	it	proves	productive,	it	is	a	perspective	that	should	help	elucidate	the	complex	digital-physical	dualism	that	 so	 complicates	 a	 great	deal	 of	 Internet	 theory	 (and,	 by	 extension,	modern	social	 theory	 as	well).	 It	 is	 not	 known	what	 the	 effect	might	 be	 of	 a	 perceived	separation	between	 the	digital	and	physical	worlds:	 it	 is	an	area	 that	demands	further	enquiry.		
After	 this	 project,	 there	 remains	 a	 reasonable	 prospect	 that	 temporal	 analysis	can	contribute	to	this	effort,	but	it	cannot	be	claimed	that	the	method	proved	its	productivity	conclusively,	or	even	that	it	was	possible	to	frame	time-space	with	a	great	 deal	 of	 objectivity.	 There	 are	 different	 reasons	 for	 this,	 and	 it	 is	 worth	considering	 each	 in	 turn,	 both	 to	 establish	 the	 limitations	of	 the	 approach,	 but	also	to	suggest	possibilities	for	development.		
The	 first	 issue	 –	 which	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 and	 discussed	 on	 occasion	already	–	is	that	digital	time-space	remains	an	elusive	phenomena	that	is	hard	to	describe	 and	 easy	 to	misinterpret.	 In	 particular,	 a	 researcher	 interested	 in	 the	temporal	 approach	 must	 recognise	 that	 it	 is	 very	 easy	 to	 impose	 temporality	rather	than	to	observe	it.	This	involves	both	practical	and	theoretical	issues,	and	neither	type	is	easily	resolved.	The	practical	issues	relate	mostly	to	the	fact	that	data	 collection,	 processing,	 filtering	 and	 reading	 methods	 can	 all	 suggest	temporalities	 that	 are	 hardly	 related	 to	 the	 (physical	 or	 social)	 phenomenon	being	 studied.	 These	 temporalities	 are	 constructed	 first	 in	 the	 parsing	 and	processing	 done	 by	 the	 (Twitter)	 API,	 and	 then	 in	 the	 programmes	 and	 the	spread-sheets	 of	 the	 researcher,	 not	 to	mention	 the	 theoretical	 and	 structural	preferences	that	shape	methodologies.		
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An	 easy	 way	 to	 illustrate	 this	 issue	 is	 to	 consider	 the	 decisions	 taken	 in	 the	identification	and	extraction	of	the	riot	public.	The	decision	to	focus	on	hashtags	to	define	that	public	reflects	an	assumption	that	Twitter	is	organised	according	to	 structural	 layers,	 and	 that	 the	macro	 layer	 is	 best	 suited	 to	 identifying	 the	most	 public	 conversations.	 Limiting	 the	 analysis	 to	 certain	 hashtags,	 however,	excludes	 tweets	 that	 don’t	 use	 those	 hashtags	 and	 constructs	 a	 ‘conversation’	that	exists	as	an	object	only	in	the	context	of	the	research.	Most	probably,	it	was	never	 experienced	by	a	 single	human	user	 in	 the	 form	 it	 is	 eventually	 studied.	Clearly	 this	 has	 implications	 for	 temporality.	 Two	 researchers	 could	 study	 the	UK	riots	and	construct	quite	different	temporal	pictures	depending	on	how	and	where	they	chose	to	search,	 their	processing	techniques	and	their	presentation	methods.		
In	large	part,	this	is	an	issue	for	big	data	methods	more	generally.	There	needs	to	be	far	more	awareness	about	the	social,	representational	and	phenomenological	significance	 of	 data	 processing	 decisions.	 Clearly	 the	 object	 as	 studied	 is	 not	always	 the	 same	 as	 the	 object	 as	 lived,	 and	 often	 this	 separation	 needs	 to	 be	better	understood.		
In	the	context	of	this	project,	the	discussion	chapter	attempted	to	question	what	the	 different	 temporal	 measures	 actually	 represented	 in	 terms	 of	phenomenological	 experience.	 The	 riot	 public	 is	 an	 abstraction,	 as	 indeed	 are	stream	density	and	persistence.	In	terms	of	lived	phenomena,	it	was	argued	that	they	reflect	the		ambient	temporality	of	the	riot	on	Twitter	–	the	sense	of	being	surrounded	by	the	story	–	but,	of	course,	this	too	is	a	conceptual	abstraction.		
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More	 work	 is	 needed	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 relationship	 between	 these	abstracted	 measures	 and	 time	 as	 it	 manifests	 and	 is	 experienced	 on	 screen	during	the	communicative	act.	It	is	well	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis	to	make	any	assertions	or	predictions	about	how	that	work	might	proceed,	but	it	seems	likely	 that	 it	 will	 require	 contributions	 from	 across	 the	 social,	 cultural	 and	natural	sciences.	What	is	clearer	is	that,	at	this	stage,	considerable	caution	must	be	 exercised	 in	 applying	 and	 interpreting	 temporal	 measures	 –	 and	 that	 the	scope	 for	 quantitative	 analyses	 remains	 limited.	 The	 quantitative	 measures	developed	 in	 this	 project	 have	 been	 applied	 only	 in	 the	 framing	 of	 qualitative	readings	 but,	 even	 so,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 preface	 (and	 now	 postscript)	 those	readings	 by	 acknowledging	 the	 assumptions	 and	 the	 abstractions	 that	 made	them	possible.		
This	 observation	 has	 wider	 implications	 for	 big	 data	 analyses,	 which	 tend	 to	assume	an	ontology	of	unified	and	quantitative	objectivity.	 Indeed,	much	of	the	machine-driven	processing	of	 the	data	archive	 relies	on	a	 tacit	acceptance	 that	aligns	 observation	 and	 reality	 without	 any	 acknowledgement	 of	 abstraction,	exclusion,	 representation	 or	 dualism.	 Perhaps	 this	 points	 to	 an	 emergent	 role	(and	 responsibility)	 for	 the	 social	 theorist:	 the	 task,	 first,	 of	 understanding	properly	 the	 data	 science	 domain	 and,	 second,	 of	 interpreting	 (and	 informing)	big	data	work	for	social	and	cultural	application.	As	recent	publications	indicate,	several	researchers	are	aware	of	this	responsibility	and	are	working	already	to	integrate	the	social	and	data	sciences	(Crawford	et	al.	2014,	Bowker	2014,	boyd	and	Crawford	2011).		
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Those	efforts	should	include	contributions	to	the	development	of	techniques	that	will	 enable	big	data	work	 to	better	 inform	social	 and	cultural	 theory	 (and	vice	versa).	Standardisation	is	likely	to	be	critical	in	this	respect	(Bruns	and	Stieglitz	2013).	 One	 of	 the	 reasons	 for	 pursuing	Twitter	 time	was	 that	 it	 could	 suggest	ways	to	standardise	analyses	of	democratic	potential.	 If	 the	temporal	approach	can	be	standardised,	then	perhaps	it	becomes	possible	to	compare	and	contrast	contextual	 studies	of	digital	democracy.	Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 reflect	on	the	 methods	 used	 in	 this	 project	 and	 to	 identify	 the	 techniques	 that	 proved	productive	and	any	issues	that	might	complicate	standardisation.	
As	with	all	projects	that	rely	on	automated	API	queries	and	big	data	processing	tools,	 this	study	must	acknowledge	 the	potential	 for	selection	and	confounding	biases	(Ruths	and	Pfeffer	2014).	Selection	biases	are	particularly	an	issue	when	APIs	 are	 proprietary	 and	 restricted.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Twitter,	 the	 streaming	 API	used	 to	 collect	 tweets	 for	 this	 study	 returns	 approximately	 one	 per	 cent	 of	 all	tweets	published.	The	sample	size	 is	 less	of	an	 issue	 than	 the	sample	selection	methods,	which	are	not	known	to	researchers.	These	issues	were	acknowledged	in	 the	 methodology	 and	 some	 strategies	 were	 developed	 to	 mitigate	 against	biases,	 but	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recall	 this	 potential	 for	 error	 because	 it	 is	fundamental	to	data-driven	Internet	analysis.		
There	are	steps	that	individual	researchers	–	and	the	academic	community	as	a	whole	 –	 could	 take	 to	 further	mitigate	 against	 such	 biases	 in	 future.	 Clearly,	 a	standardised	 and	 replicable	 approach	 to	 both	 collecting	 and	 processing	 data	would	help.	In	this	regard,	it	is	important	that	researchers	currently	developing	methods	 for	data	 collection	and	processing	make	public	 their	 tools	–	 including	
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API	 querying	 scripts,	 data	 handling	 processes	 and	 analytical	 tools.	 A	 public	record	 would	 assist	 verification	 and	 development	 efforts	 as	 well	 as	standardisation.		
Researchers	 should	 also	 acknowledge	 more	 readily	 the	 likelihood	 that	confounding	 relationships	 confuse	 and	 complicate	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 analyses,	especially	 in	 a	 text-based	 communication	 system	 that	 enables	 hyperlink	relationships	to	connect	millions	of	documents.	In	general	terms,	the		
“logic	 of	 hyperlinking	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 defy	 independence,	 to	 create	confounding	relationships	between	samples	regardless	of	platform,	audience	or	sampling	techniques.	The	‘temporality’	of	Google	search	will	be	driven,	in	part,	by	the	temporality	of	Facebook	and	Twitter	and	all	the	different	sources	that	Google	indexes.”	(Pond	2015,	154).	
More	specifically,	the	practice	of	embedding	hyperlinks	into	tweets	makes	it	very	difficult	to	define	the	tweet	object,	either	as	a	text	or	as	a	temporal	moment.	As	discussed	already,	embedded	links	create	windows	into	a	vast	web	of	interactive	text,	 the	 limits	 of	 which	 can	 only	 be	 guessed	 at.	 In	 this	 study,	 each	 link	 was	followed	to	its	immediate	destination	and	no	further,	but	there	are	no	such	limits	on	 real	 Twitter	 users.	 A	 tweet	 can	 pass	 by	 in	 an	 instance	 or	 it	 can	 ‘unfurl’	 for	hours,	through	networks	of	hyperlinked	deferrals.		
These	 connections	 are	 not	 always	 temporally	 linear	 either.	 It	 has	 been	 noted	how	 different	 links	 can	 invoke	 different	 temporal	 experiences	 (past,	 present,	future),	but	it	is	equally	the	case	that	tweets	can	reference	other	tweets	in	ways	that	 are	 temporally	 non-linear.	 The	 retweet,	 for	 example,	 is	 particularly	
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problematic	 in	 this	 respect.	 According	 to	 the	 temporal	 method,	 a	 retweet	 is	located	 by	 its	 moment	 of	 publication	 –	 where	 it	 appears	 in	 the	 stream	 is	determined	by	 its	 timestamp.	This	 is	 a	 considerable	 simplification	however.	 In	some	 respects,	 the	 retweet	 is	 not	 something	 new,	 defined	 by	 its	 moment	 of	creation,	but	a	 reference	 to	a	moment	already	passed	–	 to	 the	original	 tweet	–	which	now	extends	into	the	present	in	uncertain	ways	thanks	to	the	retweet	and	the	additional	viewing	opportunities	(moments)	that	the	retweet	creates.	A	great	deal	 more	 conceptual	 and	 empirical	 work	 is	 required	 to	 explore	 how	 these	historical	relationships	complicate	Twitter	time.		
In	 lieu	of	 that	work,	 it	 seems	problematic	 to	 suggest	 that	network	 time	can	be	measured	 simply	 by	 observing	 publication	 rates	 in	 pre-defined	 temporal	windows.	 Such	 an	 approach	 creates	 an	 artificial	 picture	 of	 temporal	 unity	 (of	pace	 or	 speed	 defined	 only	 in	 the	 present,	 of	 peaks	 and	 troughs	 seemingly	unrelated	 to	 each	 other)	 and	 this	 can	 confuse	 analysis.	 This	 confusion	 was	evident	 in	 the	 attempts	 to	 explain	 spikes	 in	 stream	 density	 in	 relation	 to	persistence	spikes,	ambient	temporality	or	diurnal	variations.		
Despite	 these	 considerable	 conceptual	 and	 practical	 issues,	 the	 temporal	approach	 appears	 to	 be	 more	 promising	 than	 the	 spatial	 approach,	 which	 is	undermined	by	the	limited	availability	of	spatial	data	and	the	fact	that,	in	terms	of	Twitter	at	least,	the	fact	that	the	spatial	sample	is	self	selecting.	While	it	was	possible	 to	make	 some	 general	 claims	 about	 a	 national	 riot	 public,	 it	 was	 not	possible	 to	 explore	 in	 any	 detail	 how	 the	 structures	 of	 Twitter	 and	 its	information	 flows	 related	 to	 the	 physical	 distribution	 of	 riot	 events.	 These	difficulties	are	likely	to	remain	unless	social	media	sites	change	how	they	collect	
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(and	make	available)	spatial	data	on	their	users	–	and	such	a	change	would	raise	considerable	ethical	concerns	and	risk	violating	the	privacy	of	users.		
Unless	more	Twitter	users	decide	 that	 they	wish	 to	make	public	 their	 location	information,	spatial	methods	must	seek	to	make	use	of	textual	location	data	from	profile	 information	 and	 Twitter’s	 location	 metadata	 point.	 As	 discussed,	however,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 process	 this	 data	 and	 to	 extract	meaningful	 location	information	 from	 it.	 Innovation	 in	 this	 area	 will	 be	 dependent	 upon	 better	automated	 reading	 tools,	 comprehensive	 location	 databases,	 and	 a	 better	understanding	of	how	Twitter	users	choose	to	represent	their	physical	locations	to	the	platform.		
If	 it	 is	difficult	to	automate	the	analysis	of	 location	information;	it	 is	even	more	challenging	 to	 automate	 the	 reading	 of	 political	 talk	 and	 to	 evaluate	 the	deliberative	quality	of	 tweet	 text.	The	study	demonstrated	the	difficulty	 in	 first	applying	 and	 then	 interpreting	 sentiment	 analysis	 and	 automated	 reading	techniques.	There	are	two	issues	in	particular.	The	first	 is	that	machine	natural	language	 toolkits	 (automated	processing	engines)	 struggle	 to	 interpret	nuance,	metaphor,	 satire	 and	 other	 types	 of	 non-literal	 representation.	 The	 second	 is	that,	even	if	meaning	can	be	extracted	and	interpreted	successfully,	 it	 is	always	reductive	 to	 render	 this	 meaning	 into	 a	 computable	 form	 –	 a	 floating	 point	sentiment	score,	for	instance,	or	a	word	cloud.		
It	remains	necessary,	therefore,	to	human	read	tweets	to	assess	thematic	content	and	 to	 evaluate	 deliberative	 potential.	 Human	 reading	 is	 clearly	 slower	 than	machine	 reading,	 and	 greatly	 limits	 the	 number	 of	 tweets	 that	 can	 be	 studied.	This	 undermines	 somewhat	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 big	 data	 approach,	 and	 even	 in	
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human	 hands,	 coding	 methods	 remain	 reductive.	 Democracy	 can	 only	 be	considered	 narrowly,	 according	 to	 certain	 definitions	 in	 certain	 contexts,	 and	using	 certain	 (simplified)	 criteria.	 This	 study	 relied	 upon	 a	 deliberative	interpretation	 of	 communicative	 democracy	 but	 this	 is	 hardly	 the	 only	way	 to	frame	 democracy,	 and	 it	 remains	 a	 contested	 interpretation,	 especially	 in	 its	normative	form.		
Furthermore,	such	an	approach	removes	the	democratic	process	from	the	minds	and	 mouths	 of	 the	 human	 beings	 who	 practice	 it.	 Democracy	 becomes	 an	abstract,	normative	concept	–	one	that	exists	solely	in	the	text	of	tweets	and	the	representative	 meaning	 encoded	 therein.	 While	 such	 an	 approach	 may	 be	necessary	or	convenient	from	a	methodological	perspective,	it	is	hardly	ideal	to	reduce	 a	 complex,	 vibrant,	 discordant	 social	 practice	 in	 this	 way.	 What	 is	required	 is	 a	 theory	 of	 digital	 democracy	 that	 fully	 frames	 the	 digital	 object	without	 reducing	 or	 ignoring	 the	 influence	 of	 human-led	 social	 construction.	There	 are	 plenty	 of	 attempts	 at	 such	 a	 theory	 (Coleman	 and	 Freelon	 2015,	Dryzek	and	List	2003,	Barber	2002,	1997)	but	it	remains	an	urgent	task	for	the	political	sciences.		
Many	of	these	theories	have	attempted	to	combine	multiple	perspectives	on	the	relationship	between	digital	 communication	and	democracy.	Temporality	often	plays	a	central	role	in	such	theories,	but	is	this	role	deserved?	Does	the	analysis	of	 the	UK	 riots,	 and	 the	 discussion	 that	 has	 followed	 it,	 support	 the	 view	 that,	because	 digital	 technologies	 are	 fast,	 they	 undermine	 the	 necessarily	 slow	practice	of	democracy?		
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Temporality	eludes	objective	measurement.	It	can	be	described	in	quite	specific	terms,	but	comparing	Twitter	time	to	Facebook	time	is	 fundamentally	different	from	comparing	the	top	speeds	of	a	car	and	an	aeroplane.	Moreover,	the	notion	that	any	technology	(Twitter,	Facebook	or	the	Internet	as	a	whole)	has	an	innate	speed	 is	 inherently	 deterministic.	 The	 analysis	 of	 Twitter	 time	 during	 the	 UK	riots	 suggested	 that	 the	patterns	of	pace	observed	 (the	 stream	densities)	were	constructed	by	the	discourse	–	by	users	choosing	to	log	on	to	Twitter	and	to	send	tweets.	Those	patterns	of	pace	may	have	constructed	discourse	in	turn,	shaping	the	 structural	 flows	 and	 ambient	 topicality,	 but	 at	 best	 temporality	 is	 an	indicative	measure	not	an	explanatory	one.		
This	is	the	same	point	as	the	one	made	right	at	the	start	of	the	literature	review:	that	media	studies	have	long	tried	to	balance	the	determinist	and	constructivist	perspectives	and	that	delicate	interpretative	act	seems	to	begin	anew	with	each	emergent	technology.	While	this	project	has	been	preoccupied	with	defining	the	Internet	as	an	object	for	study,	this	is	really	just	a	continuation	of	a	more	general	effort	 to	 conceptualise	 media	 and	 mediation.	 It	 is	 clear	 that,	 while	 digital	technology	 is	 new,	 challenging	 and	 theoretically	 exciting,	 communication,	representation	 and	 social	 practices	 like	 democracy	 are	 not.	 This	 realisation	serves	 as	 an	 important	 reminder:	 an	 integrated	 approach,	 calling	on	 computer	science,	 software	 studies,	 social	 hermeneutics	 and	 critical	 theory,	 is	 absolutely	necessary	 for	 researchers	 seeking	 to	 better	 understand	 digitally-mediated	modernity.		
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RECOMMENDATIONS	FOR	FUTURE	RESEARCH		
The	 review	 of	 limitations	 is	 important,	 partly	 because	 it	 is	 a	 reminder	 that	judicious	caution	must	be	exercised	when	interpreting	the	findings	of	this	study,	but	 also	 because	 it	 reveals	 outstanding	 questions	 and	 suggests	 avenues	 for	future	investigation.	The	final	task	in	this	thesis,	then,	is	to	consider	these	future	research	challenges	briefly,	to	ask	how	they	are	informed	by	this	project	and	to	suggest	ways	that	researchers	might	seek	to	respond.	These	suggestions	should	not	be	read	as	an	attempt	to	limit	or	to	define	future	research	efforts	–	there	are	innumerable	unanswered	questions	and	conceptual	uncertainties.	Rather,	this	is	an	 attempt	 to	 identify	 questions	 that	 follow	 directly	 from	 the	 analysis	 and	discussion	of	the	UK	riots.	The	comments	reflect	the	particular	research	interests	of	the	thesis.		
The	 first	 point	 has	 been	 noted	 briefly	 already:	 there	 is	 a	 convincing	 case	 for	building	a	more	complete	historical	record	of	software-enabled	communication	in	 political	 contexts.	 This	 record	 should	 not	 be	 limited	 to	 any	 one	 application	(e.g.	 Twitter),	 and	 it	 should	 extend	beyond	 the	narrow	deliberative	 framing	 of	democracy	 employed	 in	 this	 project.	 Clearly,	 this	 is	 a	 substantial	 undertaking,	but	 the	 opportunity	 to	 compare	 and	 contrast	 across	 different	 contexts	 would	enable	researchers	to	investigate	better	the	super	logics	shaping	the	relationship	between	software	and	communication.		
For	 instance,	 it	was	 noted	 in	 the	 findings	 that	 adjunctive	 discussion	 tended	 to	happen	 in	 response	 to	 links	 embedded	 within	 tweets	 –	texts,	 multimedia,	speeches,	statements	and	opinions	circulating	more	widely	in	the	mediasphere.		
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An	 important	 affordance	 of	 Twitter	 is	 that	 it	 acts	 as	 a	 link	 sharing	 and	commenting	 system,	but	 is	hardly	 the	only	platform	 for	 commenting	on	media	texts.	 Rather	 than	 attempting	 to	 assess	 the	 deliberative	 potential	 of	 Twitter	 in	isolation,	 it	 would	 perhaps	 be	 more	 productive	 to	 perform	 a	 comparative	analysis	 with	 adjunctive	 discussion	 supported	 by	 different	 applications	 at	different	locations	on	the	Internet.		
An	 obvious	 example	 is	 the	 commenting	 communities	 that	 many	 websites	support,	 which	 have	 a	 variety	 of	 affordances	 that	 support	 reader	 engagement	with	texts.	Given	the	number	of	national	media	texts	circulating	in	the	riot	public,	it	could	be	instructive	to	compare	the	Twitter-enabled	discussion	of	these	texts	with	the	in	situ	discussion	at	the	newspaper	websites.	How	do	thematic	concerns	differ?	 Is	 one	 more	 deliberative	 than	 the	 other?	 Is	 there	 any	 evidence	 that	differences	are	shaped	by	the	affordances	of	the	different	commenting	software?	As	noted	already,	there	would	be	considerable	value	in	exploring	more	fully	how	an	application	like	Twitter	is	situated	within	the	wider	media	system.		
The	temporal	approach	developed	in	this	thesis	has	also	been	used	to	compare	discourse	 on	 Twitter	with	 televised	 political	 discussion	 (Pond	 2015).	Q&A	 is	 a	weekly	political	discussion	program	on	the	Australian	Broadcasting	Corporation	(ABC),	 and	#QandA	 is	a	hashtag	used	specifically	 to	 interact	with	 the	 televised	broadcast.	The	study	found	similar	temporal	complexities	to	this	project,	some	of	which	were	 challenging	 for	 deliberation,	 but	 also	 noted	 that	 rigid	 clock-based	temporalities	 are	 not	 necessarily	 conducive	 to	 deliberation,	 even	 if	 they	 are	slower.		
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The	second	research	recommendation	is	a	clear	extension	of	the	first.	To	enable	meaningful	comparative	analysis	across	any	historical	record,	there	needs	to	be	standardised	 practices	 for	 data	 collection	 and	 processing	 and	 standardised	techniques	 for	 data	 analysis.	 Other	 researchers	 have	 called	 for	 greater	standardisation	 across	 Twitter	 research	 (Bruns	 and	 Stieglitz	 2013,	 2012),	 but	there	are	considerable	challenges,	not	least	the	on-going	disagreement	over	how	digital	 objects	 should	 be	 conceptualised	 and	 observed.	 Is	 standardisation	possible	 across	 software	 applications,	 for	 instance,	 or	 does	 the	 specificity	 of	software	construction	mean	that	Facebook	and	Twitter	will	never	submit	to	the	same	analytical	methods?		
One	argument	for	pursuing	a	temporal	method	was	that	it	could	enable	a	degree	of	 standardisation	 across	 software	 structures.	 While	 temporality	 may	 be	complex	and	contextual,	the	experience	of	time	–	that	is,	the	relative	negotiation	and	perception	of	its	pace	and	rhythms	–	is	pervasive.	Furthermore,	it	has	been	proposed	that	hegemonic	clock	time	can	serve	as	a	mechanised	baseline,	against	which	 the	 interplay	of	dynamic	 temporalities	might	be	observed	empirically.	 If	researchers	 could	 reach	 consensus	 around	 a	 suite	 of	 temporal	methods,	might	this	support	a	standardised	framework	for	contextual	analysis?		
This	 study	 provides	 some	 evidence	 that	 such	 a	 consensus	 might	 be	 possible,	though	 it	 raises	 several	 issues	 for	 a	 temporal	 approach.	 As	 noted	 in	 the	discussion,	it	does	appear	that	temporality	–	stream	density,	persistence,	lag	–	is	variable	across	Twitter’s	software	structures,	and	that	discourse	is	also	variable	across	 these	same	structures.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	possible	 to	observe	how	these	temporal	 dynamics	 might	 construct	 differential	 communicative	 experiences,	
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making	 use	 of	 concepts	 like	 ambient	 temporality.	 Those	 observations	 are	complicated,	however,	by	the	unstable	(and	sometimes	uncertain)	temporality	of	software	objects,	 the	deferral	 of	meaning	 in	 text	 (and	 through	hyperlinks)	 and	the	difficulty	of	translating	abstract	flows	into	objective	user	experiences.		
Clearly,	if	the	temporal	method	is	to	support	standardisation,	then	considerable	work	 is	 needed,	 both	 conceptually	 and	methodologically,	 to	 better	 understand	the	 relationship	 between	 software,	 time	 and	 meaning-making.	 It	 is	 worth	remembering	 that	 this	 is	 an	 emergent	 area	 of	 research	 –	 a	 new	 and	 dynamic	research	space.	Theories	of	network	 time	are	 still	being	developed	and,	 as	yet,	there	 have	 been	 hardly	 any	 substantive	 attempts	 to	 study	 network	 time	empirically.	This	remains	an	area	of	some	promise,	then,	and	one	in	which	there	is	genuine	potential	for	inter-disciplinary	collaboration.		
Beyond	the	temporal	method,	the	third	recommendation	is	that	there	should	be	greater	 effort	 to	 synthesise	 and	 standardise	 different	 methodological	perspectives.	In	other	words,	a	temporal	method	might	prove	productive,	but	it	is	 only	 one	 perspective	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 software	 and	 the	 human-social	 experience.	 Other	 perspectives	 are	 valuable,	 and	 they	 are	 provided	 by	network	science,	 textual	analysis,	cultural	studies	and	so	on.	To	date,	 there	has	been	very	 little	effort	 to	develop	 truly	 integrative	 research	approaches.	Clearly	there	 are	 conceptual	 challenges	 to	 unifying	 these	 very	 different	 methods,	 but	they	are	not	insurmountable.		
It	 is	 acknowledged	 that	a	potential	 criticism	of	 the	methodology	 is	 that	 it	does	not	attempt	to	interview	the	human	contributors	to	the	riot	public	or	to	describe	them	in	any	great	detail.	The	preference	for	textual	analysis	does	not	imply	that	
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an	 analysis	 of	 gender,	 ethnicity,	 demography	 or	 social-economic	 status	 is	 not	required.	 Such	 information	 could	 prove	 contextually	 and	 critically	 important.	The	conceptual	framework	invoked	Stuart	Hall’s	concept	of	the	situated	audience	and,	 in	doing	 so,	 expressly	 acknowledged	 the	 importance	of	 interpretative	and	situated	decoding	by	 the	physical	 audience.	The	significance	of	physical	 (social	and	cultural)	situation	is	acknowledged	in	the	call	for	spatial-contextual	analysis	of	 digital	 flows	 and	 the	 recognition	 of	 potential	 dualism	 (the	 digital-physical	dialectic).	Cultural,	 anthropological	 and	ethnographic	approaches	 could	help	 to	untangle	these	complexities	and	to	re-contextualise	the	audience.		
This	project	attempted	to	synthesise	ideas	from	software	studies,	epidemiology,	political	 theory	 and	 cultural	 theory.	 Network	 analysis	 was	 rejected	 initially	because	it	is	less	suited	to	an	analysis	of	situated	meaning-making.	Nevertheless,	as	the	discussion	made	clear,	a	concept	like	ambient	temporality	is	dependent	on	the	flow	of	meanings	within	systems	–	collections	of	 individuals	–	and	network	analysis	 could	 have	 revealed	 useful	 information	 about	 connections	 within	 the	riot	public.	Integrated	methodologies	may	require	paradigmatic	shifts	in	the	way	that	 digital	 communication	 is	 conceived	 for	 study	 and	 a	 challenging	 re-integration	of	cultural	and	empirical	approaches.	The	emergent	field	of	Cultural	Science,	 for	 instance,	 seeks	 to	 situate	 culture	within	an	empirical,	 evolutionary	framework	(Hartley	and	Potts	2014).		
The	 success	 of	 these	 integrated	 methods	 may	 depend,	 in	 part,	 upon	 the	development	 of	 automated	 techniques	 for	 making	 full	 use	 of	 the	 metadata	created	 by	 digital	 technologies.	 From	 a	 cultural	 perspective,	 it	 is	 tempting	 to	dismiss	 the	 potential	 of	 automated	 processing,	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 machine	
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reading	will	always	struggle	to	interpret	the	nuance	and	complexity	of	individual	subjectivity.	 This	 study	 demonstrated	 the	 limits	 of	 some	 current	 techniques.	Critiquing	the	current	utility	of	automated	processing	is	not	the	same	as	rejecting	its	 future	 potential,	 however.	 Natural	 language	 processing	 has	 improved	dramatically	in	a	short	period,	and	the	algorithmic	analysis	of	social	media	data	has	 already	 produced	 some	 intriguing	 observationsxxxiii.	 While	 these	 methods	may	not	replicate	 the	nuance	and	 insight	of	hermeneutical	analysis,	 it	 is	surely	worth	pursuing	automated	methods	that	 improve	the	 framing	and	efficiency	of	such	work.			
Freelon	 (2015)	 identified	only	 a	handful	 of	 studies	 that	have	 attempted	 to	use	social	 computing	 methods	 to	 inform	 an	 analysis	 of	 digital	 politics,	 and	 yet	defining	 the	 digital	 object	 for	 study	 is	 clearly	 one	 of	 the	 central	 challenges	 for	digitally-focused	research.	Too	often,	digital	research	is	pursued	without	a	clear	understanding	 of	 digital	 technology	 and	 without	 a	 clear	 concept	 of	 how	 that	technology	might	 construct	 digital-social	 effects.	 This	 uncertainty	may	 explain	the	persistent	determinism	for	which	Internet	studies	has	been	criticised.		
This	 observation	 inspires	 the	 final	 recommendation	 of	 this	 thesis:	 greater	dialogue	 between	 social	 and	 cultural	 theorists,	 engineers	 and	 developers	 is	highly	 desirable.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 call	 for	 specific	 research	 but,	 rather,	 a	 call	 for	greater	research	capacity.	Productive	and	constructive	dialogue	can	support	and	strengthen	research	 into	 the	effect	of	 software	 in	 society.	At	present,	 there	are	remarkably	 few	 research	 teams	 properly	 equipped	 to	 pursue	 fully	 integrated	digital-social	research.	Developing	 integrated	theories,	 integrated	methods,	and	
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integrated	research	teams	to	pursue	those	methods	will	be	crucial	to	the	future	success	of	digital-social	research	efforts.		
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ENDNOTES	
 
																																																																		
i	The	Broadwater	Farm	estate	 in	Tottenham	has	a	notorious	history.	 In	1985,	 it	experienced	 serious	 rioting	 after	 “a	 local	 woman,	 Cynthia	 Jarrett,	 died	 while	police	searched	her	home	following	the	arrest	of	her	son.”	(Dodd	2014).	During	those	riots,	Police	officer	PC	Keith	Blakelock	was	fatally	stabbed.			
ii	In	 addition	 to	 the	 causal	 factors,	 he	 outlines	 several	 police	 procedures	 that	likely	 served	 to	 increase	 looting	 during	 the	 riots,	 particularly	 an	 emphasis	 on	protecting	 life	 –	 on	 “holding	 the	 line”	 –	 above	 the	 preservation	 of	 property	(Bridges	2012).		
iii	“By	 analogy	 with	 the	 biosphere	 (Vernadsky’s	 concept)	 we	 could	 talk	 of	 a	semiosphere,	 which	 we	 shall	 define	 as	 the	 semiotic	 space	 necessary	 for	 the	existence	and	functioning	of	languages”	(Lotman	1990,	123.) 
iv	Legitimacy	is	clearly	a	complex	and	much	theorised	concept	in	political	science	(Buchanan	 2002).	 The	 term	 is	 used	 here	 in	 a	 generic	 descriptive	 sense	 –	legitimate	 political	 action	 requires	 that	 the	 acting	 body	 (government)	 is	perceived	to	have	authority	for	its	action.	According	to	REF,	political	legitimacy	justifies	coercive	behaviour:	“The	descriptive	use	of	political	legitimacy	accounts	for	why	people	believe	that	a	government	has	the	right	to	 impose	sanctions	on	them”	 (Paletta	 2011).	 That	 right,	 or	 authority,	 is	 awarded	 through	 democratic	processes	and	implies	that	the	action	broadly	reflects	the	will	of	the	citizenry.	As	such,	legitimacy	is	a	test	of	democratic	process	and	a	functioning	public	sphere.	
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v	Print	 circulations	 in	 India,	 for	 instance,	 remain	 strong.	 See	 The	 Economist:	http://www.economist.com/node/17106285 
vi	The	Guardian	has	developed	alternative	revenue	models	to	fund	its	journalism,	including	 philanthropy,	 subscription	 services,	 sponsorship	 and	 user-generated	content	(see,	for	instance	http://www.theguardian.com/sponsored-content).	
vii 	It	 would	 be	 remiss	 to	 suggest	 that	 access	 to	 the	 Internet	 is	 distributed	uniformly	and	globally.	In	India,	a	country	with	1,200,000,000	people,	only	7.5%	of	 the	 population	 was	 online	 in	 2010,	 according	 to	 Google.	 The	 CIA	 provides	similar	 figures:	 61,338,000	 people	 online	 in	 2009	 (5%	 of	 the	 population).	 As	such,	 the	networked	 communication	 technologies	discussed	 in	 this	project	 are,	predominantly,	 concentrated	 in	 North	 America,	 Europe	 and	 Asia	 (Java	 et	 al,	2007).	
viii	There	is	also	a	question	of	human	distinctiveness.	If	human	society	is	defined	by	 its	 technology,	 then	 what	 does	 this	 imply	 about	 other	 species	 that	 use	technology?	Arguably,	 it	 limits	 the	 scope	 for	 distinction	 and	definition	 to	 align	society	and	technology	quite	so	closely. 
ix	“Architectural	control	is	an	inescapable	feature	of	digital	technology.	All	digital	code,	 by	 choosing	 to	 enable	 interaction	 in	 a	 particular	 manner,	 closes	 off	
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x	Consider,	 for	 instance,	 the	 following	 quotation:	 “Social	 networks	 are	 often	divided	into	groups	or	communities,	and	it	has	recently	been	suggested	that	this	division	could	account	for	the	observed	clustering.”	(Newman	and	Park	2003,	1).	In	 effect,	 then,	 an	 abstraction	 –	 the	 network	 –	 has	 been	 adopted	 to	 explain	 a	complex	 social	 formation	 –	 the	 community	 –	 but	 that	 complex	 formation	community	 is	 now	 being	 invoked	 to	 itself	 explain	 an	 observed	 feature	 of	 the	network:	clustering.			
xi	Actually,	 Facebook	 could	 now	 better	 be	 described	 as	 a	 platform	 upon	which	many	applications	run	and	interact.		
xii	van	 Dijck	 and	 Poell	 (2013)	 use	 a	 familiar	 definition	 of	 social	 media	 that	combines	the	somewhat	fuzzy	concepts	of	Web	2.0	and	user-generated	content.	These	 are	 technologies	 that	 “build	 on	 the	 ideological	 and	 technological	foundations	 of	 the	Web	 2.0	 and	 that	 allow	 the	 creation	 and	 exchange	 of	 user-generated	 content"	 (Kaplan	 and	 Haenlein	 2010,	 61).	 As	 discussed,	 Morozov	(2013a)	 has	 argued	 that	 web	 2.0	 is	 an	 empty	 concept	 that	 seeks	 to	 suggest	technological	differences	between	phases	of	the	Internet	that	simply	do	not	exist.	Additionally,	the	notion	of	user-generated	content	really	makes	little	sense	given	that	all	content	on	the	Internet	has	been	uploaded	by	a	user	somewhere	or	other.	If	 one	 wishes	 to	 infer	 a	 distributed	 network	 logic,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 sense	 of	central	 authority,	 ownership	 or	 production	 in	 terms	 of	 Internet	 content.	
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																																																																																																																																																																																													Alternatively,	 if	 the	 intent	 is	 to	 distinguish	 between	 professional	 and	 amateur	content,	 this	 too	 is	nonsensical	given	 that	a	great	deal	of	content	published	via	social	media	technologies	is	written	either	to	generate	income	or	by	authors	who	are	 paid	 formally	 by	 the	 media	 industry	 to	 produce	 content.	 In	 short,	 the	characteristics	 of	 social	 media	 that	 supposedly	 isolate	 it	 for	 analysis	 are	 not	sufficiently	robust	for	the	task.	 
xiii	Accessibility	 is	 relative.	 Most	 of	 the	 applications	 under	 discussion	 here	 are	privately	 owned,	 commercial	 enterprises,	 employing	 proprietary	 algorithms	 to	drive	 revenue-generating	 services.	As	boyd	and	Crawford	 (2011)	 	have	argued	convincingly,	the	production	and	distribution	of	big	data	raises	access	questions	and	 ethical	 concerns.	 They	 warn	 of	 a	 new	 digital	 divide	 as	 access	 to	 data	 is	increasingly	limited,	or	available	only	from	commercial	suppliers	for	restrictive	fees.	Twitter,	for	instance,	now	restricts	access	to	its	API	far	more	than	it	used	to,	and	provides	historical	 or	 large-scale	 access	only	 through	GNIP	–	 its	preferred	commercial	 supplier.	 	 Additionally,	 of	 course,	 accessibility	 does	 not	 confer	automatic	ethical	consent.		
xiv	The	 preference	 so	 far	 has	 been	 to	 keep	 things	 as	 simple	 as	 possible	 and	 so	discuss	social	media	technologies	as	though	these	applications	were	stand-alone	software,	 created	 somehow	 in	 isolation.	 This,	 of	 course,	 is	 a	 misnomer.	Technology	 is	 not	 value-neutral,	 nor	 does	 it	 exist	 outside	 of	 the	human	 agents	and	 social	 processes	 engaged	 in	 its	 genesis	 (Williams	 1975).	 Facebook	 and	Twitter	are	applications,	but	they	are	also	companies,	both	now	listed	publically,	
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																																																																																																																																																																																													both	 required	 to	 submit	 financial	 statements	 and	 shareholder	 reports.	Commercial	motivations	are	written	into	the	code	that	makes	these	applications	function.			
xv	A	 clear	 issue	with	 social	media	 as	 a	 term	 is	 that	 it	 implies	 that	 a	 technology	operates	 with	 limited	 functionality	 –	 promoting	 sociality	 –	 and	 that	 whatever	that	 function	 is,	 it	 must	 be	 uniform	 across	 all	 social	 media	 technologies.	 A	cursory	analysis	of	Facebook	makes	it	clear	that	this	is	not	the	case.	Facebook	is	more	accurately	described	as	a	suite	of	applications	delivered	through	a	common	interface	(the	Facebook	website	or	mobile	application).	Facebook	has	long	been	working	 to	 integrate	 search	 tools,	 retail,	 recommendation	 and	 review	 services	and	 many	 other	 functions	 into	 this	 existing	 interface.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	company	 has	 more	 in	 common	 with	 Google	 than	 with	 Twitter.	 Further,	 both	Facebook	and	Twitter	develop	applications	 to	 integrate	 their	own	 functionality	and	 data	 collection	methods	 into	 far	 flung	 corners	 of	 the	Web,	 either	 through	widgets	or	clients,	or	through	integrated	sign-in	processes.	
xvi	Twitter,	 Inc.	 also	maintains	 a	 repository	of	 its	 open	 source	 collaborations	 at	https://github.com/twitter 
xvii	There	is	also	no	certainty	that	influence	is	well	approximated	by	these	readily	available	data	points.		
xviii 	There	 is	 a	 further,	 more	 complex	 question	 about	 the	 epistemology	 of	metadata	 –	 the	 additional	 layer	 of	 encoded	 information	 that	 researchers	 often	focus	on	when	 they	 scrape	 Internet	datasets.	 There	 is	 a	 prevailing	 assumption	
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																																																																																																																																																																																													that	 this	metadata	 represents	a	more	essential	 representation	of	datafication	–	the	true	nature	of	data	object,	as	it	were.	Of	course,	this	is	not	the	case.	Metadata	is	 similarly	 captured,	 encoded	 and	made	 available	 by	 the	 Internet	 application	and	its	creators.	It	can	no	more	be	assumed	to	reveal	than	it	can	obscure.			
xix	Language	 is	 central	 to	 any	 comparison	 here.	 No	 matter	 how	 successfully	 a	researcher	 controls	 for	 potential	 biases	 and	 confounders,	 to	 make	 any	 cross-context	comparison,	he	or	she	must	assume	linguistic	universality.	With	all	else	being	equal,	what	reason	is	there	to	assume	that	people	will	discuss	London	the	same	as	they	do	New	York,	or	conservatism	the	same	as	 liberalism,	or	men	the	same	as	women?	
xx	“In	2009	in	Tunisia	and	Egypt,	there	were	only	34.1	and	24.3	internet	users	per	100	 inhabitants	respectively.	Furthermore,	 in	Egypt	only	7%	of	 inhabitants	are	Facebook	users,	while	16%	use	the	platform	in	Tunisia.”	(Comninos	2011,	5).	
xxi	The	 authors	 define	 their	 method	 as	 follows:	 “We	 identify	 these	 flows	 by	finding	very	similar	tweets	in	our	datasets	using	the	shingling	method	for	string	comparison	 (Manning,	 Raghavan,	&	 Schütze,	 2008),	which	 converts	 a	 string	 of	text	(such	as	a	tweet)	into	a	fingerprint	summary	of	the	words	it	comprises.	This	fingerprint	can	then	be	efficiently	compared	against	other	strings	(other	tweets)	to	 find	 near-duplicates.	 This	 methodology	 parallels	 the	 one	 used	 in	 Lotan’s	(2009)	visual	analysis	of	tweets	surrounding	the	2009	Iranian	election	protests.”	(Lotan	et	al.	2011,	1381).		
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xxii	Like	 virality,	 another	 term	 borrowed	 from	 the	 natural	 sciences,	 it	 can	 be	 a	helpful	metaphor,	one	that	appears	to	describe	the	superficial	characteristics	of	information	 exchange	on	Twitter.	Unfortunately,	 such	 terms,	 precisely	because	they	have	such	specific	scientific	uses,	 imply	material	and	structural	properties	that	may	not	be	appropriate	to	communication	dynamics.	In	chemistry,	maybe,	it	is	inevitable	that	a	substance	will	diffuse	from	high	to	low	concentrations:	there	is	no	such	inevitability	in	communication.	
xxiii	Identifying	 the	 location	 of	 Twitter	 users	 relies	 upon	 the	 user	 choosing	 to	attach	geo-coordinate	data	to	their	tweets.	Very	few	users	opt	to	do	this	–	1-2%	in	most	data	 sets.	 In	 this	 case,	 though,	 the	 authors	 selected	 a	 sample	of	 highly	retweeted	users	and	then	manually	searched	through	their	Twitter	histories	for	evidence	of	location. 
xxiv	In	 a	 special	 parliamentary	 session	 to	 debate	 the	 riots,	David	Cameron	 said:	““Everyone	 watching	 these	 horrific	 actions	 will	 be	 struck	 by	 how	 they	 were	organised	via	social	media.	Free	flow	of	information	can	be	used	for	good,	but	it	can	 also	 be	 used	 for	 ill,	 so	 we	 are	 working	 with	 the	 police,	 the	 intelligence	services	 and	 industry	 to	 look	 at	 whether	 it	 would	 be	 right	 to	 stop	 people	communicating	via	these	websites	and	services	when	we	know	they	are	plotting	violence,	disorder	and	criminality.”	(Hansard	2011).	What	the	evidence	was	for	this	 claim	 is	 unknown	 –	 certainly	 it	 is	 not	 a	 view	 supported	 by	 any	 of	 the	subsequent	academic	research	into	riot	causation	and	organisational	practices.	 
xxv	See	Williams,	R	(1976) 
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xxvi	A	 change	 in	 language,	 after	 all,	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 the	 action	 of	 an	individual.	Even	if	that	individual	is	Shakespeare,	and	the	change	is	something	as	specific	as	a	coinage	–and	Shakespeare	is	credited	with	several	–	the	coinage	still	requires	a	popular	reception	and	adoption	into	the	common	lexicon.	 
	
xxviii	The	 team	at	FloatingSheep.com	are	a	notable	exception.	Working	primarily	from	 a	 social	 geography	 perspective,	 they	 have	 made	 notable	 advances	 in	mapping	 the	 geographies	 of	 “digispace”.	 See,	 for	 instance	 Graham	 and	 Zook	(2013)	and	Shelton	(2013).	
xxix	It	 is	 important	 to	note	 a	 limitation	of	 this	 technique,	 especially	 in	 a	 sample	this	size:	a	single	tweet	can	distort	such	a	visual	representation	of	the	discourse.	Within	the	#LondonRiots	cloud,	several	of	the	most	prominent	words	originate	in	the	tweet:	
“New	#CitizenRadio:	#ALEC’s	prison	slave	labor,	#Londonriots,	Mississippi	hate	crime	killing	http://bit.ly/r3DeJQ	#p2	#tpot”.		
Retweeted	37	 times	(the	 longest	chain	 in	 the	#LondonRiots	sample),	 the	 tweet	links	 to	 episode	 #352	 of	 the	 Citizen	 Radio	 podcast,	 in	which	 the	 London	 riots	were	discussed.	The	frequent	retweeting	of	this	link	explains	the	prominence	of	Mississippi,	ALEC	 (the	American	Legislative	Exchange	Council),	 slave,	 hate	 and	killing	in	the	#londonriots	cloud.	It	would	be	a	misreading,	then,	to	assume	that	these	 particularly	 emotive	 words	 are	 necessarily	 signifiers	 or	 riot-related	meaning,	but	the	benefit	of	working	with	these	relatively	small	samples	(in	terms	
	
	396 
																																																																																																																																																																																													of	 big	 data	 at	 least)	 is	 that	 it	 is	 still	 possible	 to	 manually	 follow	 up	 these	inconsistencies	 and	 correct	 for	 them.	 The	 WordCloud	 presented	 has	 been	adjusted	by	removing	the	Citizen	Radio	tweet.		
xxx	The	concept	of	lag	was	conceived	in	an	attempt	to	explore	the	temporality	of	retweet	chains	and	scripts	were	written	accordingly.	There	are	a	few	examples	of	research	 teams	 developing	 similar	 approaches,	 although	 these	 have	 tended	 to	rely	 on	 strict	 informational	 approaches	 to	 information	 flow,	 mathematics	 and	diffusion-modelling.	 For	 example,	 Burnap	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 calculate	 information	flow	 size	 and	 survival	 as	 a	 way	 of	 modelling	 communication	 during	 an	 acute	event,	 where	 survival	 is	 a	 similar	 concept	 (both	 epistemologically	 and	methodologically)	to	 lag.	They	find	an	association	between	these	measures	and	sentiment	 scores	 –	 a	 finding	 that	 could	 not	 be	 replicated	 in	 exploratory	 data	analysis	 for	 this	 thesis.	Again,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 the	abstract	and	 idealised	nature	of	such	communicative	modelling,	and	to	repeat	the	observation	that	it	is	inherently	reductive	to	render	complex	meaning-making	dynamics	in	this	way.		
xxxi	The	 evocation	 of	 Derrida	 and	 différance	 is	 intentional	 (Derrida	 1967).	 In	 a	hypertext	 system,	meaning	 is	always	deferred,	 through	 language	of	 course,	but	also	through	the	technicity	of	the	hyperlink	itself.			 
xxxii	It	is	possible	to	access	different	iterations	of	Twitter’s	proprietary	code	base	–	at	different	times	different	scripts	have	been	made	available	for	public	access.	However,	 the	 full,	 functioning	 and	 current	 code	 base	 remains	 commercial	 and	confidential.		
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xxxiii	See,	 for	 instance,	 evidence	 that	 Twitter	 sentiment	 predicts	 stock	 market	movements	(Bollen	et	al.	2011). 
Appendix A
#	Connect	to	the	Mongo	DB	containing	all	tweets	
def	connect():	
				from	pymongo	import	MongoClient	
				client	=	MongoClient()	
				db	=	client.ukriotsdb	
				return	db	
					
#	Calculate	time	intervals	for	desired	study	period		
from	datetime	import	*	
#	start,	end	datetimes;	interval	timedelta	
def	times(start_time,	end_time,	interval):	 	 	
	 period	=	(end_time	-	start_time).total_seconds()	/	
interval.total_seconds()	
	 i	=	0	
	 t	=	[]	
	 while	i	<=	period:		
	 	 t.append(start_time	+	(i*interval))	
	 	 i	+=	1	
	 return	t	 	
					
#	perform	calculations	on	tweet	sample:	count	frequencies,	user	lists,	
sentiment	scores,	follower	numbers	
def	halflife(tweets,	times):	
				i	=	0	
				out	=	{}	
				while	i	<	len(times):	
								for	item	in	tweets:	
												if	times[i]	<=	item['datetime']	<	times[i+1]:	
																if	times[i]	not	in	out:	
																				out[times[i]]	=	{'count'	:	1,	'users'	:	[item['user']
['screen_name']],	'followers'	:	item['user']['followers_count'],	
'sentiment'	:	[item['sentiment']]	}	
																else:	
																				if	item['user']['screen_name']	not	in	out[times[i]]
['users']:	
																								out[times[i]]['users'].append(item['user']
['screen_name'])	
																								out[times[i]]['followers']	+=	item['user']
['followers_count']	
																								out[times[i]]
['sentiment'].append(item['sentiment'])	
																								out[times[i]]['count']	+=	1	
																				else:	
																								out[times[i]]['count']	+=	1	
								i	+=	1	
				return	out	
					
#	clean	results:	return	0	value	if	no	tweets	in	interval					
					
def	clean_halflife(times,	out):	
				for	i	in	times:	
												if	i	not	in	out:	
																out[i]	=	{'count':0,	'users':0,	'followers':0}	
																	
#	Functions	for	textual	manipulation	including	retweet	identification,	
wordcloud	computation	and	automated	content	analysis.		
#	parse	tweets	for	NLP	
def	make_tags(tweets):	
				from	textblob	import	TextBlob	
				for	item	in	tweets:	
								blob	=	TextBlob(item['text'])	
								tags	=	blob.tags	
								item['tags']	=	[]	
								for	tag	in	tags:	
												item['tags'].append(tag[0])	
													
#	Find	RTs													
									
def	find_rts	(tweets):	
				rt	=	[]	
				for	i	in	tweets:	
								try:	
												p	=	[u	for	u,x	in	enumerate(i['tags'])	if	x	==	'RT']	
												for	v	in	p:	
																temp	=	v+1	
																if	i['tags'][temp]	==	'@':	
																				rt.append(i)	
								except:		
												i['text']	
				return	rt	
					
#	Identify	and	extract	RT	chains	
def	make_chains(rt):	
				import	difflib	
				out	=	[]	
				i	=	0	
				while	i	<	len(rt):	
								a	=	rt[i]['text']	
								tweets	=	[a]	
								ids	=	[rt[i]['id']]	
								for	item	in	rt:	
												if	item['id']	not	in	ids:	
																b	=	item['text']	
																seq=difflib.SequenceMatcher(a=a.lower(),	b=b.lower())	
																if	seq.ratio()	>	0.9:	
																				tweets.append(b)	
																				ids.append(item['id'])	
								temp	=	[tweets,	ids]		
								out.append(temp)	
								i	+=	1	
				return	out		
					
#	chain	manipulation	
def	filter_chains(out):	
				chains	=	[]	
				for	item	in	out:	
								if	len(item[1])	>	1:	
												chains.append(item)	
				return	chains	
					
def	sort_chains(chains):	
				for	item	in	chains:	
								item[0].sort()	
								item[1].sort()	
									
def	tuple_chains(chains):	
				tup_set	=	[]													
				for	item	in	chains:	
								temp	=	[]	
								for	v	in	item:	
												temp.append(tuple(v))	
								tup_set.append(temp)	
				return	tup_set	
					
def	final_chains(tup_set):	
				final	=	set(map(tuple,	tup_set))	
				final_list	=	map(list,	final)	
				return	final_list	
					
#	lag	calculations	
def	make_ids(chains):	
	 id	=	[]	
	 for	i	in	chains:	
	 	 	 id.append(i[1])	
	 return	id	
	 	
def	make_dts(id,	t):	
				dt	=	[]	
				for	i	in	id:	
								temp	=	[]	
								for	v	in	i:	
												for	tweet	in	t:	
																if	v	==	tweet['id']:	
																				temp.append(tweet['datetime'])	
								dt.append(temp)	
				return	dt	
					
def	trim_dt(dt):					
				for	i	in	dt:	
								if	len(i)	>	5:	
												del	i[0]	
												del	i[-1]	
									
def	make_lag(dt):	
				lag	=	[]	
				for	i	in	dt:	
								l	=	i[-1]	-	i[0]	
								av	=	l	/	len(i)	
								lag.append(av)	
				return	lag	
									
def	chain_locator(a,	t):	
				out	=	[]	
				for	i	in	a:	
								temp	=	[]	
								for	item	in	i[1]:	
												for	tweets	in	t:	
																if	tweets['id']	==	item:	
																				temp.append(tweets['user']['location'])	
								out.append(temp)	
				return	out	
Appendix B
					
Complete riot public 
#UKRiots
#LondonRiots
#Riots
#RiotCleanUp
#OperationCupOfTea
Wednesday coding sample (10:30 – 13:30)
Thursday coding sample (10:30 – 13:30)
																
					
				 
Appendix C: Riot public coding sample: adjunctive discussion tweets
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BR1 u'RT @Cbrum71: Anyone recognise 
this muppet? NAME AND SHAME! 
http://t.co/DKS5Wto #birminghamriots'
RFI BL PRE signification looters RAO 2
BR1 u"He's got this spot on. #londonriots 
#manchesterriots #liverpoolriots 
#BirminghamRiots #riots  http://t.co/
2ZUOB9K"
MM PO frustration class 
divides historical 
explanation
SOC, NLC
4
BR1 u'http://t.co/VUT8Qqa 
#birminghamriots @ArianaSana 
@MsUGBAmbassador PEACE BE 
UPON THE MUSLIM BROTHERS. this 
is unbelievable'
NM PRE ES reaction shock O 2
BR1 u'Lest we forget the 2005 Brum Race 
Riots, based on rumours about a gang 
rape that never happened. Story:http://
t.co/FDDBh8i #BirminghamRiots'
OM PO comparison 
birmingham riots 
2005 
O 2
BR1 u'if u would like 2 engage me on a 
personal level instead of 
@birminghamriot u can get me at 
@Freddie_BloorUK #birminghamriots. 
Value feedbck'
DA value feedback? O 1
BR1 u"#birminghamriots 3 dead already and 
if we don't go beyond the 'criminal' 
rhetoric this will happen again."
PO, PRE criminal rhetoric 
dangerous
SOC
3
BR1 u'After the 3 Muslims who got 
murdered in the #birminghamriots I 
really do think diff communities are 
now gna fight. :|'
PO different 
communities fight 
opinion
O 2
BR1 u"...a fucking library, pick up a book, 
start reading & learn something. IT'S 
TOTALLY FREE! #BirminghamRiots 
#LondonRiots"
PRE declarative 
statement
RAO 2
BR1 u"@SunnyNandra thanks,I just don't 
want silly excuses being made for 
these rioters! They could have chosen 
not to riot at all #birminghamriots"
PRE signification rioters 
excuses
RAO 2
BR1 u'Tres muertos m\xe1s en UK, en 
#birminghamriots .'
PRE unknown O ?
BR1 u'The three people that died last night, 
RIP. I do hope the Police catch the 
people who did that to them. 
#Birminghamriots'
PRE ES comment SOL 1
BR1 u'RT @Leegend90: The three people 
that died last night, RIP. I do hope the 
Police catch the people who did that to 
them. #Birminghamriots'
PRE ES reaction emotive SOL 1
BR1 u'SO FUCKING BORED, wish these 
#birminghamriots would end already so 
i can leave the bloody house'
PRE declarative 
statement
O 1
BR2 u"#birminghamriots. Copycat 
wannabes when your older I'm gonna 
be there to fuck your life up!!! Pussy 
holes!!!"
PRE anger RAO 0
BR2 u"It's all 2 quiet. Let's hope this isn't the 
calm before the storm. 
#BirminghamRiots"
PN, PRE comment worry O 1
BR2 u"#Birminghamriots the thing is they 
stole tvs and they can't afford to pay tv 
licence"
PRE comment rioter RAO 2
BR2 u'#birminghamriots @alexmufc1 I 
could have sworn using mobile phones 
in petrol stations is slightly less 
dangerous than candles...'
PRE comment O 1
BR3 u"http://t.co/rOsbc6v #londonriots 
#manchesterriots #birminghamriots 
'Banker puppet govt+police brutality
+betrayed youth=Londonriots #nwo"
MM, NM PC crisis leadership 
banks policies 
policing
POL, RED 3
BR3 u'http://t.co/rOsbc6v #londonriots 
#manchesterriots #birminghamriots 
Banker puppet govt + police brutality
+betrayed youth =Londonriots #nwo'
NM, MM PO russia today blame 
government cuts 
politicians bankers
RED 3
BR4 u'@uk_alternative We all need to take 
responsibility for #BirminghamRiots, 
#ukriots  http://t.co/k5MQMXQ'
DA, PRE call to responsibility SOC 4
LR1 u"RT @DavidAllenGreen: Post on 
#LondonRiots by this year's 
#OrwellPrize for blogging winner and 
#Hackney resident @graemearcher: 
http://tg ..."
BL PO, PR 3
LR1 u'http://lockerz.com/s/128298401 
\nThe police are kicking ass. 
\n#Birminghamriots #Londonriots 
\n#Liverpoolriots'
BL PRE admiration for police POLICE 2
LR1 u'Ah come on now Dave, stop sitting 
on the fence! http://t.co/WT1ICEE 
#LondonRiots'
BL PRE political comment POL 2
LR1 u'One young Londoner confronts Tory 
Boris Johnson over #londonriots and 
the lack of investment in future 
generations: http://t.co/PbmZ6ye'
BL PC social youth failing
SOC, POL
3
LR1 u'RT @KetyDC: Watch this woman 
shouting at the rioters, facing them by 
herself. Good for her. Great speech. 
http://t.co/AJ7Zlqd #Londonriots'
BL PO NN 3
LR1 u'Watching a good city turn bad 
#Londonriots http://t.co/O2LOq8f'
BL PRE value states London O 2
 1
LR1 u'Check this video out -- Riots London 
http://t.co/eX5dMNC via @youtube 
Boris gets told #londonriots'
BL PO NN 3
LR1 u'RT @Tony_McNulty: 
\u201c@AdamBienkov: New Post: 
Boris Johnson comes out against his 
own police cuts http://t.co/kyu47gI 
#LondonRiots\u201d Exactly!'
CM PC politics policing cuts 
budgets
RES
3
LR1 u'"A riot is the language of the unheard.
\u201d - Martin Luther King http://t.co/
Kgt9Ayp #londonriots'
CM PO luther king 
disenfranchised cuts 
facilities 
discrimination
SOC 3
LR1 u'RT @daddydazed: I made a TV 
series on #riots in the Uk. This is my 
view of #londonriots. http://t.co/
XMTMdTJ  if you like Zoe Williams i ...'
CM PO, PC complexity of causes 
social investment 
important 
SOC
3
LR1 u'\u201c@ecelsahn: http://t.co/lHry3aY 
No Voice, no future, no leadership. 
Prob the best video i have seen on 
what is happening in LDN 
#Londonriots'
CM, MM PC disenfranchisement 
unemployment 
bankers police social 
political expenses 
causes ‘message’ 
POL, SOC 4
LR1 u"(cont'd) & also this comment on 
#londonriots http://t.co/V3xJXhs"
CM, OM PO reddit discussion 
thread mixed
SOC 2
LR1 u'shocking video of looting in London! 
\nhttp://t.co/nHQxkdQ #ukriots 
#londonriots'
MM PRE media spoof reaction 
shock
O 1
LR1 u'#Londonriots and #walk2work- 
Another one by Fred Senoga 
Makubuya  http://t.co/5RBFTDM via 
@twitpic'
MM PO national comparison 
uganda?
NN 2
LR1 u'this is what UK needs. Cameron you 
arse. are you asleep ? #UK 
#LondonRiots #Pakistan http://t.co/
NKDLMgU'
MM PRE politcal comment 
signification 
Cameron
POL 2
LR1 u'@WayneRooney is that how you 
celebrate your charity Shield win? by 
looting london. #londonriot 
#riotcleanup http://t.co/aNr5UY8'
MM DA spoof media O 1
LR1 u'Genius!! http://t.co/ZoI2afO 
#manchesterriots #londonriots'
MM PRE signification looters RAO 1
LR1 u"RT @theboylightning: Poor Alexis 
Bailey - Should've looted Specsavers 
http://t.co/2g5b3NB #ukriots 
#londonriots"
MM PRE signification looters RAO 2
LR1 u'London Riots. (The BBC will never 
replay this. Send it out) http://t.co/
m4mlDH9 #LondonRiots'
MM PO CTA MC social political 
causes duggan 
media stop search 
racism protest 
insurrection SOC, POL
3
LR1 u'RT @Purelaise: Croydon rioter 
confessing on Facebook..BUSTED! 
PLEASE RT! http://t.co/7Ux8upA 
#londonriots #ukriots @metpolice 
@SeanBosco ...'
MM, CM PRE IA, CTA signification looters RAO 2
LR1 u'RT @lbc973: The video of the rioters 
helping an injured man... then stealing 
his things http://t.co/VvT5w3Y 
#LondonRiots // Makes me sick.'
MM, NM PN reaction emotive 
looters sickening
RAO 2
LR1 u'#londonriots http://t.co/coP38ns listen 
to this dude.'
MM, NM PRE unknown O 2
LR1 u'RT @moosemanIT: 
\u201c@magicalmaths LESSON ON 
HOW TO STOP A LOOTER http://t.co/
6lqyMEQ  #londonriots &lt;&lt; 
excellent stuff - tutorial vide ...'
MM, OM PRE media spoof RAO 2
LR1 u'A rational analysis #londonriots http://
t.co/mJVsg96 via @guardian'
NM PC shopping riots 
Baudrillard? 
consumption political 
still more complex 
than criminality 
looting SOC, NLC
3
LR1 u'The UK riots: the psychology of 
looting | Zoe Williams http://t.co/
2uAvIPf via @guardian Another very 
level-headed piece #londonriots'
NM PC shopping riots 
Baudrillard? 
consumption political 
still more complex 
than criminality 
looting SOC, NLC
3
LR1 u"#LondonRiots- #Gaddafi's regime: 
Cameron lost all legitimacy after the 
violent suppression of peaceful 
protests http://tinyurl.com/44l745w ?"
NM PC news O 2
LR1 u'1example of biased bigoted 
journalism - http://t.co/ilTWREL - 
#tottenham #londonriots'
NM PC MC media meta 
commentary
MC 3
LR1 u'Oha, nun bringt man die Krawalle in 
#UK mit #Breivik in Verbindung http://
t.co/i7Q5A9l #UKRiots #LondonRiots 
#EDL'
NM PC news: cameron 
“moral” as political
SOC ?
LR1 u'worth reading - http://t.co/PkmBTp1 
#LondonRiots #UKRiots'
NM PC daily mail wild 
beasts liberal dogma 
blame max hastings RAO, LC, RED
3
LR1 u"RT @CBSNews: UK PM vows 
culture of fear won't take over England, 
says water cannons ready if needed: 
http://bit.ly/qpZGJg  #londonriots"
GI NM PC
O, RES
2
LR1 u'RT @TimeOutLondon: Want to know 
what @HulkHogan has to say about 
the #londonriots? Sure you do 
Hulkamaniacs... http://t.co/uwLXJSg'
NM PRE hulk hogan 
recommends 
restrain 
understanding
O 2
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LR1 u'Se il mondo fosse un computer 
sarebbe il momento di premere Ctrl+Alt
+Canc http://t.co/W4l1JyZ #londonriots'
NM PRE comment universal O ?
LR1 u'RT @donnachadelong: Who are the 
rioters? http://t.co/3Kmdrpe via 
@guardian #londonriots fantastic piece 
by @PaulLewis'
GI NM PC rioter classification? 
poor areas diversity 
nuanced descriptive
SOC
3
LR1 u'About bloody time too!!! http://t.co/
zATlTVR *sings* Let the water cannon 
kick it! http://t.co/GjYmE8p 
#londonriots #manchesterriots'
NM, MM PN, PRE recommendation 
aggressive state
RAO, RES 2
LR1 u'V\xeddeo: Al Jazeera fala com o 
autor Alex Wheatle sobre os motins no 
Reino Unido | http://bit.ly/mP9oG9 | 
#LondonRiots #UKriots'
NM, MM PC criminality vs 
economic hardship 
student protest 
brixton policing 
disenfranchisement 
balance
SOC ?
LR1 u'What turns people into looters? http://
t.co/JqncJ2x #londonriots 
#manchesterriots #liverpoolriots 
#birminghamriots #riotcleanup'
NM, OM PC psychological 
causes
SOC 3
LR1 u"Here's the latest version of my 
#LondonRiots Bennett diagram http://
t.co/z4HIxQH"
OM PRE comment social 
(humour)
O 2
LR1 u"RT @lilylun: Must Read: The 
#LondonRiots are a symptom of the 
'burning' & 'looting' of UK public 
services http://t.co/GQRKlWg via 
@kgosz ..."
OM PC burning looting 
public services state 
responsibility
POL, NLC 3
LR1 u'RT @Jack_FFF: More of this please! 
Looter rag-dolled: http://t.co/iOVAM7g  
(via @Samuel_Mallett @danhett 
@gradiate) #LondonRiots'
OM PRE signification looters 
réponse spoof
RAO 2
LR1 u'RT @ReedoMUFC: Worst looter of 
them all, what a bastard. http://t.co/
ezRLdxW #UKriots #ManchesterRiots 
#LondonRiots'
OM PRE signification looters RAO 2
LR1 u"Editor's blog: Business and the 
burglars of plasma screens http://bit.ly/
pKHASm #HR #LondonRiots"
OM PO personal moral 
responsibility looting 
HR perpective! RAO, RED
3
LR1 u'RT @DahnertLFC: LOL at this gif: 
http://t.co/jD0XNrY #LondonRiots 
#idiots #laughatthescum'
OM PRE SPAM reaction humour 
riots = idiots scum
RAO 2
LR1 u'Chav of the week award? http://t.co/
ii8lHpw Bloody morons the lot of them 
#londonriots'
OM PRE signification looters RAO 2
LR1 u'RT @SocialEurope: New article: "The 
#londonriots \u2013 On #Consumerism 
coming Home to Roost" by Zygmunt 
Bauman http://t.co/yC2PaQk'
OM PC consumerist riots SOC, NLC 3
LR1 u"Hmm .. RT @benwhitelaw: 'The 
#londonriots show journalism isn
\u2019t the moral arbiter it likes to 
think it is': http://t.co/Ub67T3Z"
OM PO, PC MC media meta 
commentary
MC 4
LR1 u'RT @ASOS_Danielle: Something 
good to come out of #LondonRiots 
http://t.co/0if6gLG'
OM PRE CTA, IA reaction something 
good
O 2
LR1 u'Heard David Cameroon speaking 
after #LondonRiots , particularly taking 
questions. I wish if India had a PM with 
even 10% oratory skills :('
PRE politcal comment 
signification 
Cameron
O 1
LR1 u"#londonriots were the hot topic in 
English class today, it's so Tragic and 
wrong, why do people do this? So 
unexpected #prayforlondon"
PRE ES reaction awful SOL 1
LR1 u"Every1s got an opinion its funny how 
the #londonriot has allowed opp 2c the 
ignorance of some people u wouldn't 
have expected"
PRE comment social 
commentary 
ignorance
SOC, MC 2
LR1 u"seriously.... one person in the dock 
this morning was a 31 year old teacher 
for looting richer sounds Croydon?! 
Can't be right #londonriots"
PRE signification looters RAO 2
LR1 u'RT I hope they get those bastards 
who killed that man in Ealing. He was 
just putting a fire out. An innocent. 
Absolute bastards #londonriots'
PRE reaction emotive 
looters anger
O, RAO 2
LR1 u"@TonyBarretTimes it's a great point, 
but also listen to some of 
#LondonRiots 'it's great' 'We got X, Y & 
Z' that's not hate just scum acts!"
PO commentary causes 
looting vs other? 
consumerism
SOC, RAO 3
LR1 u'RT @AMonkster: RT @Wossa99 - 
@MetPoliceUK @ASPolice Here is 
one of the scummy wankers. RT & get 
the bastard caught. #londonriots  
locker ...'
PRE CTA signification looters RAO 2
LR1 u"@chrisbrown the thugs causing 
#LondonRiots don't deserve to be 
awarded with a free concert.. If 
anything they'll loot yo shit too"
PRE signification looters RAO 2
LR1 u'Cameron says the police will get 
"whatever they need" .. mmm, so if 
they ask for flamethrowers..? Let\'s test 
him. #LondonRiots #riotcleanup'
PRE comment POLICE, RES 2
LR1 u'I hope these #londonriots have 
something to do with dental insurance.'
PRE unknown O 1
LR1 u'And I thought I was the only one who 
didn\'t :) "@lukeslocombe: Still don\'t 
have a clue what these #londonriots 
are about.."'
PRE confusion O 1
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LR1 u'RT @UmeraMz: And I thought I was 
the only one who didn\'t :) 
"@lukeslocombe: Still don\'t have a 
clue what these #londonriots are 
about.."'
PRE confusion O 1
LR1 u'i keep hearing about all the 
#londonriots blokes calling themselves 
"freedom fighters" and all i can think of 
is Braveheart but w/ chavs'
JFI PRE signification rioters RAO 1
LR1 u"Police Dogs get injured but they 
won't use WATER cannons. That's the 
British Governments way of thinking 
#londonriots"
PRE, PO police dogs injured 
but no water 
cannons
RES 3
LR1 u"@SwissMinx it's bloody horrendous! 
#londonriots"
PRE reaction shock O 1
LR1 u"RT @denkisandwich: 33% support 
use of live ammunition against 
#londonriots, demonstrating once 
again why community safety isn't in the 
h ..."
GI PRE comment looter 
punishment 
implications
RES 2
LR1 u'What I don\'t understand is if  the 
yobs are rioting "coz of unemployment" 
wtf are 11,12,13 year olds doing there? 
#londonriots'
PRE rioter status 
confusion causes
RAO 2
LR1 u'David Cameron says "actions have 
consequences" i.e. police murder of 
Mark Duggan caused UK wide 
protests.  #tottenham #ukriots 
#londonriots'
GI PO police murder 
consequences
POLICE, POL
3
LR1 u"I'm assuming the only place that 
hasn't been looted is the local library... 
#londonriots"
PRE making light looter RAO, SOC 2
LR1 u"Can't help but draw contrast between 
#Egypt #Jan25 uprising and 
#londonriots with same economic 
triggers - who's civilised now? 
#justsayin"
PO contrast national 
egypt uk economic 
triggers
SOC 3
LR1 u'@christydena I wonder if the MET 
Police will contact the Cloudmakers re: 
the little matter of rioting 
#problemsolving #londonriots'
PRE unknown O 1
LR1 u'RT @KingOla2nd: TBH Tony Blair is 
the best PM we have had in a long 
time! I miss that guy #NoHomo lol 
#LondonRiots&lt; fuck blair yo'
PRE comment politics 
blair
O 2
LR1 u"@seeandconnect Am seeing if I can 
distill some of my thinking on 'different 
life experiences + #LondonRiots' into 
something sharable now..."
PN, PRE unknown O 1
LR1 u'RT @spikedonline: Why do people 
assume a gathering of white blokes 
defending their town is a racist 
pogrom-in-the-making? #LondonRiots   
...'
PO race assumptions O 3
LR1 u"How many involved in the 
#londonriots will claim incapacity 
benefit for bad backs after carrying 
those tv's?  Remove their benefits for 
life"
PRE signification looters 
punishment
RAO 2
LR1 u"What's a water canon? That just 
sounds kinda fun to me... 
#LondonRiots"
PRE making light O 1
LR1 u"Awoken by the police helicopter this 
morning! When it starts to affect my 
sleep that's when I get upset! 
#londonriots #ukriots"
PRE making light O 1
LR1 u'#MetPolice says last night\'s 
#Londonriots were the worst the force 
has seen "in current memory". This is 
crazy.'
GI PRE reaction worry O 2
LR1 u"@atkins_benjamin I wonder how 
many #teacherontwitter will..I'm just 
looking at riotfaces.com now 
#londonriots"
PN unknown O 1
LR1 u'RT @MtsotsoMzuri: Oh dear London! 
I see 2012 around the corner seriously! 
#londonriots'
PRE comment O 1
LR1 u"#londonriots better stop fairly lively! 
We've all waited too long for the 
football season to come back I cant 
wait another week!"
PRE comment normal O 1
LR1 u'I will keep you updated on the current 
government status in dealing with the 
#LondonRiots'
O unknown O 1
LR1 u'#LondonRiots Are they rioting? I just 
see people hell bent on going out 
looting!'
PRE comment RAO 2
LR1 u"RT @Mitch_Lewis: If Batman was 
real, this #LondonRiots shit wouldn't 
have made it past the first night..."
PRE making light O 1
LR1 u"RT @AdamLWeaver: Is Martial Law 
on it's way? Do the big guns need to 
come out? #londonriots"
PRE comment law 
response
RES 1
LR1 u'Doing what u want without fear of 
consequences must feel powerful for 
kids, and an addictive contrast to 
everyday powerlessness #londonriots'
PO power 
powerlessness 
emotive explanation
SOC
3
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LR1 u"Where's Danny Dyer, and what's he 
up too? I've thought of a proppa nawty 
film to get up and running 
#havsumovthat #LondonRiots"
PRE making light O 1
LR1 u"...a fucking library, pick up a book, 
start reading & learn something. IT'S 
TOTALLY FREE! #BirminghamRiots 
#LondonRiots"
PRE anger rioter read 
books
RAO 2
LR1 u"@Orderof9Angles What's happening 
is certainly no protest, but there is 
plenty of terror. Buy a dictionary. 
#londonriots"
PRE comment riot 
signification (not 
protest)
RAO 2
LR1 u"RT @RobertBenfer: The #londonriots 
weren't just about looting, they were 
about..Nah it was just about looting."
PO opinion looting 
simple
SOC, RAO 3
LR1 u'As much as I approve of people 
standing up for themselves, this has 
been taken way too far with innocent 
people being hurt #londonriots'
PRE declarative 
statement
O 1
LR1 u'RT @RabiahMK: R.I.P the 3 British-
Pakistani Muslims killed by looters in 
Birmingham while defending their 
community&mosque x #londonriots'
PRE ES solidarity O 1
LR1 u"Started in hackney again last night, 
police dogs going to into my mates 
garden, lucky it hasn't come to 
highbury THANK GOD #londonriots"
SI PRE reaction 
commentary
O 1
LR1 u'@Robert_F_AFC I hope you and 
your family are safe! One of my friends 
in Birmingham is in hospital, not good 
at all! :( #londonriots'
DA, PRE ES reaction worry O 1
LR1 u"#LondonRiots r truly only mo' 
extreme manifestations of wuts 
happening everywhere, external 
reflection of r dysfunctional, intrinsic-
state."
PO state disfunction 
reaction
SOC, POL 3
LR1 u"These riots are the finger pointing at 
the problem. Don't focus on the finger 
#LondonRiots"
PRE, PO deeper causes?
SOC
3
LR1 u"Kind of housebound currently, 
anyone know if all's unboarded and 
open for business in London today?  
Seems very quiet here #londonriots"
RFI PN unknown O 1
LR1 u'RT @NicolasBaygert: "Don\'t know 
what I want, but I know how to get 
it" (Sex Pistols) #LondonRiots #FB'
PRE comment O 1
LR1 u"RT @piersmorgan: Let's get one 
thing straight: these people aren't 
'protesting', they are thieving and 
destroying. #LondonRiots"
PRE signification looters RAO 2
LR1 u"\u201c@natashanorazman: 
#londonriots should stop :(\u201d let's 
be honest riots going on everywhere 
need to stop :("
PO emphasis on 
national nature
O
2
LR1 u"RT @spikedonline: Brendan O'Neill 
says there's nothing political about 
#LondonRiots, which are being carried 
out by a mollycoddled mob h ..."
GI PO no political cause 
mob
RAO, RED 3
LR1 u'\u201c@xchar_cawseyx: This is just 
getting ridiculous #londonriots\u201di 
saw you shoving dressess up your top 
at bluwater last night didnt i?'
DA, PRE confusion O 1
LR1 u"Flew over to the #londonriots, 
couldn't use my claws on them kids, 
got bored, went to The Griffin and got 
drunk."
PRE making light O 1
LR1 u'U think Theresa may gets \xa31 
every time she uses the word robust!! 
#Londonriots'
PRE comment O 2
LR1 u"Meant to be working but have to 
admit I'm glued to the news need to 
drag myself away from the TV 
#londonriots"
PN comment news 
engrossing
O 1
LR1 u"RT @jamiewoolhead: It's ridiculous 
that people are claiming that the 
#LondonRiots are in protest against 
government austerity instead of ..."
PO riots not a protest 
against austerity
SOC, RED
3
LR1 u"RT @oh_nena: \u201cWell, you 
know, like, I don't really give a fuck 
what the general public think.\u201d  
Sid Vicious #londonriots"
PRE unknown O 1
LR1 u"Give police a paintball gun and shoot 
them all in colours that don't wash off... 
#Londonriots"
PRE comment punish 
looters
RAO 2
LR2 u'H\xe4r \xe4r jag n\xe4r jag luutar 
#looting RT @Danne_85 The luuting 
has begun #haningeriots #londonriots 
http://yfrog.com/gyh7qrsj'
BL PN unknown NN ?
LR2 u'Not sure about blaming the parents 
but check it: http://t.co/cnTpSzX 
#londonriots #cameronisatwat'
CM PRE, PC looter politician 
comparison
SOC, POL
3
LR2 u'Heroes Haroon Jahan, Shahzad Ali, 
Abdul Musavir http://t.co/ESoaQVc 
#londonriots #birminghamriots #ukriots 
#islam'
CM PC focus on heroes 
standing up against 
rioters
SOL 2
LR2 u"RT @majorityfm: BBC Doesn't Want 
to Hear the Real Reasons for the 
London Riots - VIDEO: http://on.fb.me/
o0WG66 #p2 #londonriots #ukriots"
CM PC MC austerity youth 
politics youth clubs 
US politcal left 
establishment 
insurrection
SOC, NLC, MC 3
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LR2 u'#londonriots #blog!!  name & shame!! 
http://t.co/QFpH9u2  Check it out!!'
GI, RFI CM, MM PRE CTA signification looters 
awareness 
excitement
RAO 2
LR2 u'RT @charliethescarf: #EDL attacks a 
bus - they are not the defenders of our 
community!  http://t.co/ldiSl3o what 
#dickheads #londonriots'
GI MM PRE politcal comment 
signification EDl
O 3
LR2 u'RT @GiralunaSpoiler: 
#prayforlondon #londonriots http://t.co/
nll5mqa'
MM PRE ES unknown O 1
LR2 u"RT @majorityfm: BBC Doesn't Want 
to Hear the Real Reasons for the 
London Riots - VIDEO: http://on.fb.me/
o0WG66 #p2 #londonriots #ukriots"
MM PC MC austerity youth 
politics youth clubs 
US politcal left 
establishment 
insurrection
SOC, NLC, MC 3
LR2 u"RT @nairamk: Delighted - Britain's 
youngest looter is dragged to court by 
his mum  http://t.co/6W1ZxPV #ukriots 
#londonriots"
GI MM, NM PRE signification looters 
delight punishment
RAO 2
LR2 u"RT @majorityfm: BBC Doesn't Want 
to Hear the Real Reasons for the 
London Riots - VIDEO: http://on.fb.me/
o0WG66 #p2 #londonriots #ukriots"
MM, OM PC MC austerity youth 
politics youth clubs 
US politcal left 
establishment 
insurrection
SOC, NLC, MC 3
LR2 u"RT @majorityfm: BBC Doesn't Want 
to Hear the Real Reasons for the 
London Riots - VIDEO: http://on.fb.me/
o0WG66 #p2 #londonriots #ukriots"
MM, OM PC MC austerity youth 
politics youth clubs 
US politcal left 
establishment 
insurrection SOC, NLC, MC
3
LR2 u'#DamianThompson of #Telegraph is 
#RACIST http://t.co/I4E1NsM 
#Londonriots #Libya, #Africa,'
NM PO media meta racist 
commentator gang 
culture black 
problem blame MC, SOC, RAO
2
LR2 u'#DamianThompson of #Telegraph is 
#RACIST http://t.co/I4E1NsM 
#Londonriots Libya, #Africa,'
NM PO, PC media meta racist 
commentator gang 
culture black 
problem blame MC, SOC, RED
2
LR2 u'#DamianThompson of #Telegraph is 
#RACIST http://t.co/I4E1NsM 
#Londonriots Libya, #Africa,'
NM PRE, PC media meta racist 
commentator gang 
culture black 
problem blame
MC,SOC, RED 2
LR2 u'RT @umairh: RT @HarvardBiz: The 
Great Splintering http://s.hbr.org/oUIrVI 
(My new post on the #londonriots. 
Please read + share.)'
NM PO, PC social economic 
inequality social 
contract broken at 
both ends
SOC, NL 3
LR2 u'RT @JohnBirmingham: RT. Politics 
and violence 101. http://t.co/vJQNIOZ 
#Londonriots'
NM PC Australia politics 
violence media 
critique
SOC, MC 3
LR2 u'RT @BBCWorldTonight: Ex gang-
member interview on the #londonriots 
@ceashton  http://t.co/SpyZGnP'
GI NM, MM PO gang culture 
responsibility 
families role parents
SOC 3
LR2 u'RT @Sallienful: Legend! This is how 
to deal with #riots. http://t.co/z9nV6Yq 
#londonriots #ukriots'
OM PRE signification re looter 
response
RAO 2
LR2 u'A different take on the #londonriots. 
PLEASE NOTE: not my view. http://
t.co/gj5iora'
OM PC massive attack 
banker complaint 
(not personal view)
POL, NLC 4
LR2 u'Over 1000 Arrested in UK as Anger 
over Inequality, #Racism Boils Ovr into 
"Insurrection" http://t.co/gR6cvJY via 
@democracynow #LondonRiots'
GI OM PC insurrection social 
cause anti-terror 
legislation
SOC 3
LR2 u'#LondonRiots #UKRiots 
#ManchesterRiots Media Calls Brutal 
Police Beating Of Teenagers  "Rough 
Justice" http://t.co/akEas2t  (via 
@kr3at)'
OM PC police brutality 
‘justice’ media 
commentary human 
rights
MC, RES
3
LR2 u'RT @loupepper: 89 yr old Aaron may 
have to close his barbers after 
#londonriots - give what you can : 
http://t.co/Hn3H607'
OM PRE IA, CTA
LR2 u'\u201c@truthout: London Riots Put 
Spotlight on Troubled, Unemployed 
Youths in Britain http://t.co/GQm03ym
\u201d#londonriots'
OM PC social trouble 
policing criminality 
long-standing 
disfunction SOC
3
LR2 u"RT @majorityfm: BBC Doesn't Want 
to Hear the Real Reasons for the 
London Riots - VIDEO: http://on.fb.me/
o0WG66 #p2 #londonriots #ukriots"
OM PC MC austerity youth 
politics youth clubs 
US politcal left 
establishment 
insurrection
SOC, NLC, MC 3
LR2 u"RT @majorityfm: BBC Doesn't Want 
to Hear the Real Reasons for the 
London Riots - VIDEO: http://on.fb.me/
o0WG66 #p2 #londonriots #ukriots"
OM, NM PC MC austerity youth 
politics youth clubs 
US politcal left 
establishment 
insurrection
SOC, NLC, MC 3
LR2 u'RT @manelrosalvador: Ara resulta k 
la culpa dels #londonriots son les 
subvencios k reben els + desfavorits. 
Quina vergonya #periodismevi ...'
PO disadvantaged 
shame
SOC ?
LR2 u"RT @kirstypatterson: I've pledged to 
spend \xa310 in all my local shops 
affected by #Londonriots to help get 
Ealing #backonitsfeet. Join us ..."
PRE IA, CTA solidarity SOL 1
LR2 u"@MayorOfLondon I've always 
supported you but I many in court let 
out on bail! THEY NEED TO BE 
CHARGED!! Boris this IMPORTANT! 
#londonriots"
DA, PRE comment looter 
punishment
RAO 2
LR2 u'looks like another quiet night on the 
#londonriots front.  Well done police I 
say.  loads of them around by us...'
SI PRE police support POLICE, SOL 2
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LR2 u'#LondonRiots, if you crazy English 
disrupt the #Everton match on 
Saturday I will be \xfcber pissed.'
PRE reaction anger 
conditional
O 1
LR2 u"Superman ain't saving shit. 
#londonriots"
PRE declarative 
statement
O 1
LR2 u"While I get that the #londonriots 
must've been about venting out pent-
up rage, pics show that it was just 
looting and violent fun. #sad"
PO, PRE riots about looting 
and violent fun (but 
get pent up rage)
SOC, RED
3
LR2 u'#LondonRiots #UKRiots #riotcleanup 
Closed community make closed 
society. I suggest to following with 
other kind of people by twitter.'
PRE comment society SOC 2
LR2 u"The BBC #newsnight debate w/
Diane Abbott on right now, is the most 
completely out of touch discussion on 
#LondonRiots I've seen so far."
PO, PRE politics diane abbott 
out of touch
O
3
LR2 u'Please research about the black 
community in London, Nigeria, Ghana, 
Somalia & watch the news before u 
make any comment on da #londonriots'
PRE comment SOC 2
LR2 u"Oh for heavens sake it's not music 
that is causing these #Londonriots !!!!"
PRE frustration O 1
LR2 u"Hearing lots of sirens flying down 
Finchley Road. Hoping it's not related 
to the looting/mobs/dumbshits 
#londonriots"
SI PN, PRE signification looters O 1
LR2 u'Segundo os comerciais da Nike da 
minha juventude, tava certo que eu 
seria um skatista famos\xe3o. Bom, 
algu\xe9m foi cobrar #londonriots'
PRE SPAM unknown O ?
LR2 u'this is absolutly terrible. i close my 
eyes and pray. #londonriots 
#prayforlondon'
PRE ES reaction awful SOL 1
LR2 u"RT @jenny_ricks: Did that guy just 
say, 'they're not very high up on 
maslow's ladder?' Amazing #newsnight 
#londonriots"
PRE comment 
commentary
O 2
LR3 u'Yes! RT @TheBrowser: Few 
Thoughts: on UK troubles from 
@uksnowolf: all excellent & well worth 
reading http://t.co/JTDi4Z1 
#londonriots'
BL PO NN 3
LR3 u'Is locking away the kids of the 
#LondonRiots really the solution?Read 
@Laura_B_C1 blog for 
@ChemistryGrouphttp://t.co/PWfJcg5 
@MegaMentors'
BL PC justice sentencing RES 3
LR3 u'Governed by Fools - http://t.co/
h0wRAtW  #londonriots #bbcdp #hoc'
BL PRE government fools POL 2
LR3 u"HAHAHAHA RT \u201c@ChefNero: 
Shouldn't but I will. It is a pretty funny 
pic! #LondonRiots #riot #afc #arsenal  
http://t.co/5TmBWkh\u201d"
BL PRE reaction humour O 1
LR3 u'no core, proud identity to fall back on
\u2026 recipe for problems. http://t.co/
viE4GNr #UKRiots #LondonRiots'
BL PO identify missing 
possible cause
SOC
4
LR3 u'"If We Don\'t Riot, You Don\'t Listen 
to Us": The Case for Chaos http://
pulse.me/s/16rDe #londonriots'
CM PC rioter focus policing 
media state black 
deaths SOC
3
LR3 u"An Open Letter to David Cameron's 
Parents - http://bit.ly/qe4uvP  
#londonriots #cameron #corruption"
CM PO looter politician 
comparison
SOC, POL
3
LR3 u"Open Letter to David Cameron's 
Parents http://t.co/bI9wGgM #ukriots 
#londonriots #ealing #hackney 
#croydon"
CM PO, PC looter politician 
comparison
SOC, POL 3
LR3 u'http://t.co/faCz669 This is interesting, 
worth a look. Pokes a few holes in the 
official story of #londonriots  Maybe 
not.'
CM PO, PC social causes 
complexity police 
marginalisation
SOC 4
LR3 u'what #londonriots are about http://
t.co/d04ledN'
CM, MM PC disenfranchisement 
unemployment 
bankers police social 
political expenses 
causes ‘message’ 
SOC, POL 3
LR3 u"RT @thekarachikid: RT @guardian: 
Full text of Cameron's speech on 
#ukriots #londonriots now up on No 10 
website http://bit.ly/nhmzdk"
GI GM PC cameron criminality 
violence vandalising 
law order no 
justifiable causal link RAO, RED
2
LR3 u'As ever Camer-moron the British 
Prime Minister is on top of the looting 
situation! #londonriots  http://t.co/
6VQvLDU'
MM PRE politcal comment 
signification 
Cameron
POL 2
LR3 u"I'm from a little place called Great 
Britain, but I dunno if I love or hate 
Britain ... http://t.co/p4JfW1N 
#londonriots"
MM PN value states GB O 2
LR3 u'Check this video out -- Hackney Riots 
#LondonRiots 8th August 2011 http://
t.co/idM6hhM via @youtube #shocking'
SI MM PRE reaction shock O 2
LR3 u"RT @aerotwist: Remember that 
photo of the #londonriots I said I found 
most distressing? Apparently I wasn't 
the only one: http://bit.ly/ ..."
MM PN reaction emotive O 2
LR3 u'\u201c@1equalmusic: http://t.co/
wIxVWD3 #R2J #londonriots\u201d 
#Whoismyneighbour'
NM PC religion, soul 
searching inequality 
SOC 1
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LR3 u'\u201c@paigey_cakey: read my 
article about youths #LondonRiots and 
my role in #attacktheblock & #theknot 
in the @dailyStar http://t.co/Kgct6N5 
RT'
GI NM PO youths anger self 
promotion
O
2
LR3 u'\u201c@guardian:David Cameron 
considers banning rioters from social 
media http://t.co/cJYLj77 #riots 
#londonriots #ukriots\u201d The man 
is an idiot'
GI NM PRE MC politcal comment 
signification 
Cameron
POL, RES, MC 4
LR3 u'UK PM considers banning suspected 
rioters from social media http://t.co/
jytQVaK #londonriots agree w/ 
revoking benefits,but not free speech'
GI NM PO MC social media politic 
opinion free speech
RES, RAO 4
LR3 u'RT @newsbrooke: Yet again 
@DavidAllenGreen is the voice of 
reason. This time on #londonriots: 
http://t.co/fNivlfx'
NM PO, PC response justice 
various causes 
reason restraint
SOC, RES 3
LR3 u"http://t.co/rOsbc6v #londonriots 
#manchesterriots #birminghamriots 
'Banker puppet govt+police brutality
+betrayed youth=Londonriots #nwo"
NM, MM PO russia today blame 
government cuts 
politicians bankers
RED 3
LR3 u"Massive Attack's take on the 
#londonriots http://bit.ly/ogZfrj"
OM PO, PC looter stealing banks 
politicians massive 
attack
SOC, NLC 3
LR3 u'Everyone needs to RT this!! I hope 
@Hey__SoulSister gets what she 
deserves, the EVIL WITCH. http://t.co/
yyne6J5 #LondonRiots RT RT'
OM PRE CTA signification looters RAO 2
LR3 u'Massive Attack comments on 
#londonriots cause a shitstorm on 
Facebook. http://t.co/3ollW5z'
OM, CM PC MC political causes tax 
banks politcal meta 
narrative
SOC, POL, NLC 3
LR3 u'There is NOBODY in that House 
whose opinion i respect #hoc 
#londonriots #bbcdp'
PRE political comment POL 2
LR3 u"I really do not believe that the Rioters 
will be evicted. I just don't, most 
councils are push overs anyway. 
#Londonriots"
PRE comment law 
response
RAO 2
LR3 u"#londonriots: when revolution is 
shaped as a song by the clash, it's ok. 
if london becomes sid vicious dream, 
then people gets (very) upset."
PRE comment O 2
LR3 u"The #londonriots happened because 
of &lt;racism&gt;, thus the solution is 
&lt;tearing everyone's eyes out&gt; 
#DIYriotcolumn"
PRE unknown O 2
LR3 u'I think the Queen is fasting unto 
death. Anna Hazare spoke to her. Stop 
riots else Queen will die fasting 
#londonriots #democracy'
PRE comment O 1
LR3 u"I don't understand what David 
Cameron has against insightful people. 
#londonriots"
PRE politcal comment 
signification 
Cameron
POL 2
LR3 u'RT @piercepenniless: PRECISELY 
RT @againsthoping: if unity means 
condemnation, i want no part in it. 
#ukriots #pmqs #londonriots'
PO unity = 
condemnation not 
desirable
RES 3
LR3 u"#Londonriots Good idea for tshirt,'I 
survived the riot and all I got was was 
this stolen t-shirt'"
PRE making light O 1
LR3 u'Why aren\xb4t anyone arresting the 
crook David Cameron we have a 
picture of him why beat up small fish 
when we can hang big fish 
#londonriots'
PRE politcal comment 
signification 
Cameron
POL 3
LR3 u"the situation in England makes me 
very sad. don't know what else to say... 
I'm worried. #LondonRiots"
PN reaction sad O 1
LR3 u"RT @SamBlonde: Cant help but 
think it looks like Political mexican 
wave when the MP's rise & fall in their 
seats #londonriots in discuss ..."
PRE signification looters O 1
LR3 u'Anyone know how to get around the 
checkout page? I wanna loot 
Amazon...\n#LondonRiots'
PRE making light O 1
LR3 u'God dammit, the one game I was 
looking forward to this wknd gets 
postponed.. Fuck! #Tottenham 
#Everton #LondonRiots'
PRE reaction anger O 0
LR3 u'#UKriots #londonriots constant talk 
about "stealing and looting" from UK 
MP\'s in parliament, backed up by the 
bankers who never stole..'
PO looter stealing banks 
politicians
POL 3
LR3 u'My Mum just before beating me 
would say \'I warned you! Who don\'t 
hear must feel!" The GOVERNMENT 
AND POLICE AINT LISTENING!!! 
#londonriots'
PRE declarative 
statement morality
O 2
LR3 u'I would like to propose a solution to 
sentencing #LondonRiots. We cannot 
make kick offending kids out of the 
communities. But I have it!'
PRE comment 
sentencing
RES 2
LR3 u'Some of the sentences for rioters, 
4mths, 3mths, 8mths, 10weeks, Wot a 
big FUCK U from the govt to the 
innocent people affected #londonriots'
GI PRE comment looter 
punishment
RAO 3
LR3 u'PM Cameron "This isn\'t about race; 
its about crime".  Absolutely! 
#londonriots'
GI PRE political comment 
riot cause
RAO 3
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LR3 u'Exactly! RT "@JFInJFIrrie: Where\'s 
Cameron\'s compensation for decades 
of economic irrationalism and elite 
looting? #Londonriots #newfeudalism"'
PRE, PO looter politician 
comparison
SOC, NLC
3
LR3 u'Sky news headline . "we don\'t want 
culture of fear" .. #londonriots #irony'
GI PRE comment media 
commentary
MC 2
LR3 u'just saw the video of the Msian kid re 
#londonriots, i dont know how you can 
say mob rule is OK. Any large 
gathering can end up like that.'
PO, PRE social opinion mob 
rule
SOC
3
LR3 u'.@Asher_Wolf I think the bigger 
concern was shutting down mobile 
networks #londonriots'
DA MC comment MC 2
LR3 u"RT @paulmakepeace: I'm glad to 
see David Cameron has restored hors 
d'oeuvres to our streets #londonriots"
PRE comment cameron POL 2
LR3 u'RT @PeterTatchell: Cameron wants 
looters jailed. Let\u2019s start with 
MPs who looted the expenses system 
#londonriots #UKriots #duggan 
#Love ...'
PO looter politician 
comparison
POL 3
LR3 u"I want a dignified PM, not someone 
who throws out words like 'they are 
sick' 'thugs' etc. He needs more 
gravitas  #londonriots"
PO politics dignity 
analysis gravitas
POL 3
LR3 u"RT @Life4BH: #BBC doesn't cover 
the #LondonRiots as much as it did 
#Bahrain in fear of cancellation of 
#londonOlympics #London2012 
#2012 ..."
PO MC bbc coverage 
olympics contract
MC 2
LR3 u'RT @PeterTatchell: Cameron wants 
looters jailed. Let\u2019s start with 
MPs who looted the expenses system 
#londonriots #UKriots #duggan 
#Love ...'
PRE, PO looter politician 
comparison
POL
4
LR3 u"These #londonriots costing the 
Government's purse millions of pounds 
when we are already on the brink 
#bloodyhooligans"
PRE comment RAO 2
LR3 u"Do we ban the video camera 
because some people use it to make 
porn? Don't blame social media for 
#londonriots #ukriots"
PO MC social media meta
MC, SOC
3
LR3 u'RT @dnotice2012: Shorter 
Parliament: I WANT VENGEANCE! 
FUCK THE INEVITABLE NEGATIVE 
CONSEQUENCES! #ukriots 
#londonriots #roitcleanup'
PO, PRE opinion? satire?
RES
3
LR3 u"#londonriots no matter what the 
economic situation is, there is no 
justification for destroying innocent 
people's homes and businesses"
PRE comment SOC 1
LR3 u'RT @Polly_Evans: RT 
\u201c@WilliamsJon: Tweeting in 
Kabul airport! Real irony if #londonriots 
results in #Afghanistan being free-er 
than UK.  ...'
PN, PRE comment irony O 2
LR3 u"Don't have a problem banning face 
coverings, head scarves and hoodies 
for a period to assert responsibility?  
#LondonRiots"
PO question ban 
hoodies face 
scarves etc?
RES 3
LR4 u'Government mulls social media 
controls after #londonriots  http://t.co/
dAw84F8 Social media is a tool. How 
you use it is up to you.'
BL PC MC social media meta 
commentary
SM, RES
4
LR4 u'#Blog:- \u201cLondon\u2019s 
Burning\u201d \u2013 A guest blog 
about the rioting in England, on 
@EdenBaylee\u2019s site: http://
tinyurl.com/3pmb3nm #LondonRiots'
CM PO, PC human causes 
minority response 
SOC 3
LR4 u'RT @mrgeog: RT @GOOD: An 
important map showing the connection 
between poverty and riots in #London 
http://t.co/CoWCztF #londonriots'
GI CM, OM PC empirics correlation 
not causation 
poverty riots
SOC
3
LR4 u'The #Londonriots are just getting silly 
now. Some black lady is pissed.
\nhttp://t.co/gwI9eOl'
MM PRE comment 
questionable 
sincerity
O 1
LR4 u"These young people have no sense 
of community because they haven't 
been given one. Russell Brand http://
t.co/NpUEAdI #ukriots #londonriots"
NM PC nuance community 
deprivation politics 
complexity reaction
SOC
3
LR4 u'#londonriots RT: @profdavidharvey  
Feral Capitalism Hits The Streets http://
t.co/zrVoagP'
OM, CM PC left critique feral 
capitalism political 
economy mass 
disposession
SOC, NLC 3
LR4 u'@Dynamomagician  please listen 
and RT a friends view on recent events 
http://t.co/TQy1eLv #londonriots'
OM, MM PO CTA ?
NN
3
LR4 u"Morceau de rap pas mal du tout sur 
un sujet d'actualit\xe9 #londonriots 
http://t.co/wleAP8f"
OM, MM PO ?
NN
?
LR4 u'@GasolineShorts I take it the 
criticism has started! Then 
#londonriots'
PRE declarative 
statement
O 1
LR4 u'This is terrible! I feel like throwing 
something at my new 42" plasma 
#bbcqt #londonriots'
PN, PRE reaction shock 
spoof
O 1
LR4 u"English Defence League you don't 
defend me, nor stand up for what I 
believe in. #EDL #LondonRiots"
PRE declarative 
statement
O 3
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MR1 u'RT @SamKennerley: if you want to 
stand you ground and protect your city 
- http://t.co/GUKEnXZ #manchester 
#manchesterriots #riots'
BL PRE unknown O 3
MR1 u'#manchesterriots Community is rising 
up against riots - Politicians quick to 
score photo ops - http://t.co/r2cvJR0'
GI BL PO politics opportunism 
media
RES, O 2
MR1 u'http://t.co/SqJFIsjt\n\nShows just how 
stupid the majority of looters are.  
#Manchesterriots #Londonriots'
BL PRE looter stupidity RAO 3
MR1 u'Interesting look at the "catch a looter" 
sites going up http://t.co/zT2CIf0 
#ManchesterRiots #UKRiots'
CM PO, PC MC meta social media 
riot response deeper 
social issues
RES 3
MR1 u'you dont fuck with the GMP or the 
GMP fuck with you http://t.co/sm2JQXs 
#manchesterriots'
SI MM PRE recommendation 
aggressive state
POLICE, RES 2
MR1 u"Liam Gallagher's store also hit - 
ironic, looters decided to steal from 
their own: http://twitpic.com/63vvou 
#Manchesterriots #PrettyGreen"
SI MM, CM PRE signification looters RAO 2
MR1 u'About bloody time too!!! http://t.co/
zATlTVR *sings* Let the water cannon 
kick it! http://t.co/GjYmE8p 
#londonriots #manchesterriots'
NM, MM PRE SPAM recommendation 
aggressive state
RAO, RES 2
MR1 u'RT @RT_com: UK fights wars, 
retreats in riots? London outraged at 
police fail http://t.co/JhNvyQ9 #news 
#londonriots #manchesterriots #b ...'
GI NM, MM PO russia today state 
blame foreign wars 
SOC, RED 3
MR1 u'I feel absolutely sick, just seen a 
picture from #manchesterriots of 
people i kind of know'
SI PN reaction shock O 1
MR1 u"A relationship is only meant for two 
people, but some bitches these days 
just don't know how to count. 
#manchesterriots #riotcleanup"
PRE unknown O 1
MR1 u"RT @FootballAgentPM: Recognise 
these looters from the 
#manchesterriots then contact 
@gmpolice with information. Stand up 
for what's righ ..."
PRE CTA comment RAO, RES 2
MR1 u'RT @DaveWinder1: I think thats 
called incitement @Tony_LFCnicol Yes 
I Hope MANCHESTER gets destroyed 
Tonight #ManchesterRiot @gmpolice'
PRE commentary twitter 
behaviour
O 1
MR1 u"for once thank god for the rain. 
Looting ain't such fun when you are 
p....d wet through #manchesterriots"
PRE comment RAO, O 1
MR1 u'iPod  Please realize that when I put 
you on "shuffle" I mean "play all of my 
favourite songs skip... skip... skip... 
#manchesterriots'
PRE Other none O 1
MR1 u'Great quote from Waterstone\'s 
employee on the news: "We\'ll stay 
open, if they steal some books they 
might learn something" 
#manchesterriots"'
GI PRE signification looters RAO 2
MR1 u'@CharlotteCoulst @riotcleanupmanc 
Yeh I have. Great to see! Hearing the 
place is starting to resemble a city 
centre again? #ManchesterRiots'
RFI DA ES reaction hope? O 1
MR1 u'@DazzaH_F1 did u see that little 
cunt on #skynews being interviewed 
last nite #manchesterRiots'
PRE signification looters RAO 0
MR2 u'Everyone expected #Leedsriots to 
happen because of the #Londonriots 
and #Manchesterriots this is what they 
got http://t.co/LHBElj4'
MM PRE comparaison 
situational
O 1
MR2 u'RT @AlexNicholson88: Ppl On The 
News Whom R Making Excuses For 
#manchesterriots R SCUM!! There Is 
NO Excuse!!'
PRE signification riot 
excusers
RAO 2
MR2 u'I, Robot is like Manchester... Riots! 
#Manchesterriots'
PRE unknown O 1
MR2 u"When the only shops that sell vans 
caps get looted and you can't get one 
#manchesterRiots"
PRE comment O 1
MR3 u'@LadylikeTheboot Attention: Capital 
in chaos!! #ukriots #manchesterriots 
http://t.co/CxDLPHD'
BL PRE declarative 
statement
O 2
MR3 u'http://t.co/4GzJ5ak #liverpoolriots 
#ukriots #manchesterriots THIS IS 
EXACTLY RIGHT!!!'
MM PO, PC police brutality
SOC, NLC
4
MR4 u"Why can't we see that 12yo lad's 
face & his vile mother on BBC News? 
#manchesterriots"
PRE signification looters RAO 2
OCT1 u'#OperationCupOfTea Less riots in 
London with 16000 police were on duty 
- Riots spread to rest of country 
instead - http://t.co/3FWJ3t7'
BL PRE possible opinion? 
declarative 
statement 
SOC 4
OCT1 u'#OperationCupOfTea A very British 
way of handling things! http://t.co/
btHTYkC'
BL PRE ES national identity SOL 2
OCT1 u'Blog post on the riots - The England 
Riots http://t.co/npmT3cr #riotcleanup 
#OperationCupOfTea #Riots'
CM PO, PC personal moral 
responsibility no 
respect authority SOC
3
OCT1 u'Interesting idea... not sure if it would 
work though... http://t.co/s7OisHe 
#riotcleanup #OperationCupOfTea'
GM PRE IA expression interest 
looter benefit 
punishment
RAO, RES 3
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OCT1 u'RT @William_HRH: 
#OperationCupOfTea - http://t.co/
sEKZETI'
MM PRE media support SOL 1
OCT1 u"Aha. TV Presenter #DanSnow 
'caught and sat on a looter' http://t.co/
aJqnl7O #ukriots #riotcleanup #london 
#OperationCupOfTea"
GI NM PRE reaction humour O 1
OCT1 u"I've decided to join in with 
#OperationCupOfTea what else is 
there to do when the world is in a 
mess!!!!!"
PRE ES supportive 
statement
SOL 1
OCT1 u'#OperationCupOfTea LETS DRINK 
TEA! wait a minute...i cant .__.'
PRE supportive statement SOL 1
OCT1 u"#OperationCupOfTea - Milk, 3 
sugar's, Just got the kettle on. Anyone 
else?"
PRE ES supportive 
statement
SOL 1
OCT1 u'I love #OperationCupOfTea' PRE ES support SOL 1
OCT1 u"RT @VixKhalifa: DON'T MAKE WAR 
MAKE TEA! #OperationCupOfTea"
PRE supportive 
statement
SOL 1
OCT1 u"Steve  I like that 
#OperationCupOfTea is trending, such 
a British response, I'll raise my mug of 
Green Tea to that!  Seymour"
PRE MC supportive statement SOL 2
OCT1 u'#OperationCupOfTea I like 
#operationplateofbacon better.'
PRE supportive 
statement
SOL 1
OCT1 u'RT @BariTea: RT @Alnwickist: I love 
living in a country which makes 
#OperationCupOfTea trend in reaction 
to #LondonRiots :-D'
PRE ES supportive 
statement
MC, SOL 1
OCT1 u'I think Team India is planning for Tea 
Party #OperationCupOfTea'
PRE making light O 1
OCT1 u'regardless of the riots, I need 
#OperationCupOfTea'
PRE ES supportive 
statement
SOL 1
OCT1 u"So the US has the appalling Tea 
Party movement ... the UK has 
#OperationCupOfTea Sometimes I'm 
so proud to be British"
PRE supportive statement SOL 1
OCT1 u'#OperationCupOfTea I think some 
Earl Grey...'
PRE ES supportive 
statement
SOL 1
OCT1 u'Ah now a hash tag I can actually get 
behind - time to stick the kettle on... 
#OperationCupOfTea'
PRE ES support SOL 1
OCT1 u'might be time for 
#OperationCupOfTea kitchen here i 
come.  Or am I missing something?'
PRE supportive statement SOL 1
OCT1 u'I see #OperationCupOfTea and think 
of Anons with tea cups in the streets of 
London. Click on TT. Disappointed. 
Send masks to England, STAT!'
PRE unknown O 1
OCT1 u"Ironically, in year's time in London 
there will be 100s running about trying 
to get their hands on gold, silver or 
bronze.#OperationCupOfTea"
PRE comment situational O 1
OCT1 u'Cup of Sweet Chai for me I think. 
#OperationCupOfTea'
PRE ES supportive 
statement
SOL 1
OCT1 u'I rather participate in 
#OperationCrumpets than 
#OperationCupOfTea'
PRE comment SOL 1
OCT2 u'RT @sampepper: Mr Pricklesworth 
showing his support for 
#OperationCupOfTea http://t.co/
NvcDhpC http://t.co/tnKD6oF'
MM PRE IA media support SOL 2
OCT2 u"A cup of tea and a good book. 
What's everyone reading? 
#OperationCupOfTea 
#ReadingNotRioting"
PN OTHER expression solidarity SOL 1
OCT2 u"@AndyTheBigTwit same here andy 
its just a shocking what i'm reading and 
the photos #OperationCupOfTea 
#UKRiots"
DA reaction shock O 2
OCT2 u"#OperationCupOfTea .... wth. Can't 
stand tea.. let's try trending 
#OperationCanOfCoke"
PRE supportive statement SOL 1
OCT3 u'I am supporting #OperationCupOfTea 
by lounging on the sofa, tea in hand 
whilst watching @itvthismorning . The 
cleaning can wait one day...'
PRE ES supportive statement SOL 1
R1 u'Colonsay, Jura, Mull... I miss the 
peace and quiet of the Islands. No 
#riots there! http://t.co/dvh4ORP'
BL PRE comparaison 
situational
O 1
R1 u"@ahumanright You'll be happy to 
see some are helping the fight in 
#Syria : http://t.co/42VwcxK #protests 
#web #internet #riots #humanrights"
BL PRE unknown MC 3
R1 u'RT @Martha_Burns: #riotscleanup 
this is beautiful http://t.co/0uzcPZX'
CM PRE recommendation 
expression pride
SOL, RES 2
R1 u"#Riots threatening this weekend's 
fixtures as police over-stretched - 
understandable but unprecedented - 
http://on.fb.me/qiDXT8 #football"
CM PRE, PC understandable;e to 
stop football
RES
2
R1 u'Well, our country needs tough love 
now #riots\nhttp://t.co/XlpuXRV'
CM PO genetics social 
media causes 
morals personal 
responsibility 
RES 3
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R1 u'RT @elcocinerofiel: Me encanta com 
exige respeto http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=biJgILxGK0o#t=3m38s HAVE 
SOME RESPECT! #london #riots'
MM, NM PC social political 
causes duggan 
media stop search 
racism protest 
insurrection
SOC ?
R1 u"That 31 year old teacher was Alexis 
Bailey. Not the first time she's been in 
trouble: http://t.co/9ExTGmq. Some 
people NEVER learn. #Riots"
GI NM PRE signification looters RAO 4
R1 u'This article about the riots is 
interesting, informative and considered 
- http://t.co/uKI0Dq6 via @guardian 
#riots'
GI NM PC shopping riots 
Baudrillard? 
consumption political 
still more complex 
than criminality 
looting SOC, NLC
3
R1 u'RT @radicalnoodle: Max Hastings 
seems to think that the riots were 
caused by people having sex with 
animals. http://t.co/ZPg1sJ0  #riots ...'
NM PRE comment media 
commentary
RAO, LC, RED, MC 3
R1 u"Interesting piece in tonight's Evening 
Standard on the role of Twitter in the 
#riots http://t.co/z4jFJPb"
NM PC MC social media meta 
commentary
SM 2
R1 u"RT @UclanChris: Interesting piece in 
tonight's Evening Standard on the role 
of Twitter in the #riots http://t.co/
z4jFJPb"
NM PC MC social media meta 
commentary
MC 3
R1 u'#tottenham and beyond: neoliberal 
#riots and the possibility of politics 
http://t.co/1F7v3Ol #UKriots 
#londonriots'
NM, OM PC neoliberalism riots 
link capitalism 
looting public sphere
SOC, NLC 3
R1 u'British Youth Council @bycLIVE say 
looting, lawlessness and #riots  
unnacceptable http://t.co/unomSby'
OM PR looting unacceptable 
too early to say 
causes youth cuts
O 2
R1 u'RT \u201c@endabrady 
@Charliecondou\xa0Know this man? 
Ring Greater Manchester Police #riots 
\xa0http://t.co/TQW7XMW\u201d 
(cont) http://tl.gd/ca1q3p'
OM PRE CTA
R1 u"#Riots threatening this weekend's 
fixtures as police over-stretched - 
understandable but unprecedented - 
http://on.fb.me/qiDXT8 #football"
OM PRE comment 
organisational 
response
RES 2
R1 u"#Riots threatening this weekend's 
fixtures as police over-stretched - 
understandable but unprecedented - 
http://on.fb.me/qiDXT8 #football"
OM PO, PRE understandable;e to 
stop football
RES
3
R1 u"@kirstyswift I'm reckoning so and 
there's proberley less chances of #riots 
#keepsafe"
DA, PRE unknown O 1
R1 u'#Bread #baking #disaster last 
night...I blame the #riots!!!'
PRE making light O 1
R1 u"#Riots I won't be happy if these 
ignorant scum get the footy cancelled 
on the wknd #sendthemtothefaulklands 
#ourprisonsarefull"
PRE signification looters RAO 1
R1 u"Should be on @aljazeera at 2 ish to 
discuss #riots - imagine they won't 
have much truck with ridiculous Arab 
spring analogies being pushed"
PO national comparison 
not valid arab spring
SOC 3
R1 u'Does CBCs "setting sights on justice" 
(in any translation) equal Cameron\'s 
"doing whatever is necessary to 
restore law and order" ? #riots'
PRE politcal comment 
signification 
Cameron
POL 2
R1 u'If I owned a construction company I 
would buy some land and make plans 
for a super prison for these rioters! 
#riots'
PRE comment looter 
punishment
RAO 2
R1 u"Can imagine police running round 
with super soaker 5000's due to budget 
cuts! #watercannons #idiots #riots"
PRE making light O 1
R1 u'No riots in cricklewood but I think 
there was an unsuccessfull attempt on 
Brent cross last night. Idiots, Brent 
Cross is zombie-proof.#riots'
PRE comment community RAO 2
R1 u'I can completely understand good 
citizens protecting their streets just 
wish the government would get strong 
armed against the #riots'
PRE comment state 
policy
RES 2
R1 u"While I'd love to see this stuff in 
#London as flat out social / class war. I 
Can't help but see a load of spivs 
looking for a ruck #riots"
PO class social causes? 
doubt 
SOC, RAO 3
R1 u'Sangat TV last night proved not all 
journos r scum. They turned the #riots 
in Southall n Birmingham into the best 
game of Hide n Sikh ever!'
PRE comment MC 1
R1 u'If only I had some of these feral hood 
rats addresses and a steady supply of 
grenades... And a crossbow for those 
that run! #riots'
PRE signification looters 
punishment
RAO 2
R1 u"According to smug @AlexSalmond, 
#riots are an \u201cEnglish, not UK
\u201d phenomenon. He's obviously 
not observed the aftermath of an 
Edinburgh derby."
GI PRE comparaison 
situational
SOC 4
R1 u'RT @AnnaSimo: Civisme a Clapham 
i altres barris d Londres post #riotsUK. 
La ciutadania de la vella Anglaterra 
continua donant-nos lli\xe7on ...'
PRE unknown O ?
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R1 u'@uber_SarahCross awful scenes 
from Manchester #riots - I hope you 
guys are staying safe!'
PRE ES reaction awful SOL 1
R1 u"The UK's economy may not fully 
recover for another three years!!! #riots 
#us #londonriots"
GI PO 2
R1 u"If I can't watch Utd this weekend I'm 
going to be absolutely fucking pissed 
off beyond belief!! #Riots"
PRE declarative 
statement
O 1
R1 u'I think those #riots will reach France. 
- just a matter of time.'
PRE comment O 2
R1 u"RT @Mishelle__B: Great,so its 
started in BFD now then #riots 
&lt;&lt;&lt; Don't lie..."
PRE unknown O 1
R1 u"Just been into #Leicester. There's far 
less damage than I was expecting. 
Looks like the police had the #riots 
under control :)"
SI PN support police POLICE, SOL 2
R1 u"I've never been disgusted to be 
british until now these #riots are 
unbelievably!"
PRE situational comment O 1
R2 u'RT @Ed_Miliband: Responsibility is 
the key to stop these #riots happening 
again http://t.co/XEfMx0l'
BL PO responsibility who? O 2
R2 u'Sheffield - business as usual: http://
t.co/1O67CnK #steelcitynotstealcity 
#sheffield #riots'
GI BL PRE declarative 
statement
O 2
R2 u'C\u2018est magnifique #riots 
#londonriots #liverpoolriots http://t.co/
HyhGMon'
BL PRE unknown NN ?
R2 u'Yeah this is what I want to see more 
of if these riots continue. Rough justice 
http://t.co/iOVUuEH #riots'
SI CM, MM PRE recommendation 
aggressive state
RAO, RES, POLICE 2
R2 u'RT @GillsKent30: Yeah this is what I 
want to see more of if these riots 
continue. Rough justice http://t.co/
iOVUuEH #riots'
SI MM PRE recommendation 
aggressive state
RAO, RES, POLICE 2
R2 u"Really sad 2 hear Independent music 
labels left devastated by Tuesday's riot 
fire http://t.co/qekF07j 
@patrickhaveron #londonriots #riotsuk"
NM PN IA OTHER reaction sadness O 2
R2 u'RT @Sallienful: Legend! This is how 
to deal with #riots. http://t.co/z9nV6Yq 
#londonriots #ukriots'
OM PRE signification re looter 
response
RAO 2
R2 u"politicians that couldn't be bothered 
to finish their holiday early suddenly 
exploiting the destruction as a photo 
opportunities #riotsuk"
PO politicians photo ops 
holidays
POL 2
R2 u"Love the man on the news who just 
blamed the Polish taking all the jobs for 
the #riots. That's a new one"
PO immigration blame 
doubt
SOC 3
R2 u"RT @grdryn: The anti #piracy 
adverts which stated 'YOU WOULDNT 
STEAL A TELEVISION' just don't seem 
relevant anymore. #riots"
PRE comment O 1
R2 u"Sangat TV clips by far the most real 
& interesting reporting I've seen during 
#riots, BBC and Sky look slow, 
repetitive, late by comparison"
PO MC meta media 
comparison
MC
2
R2 u"Watching the news. Can't say I am 
proud to be English tonight. 
Embarressed yes ;0( #riots"
PRE situational comment O 1
R2 u'RT @worldtreeman: i thought th 
father of one of those 3 men killed in th 
#riots yesterday was brave and had a 
great message..live in #pe ...'
PO ES restraint response 
peace
SOL 3
R2 u"they've had their fun. they've got 
their HD Tvs and their new phones. It's 
over. Doubt 1000s of extra police had 
much to do with it #riots"
PRE comment looter 
cause
RAO 3
R3 u'UK #Riots 2011: Acting 
Commissioner Tim #Godwin Defends 
Police\u2019s Measure Response to 
Looters http://goo.gl/fb/Gwwdl'
BL PR 2
R3 u"RT @SIRSconsultancy: The causes 
of #riots in #London: SIRS 
Consultancy's Christian Cullen - latest 
interview: Network Ten News: http://
t ..."
BL PO 3
R3 u'@bbcdemlive Water cannons blind 
people! Careful - picture is not for the 
squeamish. #riots #riotdebate  http://
t.co/efZZAZE'
BL PRE declarative 
statement
RES 3
R3 u'@GunesTaylor instead 
@number10gov seems intent on 
ignoring lessons and playing to the 
Daily Mail agenda http://t.co/wtKp3zH 
#riots'
CM PO MC politics mail agenda 
leadership
POL, RAO, LC 4
R3 u'#riots succeed! Boris invests 
\xa350million in result in more food and 
heritage festivals!  http://t.co/0YFIv0j'
GI GM PO social commentary 
politics investment 
RES 3
R3 u'\u201c@guardian:David Cameron 
considers banning rioters from social 
media http://t.co/cJYLj77 #riots 
#londonriots #ukriots\u201d The man 
is an idiot'
GI NM PC MC social media 
commentary politics
POL, RES
4
R3 u'RT @EmmaHopkins92: Funniest 
picture! Unlucky Mr Cameron! #Riots  
http://t.co/cALxDsg'
OM PRE spoof cameron 
looted
O 1
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R3 u'#riots Stupid sodcasting ( http://t.co/
3YqdZ9v ) materialistic shits. Look 
what they did: http://t.co/R7SJQAL'
GI OM PRE signification looters RAO 2
R3 u"I'm thinking after the last week may 
be an armored vehicle hobby may be 
useful... this looks nice for the shops! 
http://t.co/RqEWjP6 #riots"
OM PRE comment 
militarisation
RES 1
R3 u'RT @lactualaloupe: #UK #Riots 
Jamais sans ma capuche http://t.co/
RPmdhz7 via @courrierinter'
OM PO, PC politicisation hoody 
social factors
SOC
3
R3 u"'Shocked into compliance!!' 
@NaomiAKlein 's 'Shock Doctrine' 
neo-liberal tactic, use #riots to clamp 
down on civil liberties @bridgetmck"
PO political neo-liberal 
‘tactics’ civil liberties
RES, NLC 4
R3 u'i doubt if Dave can remember 1971 
#riots'
PRE politcal comment 
signification 
Cameron
POL 2
R3 u'#riots I would have you strung up 
high with your blackberry shoved down 
your throat! Rot in hell...'
PRE reaction anger RAO 0
R3 u"#riots They're all sliding away from 
reality into denial of accountability of 
any government, any UK policy. I've 
had enough - lunch!"
PO, PN government 
accountability?
SOC, POL, RES
3
R3 u"Oh no. Nick Du Bios is on. This guy 
doesn't like GTis #ukriots #riots"
PRE unknown O 1
R3 u"@number10gov #riots P L E A S E 
#MrCameron...'yes', it's a failure of our 
society...BUT, THE ROT IS ALREADY 
THERE - THEY NEED LOCKING-UP!"
PO prison justice lock up 
rot
RAO 3
R3 u"922 arrests in the #riots that's 
another 922 to be sent to Afghanistan 
to support the troops then? (Oh most 
of them are 12? Send em anyway!)"
GI PRE signification looters 
punishment
RAO 2
R3 u"RT @gunnerROB81: #pmq #riots 
what great role-models these MP's 
are,how can they condemn the looters 
when what they did with expenses was 
..."
PO, PRE looter politician 
comparison
POL
3
R3 u"You have to admire the MP of mid 
Bedfordshire's complete lack of 
understanding of how water cannons 
work. Naive MP. #riots"
PO, PRE politics water canons 
lack understanding
RES
3
R3 u"I think the only reason #labour didn't 
vote him in is because they didn't want 
both party leaders with the 
#Samename #David #riots"
PRE political comment O 1
R3 u'\u201c@Ed_Miliband: I\u2019ll be 
going to the House of Commons 
shortly for the emergency debate 
following these #riots\u201d 
congratulations!!'
PRE mocking miliband O 1
R3 u'Cameron\'s hardline approach to 
"gang culture" will be very popular. He 
should tell his insane backbenchers to 
shut it though. #riots'
PO political meta gard 
line approach 
popular
RES 3
R3 u"RT @mjrobbins: Now another MP 
saying we should end the human rights 
act. I'm going to vomit up my lunch at 
this rate #riotsolutions"
PRE, PO politics human rights 
importance
RES
3
R3 u"RT @bevclack: Well said Diane 
Abbott! Got to make sure #riots don't 
become an excuse for militarisation of 
policing. #dailypolitics"
PO policing militarisation 
must not happen
RES 3
R3 u'God I hope they follow through with 
the evictions/stopping benefits #riots'
PRE IA comment looter 
punishment
RAO 2
R3 u"Cameron repeats his thought that 
making people homeless will help stop 
#riots. Erm, no I don't think so."
GI PO politics cuts 
homelessness riot
RES 3
R3 u"#riots don't be silly Michael White - 
standing for election without party 
endorsement is pointless...and all 
parties accept gross inequality"
PO, PRE politics meta 
O
4
R3 u"@MichaelWhite  #riots At least 
bother to use the vote for which other 
young people died across the middle 
east. Otherwise don't crit. MPs"
PO voting responsibility 
middle east 
comparison
O 2
R3 u"Fining the parents of the feral kids 
involved in the #riots will not improve 
their moralality, it wasn't there in the 
first place! #HoC"
PRE signification looters RAO 3
R4 u'Hooray! Camila Batmanghelidjh on 
Question Time #riots special http://t.co/
7x5T59r #bbcqt'
BL PRE, PC NN 2
R4 u"RT @everythingedl: Yes #EDL. 
Threatening the Prime Minister will 
really make him change his mind won't 
it? #Eltham #riots http://twitpic ..."
BL PRE political comment O 3
R4 u'Britain needs intentional help to cut 
out cancer #Riots  Government 
paralyzed to deal with true issues 
http://t.co/ntIZTRO @tavissmiley'
MM PO, PC complexity of causes SOC 3
R4 u'Last laugh on the looters. This is 
genius http://t.co/lC7cbso #riots 
#looting'
OM PRE signification re looter 
response
RAO 2
R4 u"they can't read RT @nspector4 It 
says something about London\u2019s 
rioters\u2014that Waterstone\u2019s 
bookstores weren\u2019t looted #riots"
PRE signification looters RAO 2
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R4 u"The BBC and Sky did a pretty good 
job of spreading word about the #riots. 
Let's shut them too! @LouiseMensch"
PO MC media commentary 
meta
MC, SOC, RES
3
R4 u"I think we need to think through why 
'people' commit #riots not if taking 
away benefits can solve the issue - it 
won't! #bbcqt"
PO benefits causes 
opinion complexity?
SOC 3
R4 u"The #police were wrong to ignore the 
Duggan family's initial request for 
dialogue,but handled the subsequent 
#riots well. Disagree? Say why."
PO IA, CTA policing debate met 
role in duggan riots
POLICE
2
RCUP1 u'RT @CarlosLatuff: #Cartoon for 
@Operamundi - Cameron has 
everything under control - 
#PrayForLondon #riotcleanup http://
t.co/VYrpuZT'
BL PRE unknown POL 3
RCUP1 u"Well said RT @FizzyPetal: 
#riotcleanup shows us that the rioters 
and looters are in the minority. I'm 
proud of (cont) http://tl.gd/ca0ttr"
CM PRE ES recommendation 
expression pride
RAO, SOL 4
RCUP1 u'My humble musings on the london 
riots http://t.co/JOxXjpn #londonriots  
#riotcleanup #OperationCupOfTea'
CM PO community focus 
political bickering 
SOC, POL 3
RCUP1 u'Interesting idea... not sure if it would 
work though... http://t.co/s7OisHe 
#riotcleanup #OperationCupOfTea'
GM PRE IA expression interest 
looter benefit 
punishment
RAO, RES 3
RCUP1 u'#riotcleanup proving communities are 
stronger than criminals. http://t.co/
2aZko0M'
MM PO 3
RCUP1 u"The spread of disorder \u2013 a 
repost in wake of London's riot 
cleanup: Yesterday, I watched as 
hundred... http://bit.ly/q1vLoB 
#riotcleanup"
GI NM PC riot cleanup 
psychology disorder
SOC 3
RCUP1 u"good luck today england. 
#riotcleanup. it's nap time...hopefully 
cricket time soon tomorrow."
PRE comment O 1
RCUP1 u"I disagree with DC, i dont think 
society is broken, if anything 
#riotcleanup shows that its anything 
but! And there's only a small minority"
PO society not broken 
opinion
SOC 4
RCUP1 u"RT @Glinner: If the Big Society 
exists in things like #riotcleanup, 
remember that Cameron didn't give us 
it, the Internet did."
PO MC society internet 
opinion
SOC 3
RCUP1 u"No Chris Brown! The English people 
are already suffering enough. They 
don't need your shitty music. They 
need help cleaning up! #riotcleanup"
PRE making light O 1
RCUP1 u"#OperationCupOfTea and 
#riotcleanup are trending, that's really 
good :)"
GI PRE ES support SOL 1
RCUP1 u"RT @Glinner: If the Big Society 
exists in things like #riotcleanup, 
remember that Cameron didn't give us 
it, the Internet did."
PO MC social media society 
opinion
SOC
3
RCUP1 u"RT @Glinner: If the Big Society 
exists in things like #riotcleanup, 
remember that Cameron didn't give us 
it, the Internet did."
PO MC social media society 
opinion
SOC
3
RCUP1 u"@ea_akin Yeah Im following the 
#riotcleanup on Twitter anyway so 
have numbers etc... I'll see what I can 
do!"
DA unknown O 2
RCUP1 u"RT @Glinner: If the Big Society 
exists in things like #riotcleanup, 
remember that Cameron didn't give us 
it, the Internet did."
PO MC social media society 
opinion
SOC
3
RCUP1 u'"It\'s taken 3 Hours to clean up our 
country, it took 3 Days for Cameron to 
come home" #riotcleanup 
#operationcupoftea'
PO politics cameron 
holiday clean up
POL 2
RCUP1 u"Why didn't the rioters set fire to my 
desk? Work blows. #London 
#riotcleanup"
PRE making light O 1
RCUP1 u"I think some r surprised that I'm so 
angry at the rioters. But London is my 
home. Im proud of it &it deserves 
better than this. #riotcleanup"
PRE reaction anger SOL 2
RCUP1 u"#riotcleanup grab all the rubbish 
broken glass and throw I'n the houses 
where all those little shits live"
PRE comment anger 
rioter revenge
RAO 0
RCUP1 u'#riotcleanup please stop rioting, I 
have plans this month'
PRE making light O 1
RCUP1 u"Glad that no further rioting took place 
in London altho saddened it happened 
elsewhere. :-( Let's hope that's the end 
of it. #riotcleanup"
GI PRE reaction sad relief SOL 1
RCUP1 u"it's time for an end to these riots. 
#riotcleanup"
PRE ES declariative 
statement
O 1
RCUP2 u'RT @prilbot: Once again using my 
child to get what I want... 
#manchesterriots #manchestercleanup 
#OperationCupOfTea #riotcleanup 
http:// ...'
BL PRE personal reflection O 1
RCUP2 u'#riotcleanup wish I could make 
clones of myself and be in every city 
going through this!  my heart goes out 
to the people victimised by this'
PRE ES emotion solidarity SOL 1
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RCUP2 u"I'll be holding my own COBRA 
meeting tonight.\n\nOr I might have 
Kingfisher, not decided yet. 
#LondonRiots #UKRiots #riotcleanup"
PRE making light O 1
RCUP2 u"RT @Cavalorn: @johnprescott Get 
this - the bloody EDL are using 
@lawcol888's picture of the 
#riotcleanup crew on their site & 
claiming i ..."
GI PRE reaction anger 
politics 
O 1
RCUP3 u'Tariq Jahan is a living legend 
#riotcleanup http://t.co/eDK8mKc'
BL PRE declarative 
statement
2
RCUP3 u"Nice! @carolineholding #riotcleanup 
http://t.co/ftog0pH '...our actions are 
political, whether we want them to be 
or not' #riotwhitewash"
BL PO political actions 
regardless
SOC
3
RCUP3 u'#riotcleanup or #riotwhitewash? 
http://t.co/Tf1N0Yg'
CM PC inequality class 
social exclusion 
gentrification SOC, NLC
3
RCUP3 u'Must read re #londonriots and 
#riotcleanup: http://t.co/RnEE0LE (h/t 
@msgracefh)'
CM PC CTA inequality class 
social exclusion 
gentrification SOC
3
RCUP3 u"RT @TheHistoryWoman: Here's the 
European view on the riots http://t.co/
KfgiDWH #riotcleanup"
OM PC summary blind 
vandalism vs 
frustration 
SOC 3
RCUP3 u'These riots have totally shown the 
worst in everybody. Discovering now 
that I know some total arseholes, 
previously closeted. #riotcleanup'
PN, PRE moral comment SOC, RAO 2
RCUP3 u"#thatawkwardmomentwhen Kaiser 
Chiefs - 'I Predict A Riot' comes on 
shuffle on your ipod.. #riotcleanup"
PRE narrative making 
light
O 1
RCUP3 u'I spoke about the positive aspects of 
social media, eg organising 
#riotcleanup and by @cambscops to 
provide reassurance. #fb'
PO MC social media positive 
aspects
MC, RES
3
RCUP3 u'RT @julianhuppert: I spoke about the 
positive aspects of social media, eg 
organising #riotcleanup and by 
@cambscops to provide reassuran ...'
PC MC social media positive 
aspects
MC, RES 3
RCUP3 u'RT @thesoapmonster_: #riotcleanup 
-that sounds like when i have to tidy 
my room'
PRE making light O 1
UKR1 u"RT @mesamb: This boy is brilliant, 
explaining to the craven fool Boris 
Johnson why he's so angry with him 
http://t.co/M0wqIzE #UKriots"
BL PO anger youth boris 
johnson
SOC, POL 3
UKR1 u'\u0634\u063a\u0628 
\u0644\u0646\u062f\u0646 \u064a
\u0644\u062d\u0642 
\u0623\u0636\u0631\u0627\u0631\u06
27 \u0623\u0648\u0644\u064a\u0629 
\u062a\u062a\u062c
\u0627\u0648\u0632 160 
\u0645\u0644\u064a\u0648\u0646 
\u062f\u0648\u0644\u0627\u0631 
http://t.co/wIi5YDf #Bahrain #UKriots 
\u0627\u0644\u0634\u063a\u0628 
\u0644\u0647 
\u0645\u0639\u0646\u0649 
\u0648\u0627\u062d\u062f 
\u0641\u064a \u062c\u0645\u064a
\u0639 \u0627\u0644\u062f
\u0648\u0644 \u0647\u0648 
\u0627\u0644\u062e
\u0631\u0627\u0628'
GI BL PO state implications 
ruin?
O
?
UKR1 u'Why people do such things ? ... this 
is just a simple question .. the same 
like at berdich... why ? #UKRiots http://
t.co/d3w4Vge'
BL PRE confusion RAO 2
UKR1 u"RT @JonWynneJones: @petespurs 
raises key question: 'how have we 
created a society in which greed and 
consumerism' leads to #ukriots. htt ..."
BL PO, PC greed consumerism 
causes riots
SOC, NLC
3
UKR1 u"Let's catch these shits! http://t.co/
ipMF7us #ukriots"
BL PRE CTA signification re 
looters
RAO 2
UKR1 u'RT @bedlamfury: British Riots: Elites 
"Shocked" The Poor Are Rising Up 
Against Brutal Austerity Measures 
http://t.co/3Menem0 #UKriots #l ...'
BL PC anti austerity riots SOC, NLC 3
UKR1 u'My twopennth http://t.co/QPmcNRY 
#ukriots'
CM PO violent youth 
subculture SOC, RAO
3
UKR1 u'@MrRoyThomas My thoughts this 
morning at about 7am http://t.co/
K6rgB7b #londonriots 
#manchesterriots #ukriots'
CM PO police response 
guns needed
RES 3
UKR1 u'This blog post on #ukriots made me 
cry. Need coffee. BRB. http://t.co/
EXxfCRi'
CM PN reaction emotive 
balanced critique 
community morality
SOC 2
UKR1 u'Interesting look at the "catch a looter" 
sites going up http://t.co/zT2CIf0 
#ManchesterRiots #UKRiots'
CM PO, PC IA MC meta social media 
riot response deeper 
social issues RES
3
UKR1 u'RT @MsAfropolitan: Riot, rage and 
rebellion | MsAfropolitan http://t.co/
mXPjtsP #MsAfropolitanBlogs 
#UKRiots'
CM PC different rioters 
distinction looters 
rebellion
SOC 3
UKR1 u'http://t.co/Bfc47zi Not today bitch! 
#ukriots #looter #riotcleanup'
MM PRE signification looters 
spoof
RAO 1
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UKR1 u"hah. You honestly couldn't make this 
shit up. One of the few surviving shops 
around Langworthy. #salford #ukriots 
http://t.co/IUgOoHS"
MM PRE reaction irony? O 2
UKR1 u"RT @CarlosLatuff: #Cartoon - Who's 
to blame for the #LondonRiots? - 
#riotcleanup #UKriots http://t.co/
2WAzstK"
MM PO police lit match 
petrol cartoon 
POLICE 3
UKR1 u"RT @theboylightning: Poor Alexis 
Bailey - Should've looted Specsavers 
http://t.co/2g5b3NB #ukriots 
#londonriots"
MM PRE signification looters RAO 2
UKR1 u'David Allen Green in 
@NewStatesman: http://t.co/qiUHgCv 
#ukriots'
NM PC riots causes police 
social media meta
POLICE, RES
3
UKR1 u'RT @j_freedland: A.M. reminder: My 
Guardian column on the #ukriots and 
the wider crisis of confidence http://
t.co/TeRETQt'
GI NM PO, PC politics economics 
meta commentary
SOC, NLC
3
UKR1 u"\u201c@SkyNews: Three Men Killed 
'Protecting Community' http://t.co/
xW1NNzD\u201d hope they catch the 
bastards that did this #ukriots"
GI NM PRE reaction anger O 2
UKR1 u"@TheSunNewspaper http://t.co/
OtVJE76 - Send them to a proper war 
and see how 'badman' they are then! 
#UKriots"
GI NM PRE signification looters 
punishment
RAO 4
UKR1 u'RT @ydekersau: excellent piece on 
reasons behind #ukriots (1) - New 
Statesman http://t.co/cVmEJvW\u201d'
NM PC POL, SOC, NLC 3
UKR1 u"@WillHeaven on how Labour's 
response to the #ukriots has been 
even worse than the Tories. http://t.co/
WmwAqYd"
NM PC telegraph political 
analysis labour 
messes up gove 
harmen looting
SOC, RAO, RED 3
UKR1 u"RT @MatinaStevis: My thoughts on 
the #londonriots #ukriots from 
@commentisfree  @guardian: Don't 
deal with them like Athens did in 
2008  ..."
NM PO, PC national comparison SOC 3
UKR1 u"RT @PaulLewis: My Longer Read:  
Who are the rioters? Young men from 
poor areas... but that's not the full story 
http://t.co/SuFVjUQ #UKRiots"
GI NM PC rioter classification? 
poor areas diversity 
nuanced descriptive
SOC
3
UKR1 u'The UK riots: the psychology of 
looting - http://t.co/s2WgUT4 #ukriots'
NM PC shopping riots 
Baudrillard? 
consumption political 
still more complex 
than criminality 
looting
SOC, NLC 3
UKR1 u'V\xeddeo: Al Jazeera fala com o 
autor Alex Wheatle sobre os motins no 
Reino Unido | http://bit.ly/mP9oG9 | 
#LondonRiots #UKriots'
NM, MM PO complex social 
causes also looting 
SOC ?
UKR1 u"City's Senior Lecturer in Sociology, 
Dr Chris Greer, quoted by FRANCE 24 
http://t.co/iqd1mr0 and the FT http://
t.co/IYYzy9G on #ukriots"
NM, PR PC social causes 
complexity police 
marginalisation
SOC 2
UKR1 u'#riots #ukriots #hypocrisy at 
criminality, bankers plunder and live 
like kings. Free for all. Hell hath come. 
Poem at http://t.co/UGR9Gnq'
OM PO, PC looter politician 
comparison
POL 3
UKR1 u"RT @timminchin: Wow. Maxine 
Beneba Clarke: http://t.co/1CPYUJy 
#ukriots (PLEASE don't troll her 
comments. It's a poem, not her nor my 
op ..."
OM PO, PC race causes media 
complexity
SOC 3
UKR1 u'RT @Purelaise: Croydon rioter 
confessing on Facebook..BUSTED! 
PLEASE RT! http://t.co/7Ux8upA 
#londonriots #ukriots @metpolice 
@SeanBosco ...'
OM, MM PRE CTA MC signification looters 
punishment
RAO 2
UKR1 u"RT @BigBigBen: It's a shame they 
can't loot a school and steal some 
education. #ukriots"
PRE signification looters 
uneducated
RAO 2
UKR1 u"To all the people calling for the 
#ukriots rioters rioters to be put down 
and stuff.. shows what's wrong with the 
middle class in this c ..."
PO class commentary 
reaction severity
SOC 3
UKR1 u"@JoeNBC @Morning_Joe 
@morningmika what rioters are doing 
in #ukriots US politicians are doing in 
essence to it's citizenry!"
PRE comparaison 
situational
POL, O 2
UKR1 u"Al Jazeera are more objective in their 
covering of the #ukriots.There's not 
much difference between those odieros 
and #HakiYetu brigade"
PRE MC comment media 
commentary
MC 2
UKR1 u"RT @Penners_: I don't feel safer 
knowing that we're 24 hours away from 
having water cannons 
#lawabidingcitizenhere #ukriots"
PRE comment society 
safety
RES 2
UKR1 u'@moeafgg thanks I heard that the 
police now everything can use they 
need to restore the law and order?   
#ukriots'
PRE unknown POLICE 2
UKR1 u'#ukriots "Banks do it, mp\'s do it, 
even stupid hoody chavs do it! Lets do 
it, lets loot for free" (not) #riotcleanup'
PO looter stealing banks 
politicians
POL, RAO 2
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UKR1 u"RT @SkyNewsRoyal: #ukriots 
#londonriots after Cameron's tough 
talk, I'll be back on London's streets 
tonight to see if last night's rela ..."
GI PRE 1
UKR1 u"Rovers game off tonight?! Right 
that's it #UKriots, FUCK OFF!"
PRE reaction anger O 1
UKR1 u"#UKRiots Rioters: no one owes you 
a living. If you want that tv then earn it. 
The police have your pictures and I'm 
sending them my pics too"
PRE RAO 2
UKR1 u"the looting during the #ukriots is as 
bad as the fraudulent expense claims 
by politicians but why haven't all those 
thieves been prosecuted?"
PO looter politician 
comparison
POL 3
UKR1 u"@Leod_UK sorry mate, I don't really, 
was just feel rather annoyed by these 
idiots complaining to the BBC over the 
#ukriots tag"
DA expression regret 
annoyance
MC 1
UKR1 u'RT @Simon_Gardner: Is it just me 
that thinks "robust treatment" sounds a 
bit S&M? #ukriots #LondonRiots'
PRE making light O 1
UKR1 u'If I was david cameron I woulda 
called in SWAT team for these silly 
yoots riotin, none of dem woulda tried it 
#UKRiots'
PRE signification looters 
punishment
RAO 2
UKR1 u"How will poets & poetry publishers 
respond to this weeks national events? 
I predict a series of dead 
'retrospectives' in 3-5 yrs. #ukriots"
PRE comment O 1
UKR1 u"shitttttt RT \u201c@zarahsultana: 
Remember my fear of this turning into 
a race riot? It's happening.. 
#BirminghamRiots #UKRiots\u201d"
PRE, PO race cause 
O
2
UKR1 u"Going to bullring shopping, let's hope 
#ukriots haven't ruined it for us people 
that are just tryna get on with life!"
PN comment normality O 2
UKR1 u'Wow RT @RubyKhanom: 3 
Birmingham guys lost their lives trying 
to protect their Mosque &lt;3 R.I.P! 
#ukriots'
GI PRE shock SOL 1
UKR1 u"I'm assuming Britain doesn't have 
the prison space to house these 
criminals. So they'll recommence 
transportation, but WHERE TO? 
#ukriots"
PRE signification looters 
punishment
RAO 2
UKR1 u'Did I ever tell you the one about the 
British PM who hired a phone hacker; 
and then lectured an entire country on 
criminality? #ukriots'
PO politicians pm phone 
hacking double 
standards 
POL 3
UKR1 u"Todays plans, cancelled. Looks like 
I'm staying at home chilling while 
watching news again. -_- #great 
#ukriots"
PN none O 1
UKR1 u'#UKriots DC and his govt are quick to 
take credit for the community clean up 
- hello u r missing the point - this 
should not have happened'
PO anti cameron no 
credit for clean up 
responsibility?
O 2
UKR1 u'#riotcleanup & #ukpoliceforces 
represent all that is good about being 
British. Solidarity, commitment, 
determination #PROUD of U #ukriots'
PRE, PO ES police good society 
recommendation 
virtue
SOL
2
UKR1 u"I say '#ukriots' - Scotland doesn't 
have a Tory administration. Things 
seem pretty quiet up here so far. 
#maybenotunrelated"
PC political cause tory-
specific scotland 
POL, SOC 3
UKR1 u"RT @D12_Bernie: The #ukriots are 
getting fairly out of hand now, I couldn't 
see the olympics going a head there 
now!"
PRE comment O 1
UKR1 u"@azzanagas7 problem solved 
#UKriots don't even need the belts they 
just need to count to 3."
PRE unknown RAO 2
UKR1 u"Alexis Bailey rebelled against system 
cos he has a girl's name. Police are 
also looking for a 6ft+ chap with beard 
named Sophie #ukriots"
PRE making light O 1
UKR1 u"Just catching up on the news about 
#ukriots it's disgusting. I'm still so 
shocked."
PRE reaction disgust O 2
UKR1 u"#UKriots ? Last time I checked it was 
only 'england'"
PRE comment scope SOC 2
UKR1 u"If it continues to piss it down all day I 
wonder if it's enough to keep the 
#rioters off the streets? 
#wishfulthinking #ukriots"
PRE general query O 1
UKR1 u"Imagine how petrified parents are, 
knowing that the first suspect convicted 
today was a 31-year old teacher's 
assistant. #UKRiots"
PRE comment RAO 2
UKR1 u"RT @rachelatherton: Can't believe 
the chaos caused by boredom.....these 
kids need BMX tracks and skateparks!! 
#ukriots"
PO boredom cause? RED 3
UKR1 u"\u201c@RuwaydaMustafah: Imagine 
how petrified parents r, knowing that z 
first suspect convicted 2dy was 31-
year old teacher's assistant #UKRiots
\u201d"
PRE comment O 2
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UKR1 u'RT @dbudlov: #ukriots #londonriots 
\u200e"If the young are not initiated 
into the village, they will burn it down 
just to feel it\'s warmth."  ...'
PO metaphor exclusion 
disenfranchised
SOC 3
UKR1 u"@kidbritishmusic Definitely the worst 
bit of footage I've seen, fucking idiots! 
#ukriots #scum"
PRE signification looters RAO 2
UKR2 u'@trog56 Oh For fucks sake!  Looting 
near the Emirates! (see pic) http://t.co/
XhtNPAh #ukriots\u201d'
SI? BL PRE frustration O 1
UKR2 u'RT @daryl_photoshop: Oh For fucks 
sake!  Looting near the Emirates! (see 
pic) http://t.co/wOeRF84 #ukriots'
SI? BL PRE frustration SOL 1
UKR2 u"RT @mrscruff1: RT @genesiselijah: 
Big up for all the love I'm getting for my 
#UKRiot accapella. Watch it, & let me 
know what you think h ..."
BL PRE riot related crativity O 1
UKR2 u"One of the best pieces I've seen on 
the #ukriots by @OwenJones84 - 
http://j.mp/nALxVO"
BL
NN
4
UKR2 u'Awful scene of violence in 
Manchester during the #ukriots . Not 
for the faint of heart. http://t.co/IYp7r7y'
BL PRE reaction emotive O 2
UKR2 u'Diane Abbott-Hackney MP: "we need 
a long term plan" http://t.co/BqfK495 
#dearleaders #riotcleanup #ukriot'
CM PC society rebuilding 
factors
SOC, RES
3
UKR2 u"RT @majorityfm: BBC Doesn't Want 
to Hear the Real Reasons for the 
London Riots - VIDEO: http://on.fb.me/
o0WG66 #p2 #londonriots #ukriots"
MM PC MC austerity youth 
politics youth clubs 
US politcal left 
establishment 
insurrection
SOC, NLC, MC 3
UKR2 u"RT @majorityfm: BBC Doesn't Want 
to Hear the Real Reasons for the 
London Riots - VIDEO: http://on.fb.me/
o0WG66 #p2 #londonriots #ukriots"
MM, OM PC MC austerity youth 
politics youth clubs 
US politcal left 
establishment 
insurrection SOC, NLC, MC
3
UKR2 u"RT @majorityfm: BBC Doesn't Want 
to Hear the Real Reasons for the 
London Riots - VIDEO: http://on.fb.me/
o0WG66 #p2 #londonriots #ukriots"
MM, OM PC MC austerity youth 
politics youth clubs 
US politcal left 
establishment 
insurrection
SOC, NLC, MC 3
UKR2 u'#socialmedia #BBM being used for a 
lot more than rioting. http://t.co/
geTcJ9S #cleanup #londonriots 
#ukriots'
NM PC MC social media positive 
aspects
MC, RES
3
UKR2 u'An excellent read for both left and 
right. UK riots: political classes see 
what they want to see http://t.co/
WAbaB6v #ukriots'
GI NM PC causes politics left 
right meta 
commentary 
opportunism STS SOC
3
UKR2 u'#LondonRiots #UKRiots 
#ManchesterRiots Media Calls Brutal 
Police Beating Of Teenagers  "Rough 
Justice" http://t.co/akEas2t  (via 
@kr3at)'
NM PO, PC MC media meta 
commentary justice 
violence politics
MC, RES, POLICE
3
UKR2 u"@darshnasoni We could learn a lot 
from the Muslam and Sikh community's 
response to #ukriots http://twitpic.com/
642uif"
NM, MM PO response restraint 
muslim sikh
RES 4
UKR2 u"RT @nairamk: Delighted - Britain's 
youngest looter is dragged to court by 
his mum  http://t.co/6W1ZxPV #ukriots 
#londonriots"
GI NM, OM PRE reaction delight 
looter punished
RAO 2
UKR2 u'RT @4Papiertiger: "Hartes 
Jugendstrafrecht mit wenig Wirkung" 
krank: in GB ab 10 (!) strafm\xfcndig; in 
Schottland ab 8 Jahren #ukriots htt ...'
OM PO ?
UKR2 u"I've a bad feeling that these flash 
mob smash and grabs will become a 
permanent feature of our future. Power 
in numbers. #ukriots"
PRE comment O 1
UKR2 u"Just watched the mum of one of the 
looters blaming everyone but her and 
her son... that's the problem, right 
there. #ukriots"
PRE, PO personal 
responsibility not 
taken
RAO, RED
3
UKR2 u"The TARDIS can't burn, right? 
#ukriots"
PRE aside O 1
UKR2 u"On Thurs I'll be live outside UK 
Parliament for emergency statements 
from Cameron on #ukriots and 
Osborne on global economic woes"
PN none O 1
UKR2 u"@andrewwain who knows!! I'm 
guessing no police in the local towns 
tonight so crime rates in villages will be 
up! #ukriots"
PRE comment RES 2
UKR2 u"RT @Haslemerian: Don't think 
#DianeAbbott saw the #newsnight 
graphic that only 8% of uk pop think 
cuts to blame for #ukriots. Trying to  ..."
GI PRE comment SOC 3
UKR2 u'The fact that #londonriots are nw 
being called #ukriots is a disgrace its 
now reached scottland What do these 
people think they r achieving?'
PRE MC reaction anger O 2
UKR3 u'RT @guardian_world: Powerful 
reporting + video on aftermath of 
#ukriots: emotions run high at vigil for 3 
men killed in unrest http://t. ...'
GI BL PO response restraint 
vigil mourning
O 2
UKR3 u'Excellent commentary on the 
#UKRiots: "People with a job, a home 
and a future don\'t riot." ---&gt; http://
bit.ly/nOfDjT'
BL PO, PC social economic 
causes
SOC 4
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UKR3 u"RT @Angel_Infidoll: This comment is 
instigating an a untruth CFX(Combined 
EX forces) is NOT EDL that's a FACT 
#Birmingham  #UKriots http ..."
BL PRE declarative 
statement
O 3
UKR3 u'Serious Tweet Alert: The #UKRiots 
now beg the question, are we past civil 
disobedience? Does voice require 
violence? http://t.co/WP8RCQQ'
BL PC riots protest SOC 2
UKR3 u'Ugh RT @Sandmonkey RT 
@heyessa: Cameron says UK might 
limit #socialmedia use because it has 
spread the disorder http://t.co/faz3JbN 
#UKriots'
GI BL PR ES MC reaction social 
media
MC 4
UKR3 u"These weren't #ukriots - Wales and 
Scotland were unscathed. @sowadally 
asks why... http://bit.ly/otiQSn"
BL PO scotland wales 
comparison 
SOC
3
UKR3 u"Labour's Riots Blame Game Turns 
Toxic - http://t.co/G1qboHM #riots 
#ukriots"
BL PO labour response 
politics
RES
3
UKR3 u"An open letter to David Cameron's 
parents: http://t.co/hZbjzJl #ukriots &lt;  
the REAL moral lapse is 
DEMOCRACY, the evil religion of 
Tapley"
CM PO, PC looter politician 
comparison
SOC, POL
4
UKR3 u'RT @PoliceStateUK: Morons, Riots 
and Amnesia http://s.coop/3mcs 
#LondonRiots #UKriots'
CM PC policing state 
repression politics 
SOC
3
UKR3 u'My view on the aftermath of the 
England riots available on my blog - 
http://t.co/RgTI5fc Just a sign of things 
to come? #ukriots'
CM PO, PC government cultural 
let down looting 
balance
SOC
3
UKR3 u"Open Letter to David Cameron's 
Parents http://t.co/bI9wGgM #ukriots 
#londonriots #ealing #hackney 
#croydon"
CM PO, PC looter politician 
comparison
SOC, POL
3
UKR3 u'Really good stuff &gt; RT 
@davidhiggerson: Riots in the UK: 
Front pages from the regions: http://
t.co/6CCdpiR #ukriots'
GI CM, NM MC
NN
2
UKR3 u"RT @guardian: Full text of 
Cameron's speech on #ukriots 
#londonriots now up on No 10 website 
http://bit.ly/nhmzdk"
GI GM PC cameron criminality 
violence vandalising 
law order no 
justifiable causal link RAO, RED
2
UKR3 u"RT @thekarachikid: RT @guardian: 
Full text of Cameron's speech on 
#ukriots #londonriots now up on No 10 
website http://bit.ly/nhmzdk"
GI GM PC cameron criminality 
violence vandalising 
law order no 
justifiable causal link RAO, RED
2
UKR3 u'http://t.co/4GzJ5ak #liverpoolriots 
#ukriots #manchesterriots THIS IS 
EXACTLY RIGHT!!!'
MM PRE, PC police brutality SOC, NLC 4
UKR3 u"RT @PaulLewis: In the five days I've 
been covering #ukriots, nothing has 
been so moving as seeing this: http://
t.co/D9Ga2Ht #birmingham"
GI NM PO response restraint 
vigil mourning
SOL 2
UKR3 u'Muslim and Sikh men succeeding 
where government failed: protecting 
their streets in peace: http://t.co/
D9Ga2Ht #ukriots (via @PaulLewis)'
GI NM PO response restraint 
muslim sikh
RES 2
UKR3 u"Full text of Cameron's speech on 
#ukriots #londonriots now up on No 10 
website http://bit.ly/nhmzdk via 
@guardian"
GI NM PC cameron criminality 
violence vandalising 
law order no 
justifiable causal link RAO, RED
2
UKR3 u"RT @PaulLewis: In the five days I've 
been covering #ukriots, nothing has 
been so moving as seeing this: http://
t.co/D9Ga2Ht #birmingham"
GI NM PO response restraint 
vigil mourning
SOL 2
UKR3 u'Please read. \u201c@PaulLewis: 
Muslim and Sikh men succeeding 
where govt failed: protecting their 
streets in peace: http://t.co/s6FUIjA 
#ukriots\u201d'
GI NM PC social commentary 
wealth class riots 
causes complexity
SOC
3
UKR3 u'RT @PaulLewis: Muslim and Sikh 
men succeeding where the 
government failed: protecting their 
streets in peace: http://t.co/D9Ga2Ht 
#ukriots'
GI NM PC analysis reaction 
asian muslim 
restraint 
RES
3
UKR3 u'RT"@PaulLewis: Muslim and Sikh 
men succeeding where the 
government failed: protecting their 
streets in peace: http://t.co/D9Ga2Ht 
#ukriots"'
GI NM PC analysis reaction 
asian muslim 
restraint 
RES 3
UKR3 u"RT @PaulLewis: In the five days I've 
been covering #ukriots, nothing has 
been so moving as seeing this: http:/
\u2026 (cont) http://deck.ly/~uvelq"
GI NM PO response restraint 
vigil mourning
SOL 2
UKR3 u'RT @PaulLewis: First arrests of 
people using Twitter and BBM for 
inciting riots http://t.co/4Kq6LCm 
#ukriots'
GI NM PC MC summary news 
opinions live blog
MC, SOC
2
UKR3 u"RT @PaulLewis: In the five days I've 
been covering #ukriots, nothing has 
been so moving as seeing this: http://
t.co/D9Ga2Ht #birmingham"
GI NM PO response restraint 
vigil mourning
SOL 2
UKR3 u'RT @PaulLewis: Muslim and Sikh 
men succeeding where the 
government failed: protecting their 
streets in peace: http://t.co/D9Ga2Ht 
#ukriots'
GI NM PO analysis reaction 
asian muslim 
restraint 
RES 3
Content Coding Thematic coding
Text Information Media sharing Adjunctive Discussion Help & Support Meta SPAM/Other Notes Code Deliberative CodeHashtag Code
 20
UKR3 u'http://t.co/NdBnLMO police fury at 
sentences #ukriots what kind of 
example is this. throw key away imo'
GI NM PRE reaction signification 
police prisons\
RAO 4
UKR3 u"RT @guardian: Full text of 
Cameron's speech on #ukriots 
#londonriots now up on No 10 website 
http://bit.ly/nhmzdk"
GI NM PC cameron criminality 
violence vandalising 
law order no 
justifiable causal link RAO, RED
2
UKR3 u'Tariq Jahan has been the outstanding 
hero of the #ukriots. Amazing wisdom 
and maturity in the very worst of 
situations http://t.co/i2qmjGZ.'
GI NM PO restraint response 
peace humility 
birmingham
SOL
3
UKR3 u"Anyone who says #UKriots couldn't 
or wouldn't happen in Australia - cop 
this: they already did, over Easternats 
http://t.co/foGuZH1"
NM PC national comparison SOC 3
UKR3 u'Somebody can read the future. Last 
week in the guardian. #ukriots http://
t.co/kyWlFHP'
GI NM PO youth cuts social 
story pre riots there 
will be riots SOC
3
UKR3 u'\u201c@guardian:David Cameron 
considers banning rioters from social 
media http://t.co/cJYLj77 #riots 
#londonriots #ukriots\u201d The man 
is an idiot'
NM PRE, PO MC social media meta 
commentary
MC, RES 3
UKR3 u'The best of british-Muslim & Sikh 
men succeeding where the govmt 
failed: protecting their streets in peace: 
http://t.co/WXlIdhE #ukriots'
GI NM PO response restraint 
vigil mourning
RES
3
UKR3 u"must watch RT @PaulLewis: In the 
five days I've been covering #ukriots, 
nothing so moving as seeing this: 
http://gu.com/p/3x67c/tw"
GI NM PO response restraint 
vigil mourning
SOL 2
UKR3 u"RT @Dr_Tad: What did Nick Clegg 
expect? He has an arson conviction & 
gets to be deputy PM. Why can't 
rioters? http://bbc.in/oeCaUM #ukriots"
GI NM PO politicians rioter 
comparison
POL
4
UKR3 u'ALL weekend Premier League games 
are OFF, statement here http://t.co/
9ci2pfk #EPL #ukriots'
GI OM PR 2
UKR3 u"Desperate times requires desperate 
measures. It's high time the system in 
the UK is changed or better still Re-
Branded. #UKriots"
PO re brand uk? RES 2
UKR3 u'RT @ANCALERTS: "A year away 
from the Olympics, we need to show 
the world the Britain that doesn\'t 
destroy, but builds." #UKriots | via 
@ ...'
PO britain culture? not 
destroy but build
RES 2
UKR3 u"Peter Tapsell: Shouldn't we be 
learning from Richard Nixon? 
#UKRiots"
PO national comparison 
nixon lessons
RES 2
UKR3 u'RT @itv_news: RT @simonharrisitv: 
PM: "When you have deep moral 
failures you don\'t hit them with a wall 
of money." #ukriots'
PRE signification deep 
moral failure
RES 2
UKR3 u'"@Anti_s_media: Backbench Tory: 
Don\'t disperse them, round them up 
using army and put them in Wembly 
Stadium  #ukriots " Is this real life?'
PRE political comment RES, POL 3
UKR3 u'@PaulLewis i wonder if that was the 
same excuse used by Mubarak when 
they locked up loads of bloggers and 
tweeters #UKRiots'
PO social meta politics 
repression Muburak
MC, RES 3
UKR3 u"Wht cameroon declare war against 
social media? Don't blame technology 
for your weakness!!! #londonriot 
#ukriot"
PRE MC comment 
technology cameron 
MC, POL 3
UKR3 u"Nadine Dorries just said that if a riot 
broke out in Australia they'd have water 
cannon and tear gas.\n\nShe's wrong. 
#ukriots"
GI PO national comparison 
state response
RES 3
UKR3 u"#UKriots disgusted that the KGB 
bookshop gays the word was attacked! 
What's the need for that? Selfish 
bullies"
GI PRE reaction disgust RAO 2
UKR3 u"Hahaha! RT @darrenbyfield: We 
always blame the uk's weather,but it 
came in good use last night,cuz it kept 
the rats indoors #ukriots"
PRE signification looters 
(rats)
O 1
UKR3 u'@metpoliceuk While ur figuring out 
why u lied about #Duggan, we also 
want 2 know how Sean Hoare died. 
Remember him? #ukriots #notw 
@bbcnews'
DA IA comment question to 
state power
POLICE 2
UKR3 u'Early shout for Christmas Number 1: 
Cameron, Osbourne and Boris with 
their cover of "We didn\'t start the fire." 
#UKRiots'
PRE making light O 1
UKR3 u'"Part of the problem is absent 
fathers"Cameron is talkin rubbish! I 
know plenty of children without dads 
but they dont loot shops! #UKriots'
PO families absent 
fathers not cause 
cameron talking 
rubbish SOC
3
UKR3 u"Let me get this straight: We now 
support those who use social media to 
incite violence and looting?! I didn't get 
the memo. #UKriots"
PRE MC comment media 
commentary
MC 2
UKR3 u'RT @jeffjarvis: I hear an MP in 
essence asking for social media to be 
regulated. Danger, friends, danger. 
#ukriots'
PO MC social media opinion
MC
3
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UKR3 u"\u201c@AJELive: Cameron: What 
matters is to get the most out of the 
budget that is already there. #UKriots
\u201d//That's lame. 
#squeezebloodoutastone?"
GI PO politics budget 
causes?
POL 4
UKR3 u'Cameron says that police were taken 
by surprise by these #ukriots. I think 
that we were all taken a little by 
surprise.'
GI PRE comment surprise O 2
UKR3 u'RT @jeffjarvis: I hear an MP in 
essence asking for social media to be 
regulated. Danger, friends, danger. 
#ukriots'
PO MC social media 
regulation opinion
MC 3
UKR3 u'#UKriots #londonriots constant talk 
about "stealing and looting" from UK 
MP\'s in parliament, backed up by the 
bankers who never stole..'
PO looter stealing banks 
politicians
POL 3
UKR3 u"Will any MP mention the IPCC & 
most people's belief it is not 
independent from Met? #londonriots 
#ukriots #Cameron"
PC police complaints 
duggan causes?
POLICE 3
UKR3 u"RT @a_y_alex: Please don't hashtag 
the #ukriots as the #englandriots. The 
Scots are smug enough as it is. &lt;= 
**SMUG** Ya bass!"
PRE comparaison 
situational
O 1
UKR3 u"I've got an idea. I shall call it 
prohibition. Sure fire winner. #pmqs 
#UKRiots"
PRE comment society RES 3
UKR3 u"Blood still pumping from #ukriots raid 
on 'Aunty Val's Home Kitchen' in 
Kyogle. The recycled bathroom-tile 
skillet is a cracker."
PRE making light O 1
UKR3 u'RT @jeffjarvis: I hear an MP in 
essence asking for social media to be 
regulated. Danger, friends, danger. 
#ukriots'
PO MC social media opinion
MC
3
UKR3 u"RT @jonworth: Oh Cameron, 
Blackberry Messenger might be 
closed, but it's not hard to make or use 
similar systems. Hopeless. #UKriots"
PO MC social media meta 
commentary
MC
3
UKR3 u'RT @Konnolsky: #UKRiots PM: 
"Police must close down Twitter, 
Blackberry Messenger, Bell\'s 
Telephonic Engine, Smoke Signalling 
to allow t ...'
PRE MC comment media MC 2
UKR3 u'RT @Konnolsky: #UKRiots PM: 
"Police must close down Twitter, 
Blackberry Messenger, Bell\'s 
Telephonic Engine, Smoke Signalling 
to allow t ...'
PRE MC comment media MC 2
UKR3 u"\u201c@De_Risky: Whats all this 
obsession with Luton shops? I've been 
there. They're rubbish......#ukriots
\u201d work there they are rubbish :)"
PRE situational comment O 1
UKR3 u'@antwoabboud Sadly, ongoing social 
problems are rarely considered in "law 
and order" policy. It\'s all about the 
short term fixes. #ukriots'
PO justice response law 
order short term 
fixes
SOC, RES 3
UKR3 u"Why don't the rioters steal and 
plunder legally,and become a MP ? 
#ukriots"
PRE, PO looter politician 
comparison
POL
3
UKR3 u'i see tapsell and blears are trending, 
at least nation hasnt lost its sense of 
humour #ukriots #riots'
PRE MC comment media 
commentary
MC 2
UKR3 u'RT @Jabblue: i see tapsell and 
blears are trending, at least nation 
hasnt lost its sense of humour #ukriots 
#riots'
PRE MC comment media 
commentary
MC 2
UKR3 u"RT @adam_j666: I think the MPs' 
facile, unthinking, and ill-informed 
response to the #ukriots is more 
depressing than the riots themselv ..."
PO politics meta 
commentary facile 
response
RES 3
UKR3 u'How many of us are old enough to 
remember the "Middle Class" in the 
70\'s seeking petrol? Just as bad as 
the #ukriots same people.'
PO comparison middle 
class petrol 1970s
SOC 3
UKR3 u"Violence won't end anyone's 
disenfranchisement, it only gives the 
powers that be an excuse to ignore & 
not resolve legit grievances #ukriots"
PO violence undermines 
legitimate 
grievances 
SOC
3
UKR3 u'RT @jeffjarvis: I hear an MP in 
essence asking for social media to be 
regulated. Danger, friends, danger. 
#ukriots'
PO MC social media 
regulation opinion
MC 3
UKR3 u'RT @jeffjarvis: I hear an MP in 
essence asking for social media to be 
regulated. Danger, friends, danger. 
#ukriots'
PO MC social media opinion
MC
3
UKR3 u"Now whatever the reason is,I do not 
believe that person's sanity is wholly 
eradicated when there is no male 
guardian or supervision.#UKriots"
PO family single parents 
not cause opinion
SOC 2
UKR3 u"RT @copwatcher: So the state's 
message is: blame everyone but the 
powerful. At last, we're nearly all in this 
together :( #UKriots"
PO, PC state response 
blame?
SOC, POL
3
UKR3 u'RT @jeffjarvis: I hear an MP in 
essence asking for social media to be 
regulated. Danger, friends, danger. 
#ukriots'
PO MC social media opinion
MC
3
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UKR3 u"Let's nominate Tariq Jahan as 
Olympic torch bearer - Show him we 
wont forget him. #UKRiots"
PO ES, CTA tariq jahan valued
SOL
2
UKR4 u'RT @GeorgeMonbiot: The revolting, 
two-faced racist who started the 
Facebook initiative Cameron praised: 
http://t.co/93pEwY9 #ukriots'
BL PRE signification re looter 
response
RES, POL 3
UKR4 u'RT @JonathanHaynes: oh wow, 
#bbcqt #ukriots drinking game(!) RT 
@HazelPaterson: This is a good 
starting point: http://t.co/YeSLV31'
BL PRE riot levity drinking 
game
O 1
UKR4 u'@_ThomasAnderson Attention: 
Capital in chaos!! #ukriots 
#manchesterriots http://t.co/q3a1Teu'
BL PRE unknown 
excitement?
O 2
UKR4 u"UK politicians looters too? They just 
do it subtly: An Open Letter to David 
Cameron's Parents: http://t.co/
DFs6ZCn #londonriots #ukriots"
CM PO, PC looter politician 
comparison
SOC, POL 3
UKR4 u'Just got a chance to read this: http://
t.co/GUUDqWy - An excellent analysis 
of the #ukriots that deserves attention.'
CM PC causes politics left 
right meta 
commentary 
opportunism STS SOC
3
UKR4 u'RT @Energisch_: A MUST read: 
open letter to #Cameron http://t.co/
M0pth5Z #ukriot'
CM PO, PC looter politician 
comparison
POL, SOC 3
UKR4 u'Is social media-fuelled uprising the 
worst case scenario? Elements for a 
#sociology of #UKriots http://t.co/
53wf1RX @bodyspacesoc 
#movements'
CM, OM PC MC media critique 
sociological analysis 
civil violence model
MC, SOC 3
UKR4 u"These young people have no sense 
of community because they haven't 
been given one. Russell Brand http://
t.co/NpUEAdI #ukriots #londonriots"
GI NM PO community focus 
disenfranchisement 
explanations
SOC
3
UKR4 u"By watching one arrest on tv doesn't 
make us feel better, it only reminds us 
the bill is no longer on tv. #UKriots"
PRE reflection O 1
UKR4 u"Can't see Mr M Glazer, Mr J Glazer, 
or Mr A Glazer of Tampa, FL on 
@gmpolice #ukriots #luhg 
#notevenunitedfan"
PRE comment aside O 1
UKR4 u"Who taught these kids to rob? 
Bankers and British MPs, that's who. 
Don't forget the expenses scandal. 
Britain is run by thieves. #ukriots"
PRE, PO looter stealing banks 
politicians
POL 4
UKR4 u"#charliegilmour 16 months. Recent 
rioters , to date , 10 weeks,16 weeks & 
6 months. THAT'S NOT GETTING 
TOUGH. #bbcqt #ukriots #uk .."
GI PRE signification looters 
punishment
RAO 3
UKR4 u'Bored of hearing about social media 
playing a part in #ukriots. I want to 
hear about how these tossers are 
going to be caught & banged up'
PRE MC comment social 
media rioter 
punishment 
MC, RAO 2
UKR4 u"KidsCo Camila making interesting 
point about use of war language by 
politicians. Reminds me Bush's war on 
terror rhetoric #bbcqt #UKRiots"
PO language rhetoric 
politicians violence
SOC
4
UKR4 u"RT @thewritertype: Can't decide 
whether to tweet vengeful diatribe, 
simplistic panacea, nuanced analysis 
or feeble pun about lutes. #UKRiots"
PRE, PO MC social media meta 
commentary
MC
3
UKR4 u"#BBC coverage of #ukriots taking 
several leaves out of Jeremy Kyle's 
book."
PRE MC comment media 
commentary
MC 2
UKR4 u"I'm not taking sides with the rioters, 
just saying i dont think its all as clean 
cut as it sounds. #UKRiots"
PRE comment SOC 2
UKR4 u"With Scotland Yard charging less 
than 50% of all those arrested #ukriots 
I'd love to know how @gmpolice fares 
as I bet theirs is much higher"
PRE comment 
punishment
POLICE 2
UKR4 u"RT @kanaafa: it's fine for banksters 
to loot an economy (many economies) 
and send millions to old age with 
worthless pensions #UKRiots"
PO bankers looting 
economy 
comparison
POL 3
UKR4 u'they better not block twitter. i will flip 
omg. #ukriots'
PRE MC emotive social media 
comment
MC 1
UKR4 u'"Riots were best protest ever" moron 
on #bbcnews re #ukriots. What proves 
is they got some free stuff & don\'t 
understand the word "protest"'
PO not protest but 
looting
RAO, RED
3
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